



Yours most sincerely  
Robert Jackson




A VIEW  
OF THE  
FORMATION DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY  
OF  
ARMIES.)

XXXV, 425

BY THE LATE  
ROBERT JACKSON, M.D.,  
INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF  
ARMY-HOSPITALS.

THE THIRD EDITION, REVISED,  
WITH A  
MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE AND SERVICES,  
DRAWN UP FROM HIS OWN PAPERS, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS




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## ADVERTISEMENT TO THE PRESENT EDITION.

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IN putting forth the present Edition of *The View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies*, by Dr. ROBERT JACKSON, the Publishers derive much satisfaction from the assurance, that they are rescuing from comparative neglect, a work which possesses solid claims upon public consideration. Of the first and second editions very limited impressions only were printed, in the quarto size, and at a provincial press; the work therefore, with all its merits, remains comparatively unknown. Hence the necessity for its republication, to which the Publishers are encouraged by the fact stated in their original announcement, that it has been pronounced to be the most noble tribute to the profession of arms in general, and to the military character of the British Army in particular, to be found in our own or any other language.

An original Biographical Memoir is prefixed to the present edition. Immediately after the death of Dr. Jackson, Sir James M'Grigor, Director-General of the Army Medical Department, wrote to Dr. Borland, Inspector-General of Army Hospitals, as the most intimate friend of the deceased, urging him to prepare a biographical sketch of him they both so much regarded and esteemed, to be read at the anniversary of the Medical Department. This though having only a day or two for its execution, Dr. Borland performed, giving a comprehensive account of his friend's career, but owing to the shortness of time, a less succinct one than he could have desired. This was followed by an ably drawn up, and somewhat more extended sketch, by Dr. Thomas Barnes, (who attended Dr. Jackson on his death-bed,) which was published in the *Transactions of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association*, both having reference principally to his professional services, and giving no details of his early adventures and travels.

Shortly before his death, Dr. Jackson had transmitted to the late Dr. Shortt, of Edinburgh, for a somewhat similar purpose as our own, various documents and papers, which after the death of the latter could not be traced for some time. When



this republication was undertaken, it was supposed indeed that they were lost. This circumstance deprived the family of the means to aid in the preparation of a more detailed Memoir, though Mrs. Jackson, and her amiable relative Miss Tidy, contributed all the items of information in their power, and that the protracted ill health and advancing years of the estimable widow of our distinguished author would admit of. Dr. Borland, on being applied to as our main stay in the contingency, responded to the call with a prompt, cordial, and liberal kindness, that the Publishers have much gratification in thus acknowledging. The intimate friend of Dr. Jackson, and feelingly solicitous for the honour of his memory, Dr. Borland transmitted, in aid of the biographer's task, copious notes of Dr. Jackson's career and views; the portions of which that detail his solitary wanderings, being literal transcripts of the Author's recorded impressions, of what he saw and felt, narrated in his own truthful and racy way, give a great portion of the Memoir much of autobiographical interest.

After the Memoir had been a considerable way proceeded with, a parcel was received from Sir George Ballingall, with a note, stating that his friend, Mr. Harris, of Edinburgh, had discovered in Dr. Shortt's premises, among old books and lumber, a packet of papers. This on examination turned out to be a portion of Dr. Jackson's papers, which along with several memorandum-books of travels in his own hand-writing were forwarded to London by Sir George Ballingall, who thus succeeded happily in rescuing them from destruction; and they have been made use of to the extent that the limits prescribed for the task in view permitted. The result of the whole is now submitted with respectful diffidence, as the most complete Memoir that has yet appeared of the distinguished Author of this work.

It is only necessary to add, that the notes which Dr. Jackson introduced in the original Greek, have been translated for this Edition.

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Portrait of Dr. Jackson, to face the Title-Page.

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# THE LIFE

## OF

### ROBERT JACKSON, M.D.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF ARMY-HOSPITALS.

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THERE is no walk of life in which the struggle with difficulties is so sure to be hard, or the array of circumstances to be disheartening, as in the profession of medicine. To succeed in this most arduous of all professions, requires qualities of a high order, and above all, an enduring fund of benevolence, with a spirit of fortitude that no antagonism should embarrass, or any perils subdue. This is especially the case as respects the army-surgeon, uniting in himself also, as he does, the office of the physician; for the army-surgeon and physician are essentially one and indivisible. In other walks of life there are brilliant rewards, universally acknowledged to be such, and open to all. In these are found certain and imposing incentives to ambition, that strew as it were the professional path with the flowers of popular applause, and aristocratic sympathies. Leanings from the higher circles of society towards the medical profession, however, in any of its branches, there can be none, for its preliminary courses require an ordeal of humbling discipline and peculiar moral training, not called for in preparing for the church, the bar, or the counting-house. The profession is recruited from the middle classes, never from the higher. Consequently, affording no provision for aspirants, save through the channel of laborious and unremitting exertion, and personal offices of a disagreeable or painful kind in the thorny track of scientific research, including harrowing details of suffering and misery; the children of the aristocracy are never found in its ranks. Even younger sons shun it; and thus wanting the fulcrum of patronage, while it has no direct bearing on property, it has



altogether fallen into the rear of the other professions. It is well understood on all hands, that no institution or class, in this country, can take a leading or influential position in the body politic, that has not a fulcrum of property. The other professions have an *esprit de corps*, and a common centre of union, which the medical, as representing nothing tangible, wants. These secure privileges and immunities to their members that give them consequence in the opinion of the world; and guarantee an assured fair proportion of rank, honour, and distinction, ratified by expectation and custom. In everything relating to the medical man in his military and civil capacity, it is necessary to bear all this candidly in mind; for the history of all medical men, even of those who have risen to most eminence, confirms the truth of what is here stated from no narrow view or small amount of experience; and of none more than the author of the extraordinary work now for the first time, properly speaking, placed before the public.

ROBERT JACKSON was born in a respectable but far from affluent sphere of life. He was the son of a small landed proprietor, or farmer, of Stone Byers, Lanarkshire, not far from the falls of the Clyde, where he was born in 1750. The limited circumstances of his parents rendered it necessary for him early to be inured to the drawbacks and negations of the humbler walks of middle life, such as we usually find them in a provincial corner. We may conclude his home, as is generally the case with persons of his father's estimable class, to have been a sanctuary of domestic order, goodness, and emulative kindness; and judging from the son, we may infer that his parents by their own example furnished their offspring with the surest incentives to good conduct. Such a home becomes the best practical school for training the ductile mind; and the education of the moral sense thus grounded in the tenderest years, becomes a strong rivet of principle in conduct through the devious intricacies of life's pilgrimage. To young Jackson then, what are usually deemed disadvantages, served but to brace his powers for more vigorous action; for it may reasonably be questioned, whether circumstances that might have depressed beyond recoil a less energetic temperament, did not augment his mental strength and elasticity. So far as our information goes, he early distinguished himself by his literary attainments; for though born

to no patrimony, his parents bestowed upon him the best of all heritage, next to a healthy constitution, a good and solid education. In the northern part of the empire, the facilities of education, or in other words, the placing of moral armour within the reach of all, are undoubtedly greater than they are elsewhere; a fact that may weigh something in the scale, against its want of wealth.

Young Jackson received his early education at the barony school of Wandon. He was afterwards placed at Crawford, one of the wildest parishes in what are called the South Highlands, under Mr. Thomas Wilson, a teacher of reputation in those parts; and eventually apprenticed to Mr. William Baillie, a surgeon of some eminence. Lanarkshire has some interesting local traditions and associations, which were not lost on an ardent mind that had a congenial turn for the adventurous and the poetical. Sir William Wallace's first exploit was to expel the 'Southrons' from the town of Lanark; and throughout the terrible struggle for Scottish independence, Lanarkshire was the theatre of much military adventure and suffering. 'Blind Harry' is energetic on a sanguinary action that took place near Biggar between the hero above mentioned and the invaders. The upper division of Lanarkshire is very mountainous, there being a great deal of moorland. The country is watered and beautified by the Clyde throughout, and possesses a pleasing variety of landscape for the admirer of nature. The philosophical enquirer will not consider these points as irrelevant, in regard to the impressions produced on a plastic mind singularly retentive of phenomena that address the reflective faculties, and the sentiments likely to be cherished by scenery and legends appealing to martial and patriotic feelings.

After an apprenticeship of three years at Biggar, he proceeded, in the year 1768, to Edinburgh, to pursue his professional studies at the university. The northern capital in those days could boast of a very brilliant society as respected learning, science, and the arts. The university was adorned by teachers of distinguished or rising reputation, the Munros, the Cullens, the Blacks, that conferred such a just celebrity upon it throughout Europe. Edinburgh was at the same time obnoxious to an unenviable notoriety of a less laudable kind; dissipation and intemperance were regarded more as fashionable accomplish-

ments than vices ; to resist which was deemed rather a species of effeminacy than virtue. Add to this, was a disputative turn, or a love for conversational gladiatorship, which still clings to the Modern Athens a little too much, though the former head of reproach no longer exists. Happily his disposition, no less than his circumstances, placed young Jackson beyond the deteriorating influence of either. He continued through life a man of regular and temperate habits ; while his natural modesty, and philosophical depth, preserved him from being a forward or pragmatical one.

The capacity to observe and to acquire varies as much as the character of the human countenance. The progress of some is slow and painful over the intellectual landscape, while others climb its heights, and traverse its defiles in a comparatively short space of time, with a sure foot, an eagle eye, and a volent spirit. Of the latter class was the subject of our memoir, who, though his academic course was but a meagre one as compared with that of many, and what colleges now demand as the standard that entitles to examination ; yet satisfactorily demonstrated, that he not only made good use of his time as a student, but acquired habits of observation and analysis that distinguished him through life. Circumstances very early in his career obliged him to learn the *practice* of his profession, while others his colleagues had not made themselves conversant even with its theory. This was one of the effects of the *res angusta domi*. It prevented his remaining continuously at the university. The winter sessions over, the summer brought no relaxation to him, nor a lighter course of attendance on lectures open during that season. It was even necessary for him somehow to recruit his resources. There was one refuge for the aspiring student. It was not a very inviting one, but still it was for the time a provision. He accordingly engaged himself to perform the medical duties on board a Greenland whaler. Here then

Far in the horrid realms of winter, where  
Th' establish'd ocean heaps a monstrous waste  
Of shining rocks and mountains to the pole,

we behold him in his crib of a cabin, with his few books, his only solace in those stern solitudes. Here it was that, properly speaking, it might be said he first learned to think. The scene, strange and wild as it was, nevertheless had its charms for him.



It had a congenial grandeur that affected his imagination. He could not but reflect upon the dauntless spirit of enterprise that led man to make the very monsters of the deep subservient to the ends of civilization, and to seek the wages of hardy industry in the icy billows of the Polar Sea. He beheld an entirely new scene, and new actors; and the whole was fraught with lessons of daring, and virtuous toil, not to be lost upon a mind like his. It was science that guided that vessel to the solitary bight where she stood at anchor, and it was perfect discipline that enabled her brave crew, under the command of her skipper in the boats, to pursue their sea-hunt with safety and profit. Each had his allotted place and duty, and the result of their united exertions was success, and the gaiety of heart that is its reward. He too had his part to play. To him, in the event of maim, injury, or illness, were all to look up; nor was the responsibility on his young but ardent mind without its gravity and its dignity. Here then it was that he earned the means for pursuing his future professional studies, digested the topics of the past winter's course, and kept up his acquaintance with the glorious creations of antiquity, as revealed in the best works of Grecian and Roman authors, in their original languages. With purse and mind thus recruited, he returned to Edinburgh, and continued his attendance on the winter classes. When summer came, he repeated his Greenland voyage, so as to enable him to attend a third winter's sessions at the university, which thus in a manner claims to be his alma mater, though he was destined to attain the 'summi honores medicinæ' elsewhere. Another voyage now awaited him, and of a more genial character perhaps than that to Greenland. A passage to the West Indies in those days was deemed a greater matter than it is now; and the yellow fever loomed as it were in advance of such a voyage, like some mystic and horrid phantom, to which its reputed contagion lent a more ghastly hue of death. To young Jackson, however, it mattered not where he went, provided that honour and independence, as the cynosure of his being, could be kept steadily in sight on the eventful voyage of life.

He embarked as a passenger to Jamaica, in a vessel commanded by Captain Cunningham, who had been master of a transport at the siege of Havannah. That man's conversation must be barren indeed from which something may not be learned.

Young Jackson probably picked up some hints in regard to the conveyance of troops and stores. It is certain that from him he learned the first suggestion of a most important remedial agent, namely, the use of cold bathing in fevers. The first arrival of every man in a tropical region is an important event. Nature there is to be seen in her most splendid garb; and the sunny air, the luxuriant vegetation, and the picturesque landscape, form a beautiful panorama that charms the senses. What a contrast between the sterile ruggedness of Greenland and the palmy loveliness of Jamaica! Here, however, his moral perceptions were shocked by the anomalies of the slave system, which he could not reconcile to equity or reason. At Jamaica, in 1774, he became assistant to Dr. King, a highly respectable general practitioner at Savanna-la-mar, whose field of practice not only included that busy sea-port town itself, but a circle of eight or ten miles besides. He had also medical charge of a detachment of the first battalion of his majesty's 60th regiment of foot, which he made over entirely to young Jackson, (now in his twenty-fourth year); a circumstance that sufficiently stamps the opinion formed by Dr. King of his qualifications, and character for steadiness of conduct. He visited the barracks daily three or four times, to detect incipient disease. He remained in the West Indies about four years, assiduously laying up stores of information and observation that contributed to future eminence. On the whole, however, it could not be said that he was happy at Jamaica. The scene was much too limited and monotonous for one of his adventurous and enquiring turn of mind. The more he considered the matter of man's claiming man as property, and as goods and chattels, to be bought and sold at pleasure, the more revolting it seemed to his mind. Slavery too demoralizes in a variety of ways; and this must have been painfully perceptible to his pure and just spirit. He yearned to quit the place. The feeling grew upon him, till it became necessary to obey the impulse. It was providential that he did so; for had he remained at Jamaica he must, in all human probability, have fallen a sacrifice to a terrible cataclysm that visited Savanna-la-mar, in a manner as sudden as extraordinary. On the 3rd October, 1780, about one o'clock in the afternoon, a gale began to blow from the S.E. It became a hurricane as the day advanced; and while the unhappy inhabitants were assembled

on the beach, gazing with astonishment at an astounding swell and rising of the waves, which elevated themselves to an extraordinary height; instantaneously the sea burst all bounds, and overwhelmed the town and inhabitants. It rushed half a mile or more beyond the oldest high water-mark, casting vessels of burthen far up among the marshes. About three hundred human beings, of all classes, perished by this irruption of the sea, storm, and earthquake; among whom were poor Dr. King and his whole family, consisting of his wife, three children, his partner in business, &c.

But to return to our subject; Great Britain at that time was engaged in the lamentable war with her American colonies, which, commenced in injustice, and prosecuted with neither statesman-like forecast, nor military ability, terminated in mortification, and immense loss in blood and treasure. There was then frequent communication with the American sea-ports occupied by the British army. Tired of his position at Jamaica, and naturally enterprising, young Jackson resolved to avail himself of the only opening that bid fair to give him a chance of future advancement, by joining the army in America as a volunteer. This might be pronounced a rash step; but, in the history of genius, it has been often found that a course which cold calculating prudence would condemn, was the very one in which the prize was to be won. The step, however, was sufficiently hazardous; for he had but little money in his pocket, and was not known to a single soul in America. But, in his ardour, he had overlooked a little awkward obstacle. There is (at least there was) a law in Jamaica, that no person who had resided in the island could leave it without signifying his intention beforehand; or, in the absence of such notification, producing the bond of some respectable householder, as security for any pecuniary claims that might be outstanding against him. Our adventurer having no debts or money transactions, concluded that he might go when and whither he chose. Ignorant of the local law, he omitted taking out the usual certificate at the proper office, or to obtain a bond of indemnity to the master of the vessel in which he embarked. The master had also omitted to enquire about the circumstance before his passenger came on board, and so the vessel quitted her port, and all was delightfully promising. As for Jamaica, our young philosopher is well nigh quite tired of it. His heart

rises springy as the breeze, as the bellying sails wing the gallant bark towards Point Morant, in order to have a good start for the beat to windward. Lo, and behold, they are off Point Morant, the eastern extremity of Jamaica! The skipper approaches the young doctor: "We are now, sir, off Point Morant; you will therefore have the goodness to favour me with your security bond. It is a peremptory form of law that we cannot forego." To some such address as this, for such was the pith of it, young Jackson at once frankly confessed that he had no such document, and had not dreamed that any such would be required. What was to be done? A breach of the law was not to be thought of. For aught the punctilious skipper knew, it might be rank piracy to waive the bond. If the skipper was not to be put off, it was the very reverse with our young adventurer, who was re-landed at the eastern extremity of the island, with a very low purse, and quite a stranger. His darling plan had been strangled, it might be said, in the birth. What was to be done? He chanced to recollect that there was a vessel at Lucca, taking in a cargo of rum for New York. Lucca is situated at the western extremity of the island, and our traveller, the next thing to a shipwrecked man, an outcast from a vessel, was at the eastern extremity. The distance, in a climate too, continued exposure to which is deadly to the European constitution, was not less than 130 miles. Here was a situation anything but desirable, even for a lover of the picturesque. There was no sea-conveyance available, and the state of his finances did not admit of his hiring a horse. He had therefore the agreeable alternative of remaining where he was, or of undertaking the journey on foot. This was deemed not merely a dangerous feat for 'a white man,' but almost an impracticable one, and sure to prove fatal.

The desire for adventure, however, was in him a passion that deemed danger an incentive, rather than a bar. Getting into a small boat, he proceeded to Kingston, which was not far distant, and there provided himself with the certificate, the omission of which, in the first instance, had occasioned him so much trouble. He then made a bundle of his best linen, his Greek Testament, Homer, and one or two more volumes of a small portable edition of the Greek and Roman classics, and set out from Kingston about noon, on what was considered a very desperate expedition. Yielding to his own buoyant impulses, he was not to be deterred,

but went on his way, rejoicing in the strong spirit of youthful hope. After walking eighteen miles, the shades of evening began to fall. In these climes there is scarcely any twilight, and the darkness of night immediately succeeds sunset. There being no inn in view, he asked shelter for the night at the nearest habitation. Though hospitably received by the master of the house, a well-bred as well as kindly man, yet was it undeniable that there was something altogether suspicious in his position. A person, having the appearance of a gentleman, travelling on foot in a tropical latitude, is almost a thing unknown, it being considered not only dangerous to health, but unbecoming. Suspicious or not, nevertheless, it was necessary; and our adventurer therefore pushed on with cheerfulness and perfect vigour, until within a short distance of Rio Bueno, where his mortal career and his journey had nearly terminated together. Anxious to obtain a good halting station for the evening, he overheated himself by walking at a smart pace. He became thirsty, and in this heated state very imprudently stood exposed to a strong easterly breeze in an open piazza, while some lemonade was preparing for him. Drinking this off in haste, he resumed his journey, at first as he thought refreshed; but had not proceeded more than three or four hundred paces, when all capability of further exertion seemed at once to fail him, so that he could not crawl above a dozen steps at a time. As his own notes state, he completely foundered. Although at no great distance from a habitation, he was in a serious dilemma. There was a house not more than a quarter of a mile a-head, but so complete was the prostration of strength with the inability to move, that two hours were spent in reaching it, by crawling a few steps at a time, and resting for breath every five or six minutes, until at length with great difficulty the point was gained. The danger of drinking a cold fluid when the body is heated, is familiar to all. The real risk, however, is not so much at the height of heat, as when the warmth is rapidly passing off. It is said of the stag on the banks of the great American rivers, that he sips and runs. In fear of the cayman on the one hand, and the jaguar on the other, he but dips his lips and speeds on. It were well for the traveller when heated to be equally sparing in tasting cold fluid. The result of an imprudence such as the one alluded to sometimes is death itself.

In describing his own sensations on this occasion, the subject of our memoir stated, that he felt all over as if bruised from head to foot; nor did the irksomeness and painfulness wear off till five or six days, so as to permit him to resume his journey. At length he reached Lucca, without further accident, being perhaps the first European who had accomplished such a journey in Jamaica.

He found the vessel he had expected, and presenting the bond of indemnity to the master of her, set sail for New York, where he arrived in good health in the year 1788. The difference of temperature between New York and the island of Jamaica rendered additional clothing necessary, which, with the expense of the passage, reduced his pecuniary means to the lowest ebb. The prospect as respected even bare subsistence was now an uneasy one; for as yet he had no clear views in regard to employment. A Jamaica gentleman of great respectability came in the same ship with him. This worthy man became interested in his favour, for his simple, unassuming, yet manly appearance, and gentlemanlike manners, (to say nothing of his acquirements, when his modesty permitted their nature and extent to develop themselves) were eminently calculated to impress respect, and to attract good-will. From the high opinion formed of Jackson by his fellow-passenger, he solicited a commission for him in the New York Volunteers, a most respectable provincial corps; but it was a matter that required some little time to determine, and the pressing calls of rigorous necessity could not be warded off to square with the time. Our adventurer could not bring himself to solicit a pecuniary loan from his worthy fellow-passenger, who was not aware of the extreme urgency of his case; for shame sealed his lips, rather than make so humiliating a disclosure. There is something very touching in contemplating a brave young spirit reduced to such an affecting strait as this. He suffered on in silence though pinched with hunger, and if we cannot approve of the prudence of such reserve under such pressing circumstances, yet must he be a churlish moralist who would withhold his admiration from its delicacy. Hunger and ruin now literally had him in the wind. He came to know what absolute want meant; a lesson which it were well if many understood, to the improvement of their hearts, without acquiring it in the bitter school of adversity. Then should we have



fewer very poor, and fewer excessively rich. Application was made for him at the general hospital, and at the naval hospital-ship, for the situation of mate, but there was no vacancy. Excepting the gentleman alluded to above, he was not known to any one at New York, civil or military. In this perplexity, he had to discuss in his own mind the terrible argument of beggary or starvation, and to adjust the balance between them. Fearful is the pass for any man when it comes to this. It is a crisis which tests what is in a man, and whether he will do battle valiantly with adverse fortune, or throw up the game in despair. He had sought for employ in a line the details of which were familiar to him, and sought in vain. He felt that he possessed the capacity to earn his bread by labour, in some shape or other. He must even then make an effort elsewhere. He had, through the kindness of his fellow-passenger, tried all the chances at New York, and found them a blank. With no very definite view, therefore, he thought of attempting to pass the lines at Knightsbridge, in order to see what he could do in America—not to carry arms against his country, a course utterly abhorrent to him, even in the direst or any extremity; but to compound drugs it may be, or, in a word, to work with his hands in any honest howsoever humble vocation, for his bread. With a wavering no plan of this kind, he put a shirt into one pocket, a Greek New Testament and Homer into another, and set out from New York early of an afternoon, in the direction of Knightsbridge. When almost half way between New York and the lines, a military officer on foot passed along the road, and, as he thought, looked at him with uncommon earnestness. It seemed to him as if the officer in that expressive look had read his purpose, if it could be called one, one to which his own self-approbation had not been entirely accorded.

Smitten by this look, our adventurer put about immediately, and returned to New York, determined to offer himself as a volunteer to one or other of the regiments quartered in the island. The first battalion of the 71st regiment, (or Frazer Highlanders), was encamped at the time in Mac Gowan's Pass, about seven miles from New York. It was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel (afterward Sir Archibald) Campbell, an officer standing high in public opinion. Our adventurer was in his youthful days (as his own notes testify) extremely bashful, and

of course beset by that awkwardness to which the bashful are prone. On this occasion, however, the pressure of exigence made him bold. He advanced to the colonel's marquee with resolution; desired to be introduced to the commanding officer; and being so, he, without much preface or apology, offered himself as a military volunteer to the 71st regiment. The colonel on this, enquired if he was a native of Scotland? Being answered in the affirmative, the colonel next asked to whom he was known in New York? The answer was, that he was known to no one in New York, except a gentleman who had come as his fellow-passenger from Jamaica, but who was ready to testify to the respectability of his character as far as he knew. Colonel Campbell proved himself on this occasion practically not only a judge of a gentleman, but an illustration of the character, by his frank and generous reply: "Sir, I require no testimony as to your being a gentleman. Your countenance and address satisfy me on that head. I will receive you into the regiment with pleasure—but then I have to inform you, Mr. Jackson, that there are seventeen on the list before you, who are of course entitled to prior promotion."

Young Jackson was eminently one of nature's gentlemen, with the stamp of *her* aristocracy on his intellectual and open brow. Colonel Campbell recognised him intuitively for what he really was. The next question was, if the volunteer had been bred to a profession? "Yes, he had studied medicine, but was now desirous to carry arms." This question was followed by another, which came to the point, "When will you join?" "To-morrow," was the prompt and characteristic reply. It was, under the circumstances, a reply that was more than eloquent. A common-place man would have seized the occasion to state that he required some little delay; that he had not tasted food for so many hours; that he required a little money to purchase some little matters; and that he was really in great distress. But no! it was not in his nature to *display* personal privation or suffering. "*To-morrow*," might be assumed as his motto in regard to any call of duty or trial. To the last, this word might serve as a key to the demand of any sacrifice, even that of life itself, from Robert Jackson.

Next morning, accordingly, he was in the camp at an early hour. As soon as he was ushered into the colonel's tent, an

orderly was dispatched for the surgeon of the regiment, the colonel with considerate kindness observing, that it had occurred to him, that as one of the surgeon's mates was absent, and probably would not return, the duty of surgeon's mate, if qualified to exercise it, might perhaps be more comfortable for him, in the interim, than that of volunteer supernumerary; since, at any rate, it would prove no bar to the other view, if he preferred it. The surgeon, Doctor Stewart, came in during the conference, and everything was speedily settled in a very satisfactory manner. Our volunteer was now free to join the regiment at once, nor did he delay doing so an instant longer than was necessary. Furnished with the not very luxurious outfit of a soldier's tent, blanket, and ration, he never in his life, perhaps, enjoyed a day of more unalloyed and hearty content, as he was often heard to declare, than when he joined the 71st. Though reclining on a bundle of straw, and after a dinner of which salt pork had formed the whole bill of fare, he felt comparatively as if he had been translated to Paradise. Rescued as he was from indigence and starvation, he had now the proud and blessed conviction, that he was to earn his bread by the humble exertion of the talents God had bestowed upon him; for most devoutly through life did he aspire the wish of one of his gifted countrymen, whose lines of life had not fallen in pleasant places:

'Thy spirit, Independence, let me share,  
Lord of the lion-heart and eagle-eye;  
Thy steps I follow, with my bosom bare,  
Nor heed the storm that howls along the sky.'

In a week after joining the 71st regiment, he had a proof that his worthy fellow-passenger from Jamaica had not relaxed his interest in his favour. He received notice that a commission was ready for his acceptance in the New York Volunteers. The desire of military service was at this time dominant in his mind, but he had been received into the 71st, when he was unknown and in distress. He had been treated with frank *military* kindness, the most cordial of all; he had been made to feel that his continuing where he was would be acceptable to all parties. For these reasons he could not prevail upon himself, or rather could not be prevailed upon, to leave the regiment, which to him proved indeed a

home. He preferred therefore remaining, though at the forfeit of what was generally considered a more advantageous position, and which would have led to distinction, for he was at this time, as has been shown, only an acting surgeon's mate; with a most precarious chance of preferment in that line, and as slender a one of obtaining a military commission; but his heart told him that he did right, and he was one of those through life who in his own concerns followed the impulse rather of the heart, than the coldly reasoned maxims of the head.

While the regiment remained at Mac Gowan's Pass, it continued healthy, but on moving to Knightsbridge, at the end of the month of July, it soon became very sickly. A division of labour now took place between himself and the other hospital mate\* of the corps; he undertaking the hospital duties, and his colleague those of the camp. Regimental hospitals in those days were upon a very different footing from what they have been rendered since. At the present day the penetrating spirit of improvement (in a great measure as respects this department derived from him as its parent) has in a most striking manner extended its benefits to their remotest details. They were then in fact simply collections of sick men, huddled together, with little order or arrangement, how they could and as they could. No comprehensive system existed. There was no attempt at classification, and no carefully devised code of regulation respecting diet; and hospital comforts were not dreamed of. No hospital clothing was provided by the state, and every sick man was expected to bring his own blanket. Fortunately a sick man does not require much food. In the days referred to his choice of esculents was limited to salt beef or pork, which he might wash down with his ration of rum. Our young hospital mate was not a man to shut his eyes where the well being of his fellow-creatures was in question. He had thought more on matters of hospital arrangement than the surgeon, who, like a sensible man, permitted him to make such

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\* At this period, and for a long time afterwards, there was a grade in the army medical department now happily abolished, called surgeon's mate, who though really performing the duties of an assistant-surgeon, was in fact only a

warrant-officer, being appointed by the colonel on the recommendation of the surgeon-general. Consequently he held no commission, and was not entitled to half-pay.

alterations in internal economy as could be adopted without expense. Although there were costly contractorships and purveyorships of all sorts, the condition of the soldier, well or sick, was wretched compared with what it now is. With a wasteful system that enriched individuals at the expense of the state, the comfort and welfare of the sick or wounded soldier was but a secondary consideration, being scrupulously balanced against the weighty bugbear, expense. The rule was the old one, of penny wise, and pound foolish. It required the third of a century to bring conviction on this head home to authority, and the arguments of a Wellington, with sword and pen, to demonstrate, that higgling niggardliness, where human lives are at stake, is in the end always the most extravagant course.

Our hospital-mate made changes which were acknowledged to be improvements. There was much need. Any place might do for an hospital. In the days of Dean Swift all sorts of unsightly lumber were stowed away in the attics, but the stern incumbent of St. Patrick's had an odd way of declining to walk into the drawing-room before he had taken a look at the garrets; since by this test he always judged of the tidiness of the housewifery. In the good old times, the parade, and not the internal management of a regiment, was the grand consideration. The sick were as lumber that might be thrust away into any corner or make-shift place. To the hospital-mates the sense of their own position as mere drudges, and scarcely acknowledged to be gentlemen, must have been fatal dampers to zeal. What cared they for a state of things admirably in harmony with their own depressed order? The period of probation which every surgeon had to pass in this despised grade, and its low associations, was anything but favourable to generous emulation, or the development of enlarged sympathy and energetic improvement. That the subject of our memoir should *clarior e tenebris*, have risen triumphantly superior to all the difficulties of such a position, and unspotted by its sordid meanesses and deficiencies, says much for the purity of his principles and the salient strength of his mental qualities, but nothing for the system itself. The army medical department indeed in all its branches was for a long time a reproach to the state; and it may now of a truth be said, that whatever amelioration has been conceded to it, or whatever of rank has been assigned it, in order to raise it somewhat in public estimation, has been

by an exceedingly measured, if not parsimonious policy, that always left a large margin for the reformer.

The term hospital in relation to our *mate* might mislead the reader, were it not explained to apply to a turf hut, which had been a commissary's store whose contents having been translated, it may be presumed, to a better place, their cast-off hovel was constituted a hospital, *faute de mieux*. The hut had luckily one quality that ought to distinguish all hospitals, for, if deficient in other respects, it was at least water-tight in the roof. The height in its rear, was covered with wood, and it occurred to our mate that he might avail himself of the circumstance for the benefit of his patients. Accordingly, he proposed to have erected all round his hospital, platforms of wicker-work by a common fatigue party, which would serve as, comparatively speaking, comfortable couches for the sick. The suggestion was approved of, and carried immediately into effect. As already stated, the sustenance of the sick consisted of the ordinary rations. They had in verity to 'rough it.' Mighty indeed is the change for the better that has taken place in the treatment of the sick soldier. Honor to all who have aided this amelioration! Honor especially to the subject of our memoir, for having led the way, in squaring the requisite outlays of a reformed system, with available ways and means! The healthy soldier usually prefers salt beef to fresh, but the invalid is better pleased with soup and bouilli, such being in fact better suited for his condition; nature herself pointing out what is most proper for the occasion. It was at this time that the idea struck him of making an arrangement, which, originating with his fertile and suggestive mind, forms now the very basis of our national system of hospital finance. It occurred to our hospital-mate, that fresh meat and soup might be provided for the sick soldier, as well as other little *et cæteras*, without incurring expense beyond the value of his ration; and in prosecution of this view, an arrangement was made with the quarter-master of the regiment for commuting the salt ration for a fresh one, and giving money *ad valorem*, to lay out at the common market. The measure was carried into effect, it need scarcely be added, without difficulty or embarrassment. We see in this experiment the principle which he applied afterwards on a large scale, when he came to high office in the medical department; but its effect can scarcely be said to be complete while the supervision and



controul of it lies entirely out of the department itself, as is now the case. Why it should be so is not very obvious, unless it be deemed unfit to be trusted with the administration of details essentially its own, or that ought especially to be under its sole controul and supervision.

In the various movements of the 71st regiment, Mr. Jackson had the opportunity of observing very extensively the different forms and degrees of fever in the southern states of the North American continent. In the rotation of duties during the siege of York Town in Virginia, he was stationed in the most advanced redoubt, which was defended by a portion of the 23d regiment of Royal Welsh Fusiliers, against a superior French force, which three times attempted to carry it by storm, but were as often repulsed. The late Sir Harry Calvert was then a subaltern or captain in the regiment, and was serving in that redoubt. Here commenced a friendship between the two that terminated but with life. General Sir Thomas Saumarez, who now resides in Guernsey, held a commission in the same regiment, and was also one of the defenders of the redoubt\*.

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\* The following letter from the gallant veteran (now in his eighty-fourth year) will be perused with interest, as coming from perhaps the only survivor of the well-contested struggle.

*"Guernsey, Sept. 3, 1834.*

"MY DEAR SIR,

"IN reply to the favour of your kind letter, I have great pleasure in informing you that the late Dr. Jackson and myself served together, at different periods, during the American war, from 1776 to its termination in 1781. I well remember his being attached to the brigade of grenadiers, consisting of fifty-three companies, under the command of Earl Cornwallis, and it was then our acquaintance commenced. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were defending the advanced redoubt of the army against a very superior force of the French army in 1781, at the siege of York Town, in Virginia. The enemy attempted to storm the fort three times, and was as often repulsed. I well remember at this period Dr. Jackson was taken very ill,

so much so, that all the officers of the regiment were most anxious to obtain his assent to our making application for his removal to a place of greater safety and quiet, where he could have a greater chance of recovering his health and strength, being at the time exposed to the incessant cannonade of shot and shells from the enemy during the day and night; but my gallant friend declared he was fully determined to remain with us to the last, in order to render every assistance in his power.

"I sincerely wish, my dear Sir, that my memory were better than it is; I could then detail many circumstances equally creditable to our late friend; but what can you expect when you appeal to an old man of eighty-four years? I need not add, that Dr. Jackson was ever greatly esteemed by *all* who had the good fortune of knowing his amiable qualities and very extraordinary talents.

"Believe me ever, my dear Sir,

"Most faithfully yours,

(Signed) "THOMAS SAUMAREZ."

At length he became a prisoner to the American commander, General Morgan, under circumstances so highly honourable to both, the conqueror and his captive, that they cannot fail to excite admiration. During the heat of the action fought at Cowpens by a division of the British army, under disadvantages of unfavourable position and numerical inferiority, at a moment when the issue of the battle was no longer doubtful; Mr. Jackson, who happened to be well-mounted, perceiving that the horse of the officer commanding the British troops had been shot under him, immediately rode up to the dismounted commander, and tendered to him the horse he was riding himself, remarking, that for his own part he was but an obscure individual, whose escape could have but little beneficial influence, but that *his* (the officer's) safety was of the highest importance to the army. The commander, Colonel (afterwards General) Tarleton, thus pressed, accepted, though reluctantly, the generous offer, and escaped. This is truly in harmony with the finely-balanced faculties of his mind, evincing traits of Roman heroism, deserving to be held in remembrance in military records. At this moment Mr. Jackson's presence of mind did not forsake him. Seeing that the wounded British were already in the power of the enemy, and that he must be captured, instead of waiting till the enemy placed hands upon him, he fastened his white handkerchief to his walking-stick, and boldly stalked towards the Americans as a flag of truce. Being asked what he had to say, he answered "I am assistant-surgeon to the 71st regiment; many of the men are wounded and in your hands; I therefore come to offer my services to attend them\*." A person coming with a flag under such circumstances appearing a somewhat suspicious matter, he was conducted to the rear as a prisoner. He was, however, in all respects well treated, and occupied himself that night in tending the wounded; and in default of dressings for them, he disrobed himself of his only shirt, and tore it up into bandages. This action was truly characteristic of the man—simple, prompt, and practically benevolent. Through life it was the same. He was always ready to sacrifice himself for the good of others; and whatever he had was freely and cordially, but quietly and modestly, at the command of suffering and distress.

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\* *Sketch* by Dr. Barnes, and Dr. Borland's notes.

Next morning he was sent for and examined by Colonel Washington, to whom he tendered his professional assistance for the American wounded also; which was readily and courteously accepted; nor was the spirit of the offer forgotten by a generous enemy. This truly noble conduct, indeed, attracted general notice, and so greatly pleased the American general, that as soon as the British wounded could be exchanged, our gallant medical officer was sent back with them, no parole being required, nor exchange demanded.

The anecdote relative to General Tarleton, stated above, was not communicated by Dr. Jackson himself, but by an officer serving in Tarleton's brigade at the time as a captain, namely, the late Colonel Hovenden, who was present in the action, and therefore an eye-witness of the fact. When Dr. Jackson in after-life was referred to in terms of surprise, that he had never mentioned the circumstance, (and one especially that did him so much credit for patriotic disinterestedness,) even to his intimate friends, and being pointedly questioned regarding its authenticity, his short, simple, and modest reply was, "It is true."

It would have afforded us, for the honour of human nature, much pleasure to be able to enter upon this brief record, a demonstration of General Tarleton's grateful recollection of the service done to him by Mr. Jackson, in the hour of rout and danger; for painful as may be the task, it is right to mention, that in his history, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton is altogether silent on this remarkable instance of duty and devotion, and to which perhaps he owed his life, as he most certainly did his liberty and capability of usefulness\*. General Tarleton may possibly have carried in his own bosom a sense of the obligation, though a diffidence, neither very intelligible nor laudable, may have sealed his lips and his pen respecting it. The silence of Dr. Jackson and his friends is quite as expressive in another way as Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's. It tells of unrequited service, unappreciated generosity, and unrewarded devotion to public principle.

Dr. Barnes also makes mention of another characteristic

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\* *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America*; by Lieutenant-colonel

Tarleton, commandant of the late British Legion. Chap. iv.

anecdote no less honourable to the memory of Dr. Jackson:—  
“At another time during the American war Jackson displayed equal bravery and contempt of danger. After one of the battles, when the British troops were under the command of Lord Cornwallis, and were retreating, a building into which the sick and wounded had been carried was riddled by the shot of the enemy, and visiting it became so dangerous that the surgeons proposed casting lots to determine which of them should go and attend the wounded soldiers. Jackson, whose feelings were ever alive to the sufferings of his fellow-creatures, was present, and when the proposal was made to him, he said, ‘No, no, I will go and attend them.’ And he did so\*.”

We now behold our hospital-mate a prisoner to the Americans and French at New York Town, Virginia†. This might have been an idle time for him, if a man of active intellect and benevolent disposition can fairly be said ever to be idle. It was, however, a time of enforced relaxation; he had no assigned duty to perform, no authoritative call to pursue any particular avocation. He was, in short, at perfect liberty, though a captive, to follow his own bent, to chalk out occupation for himself; and for such he never could be at a loss. This was the golden opportunity to trim the wing of speculative contemplation, and to gratify, at comparative leisure, his passion for the acquirement of languages; and the extension of his researches in as many as he understood (and they were not few), with him a never-palling intellectual recreation.

At length he was at liberty to return to England on parole, and so soon as the sick were disposed of, he set out for New York, the head-quarters of the British army. He travelled on foot in the midst of a very hard winter. The condition of a prisoner of war in a strange country does not ordinarily command much respect. We had not always been very courteous to the Americans, nor was the cause of the war one likely to be soon forgotten, or to be viewed with extenuating feelings. When we were in the ascendant we did not conciliate, nor had we any right now to look for much civility. Though wrong never can come right, yet out of particular and individual injustice often spring the elements of general and portentous changes. Thus the

\* *Sketch*, p. 4.

† Dr. Borland's notes.

crotchety obstinacy of a froward minister, influenced by an overstrained and absurd theory of royal prerogative, became the generator of moral forces that have not yet ceased to operate upon the destiny of millions ; long after the heads that conceived, and the hands that wrought the original mischief, have crumbled into dust.

Mr. Jackson was everywhere treated with kindness, and this at the time enhanced his impressions of the grievousness of the incentives that irritated a fine people into armed resistance. A man of the parent country, merely because he *was* a native of it, had in the American states been generally considered as a person of superior caste ; and even after the outbreak, the English prisoner of war rarely met with harshness unless he had greatly offended. "Liberty and property," Mr. Jackson found to be the motto of the American people, or rather property with liberty to make what use of it the possessor pleases. Arbitrary interference with property roused the spirit of resistance, the only course perhaps that could have constituted a sufficient one to make the people throw off their allegiance to the British crown.

Though the Americans might not, in the opinion of our observer, be pronounced a polished people according to European notions, and the model of courtly France, yet were they an honest, simple, and straightforward people, shrewd and observant ; and who, with tenacious attachment to property, conjoined the enterprising spirit of the mother-country. As traders, and commercial pioneers, the Americans have no superior. As a merchant upon a great scale, our transatlantic brother is less scrupulous in observing his obligations than his European congener ; and recent events connected with the state of Pennsylvania have proved the correctness of Mr. Jackson's estimate of him. Convinced that Great Britain had lost America through blamable and deplorable mismanagement, he was no less sensible of the value of that independence which it has acquired. The form of government, though far from perfect as a system for upholding and creating morals, and securing happiness to all, he considered, notwithstanding, as respectable among the governments of the age. He deemed it afterwards to have done more for the enlightenment of the people, and the improvement of their general condition, than any government then in existence. But though it has thus done good, it has not, he conceived, eradi-

cated the aggrandizing spirit of the parent, or taught its subjects to maintain justice, and an equal balance of action and reaction among all conditions of men, as the source and preserver of happiness. The colonial government acted with flagrant bad faith and injustice towards the Indian nations; nor has the republican government atoned for the transgressions of its parent, but added sins of its own. A leaven of wrong is left, that is continually fermenting a lust of encroachment and aggrandizement. Fraud rather than force, circumvention rather than direct attack, is the favourite weapon of this government; and claiming not only to be free, but to be the *decus et tutamen* of liberty, the foul and inexplicable blot of slavery is on its escutcheon; and this dire inconsistency, like a dry rot, is warping the timbers of the ark of its power.

Mr. Jackson returned to Europe in the beginning of the summer of 1782. He landed in the first instance at the Cove of Cork in Ireland, and travelling to Dublin by land, took passage to Greenock. Thence he proceeded to Edinburgh, and after a short sojourn there, set off for London, like his countryman Smollett, on foot. He reached the great capital in twelve days. In his notes of this journey we have a striking illustration of his turn for philosophical investigation. It afforded him, he states, the opportunity of trying different modes of living for best maintaining the efficient power of the constitution upon a march. He had already been aware, from the experience of much walking in the West Indies and America, that the best regimen for a foot-traveller is spare living. He therefore upon this principle abstained from meat until the close of the day's journey. After walking twelve or fourteen miles he would breakfast upon tea and bread. He would then rest for an hour, or an hour and a half, and resume his journey, continuing it until he felt it necessary to take up his lodging for the night. Salad, a tart, and sometimes tea and bread, constituted the supper, or evening meal. Sleep was generally sound, refreshment complete, and next morning, soon after sunrise, he resumed his journey. Desirous from personal experiment to test the difference between this spare and a more full regimen while on the road, he dined on beef-steaks and drank porter, about 3. p.m. on two or three occasions. The result was that he walked briskly and with energy for two hours, but his alacrity subsided before he reached



his evening station; and next morning he was less willing to rise than when he had fared differently. This sluggishness of getting out of bed was experienced on every occasion after eating animal food, and drinking malt liquor, the preceding day. At length our adventurer arrived at the great Babylon, the nursing mother of all that is excellent or vile, splendid or sordid, attractive or repelling in human nature, as displayed in the social state, under the condition of masses gathered into one place. Though as a boy, his love of enterprise, and his desire of seeing and hearing for himself, had led him, as we learn from competent authority, to leave home and take a journey to London on foot; yet we know nothing more than the simple fact; and that to preserve himself from famishing, he, with the permission of the owners, milked a cow occasionally as his necessity required along the route. No date is ascribed to the event, and no memorandum of it exists, by himself or his friends, farther than what has been stated. It was now very different. He had seen much and thought much, so that, as respects the *man*, London might be said to be seen for the first time. Few situations can be more impressive than that of a stranger finding himself all at once an atom in what the greatest of living poets has beautifully denominated 'that mighty heart.' According to temperament, and the state of 'the financial department,' the feelings of the individual for the time will be buoyant or depressing.

It was about one o'clock in the afternoon, on a Sunday, when Mr. Jackson reached Highgate. Many come to London as if it were the all in all of their fate, without duly considering the object of their coming, or the means by which they are to support themselves in their new position. But there is an attraction of aggregation in man, as there is in detached particles of matter: 'Wherever the carcase is, there are the eagles gathered together.' There is a divining-rod instinct in him; and, like the hazel-wand in the hand of the adept, he is drawn towards the deep springs of power and action, to his joy or sorrow, his success or his ruin. Our adventurer now began to question himself for what purpose he had come, and sober prudence could scarcely muster a plausible answer. He had no business, properly so called, in London; and he knew not a soul there but one, and might he not be absent or dead? The acquaintance

alluded to was Dr. Stewart, the late surgeon of the regiment of Fraser Highlanders, who had recently been appointed surgeon to the Oxford Blues, and who occupied a friend's apartments at the Temple. Behold our adventurer then, now in the prime of life, being thirty-two, compactly made, with an intelligent face, expressive of thought and firmness, of plain exterior, altogether somewhat inclining to the quakerly. He must no doubt question some one in regard to localities, and his accent has a northern flavour. He is, moreover, somewhat awkward from native modesty, he himself declaring that "he was bashful even to sheepishness." At length he is arrested by certain cabalistical words that reassure him—

#### ORDINARY AT TWO O'CLOCK.

These words, emblazoned on the door of a house, gave a new turn to impulse. He enters, not without embarrassment, for he has never before sat down to the table of an ordinary. He has fellow-guests in plenty. They chiefly consisted of London tradesmen, decent in appearance, and civil in manners. One of them observing him to be a stranger, and one that did not appear to be much acquainted with the world, at least that of London, enquired courteously if he had any particular destination in town? Being answered in the negative, his interrogator offered, with much kindness, to take him to a respectable coffee-house, where he might remain for some days, until his arrangements were completed. To this he added, by way of precaution, that he took the liberty of recommending this plan to him, as strangers were liable to be imposed upon in the great city. The advice thus freely offered, with considerate benevolence, was followed. The coffee-house spoken of proved quiet and comfortable, and became his domicile, until he found out the office of the regimental agent, and the quarters of his old brother-officer. Dr. Stewart, as stated above, occupied apartments in the Temple. These belonged to a friend of his, who was then abroad, and likely to remain absent from England for some time; and as they were commodious, he, with military frankness, at once offered to lay a mattress on the floor of his library, for his old mess-mate, which was of course thankfully accepted. He spent the winter in London, in professional study and various reading. Neither lecture-rooms nor hospitals, however, being open for those who

have little money in their pockets, he was obliged to be satisfied with what he could learn at little expense. London, as a great metropolis, furnishes ample means for surveying mankind, and forming an estimate of character under many aspects and varying phases. He went to every place not shut to the poor man, in a capital where it is a heavy reproach, that almost everything worth seeing is shut against him; though perhaps a better and more liberal system begins to dawn upon him. It is indeed high time that it should be so, for whatever refines and humanizes has a tendency to coalesce and conciliate, and should therefore, in every way, be encouraged. This were true wisdom, especially at a juncture when the line of demarcation between classes is deepening and widening into one of entire separation—when the social elements seem as if crumbling down by some awful and inevitable process of moral disintegration.

In London, we may be assured, that our quiet but observant stranger was

Attentive, truth and nature to descry,  
And pierce each scene with philosophic eye.

He found the drama of human activity varied to infinity. The motive of action seemed to be the same, or similar, in all. The desire to multiply the matter of wealth was the dominant impulse. The means of accomplishing it seemed to vary without end, and London at the time seemed to him as exhibiting the picture of an immense gambling-table, where each staked his all, with serious, gay, or moody mien, according to bent of character, concealing, under a grave or careless exterior, the acme of desperation. ‘The desire to acquire was ravenous—the activity to consume was no less remarkable; man appeared, in fact, to be a voracious animal, devouring or devoured; and splendour and misery were in continual contrast.’

Peace having at length been concluded between Great Britain on the one part, and America and France on the other, in the beginning of 1783, the Continent became open once more to travellers from other parts of the world. There were but few facilities then for tourists, and guide-books were not. He announced to his friends that “he was going to take a walk,” which proved to be the tour of Europe on foot. He desired to see France; and as he hung loosely on society, he followed the impulse. His pecuniary means for the undertaking were

but low. As a hospital-mate he was entitled to no half-pay; but he had been for years an ensign in the 71st regiment, which he continued to be, until brought on half-pay as surgeon to the Buffs, in 1793. He made up a small bundle of necessary articles, and a little purse of money, and set out for the Continent in the month of May, 1783, without recommendation, or other guide than a map of the country. On leaving London, where he had been immured for eight months, he had the feelings which he supposed might belong to a person escaped from jail. His bosom's lord sat lightly on his throne, and his whole frame was dilate with joy, such as a man can only experience in his prime, when the animal spirits are in the flush of energy, and hope's wing unwearied. When he got to the other side of the channel, he seemed to derive self-consequence from the change, feeling as if he were already a travelled man. A Swiss regiment was stationed at the time at Calais, and he thought it the finest specimen of military he had ever seen. The French to whom Lord Cornwallis surrendered at York Town, were the very best troops of that nation; but they were inferior as a military body to the British. National partiality could not now divest him of the idea that the British troops were inferior to the Swiss. The regiment, he described, as compact and firm in the ranks as a wall of iron. The earth trembled under its cadenced steps. The British had not at that time been drilled to German tactic; and, as estimated by appearance, they were not equal to soldiers of the German school. First impressions are the strongest; and he afterwards confessed that the Swiss regiment he saw at Calais gave him a bias, perhaps a prejudiced one, in favour of the Swiss military.

He proceeded on his route by easy journeys, deriving great satisfaction from the comparative invisibility with which the pedestrian mode of travelling invested him. He met everywhere with great civility and kindness on the road. Indeed, it may be stated as a general fact, that he who is open, candid, and kindly-disposed himself, falls in with the like dispositions in his progress through the world. When he arrived at Paris, he felt as if he had dropped from the clouds upon some very strange land, where men and things differed entirely from what he had been accustomed to. He knew no one, and was known to no one. He walked about and looked at everything, for there every-

thing is not tabooed from the poor man or the stranger, but is open to all, at small trouble or cost. The people too were to his liking. They held not themselves suspiciously aloof, and they were not rude to a stranger, but accessible, social, and conversible—and always polite. The facility a stranger had in mixing in society made him feel more at home there in a fortnight, than a life-time could have made him in London; and this had some effect in rubbing off bashfulness, of which, as the reader has already been advised, he constitutionally possessed a large share.

His next course was towards Switzerland. He went up the Loire in a passage-boat, with the view of mixing with the peasantry, on their return from the Paris market. The weather was exceedingly hot, and the boat crowded to excess; but the study of physiognomy, which then occupied a good deal of his attention, fully compensated for the inconvenience. There was often annoyance at night from the bugs, but no dissatisfaction whatever with the people. He passed through Burgundy at leisure, walking still on foot, discursively, and without any preconcerted or formal plan. This gave a zest of originality and indescribable freshness to his progress; and it was altogether pleasant and instructive; for solitary rambles left room for contemplation, and the musing reverie led to an analyzation of things around him. He reached Geneva early in August. The site interested him. The air at that season was delicious. The place was picturesque, and charmed the fancy. He remained there a fortnight. The people appeared to him intelligent, generally well read, ingenious, and obliging. 'In their amusements one sees nothing of the drunkenness, dissipation, and rudeness of England, and but little of the trifling folly and insignificance of France. There is cheerfulness in every countenance, good-humour in every company, and something respectable, and even elegant in their manners, that no person would look for in a town of mere manufacturers.' The place however, like Calypso's isle, was too full of sensual temptations to render it fitting for a prudent man to sojourn long in, when no business or other call of duty rendered it necessary. He turned from the city to the grand tableau of nature. The walk through Switzerland gave rise to nobler sentiments than the associations of Geneva. The eye meets everywhere with something beautiful, grand, or stupendous in scenery;



and the mind is often excited and supported by a succession of objects, in a train of sublime reflection, which is allied to, if it be not itself, the very poetry of feeling. The character of the English nation stood high on the Continent in 1783; and with no other recommendation than a man's being an Englishman, he was everywhere treated with respect. An Englishman walking on foot in France or Switzerland was not then a common thing to see; and the rareness of the sight, very probably, gave it an interest that has worn off by repetition. Events in their course have modified opinions. But to return to our traveller, If the route of a Swiss peasant happened to be the same as his, the peasant not only offered, but urged to be allowed to carry his little luggage; and that with honest warmth of earnestness, as if he considered the permission to do so to be an honour, or the discharge of a positive duty of hospitality to a stranger, for which the offer of pecuniary compensation would give offence.

Leaving Geneva, our traveller proceeded towards Germany. At Morat they begin to speak German, and the peasantry put on the German dress. Berne, though but a small town, he considered 'as without exception, perhaps, the most beautiful in Europe.' The men of Berne he noticed 'as unusually well set on their limbs, with swelling chests, and countenances open and manly, saluting each other with warmth and affection.' On leaving Berne he met an adventure. 'Not a mile from the gate a gentleman in a carriage came up with me, and, after making an apology for the question, begged to know what was my road. I told him. His, he said, was the same for thirty miles, and if I would take the trouble of stepping in, he would be happy of my company. It was such an uncommon piece of politeness, I was a good deal embarrassed: however, I thanked him, and accepted of the offer. He was a sensible and well-informed man, and of some condition. It was now sunset, when we arrived at the inn, where we came to halt for the night. When supper came in I was astonished; it consisted of fifteen or twenty different things, and was followed by a most magnificent dessert. In the morning when I called for the bill, I found it had been paid. The Swiss gentleman claimed this privilege, he said, in his own country, and he seemed to take it ill that I should think otherwise. It was such a rare instance of hospitality, as a man may not perhaps meet with in a life-time, and it was



the more rare, as I believe the gentleman had no other motive but good-nature.'

Arriving at the Rhine he meets the people crowding to church, and looking at the female peasants, could not help making the reflection, 'at how much pains the poor people had been to disfigure themselves.' At Shafhausen the inhabitants had the friendly politeness to strangers that distinguishes the Swiss. On one occasion he watched unobserved a Frenchman and a Swiss. 'The Swiss was bold and open in everything he said, and everything he said procured him my respect. The Frenchman was extremely polite, extremely familiar, said a thousand civil things, and some witty ones; yet I could not help saying within myself, thou art a puppy.' About two leagues from Shafhausen, a spread-eagle on the great road marked the entrance into the empire. As he advanced he saw more of them. 'The country here is fertile in grain, and not unpleasant in appearance, but I don't know what is the matter, I feel a weight on my spirits ever since I began to see the spread-eagles.' The people of Suabia he found inattentive and disobliging to strangers. It was the same in Bavaria. The interior of the country is rather tame, but notable as the scene of much human slaughter. The people were not rude, but they are indifferent to a traveller of no condition or equipage. Following the windings of the Danube he reached Ulm. He considered the Germans as exceeded in honesty by no nation. The women of Suabia have fine limbs, and very short petticoats—'but limbs are about almost the only beauty the women of Suabia have to boast of.' At Gunzburg he is taken up for a vagabond, and nearly made what a Bengal sepoy would call a 'Zuburdustee Bullumteer'—which may be rendered *volontaire malgré lui*.

"I arrived at Gunzburg, a small town of the emperor's, about four o'clock in the afternoon. A soldier who observed me passing through the town, stopped me to know if I had a passport. When I told him I had not, he desired me to go along with him to the magistrate. The magistrate turned me over to the recruiting-sergeant for a vagabond, for I could produce no certificate of what I was, or whence I came. The sergeant conducted me to the commanding officer, and the commanding officer finding I was an obstinate fellow, and would not serve with the horse or foot, sent me to lodge for the night in the barracks. The door

opened, and I was introduced into a large room, where were about two hundred recruits, all ragged and torn, and many of them in chains. When they perceived I was an Englishman, they flocked round me, and were curious to know what I was, for an Englishman is a rare sight in this country. The poor people gave me all the comfort they had to themselves. It was a cruel situation, they said, but it was that of almost the whole of them; they were travellers taken up at random. My face burnt with shame and indignation, but fortunately I was too angry to speak German, and kept my execrations to myself. When I rested a little, and looked about me, I found everything so dirty and disagreeable, that I wrote a note to the officer requesting leave to sleep at an inn; and as a security that I would be forthcoming in the morning, offering to leave with him what little money I had. I received no other answer but an order to give up my implements of writing. Seven o'clock came, the hour they go to sleep. The sergeant announced it by a rap on the door, and immediately the floor was covered with dirty bags of straw; and the recruits went to kennel. I had gone to the corner of the room, and refused to lie down; but the captain, an elderly man whom I had not seen before, gave me the word of command. There was no remedy but to take a place between two of the dirtiest fellows in the barracks, each of whom had a leg chained to the arm. When every poor creature was disposed of, the old captain walked up and down the middle of the floor, talked familiarly with some of the recruits, and at last gave them all a kind good night. The officer who was on guard came in a little while after, and saw that everything was quiet. When he went away everybody bade him good night, in such a tone of affection as gave me a good opinion of his humanity. The sergeant brought in a candle, and put it down on a small table which stood in a corner. The best instructed of the recruits began to tell droll stories, and the sergeant walked near them to keep their mirth in moderation. At last they all dropt asleep; I began too to slumber, but my comrade, who was restless, often rattled his chains. I started up and felt my arms that they were free. In the morning I insisted on seeing the commandant, who had only arrived in the town late in the evening. I found him in his bed-room, sitting on an elbow-chair, with all the officers standing around him, receiving orders with more humility

than orderly sergeants. He was a young man, and on the whole civil enough; he told me I might have the choice of serving either in the horse or foot, that they were on the eve of a war with the Turk, and that good behaviour would undoubtedly get me promotion. When he found this would not do, he changed his tone, and told me it was the orders of the emperor, that whatever strangers should enter his territories without proper certificates of their character, should be detained in the barracks if they did not willingly enter the service. The order was so tyrannical I could not contain myself. Put me in chains if you please, I said; but this I tell you, all Germany shall not make me carry a musket for the emperor. When he found I was obstinate, and saw that I could read and write, he told me I was at liberty to proceed on my journey to Vienna if I chose, but he would recommend me to halt at Ingelfeld, and write to the British ambassador for a passport, as it was impossible to get admittance into the town without one, or even to travel the country without interruption. I thanked him, and took my leave." On reflection he even found satisfaction in his night's experience at the barracks; it taught the absolute necessity of a passport, and gave an insight into the Austrian mode of recruiting. Disgusted at his treatment, and justly blaming the emperor as the author of it, he determined to strike for Italy, instead of going to Vienna; though he admitted that a foreigner without a passport might perhaps have been subjected to similar inconvenience in free England.

At a country inn near Augsburg he fell in with a strolling party of singers. They ate and drank heartily, and conversed freely—the room was full of waggon-drivers, and country people besides, who were proceeding to market. The church-bell struck eight, on which they all fell on their knees and repeated a prayer. There was, however, but little appearance of devotion. Some of the women laughed in the middle of the prayer, some made a pause, spoke to their neighbours, and then began again. At Munich he was not without apprehension of having to spend another night in the barracks, but he was not molested by the guard at the gate. He observed the garrison to be fine-looking men. The women in general were well looking, but not so finely limbed as those of Suabia. He went to the play—the Germans seemed pleased, but shewed nothing of the transport of the

French. He passed some days at Munich, dining at a *table d'hôte*, where the conversation frequently turned on the emperor (Joseph), his preparations for war, &c. They all talked of him as a great man, the greatest perhaps of the age; and there were few who did not relate some little anecdote of him. It was impossible not to be convinced by so many testimonials, that if not actually a great man, he wished at any rate to be considered one. In the whole town there was not one circulating library. After leaving Munich, he passed through a dreary wood of three or four leagues. "There was a gibbet at the entrance of it, and a fellow that was just beginning to turn black, hanging by the arm. The sight of him gave me very unpleasant emotions for two or three hours." When he emerged from the wood, the mountains of the Tyrol begun to appear on the right. At Benedict Bayern he listened with pleasure to the songs of the peasants, though not understanding them. They reminded him in manner of English hunting-songs. On Sunday, after service, the whole peasantry, men and women, flocked to the public-house, and spent the day in festivity. "The curate came along with them, and drank as much beer as he could carry. He was a poor creature, ragged and very despicable in his appearance, which seems to be very much the case with the officiating clergy. Those of the convents are well clothed, fat and jolly." Reaching Innsbruck, he gazed around him from the top of the mountain that rises over the Inn and its magnificent landscape. The pleasure of such a scene is indescribable. Disembarrassed for the time from all worldly cares, and looking to nature in her wildest and most romantic recesses for enjoyment, he was perfectly happy. The road all the way from Switzerland to Innsbruck he found beset by hucksters and pedlars, and poor peasants on the move with their goods and chattels. The language changes between Botzen and Frioul, and a change is also observable in the manners and countenance of the people. There is great improvement in the looks of the women. Some of them approach to the beautiful. The hair and eyes black, the teeth regular and white as ivory, and the figure tall, slender, and graceful. The people sing melodiously at their labour, and even the solitary traveller sings as he walks. On the road to Borgo, he met women, of the better class apparently, riding on horseback, after the manly fashion.

He reaches Primolano, and his heart beats light at being safe out of the empire, and in a country where he need have no dread of barracks, though as yet he had no passport. There was only one inn at the place, that very dirty, and the people far from being civil.

"A wandering friar arrived in the evening; and as his business was of a more secret nature than mine, they gave him the inner apartment. A dirty old woman served me, the landlady's daughter waited on him, brought him a fine dessert, and made his bed with clean sheets. She bade him good night, and walked through the room where I lay. I rose up, locked the door, and put the key in my pocket. About midnight I heard a gentle rap. I was awake, for the fleas would not let me sleep, and the friar was awake; for it was the hour the damsel was to come to make her confession. He arose, and went to the door, but found no key. I coughed and called, 'Who's there?' He slunk back to his room and prayed aloud, and I hugged myself with my revenge on the girl who had given me a dirty bed." On the road to Bassano, he was much struck with the dress, appearance, and manners of the women, who have a voluptuous expression of character. The dress of the men also was gay. At Montre he found the people busy with the vintage. He felt as if dropped into a new world. He never met with more civility. The people of the Venetian states upon the whole seemed to possess a fair share of the good things of the world. They were generally well clothed, well lodged, and apparently well fed. In physical constitution they seemed healthy and strong, and some were even handsome in figure and features; but there was a lack of amiability in the expression of the countenance, that repelled confidence.

At Venice, in a coffee-house of the place of St. Mark, he saw people of different countries regaling themselves in their own fashion; Jews, Turks, Greeks, and Armenians, Italian merchants and noblesse. Here and everywhere, he walked about as if clad in a coat of invisibility. He looked at all that was to be seen, and listened to all that was to be heard in so far as he understood the language of the interlocutors. He felt it all to be "such a feast of enjoyment as seldom falls to the lot of man, and never to the lot of any but a poor man who has nothing conspicuous about him to attract the notice of the

crowd." The noblesse mixed but little with the rest. Venice seemed very busy—the shops exceedingly elegant and full of ornamental goods. He amused himself with the coffee-houses, singers, and paintings. On Friday the shops all shut, and instead of singers, the place of St. Mark full of preachers. The power of music on an Italian is inconceivable. It reaches to every fibre of his frame, and throws him into rapture. One is at a loss to know what the women do in Venice, since we seldom see them at any employment. The men cook, clean the house, and do most of the menial offices. There are few places in the world where it costs so little to see so much of the curious in the arts as Venice. The town abounds with booksellers' shops. He was altogether much captivated with the place. Going to Padua by water, he had an opportunity of comparing the *canaille* of Italian and French passage-boats. The French, he says, laughed and played, and looked as if they had no care. The Italians sung, talked of news, but there was no mirth or good-humour amongst them, or confidence with one another. He intended to proceed to Rome, but at Lendinaria he found that an epidemic sickness prevailed in some districts, and he was obliged to change his route, in obedience to the laws of quarantine.

At Volto, on the 3rd October, he remarks—"The air is delicious, and the prospect of the country beautiful. I follow no great road, nor stint myself to any certain stage. When I meet with a fine view, I sit down to enjoy it; or when I meet with an intelligent countryman, I spend an hour or two in chat. I begin to like the people better. They are more cheerful, and the women appear more abroad." Card-playing the universal amusement. The dialect of the different states differed so much, that they sometimes did not perceive him to be a foreigner. In the territory of Mantau the buildings strike the eye as very beautiful. The women appear more abroad, and better looking: the men stout and remarkably well limbed. The route to Cremona delightful—and felt highly gratified with the singing of the peasantry at their labours. He crossed the Po at Cremona, the boatman charging him double because he was a foreigner. The inn at Stradella was so magnificent and sumptuous, that he was afraid (it was the only one at the place too) that they would not receive a foot-traveller. It happened to be Friday, and there



was nothing for supper but eggs and salad, cheese and fruit, "it was well there was not. Had they given me what they call a good supper, it would have cost me more money than I could afford: a couple of eggs and a little salad was half-a-crown." Traversing Lombardy, he reached Genoa, which he admired much, as he viewed it from a mountain-height. "In a neat little village at the bottom of the mountain I went to breakfast at a coffee-house. It was kept by a young woman of a good countenance and handsome figure. She showed me some of her work, and wanted me to buy an embroidered handkerchief. Though my money was diminishing apace, I don't know if I could have resisted the importunity of so fine a woman, had not the arrival of some travellers in the meantime called her away to prepare some coffee. One of the travellers was a French merchant, and was so struck with her beauty, he declared himself her slave, and the embroidery he said was charming. The girl was pleased, and carried him up stairs to look at something in the frame, yet finer than that. I paid for my coffee, and proceeded on my road."

Genoa swarmed with beggars and vagabonds. He arrived at Albenga in the evening, dripping wet with rain, and could find nowhere "to put his head." There were two houses in the town that went by the name of inns, but they both pretended to be full. The Albergo di San Dominico was the principal one; but, by some mistake or other, he went to the convent of that name, and, without further enquiry, desired to be shewn an apartment. "Instead of telling me I was wrong, the young brethren looked waggish, and began to laugh. When a man is wet, and cold, and hungry, he can ill brook to be the sport of others." He shook his stick at the young priests. They looked surprised, restrained their mirth, and one among them of more experience and better breeding than the rest, desired him to walk in; for, though it was not a public-house, he was extremely welcome to shelter from the inclemency of the weather. He now perceived his mistake, and made an apology. At Nice the people refused him a lodging, while they thought him to be a German; but when they understood him to be an Englishman, gave him the best apartment in the house, and the best of everything. In manner the people are something between the gay French and grave Italian. Suspicions, that he could not

divest himself of, hung on our traveller's mind in regard to the Italians. He distrusted the Italian peasant, for his disposition to impose upon inexperience and ignorance appeared innate and irresistible. He was struck with the many strollers among the religious orders of Italy. He often lodged in the same place, and slept even in the same room, with these sons of the church; and they never failed to repeat their religious offices at the appointed hour, even in the dark. Though not deeming him to be at all within the Christian pale, they were, nevertheless, civil and communicative, and did not disdain to argue with him on matters of faith. On one occasion, a holy father who helped him to discuss a bottle of wine, said many courteous things of the English; "he esteemed them the most of all heretics, and was sincerely sorry they had departed from the true faith. Queen Elizabeth had much to answer for, he said; but she was suffering for it now in the lake of fire and brimstone." Singing and card-playing constituted the predominant recreations of the peasantry. The labourer sung gratuitously as the companion of the road; and when he found a comrade in the cabaret, would take a pack of cards from his pocket, and set to work at once. He is not talkative as an intelligent enquirer, nor eager after information; but seems, in fact, to be devoid of thought.

In passing the Var, a very broad and rapid river, dividing Provence from the territory of Nice, he was very near drowned. Finding neither bridge nor boat, and demurring to pay what he considered an exorbitant charge to the *guadini*, he tried what he could do for himself. The first step he made, the water struck him above the knee, the second was higher, and before he had reached the middle of the stream, the water was above his haunch. The stones rolled from under his feet, and his head turned giddy. He made a desperate exertion, and reached the opposite bank—he could scarcely tell how. He fortunately kept erect; for if he had once stumbled, he must have perished, the stream was so uncommonly strong and rapid. He re-entered France with warm feelings of gratification. He liked the people; and if he could not give his confidence to an Italian, he could not withhold it from a Frenchman or Swiss. He felt as if he was in a new world, "everybody was so polite, so pleasant, and so gay. I could not help expressing my satisfaction at the change; but when it came to paying of the bill in the evening,

I had reason to repent of my folly. Nine livres, all that was left me of my coins, was extravagant for a night's lodging, but what could I say? Monsieur, upon his honour, assured me he had no profit." The route between Toulon and Marseilles was at that time very dangerous, on account of robbers. Fortunately, he fell in with a party of soldiers, and kept company with them. He left for Aix, in company with a marine soldier, who had been a prisoner in England during the war, and exclaimed loudly against the treatment he met with from the people who took him. They plundered him of everything he had, and beat him into the bargain. At Montpellier he found the ladies fair, and elegant in appearance, and amiable in their manners. At Bourdeaux he was struck with a similarity of manners between the peasantry and those of England. The economy of the house and the kitchen, (with its bright and clean utensils displayed for shew), and the culture of the lands, are more after the genius of the English than any part of France he had seen. In spite of his most careful economy, he arrived at Bourdeaux with no more than six sous in his pocket. Scarcely in his life had he felt more uncomfortable. He stated his necessity to an English merchant, who, to his honour be it told, without any hesitation, advanced him a few pounds. The thing was done with such a gentlemanly and prompt confidence, that he always spoke of it gratefully. With recruited finances his spirits returned, and he went to the coffee-house, play-house, and other public places. In going to Rochfort, the current was so strong in crossing the river as to drive the boat, full of passengers, among the shipping, where it nearly overset. There was much screaming among the women, and the men that were able to get hold of a ship's cable scrambled out. "Politeness to the females forsook the whole passengers;" so true it is that one touch of nature beats a world of art. The boat was very nearly overset, and if it had been, it is next to certain that they must have been all drowned. There were two Jesuits in the inn where he lodged in the evening, and, seeing he was an Englishman, they accosted him, and talked of religion. They charitably assured him that he must be damned if he did not turn Catholic. The Irish at this time had a great connexion with the west coast of France. Our traveller was generally taken for one, and several times for one of their religious. Pride made him sometimes

undecieve them; but at other times, when he held his peace, they insisted he was a priest, and treated him accordingly. Proceeding by Rochelle and Nantes, he embarked at St. Malo for Guernsey, whence he found his way to Southampton.

Thus terminated a ramble of seven months, during which he walked five thousand miles. With a very scanty purse, with no companion to share his pilgrimage, and depending for conveyance on his two legs only, this undertaking alone bespeaks a man of no ordinary nerve. Such a mode of traversing a country is calculated to afford a more thorough knowledge of it than any other. He thus saw French, Swiss, Germans, and Italians, without disguise. It was not common to undertake such journeys at that time; nor had Goldsmith's example tempted to similar rambles among the young and adventurous; and Jackson had no German-flute to propitiate hospitality. Both belonged to the same profession, but with very different capacity to shine in it. Both had the merit of cultivating a strong desire for information to the best advantage that circumstances would allow, of which each in his way was gifted by nature and qualified by education to make a good use; but one with much greater scope of usefulness and solidity of purpose than the other, who, with all the fascinating brilliance of genius, had also so much more of its weakness. Railway travelling admits of no such thorough inspection of a country or its inhabitants, and thus loses so much moral interest, whatever it may gain in power by mere physical celerity. This form of transit may perhaps tend, in process of time, to reduce all picturesque interest and all character, to its own uniform dull level, and to engraft a mechanical sort of generalization on all nationality. Our traveller, on the other hand, had gone on his way, rejoicing in his freedom to observe, without restraint of ceremony, seeking humanity in as many phases as may be within the reach of one who is not over-burdened with "those rascal counters" the Roman made so light of. He looked into the inside of the cottage, and there read the character of its inmate. He looked at solemn processions, or followed grave ecclesiastics into gorgeous churches, contrasting their splendour, and their imposing but over-loaded ritual, with a simpler one at home. He occasionally glanced at the outside of the palace, but had no means of introduction to its lordly owner, which caused him no regret. Of simple taste

and manners himself, this unobtrusive style of travelling was a source of lively and rational pleasure. To this was added the anticipation of future advantage; for it was his express opinion, that he acquired in this way more knowledge in six months, by drawing information from his own eye and ear, and reflecting on what he saw and heard by his own judgment, than he could obtain in so many years, by attending the common seminaries of learning, and listening to the most approved lectures of erudite professors. The pedestrian traveller is now and then footsore, and may wish at times for a carriage or a horse, but the satisfaction he has from his independence counterbalances the roughing and the fatigue. Man is the same animal wherever he is found, but his acts move under a great variety of motives and passions, which so modify his conduct, that he often appears different from himself. But, however modified by circumstances the acts of a man may be, a general feature of national character and homogeneity of sentiment, mark in the mass, the inhabitants of different countries, affected by varying codes of religion and morals, distinguishing them from each other, in a greater or less degree.

Our traveller landed at Southampton about four o'clock in the afternoon, with four shillings in his pocket. At this time his outer man was not in a very flourishing condition, which perhaps offensively attracted the attention of his countrymen. His coat had been black, but, scorched by the sun and exposure of seven months on the Continent, it was now brownish, and somewhat threadbare. His hat was in shovel form, and his hair without powder, at a time when the reader will recollect all persons above the rank of a mechanic wore it. His whole appearance was not unlike that of a methodist preacher. Under the idea that he was so, (the fact is instructive), they were lavish of their scurril jests as he passed. He, however, kept the even tenor of his way, and railed not again. About half way to Winchester, he met a decent old man walking in a field by the road-side. He seemed sad, and on being spoken to, stated that his son and daughter he feared were dying of an infectious fever, that had proved very fatal in the neighbourhood. That the apothecary had given them something, but that they were no better. Why not call a physician? *He* was but a poor man. Yes, but surely there are many physicians who would do as much for nothing.

He did not doubt that, "but they don't live in our country." The doctor went to the poor man's house, and prescribed. He found the children very ill; and he recorded in his notes: "Their thankfulness, for a thing perhaps that would do them no good, gave me more pleasure than a fee, I believe, of twenty guineas, much in need of it as I was." It was dark before he reached Winchester, and he was obliged to go to an inn, which did not very well suit with his finances. He had such a supper as his humble means would afford, paid for it, and desired to be shewn to his bed. The landlady replied, that there was no bed there for such as him; and he was actually forced, with terms of abuse, to turn out of an inn, where there was not a single bed-room occupied, at ten o'clock at night, in the month of December. After wandering about the streets for some time in search of a lodging, he at length got shelter for the night in a small house at the skirt of the town. It is affecting to read of such things; but we allude to them here, in the hope of serving an useful purpose. We find this entry in his notes: "On Sunday morning I was sixty-four miles from London, and had only one shilling in my pocket. I was hungry, but I durst not eat—thirsty, and I durst not drink, for fear of being obliged to lie all night at the side of a hedge, in a cold night in December. After dark I travelled over Bagshot, was denied admittance into some of the public-houses, and ill-used in others." He requested the shelter of a barn at a farm-house near the road, but was met with a surly negative; and would have been obliged, from sheer fatigue, to lie down by the road-side, had it not been for the humanity of a country-labourer, who conducted him to a house, where he got cover for the night, for which he paid his last shilling. He started early next morning, and arrived about noon in London, fatigued, hungry, and pennyless.

His stay in the capital was but short. The first battalion of the 71st regiment, which had arrived from America, was gone to Perth to be disbanded. It was now the month of January (1784), and the earth was covered with snow. His feelings towards the regiment were warm and deep, and carried in them all that is felt of strong attachment in the symbolic words of 'auld lang syne.' Although the season was inclement, and snow deep on the ground, he desired to be with the regiment now about to



be disbanded, and accordingly set out on foot. He accomplished the journey in three weeks, including some days of halt, where he fell in with friends. He had been from the year 1778 up to that time in a Highland regiment, and though very desirous to learn the Gaelic language, for the purpose of being able to read the poems of Ossian in the original, he was not, from the want of a grammatical guide, enabled to make much progress in it. At Perth, however, he found a grammar, and a person possessed of grammatical knowledge, and by this double aid, in the course of six weeks he made such progress as to be able to read, and tolerably understand the Gaelic bible, and such poems, fragments, and songs, as fell in his way; though of course it was not to be expected that he could speak it fluently.

The regiment was at length disbanded, after which he made a pedestrian tour to the Highlands, proceeding to Inverness, and afterwards to the Isle of Skye. The country was new to him, and the mode of travelling congenial. He thus beheld the Highlander in his native mountains; and on looking at his outside, and comparing him with the Lowlander and the peasant of England, he was disposed to rank him with the savage. On considering his interior or mind, again, he felt obliged to elevate him to the highest class in the community. The Highlanders are ignorant, and even stupid, as respects works of art, but are original in their conceptions, and intelligent of humour and character beyond any peasantry of Europe. They have a national pride, and a sentiment of honor, which is sought for in vain in the same class in the southern and more civilized parts of the kingdom. They have, moreover, a moral virtue, which shews that man may be good without the knowledge of book-learning. The Highland peasant covets money like most men, but he regards honor more. One of the thieves or cattle-lifters, who gave shelter and protection to Prince Charles, in the braes of Glenmorriston, after the battle of Culloden, fell in the way of our traveller while traversing that part of the Highlands; and his history is alluded to by him in proof of the correctness of his estimate of the Highland character. The cattle-lifter knew of the reward that was pending on the prince's head, but he did not permit himself to turn his eye upon it, for it would have come upon him through an act of dishonour. The poor Highland reaver was then old and in ragged garments; but the stream of life was quickened, and his eye sparkled fire,

when the prince's name was mentioned, for it brought to his recollection a noble sentiment which belonged to his own mind ; it touched the chord of ancient loyalty, and awakened the pride of having, in the face of the most imminent danger and temptation, given protection to his persecuted prince.

When the tour to the Highlands came to a close, he remained at Edinburgh for two or three months. He was now about to form a connexion upon which so much of man's happiness or misery in this world depends. He had formed an attachment to a lady every way worthy of becoming the object of a wise man's choice. This was the daughter of Dr. Stephenson of Edinburgh, an accomplished woman of good fortune, to whom he became united in 1784. Being by this union placed in easy circumstances, he was enabled to pursue his studies in Paris for a longer period than on the former occasion. The means of gaining information at that capital are attained at little expense ; and to a person who desires to form an opinion from his own observation, rather than to treasure in memory the opinions of others, they are the best perhaps in Europe. L'Hopital de la Charité he considered the best conducted he had seen, and L'Hotel Dieu the worst. He attended the first of these regularly ; and was gratified and instructed in what regarded order and economy. The humanity and kind attention of the brethren and sisters impressed him strongly in favour of the institution, and even with sentiments favourable to the Catholic religion in some of its practical results. Is it owing to their religion, or what is it, that French nurses are not only the most expert, but the kindest and most sympathizing in Christendom ? He remained in Paris till the end of 1784 ; adding largely to his professional knowledge, but engaged much with teachers of languages, and among others with one in Arabic. Quitting Paris, he went to Brussels, and thence proceeded to Leyden, where he took the degree of Doctor in Medicine ; not by purchase or keeping terms merely, but by actual trial and examination. Having thus travelled over the greater portion of Europe, surveying minutely the medical, military, literary and scientific institutions of foreign states, as far as they could be observed in his position ; having added largely to the stock of his academical and general knowledge, and having now the responsibilities of a family man, he returned to England, and established himself as a physician at Stockton-upon-Tees, in the county of Durham. His choice of

the locality arose from a friendship between himself and Colonel Francis Shelley (uncle to Mrs. Jackson), which was formed in the American war\*. Colonel Shelley, in writing to his friends during the period of their common service in America, said:—"Such changes have taken place in my regiment, that there is only one *gentleman* left in it, and that is Dr. Jackson." He soon succeeded to considerable practice, and became highly esteemed. His treatment of fever would of itself have secured him a large income in private practice. He never, notwithstanding, took quite cordially to this walk of the profession. Perhaps it required a flexibility of conformity in many points, which he could not honestly give in to. Many years afterwards, when his reputation as a physician was established beyond dispute, we find him expressing himself to a friend in these terms. "Our profession is a lottery, and requires something beyond knowledge to lead to success. I like it in an hospital; I do not like it as a country practitioner, and I do not find I can practise it with success. The cases generally are in advanced stages before I see them†." He had a very solemn impression of the awful responsibilities of the physician, which made him more sensible of the great disadvantage, and even risk to patient and practitioner, of being called in to combat with phenomena in their full maturity of reaction or collapse, instead of at their commencement, when the capabilities of control may be more within the practitioner's power. His directions for the management of the sick were always given, therefore, with the utmost care and consideration, under a full conviction of this conscientious responsibility. At times the folly and ignorance of parents and relatives shocked him; but he never could be induced to surrender his judgment to the caprice of a patient for the sake of a fee, or to succumb to the imperious frowardness of the rich hypochondriac.

He had resolved at an early period not to read translated works, but to study the originals. He became an accomplished scholar and linguist, and devoted all his spare time to classical and scientific study in the dead and current languages of Europe, and partly of Asia also. At the time he settled at Stockton, he was in the habit of reading the Greek and Latin authors as an

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\* Miss Tidy's note.

† Letter to Dr. Borland, dated Stockton, 11th March, 1822.

amusement. In one of his works he thus comments upon the bent of his own pursuits.

“The author formed a resolution at an early period of life, how originating he does not recollect, not to read a translated work. A desire of obtaining knowledge of the history of men and things was strong in his mind; and from this desire, he studied foreign languages with diligence, in hopes of being thereby enabled to penetrate to original sources of information. Through dint of labour he attained to moderate knowledge of several; he is not a critical scholar in any. The most of what he reads, even at the present time, is in one or other of the foreign tongues; and as we readily receive impression from that with which we most associate, the style of the present work\* probably exhibits too much of foreign idiom. He trusts it is intelligible; if it be peculiar, it is not through a desire of being singular that it is so.” Among the languages with which he thus, it is said, acquired some familiarity were Hebrew, Persian, and Gaelic. He had also collected a considerable number of books and manuscripts, including amongst the former the standard works of France, Italy, Spain, and Germany; and had procured almost every printed book on the subject of medicine from the time of Hippocrates to the eighteenth century. During the time he resided at Stockton, he, in the intervals of professional avocation, went over the Greek and Latin classics in a series, and the principal works of taste in the modern languages. We learn that he had also read some of the Arabic and Persian historians and poets; but on this head we are not able to add any thing specific. The Bostan of Saadi was a favorite with him.

In the year 1791 he submitted to the public the result of his experience in Jamaica and America, in a work which soon attracted deserved notice, the materials of which were collected between the years 1774 and 1783†. The author had traversed with his regiment, in its summer expedition, the greatest part of the provinces of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. The sick list was sometimes enormous. Georgia and Carolina, at least

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\* *The History and Cure of Febrile Diseases*, 1820.

† It bears the title of *A Treatise on the Fevers of Jamaica, with Observations*

on the Intermittent Fever of America; and an Appendix containing some Hints on the Means of preserving the Health of Soldiers in Hot Climates.

particular districts, or particular portions, in these provinces are regularly unhealthy, so that he had ample opportunities for pathological and clinical observation, of which the treatise alluded to shows that he made admirable use. Having resided now about seven years at Stockton-upon-Tees, in fair esteem, and with a professional income superior to the salary of an army-physician, Dr. Jackson could not have had any pecuniary motive in offering to serve again at the commencement of the war in 1793. Fever had attracted his attention more than any other disease, and as the practitioner in a country-town has rarely the opportunity of seeing persons who are ill of fever, until advanced periods when he can do little good, and where he has seldom the opportunity by opening the dead body to satisfy himself whether he understood the case or not, he was desirous of another field for the exercise of his talents; for he was truly an amateur in the healing art\*. His previous experience in the West Indies led to the opinion that fever in that climate is not so unmanageable, in its own nature, as it appears to be in the common estimate of mankind; he therefore made an offer to the secretary at war to re-enter the army as physician to the forces for service in the West Indies. He was not known to the war-secretary, but he considered the book he had published on the fevers of Jamaica and America a sufficient introduction for the appointment solicited.

The proposition was referred to Mr. Hunter, who was then surgeon-general and director of the medical concerns of the army. Mr. Hunter, as Dr. Jackson himself testified, was a man of an original mind, and of considerable discernment; but he was too little acquainted with military operations in the field to foresee every thing that was likely to occur in military service, and to provide on all occasions, from his own sources of knowledge, the best means of remedy. "Yet not being much led by the prejudices of education, he took information where he found it, formed his plans upon the best grounds he could command, and executed with firmness the plans which he formed. He appears to have considered the cure of disease, whether by manual operation, or the use of internal remedies, as the proper business of a medical man destined for the service of the army.

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\* Dr. Borland's notes.

He could not avoid observing, that the persons denominated surgeons of regiments, sometimes employ the one means, sometimes the other. They act in two capacities; rarely indeed in the surgical capacity, for there rarely is occasion, unless in actual war; daily in the medical, for a regiment is scarcely ever without a list of sick. Hence surgeons of regiments, who remove diseases by the use of internal remedies are *bona fide* physicians—as much physicians as Hippocrates; and they obtain the diploma in the same school, that is, the school of experience\*.” As Mr. Hunter had made a rule that no person should hold the rank of army-physician who was not, or had not been staff-surgeon, regimental-surgeon, or apothecary to the forces, Dr. Jackson was technically not qualified, and his offer was not accepted. The rejection was a disappointment, for he was particularly desirous of seeing the diseases of the West Indies again, for his own satisfaction; but as it was couched in such terms by Mr. Hunter, as led him to believe that the circumstance of his not having borne a surgeon’s commission was the only bar to the appointment, he replied that he was willing to take the surgery of a regiment actually in the West Indies, or under orders for it, on the understanding that the physician’s commission would be given to him on the first proper occasion. The surgery of the third regiment of foot or Buffs, then embarked at Spithead, as part of the force destined for the West Indies under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Grey, was offered and accepted. He set out immediately to join the corps at Spithead; but before he reached London Mr. Hunter was dead, consequently whatever might have been projected with regard to the physician’s rank was void. The Buffs, instead of going to the West Indies, as had been intended, were put under the command of the Earl of Moira, as part of a force destined to land, or make a demonstration on the coast of France. His lordship’s expedition, as it was called, looked at Cherburg at a distance, passed some days in the roads of Guernsey in stormy weather, and returned to England about the end of the year; landed at Cowes in the Isle of Wight, and the troops were dis-

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\* Dr. Jackson, *Remarks on the Constitution of the Medical Department of the British Army, &c.*



persed in cantonments in the neighbourhood. The Buffs were sent to Lymington in January.

The medical department of the British army being without a head by the death of Mr. Hunter, it was new-modelled, being put under the management of a board consisting of a physician-general, a surgeon-general, and an inspector-general of regimental-hospitals; all of them men unacquainted with military service, and not one of them eminent in the walks of science in civil life. There was an ardent desire for innovation in the minds of men in 1793, and the new medical board, participating in the common rage, without experience to guide it, considered the first proper step in their proceedings to be the destruction of the work of its predecessors. Mr. Hunter, as we have seen, had instituted a fundamentally good rule, requiring ostensible service as a qualification for army-physician. It evinced experience to a certain extent. It supposed an acquaintance with army diseases, with the manners of soldiers, the routine of economy and management of troops. The new board made service in the former qualifying ranks an absolute preclusion from the rank of physician, and got enacted a law that the appointment of physician to the army, was in future to be confined to a privileged class, namely, the graduates of Oxford or Cambridge, members of the College of Physicians of London, or, in defect of candidates possessing these privileges, to licentiates of the college. Any one else was completely barred away, even though he might possess the knowledge of Sydenham or Radcliffe. Dr. Jackson re-entered the army in expectation of being appointed army-physician at an early period. By acting as surgeon, having fulfilled the old legal condition which existed when on its faith he broke up his country practice to fulfil another object, he considered himself qualified and fairly entitled to benefit accordingly. So deeming, in March 1794, he went from Lymington, where his regiment was stationed, to London, to ascertain in what view the case stood with the chiefs of the medical department. Having obtained an interview with the physician-general (Sir Lucas Pepys), he was informed by him, after some official formalities, that he could not be permitted to entertain the hopes of ever getting the step of physician in the army. Dr. Jackson stated the condition under which he had re-entered the service, urging the justness of his claim. It was of no avail. The existing regulation was against

it. Dr. Jackson rejoined in a persistent manner, "that he had been in the West Indies, that he had written a book on the fevers of Jamaica, that he presumed to have attained some knowledge of the diseases of tropical climates, and that he was desirous to apply the same to the benefit of his majesty's service." The physician-general lost temper, and replied with acrimony, "Had you the knowledge of Sydenham or Radcliffe, you are the surgeon of a regiment, *and the surgeon of a regiment can never be allowed to be physician to his majesty's army.*" The words were pronounced with official authority, and a final emphasis, that shewed there could be no appeal. The doctor contented himself with observing, that the regulation was made in ignorance, and could not fail of being injurious to the service in its consequences; a remark which a worldly-wise man perhaps would have left unsaid; but as it was the truth, he felt no scruple in stating it as his honest opinion; and thereby no doubt sealed his doom with the triarch of the board. The matter is not without its moral, as showing the off-hand oppression and injustice that heads of departments sometimes wantonly commit; compromising thereby the rights, comforts, and hopes, of whole classes, to say nothing of individuals, in an unnecessary and flagrant manner, through the operation of *ex post facto* regulations of retrospective effect, and in direct breach of preexisting laws and covenants.

The interview with the physician-general having terminated thus inauspiciously, Dr. Jackson went to Lord Amherst, who was then commander-in-chief, and to whom he was personally known, in order to resign the surgency of the Buffs. Being, however, informed by his lordship that the regiment was that day ordered to Jersey, where there was apprehension of an attack from the enemy, he suspended his resolution, and accompanied the corps to its destination. He remained at Jersey about two months, and the regiment being ordered to the Continent, he continued on with it, being desirous to witness one campaign on the great scale of war before he returned to civil life. Accordingly he accompanied the regiment to Flanders, in August 1794. The army, as the reader knows, was commanded by his royal highness the duke of York. In a day or two after, the Buffs joined the army at Rozendael, near Bergen-op-Zoom; the commander-in-chief was riding along the line, accompanied by Major (afterwards Sir Harry) Calvert, who, it will be recollected, was

a subaltern in America, with Dr. Jackson. The major recognizing his old fellow-campaigner, stopped to parley with him, while the duke rode on. On rejoining his royal highness the major apologized for his absence, mentioning that he had just fallen in with an old friend; and giving a short account of his merits and services. The impression this made upon the duke was so favourable, that to it Dr. Jackson ascribed his rapid promotion, notwithstanding the physician-general's opposition. Indeed, as long as the duke remained commander-in-chief, the subject of this memoir continued to be honoured with his countenance and protection. When the duke left the army on the Continent, towards the close of this year (1794), on being appointed field-marshal and commander-in-chief of the British army, Lieutenant-general Harcourt succeeded to the command. The troops were in their retreat through Holland in a very sickly state. The sick were sent to hospitals whenever the army changed ground, and as it did so frequently, the accumulation in hospitals was great, and the mortality enormous. General Harcourt, soon after he succeeded to the command, transmitted a recommendation of Dr. Jackson to be physician to the forces. The army, as stated, was very sickly, and the hospital-physicians having no experience of army-diseases, had not the confidence of the army. His royal highness the commander-in-chief approved the recommendation, and enforced the appointment, on an understanding with the medical board, that the doctor should enter with the London College as licentiate, so soon as the circumstances of the service would permit of his return to England. The board was thus forced to annul its own regulation, and the physician's rank was again thrown open to the regimental surgeon, and the monopoly of the college dissolved. He joined the hospital as physician at Bremen. Holland was lost, and it was determined that the infantry should be withdrawn from the Continent, but the cavalry, amounting to about five thousand, were to remain under the command of Major-general David Dundas, with a view of joining the Austrians upon a proper occasion.

General Harcourt put it to the doctor's option to remain with the cavalry at the head of the medical department. This was a mark of good opinion, and moreover confirmed, contrary to the rule of the service, by appointing him, though only acting-

physician, to form the arrangements, and to superintend the embarkation of the sick and convalescent of the infantry, which were to be withdrawn from the Continent. The sick (nearly five hundred) were sent from Bremen to Bremen-lake, in the supposition that a sufficient tonnage of transports had been prepared for their reception. The strength of the army, and the amount of its baggage, had not been properly reported, or the agent of transports had erred in his calculation; for when the sick arrived at Bremen-lake, no adequate provision of transports was reserved for them, consequently there was a necessity for dispersing them in the villages of the neighbourhood, until a sufficiency of transports should be sent from England. The medical arrangements were under the superintendence of Dr. Jackson; the military were under the care of Colonel (afterwards Major-general) Barnet, a man singular in his attention to the interests of sick soldiers. When the transports arrived, the sick (a great porportion of whom were then convalescent) were embarked in good order, and Dr. Jackson returned to Bremen, where the general hospital for the cavalry was established. Dr. Kennedy, who had been inspector of hospitals on the Continent, and in ill health for some months, died about the time, and Dr. Jackson was appointed his successor, in direct opposition to the wishes, and even against the strongest remonstrances, of the medical board. Being thus placed in charge of the medical department of a division of the army, it became necessary that he should communicate with the medical chiefs at home. He accordingly wrote to them repeatedly on matters of hospital management, but received no answers to his letters.

Upon the infantry being withdrawn and embarked from Bremen, Dr. Jackson was ordered to England. The spirit of the nation did not allow this force to remain long idle at home. It was new-modelled, and prepared for service abroad. Two armies were assembled, under the direction of Lieutenant-general Sir Ralph Abercrombie. One was collected in England, amounting to 15,000 men, the *élite* of the army, intended for the conquest of the French Charibean Islands; another was assembled in Ireland, destined for the subjugation of St. Domingo, a portion of which island had been occupied since the year 1794. The commander-in-chief was to sail with the division from England; Major-general John Whyte was to conduct that in Ireland from

the Cove of Cork to the general rendezvous at Barbadoes. When the newspapers announced the preparation of armaments for service in the tropics, Dr. Jackson signified his desire at the war-office to be included in the staff of one of the projected expeditions. The loss by death had been great in the army which previously served in that quarter of the world, under Sir Charles Grey; and there was a general opinion that the management of the medical department had not been so good as it might, or, rather, ought to have been. Government, it would appear, was desirous to preclude complaint on that head, by the selection of fit medical chiefs; and as some members of the cabinet had a high opinion of the professional abilities of Mr. Rush, proposals were made to that gentleman to undertake the medical superintendence of the greater of the two armaments. The terms offered to Mr. Rush at retirement, marked the high value that was set upon his service. He was satisfied with the terms, but there were causes, not known to every one, which induced him to decline. Dr. Jackson, by accident, met Mr. Rush in London, who, knowing the purpose for which he had been brought from the Continent, informed him of his negotiations with government, on the subject of medical superintendence for the Charibean expedition. Dr. Jackson had only just arrived from Bremen when he met Mr. Rush. He reported himself at the Horse Guards, and was ordered to Southampton, there to report himself to Sir Ralph Abercrombie. Being known to Sir Ralph, he was received with great kindness, as the destined medical chief of the expedition. On the second day after his arrival, when Sir Ralph desired him to take into consideration the arrangements prior to embarkation, he took the liberty of mentioning that he had seen Mr. Rush, and had been informed by him of the terms which had been held out to him, and wished to know if the same terms were available for others. Sir Ralph replied, that he believed not; that government would not be disposed to give the same terms to others. The doctor observed, that in such case he did not consider himself at liberty to undertake the responsibility; not on account of rank or pecuniary consideration, but with the impression on his mind that government thought injuriously of his qualifications. Sir Ralph replied, that the matter did not altogether strike him in that light, for Mr. Rush, by accepting the appointment, would give

up a lucrative practice ; that he, Dr. Jackson, was already in the service, and lost nothing. This was true as a matter of bargain, but in Dr. Jackson's opinion the superintendence of the health department of an army was not to be weighed in the scale of traffic, and on this subject his mind was made up. He has been blamed by his friends for this decision, as it affected his own interest, but he always maintained, that according to his own feelings, and in justice to the profession, he could not have done otherwise, or have undertaken the responsibility of medical chief on conditions inferior to those which he knew to have been offered to another, since it would have marked a confession of inferior fitness ; an idea under which no man who esteems himself properly could act. Sir Ralph was disappointed, and seemed chagrined. He desired that the decision should be put in writing, to be transmitted to London. It was accordingly given in, and it was therein stated, that though he could not undertake the responsibility of the department on conditions inferior to those which had been offered to another ; yet, as he was desirous of serving in the West Indies, he was willing to serve in an inferior station, as physician of the forces. Nothing more was known of the reception of his statement at headquarters, but Mr. Young was gazetted as inspector-general of hospitals for the Charibean Islands. It was, however, intimated to him, that it would be acceptable to his royal highness the commander-in-chief, if he would serve in St. Domingo, as second to Mr. Weir. This he accepted without hesitation, for it brought the object of his pursuit within his reach. The troops destined for St. Domingo being ordered to assemble at the Cove of Cork, as the second medical officer of the expedition, he was despatched there in October, to look into the state of health prior to embarkation. The expedition sailed, and after touching at the general rendezvous at St. Salvador's, arrived at Cape St. Nicholas' Mole, on the 1st of May, 1796, where Mr. Weir fixed his quarters. Dr. Jackson was sent to visit all the different stations in the island occupied by British troops ; and it was at Jeremie, the chief port in the grand cense district where Dr. Borland was the senior medical officer under the command of General Bowyer, that he made his first acquaintance with Dr. Jackson, on his official inspection of that quarter of St. Domingo. It will be seen from the foregoing that his disappointment at not pro-



ceeding, in the first instance, as he had intended and desired, to the West Indies, ultimately turned out fortunately for his own satisfaction, and the advancement of medical knowledge; as it afforded him the opportunity of investigating, in a wide and varied field, the no less important subject of contagious fever, which prevailed to a great extent during the retreat of the British troops through Holland and Germany; of the medical history of which campaign, remarkable for its sickness and mortality, his pen has presented the world with a melancholy but accurate and instructive picture. The duty assigned to him at St. Domingo afforded the means of examining the features and causes of endemic disease at different points and in different climates, more fully than had occurred to any other person on the medical staff of that army. He kept up his accustomed rule, as pursued in Holland, of writing the annals of disease at the bed-side of the sick, and minuting, on the spot, every circumstance observed, notwithstanding other and various laborious duties as the head of a department. But there was something important besides that called for his conscientious interference, for with him it was a rule, if a real abuse arose as an obstacle in the path of his duty, not to go round it—not merely to flank it—but to blow it up. This resolute determination to do what was right, gave some an impression of his being inclined to be insubordinate. He certainly was not tolerant of known wrong when he met it as an obstacle, nor was he to be awed from exposing it merely from personal considerations; but he was too good a disciplinarian, ever for a moment even, to commit himself, in a military sense, by any shew of difficulty or cavil to supreme authority. He had an innate love of justice, but it was always under the control of military rectitude, when he was in a military position. Shortly after his arrival at St. Domingo, a matter called for his interference, which may be given in his own words. “The colonels of colonial regiments, or persons connected with them, had at that time a contract for the subsistence of their sick in hospital. The *expense was enormous*. The author was directed to visit the different posts, to inspect the different establishments, and to report the most probable means of remedy. These were not of difficult discovery, for it had been perfectly proved by him in his former experience,

that the value of the ration—in this case a commuted ration—that is, fresh meat in place of salt meat, wine in place of rum, *ad valorem*; with the power of charging with the commissary the species of provision, according to a fixed rate of value, would furnish the means of supplying every requisite subsistence, or extra refreshment which sick men require. The plan was suggested, approved, and carried into effect. The saving to the public was great—not less than eighty thousand pounds a year; and the comfort of the sick was increased, for it did not depend upon the liberality of a contractor\*.”

His sudden advancement in the service surprised many, nor was he himself an exception to the feeling, more especially, considering the official rancour against him, which lost no opportunity of venting itself whenever it could, and always under the guise of public expediency. We need not look far for the cause of his elevation. The jealousy against him was understood at headquarters. There the character of the man was fully known and appreciated. He had a staunch friend, too, in Sir Harry Calvert. It may be also, that a short memorial which he had written, and transmitted to the secretary at war, on the medical arrangements of troops on service, may have had its share in it. This had been seen by several officers of reputation on the Continent, particularly Sir Ralph Abercrombie; and it is probable that an official report by Colonel Barnet, which mentioned his diligence and attention to the sick at Bremen-lake, in terms of high commendation, might have decided his royal highness to promote him on the death of Dr. Kennedy. He assigned it himself, as well as all his good fortune in the army medical-department, to Sir Harry Calvert, who though no professed patron, was a true and steady friend. His kindnesses were really acts of the heart, and the relation of them used to make the doctor's bosom glow with grateful emotion, even in his old age. Writing to a friend not long before his death, he thus expresses himself. “If my labours have effected any useful change in the management of the medical department of the British army, Sir Harry Calvert may be regarded as the author of it; for had not Sir Harry been with the army on the Continent, in the year 1794, and had he not

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\* *Remarks on the Constitution of the Medical Department, &c.*

been a sincere and unostentatious friend, I would have left the service, at the close of the campaign in Holland, as the simple surgeon of a regiment\*."

When the evacuation of Port au Prince by the British troops, in 1798, liberated a portion of the medical staff, and Dr. Jackson and other medical officers were preparing to return to England, his friend Dr. Borland suggested a joint excursion to the United States of America; a proposal to which he eagerly assented. They accordingly embarked at Mole St. Nicholas, and General Maillard having kindly furnished them with letters of introduction, and despatches to Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Liston, then British minister at the United States, they pursued their voyage. Arriving at Philadelphia, they met with attention from Dr. Rush and other American physicians; and to Dr. Jackson it must have been gratifying to find that his professional fame had preceded him in that country. His first book on fever being considered a standard work, was in the hands of every respectable practitioner. This tour furnished an opportunity, which he of course seized, of further investigating the nature of yellow fever, which then prevailed at Philadelphia and New York. At this time, Dr. Rush was the most eminent as well as popular medical man in the United States. Of amiable manners, and singular benevolence, he was one of those distinguished men of whom his country has just cause to be proud; for he was both enlightened, and zealous for every scheme of philanthropy. He was the most active instrument in framing and superintending the economical arrangements of the jail of Philadelphia, which, notwithstanding the pains that of late years have been taken on the subject of jails in other countries, is as yet unparalleled in respect to the moving principle that directs the management\*. The government of jails is ordinarily a controul of harshness; kindness being considered alien to its purposes, or being at any rate a mere contingent condescension. The jail of Philadelphia, in so far as strangers might judge at that time, was truly under a system of benign authority; the prisoner, though erring and criminal, being still deemed entitled to humane consideration. Prominent in the field of good sense and benevolence, Dr. Rush was actively instrumental in diffusing knowledge throughout the American

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\* Dr. Borland's Notes.

continent, thus acquiring universal respect as a national benefactor. To have witnessed the friendship and confidence which sprung up, it might be said intuitively between these two excellent men, was indeed most gratifying\*. At Dr. Rush's table, too, Dr. Jackson renewed his acquaintance with his former generous foe, General Morgan, whose prisoner he had been. It was delightful to witness the glow of cordial satisfaction with which they embraced at meeting.

The war between Great Britain and France still continuing, Dr. Jackson and his friend Dr. Borland, on quitting the United States, embarked for England, on board a neutral vessel, in order to avoid the risk of capture by French privateers. Landing safely at Portsmouth, the former with all practicable expedition rejoined his family at Stockton, and in the course of the same year (1798), published the result of his experience on the Continent of Europe, as well as of his arduous researches in St. Domingo†. The superintendence of the medical concerns of a body of Russian troops, consisting of 1700 men, which acted with the British army in the expedition to the Helder, in the year 1799, was next committed to Dr. Jackson, by the desire of the Russian ambassador, Count Woronzow. These troops, after the termination of their disastrous service in North Holland, were stationed in the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, where they arrived in a most disorganized and sickly condition. The management of their numerous hospitals in these islands was conducted upon a principle of efficiency, economy, and judicious adaptation of means to purposes, not previously witnessed in the British army. The success that had attended his management in this special service, was so manifest, that his royal highness the commander-in-chief was induced the following year (1800) to nominate him physician and head of the army-depot hospital (then at Chatham), on the death of Dr. Mitchell. As has been justly observed by Dr. Barnes, "self-advancement was never his object. It will ever redound to his praise for moderation and disinterestedness, that having obtained the rank of army-physician, he never after-

\* Dr. Borland's Notes.

† The work bore the title of *An Outline of the History and Cure of Fever, Contagious and Endemic, more especially the Contagious Fever of ships, jails,*

*and hospitals—vulgarly called the Yellow Fever of the West Indies; to which is added, an explanation of military discipline and economy; with a scheme of medical arrangement of armies.*

wards solicited higher rank or emolument, and he always offered his services to the public when he thought they would be useful\*.” The recommendation of the duke of York, as he stated himself afterwards, in his printed letter to Sir David Dundas; “proceeded from his royal highness, without application or knowledge on his part. He was not in his own mind desirous of the office, but as he was named to it, he was solicitous to execute his duty to the best of his ability, both as acquitting himself of an important trust, and as testifying the sense he entertained of the high mark of confidence which his royal highness had been pleased to place in him.” But this appointment launched him eventually upon a sea of troubles. As the title of the appointment (namely, head of the hospital) rendered him, according to the common interpretation of the word, responsible for the conduct of the business in all its details, he considered himself at liberty, or more properly speaking, bound by the tenor of his duty, to rectify such parts of the existing management as appeared on good evidence erroneous, or to supply such parts as appeared to be defective. As he had conducted those hospitals with the management of which he had been primarily intrusted, upon a simple plan, and with a striking comparative economy of means; he proceeded on the present occasion, with the approbation of Major-general Hewett, commandant of the depot and his immediate commanding officer, to adopt measures similar to those on which he had formerly acted. These alterations and improvements were such as would be now acknowledged without question. The full diet, which had absurdly been greater for a sick man than for a soldier well in barracks, was modified, and diet proper for a sick man substituted. He was not aware, of course, that there was any other object in the view of the army medical board, except that an hospital should be conducted in the best manner and at the smallest expense. It here became his duty to take away, not to add. The alterations were known to the board soon after they were framed. They were even approved by Mr. Keate, one of the members of the board, when he made a visit to Chatham in the month of June; an approbation which was expressed in the presence of Major-general Hewett, and of Mr. Warren the garrison surgeon†. The medical board, however, as the saying is, had a rod in pickle for a

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\* *Biographical Sketch.*

† Dr. Jackson's letter to Sir David Dundas.

man of whom it felt jealous. It happened that an epidemic sickness, added to the usual diseases of a crowded depot of recruits, prevailed in Parkhurst barracks, in the latter end of the year 1801, and as there was great sickness, there was, as might reasonably be expected from the character of it, considerable mortality. The physician-general and surgeon-general, overlooking altogether the economy and judiciousness of Dr. Jackson's alterations, and taking advantage of the accidental occurrence of sickness which was accompanied by some mortality, made representations, or rather preferred charges against his management, in the hopes (as the doctor himself publicly charged them with) of removing him from the service as a person disposed to innovate. The commander-in-chief on the charges thus preferred ordered an investigation, deeming it proper to appoint a board of medical officers specially to enquire and report opinion. The board thus appointed inspected the hospital, enquired into the circumstances of management, and reported thereon to the commander-in-chief. We subjoin an extract from the decision of the commander-in-chief, communicated to Major-general Hewett, through the secretary at war.

“*War Office, Jan. 16, 1802.*”

“His Royal Highness conceives the unanimous opinion of the board to have exculpated Dr. Jackson from all improper practice in the treatment of diseases, and in the care of the sick, and is gratified in seeing that an opportunity has thus been given to that most zealous officer of proving his fitness for the important situation in which he is placed.”

So far as it goes this was well enough, but it did not go far enough. To a medical officer of reputation and experience, and of a nice sense of honour, professional and personal, it could be no reparation for the attempt to destroy his character, to merely admit that he was *exculpated* from the charges of two persons (no matter how high their position) who had no practical knowledge of an army-department, the physician-general having never, that was publicly known, even transiently visited a military hospital, and the surgeon-general's services having been confined to London. As to the opportunity of proving his fitness for his office, surely *that* had been satisfactorily proved before, and to question it without the most unequivocal evidence, was of itself a grave offence. Either the charges of mal-practice were true



or false. If the latter, what did the framers of them deserve, especially if, as stated in a communication from General Hewett, "they employed means in the fabrication of them not consistent with the rules of military discipline?" His royal highness seemed to have a perceptive feeling of this, for the order concludes somewhat more stringently.

"The commander-in-chief has further, although with regret, declared his opinion that the physician and surgeon-general were not grounded in their representations regarding the hospitals in the Isle of Wight; and that instead of having recourse to inferior officers who had served under Dr. Jackson, for their opinion as to his practice and mode of treating the sick, it was their duty to satisfy themselves on these points from their own personal observation, &c."

After all that happened, it was still optional with Dr. Jackson to remain at his station; but as the execution of his duties at the army-depot hospital implied occasional correspondence with the army medical board, of which Mr. Keate was the corresponding member, and it was not possible, according to his own apprehension of things, to hold intercourse of any kind with a person who had acted so insidiously as, according to Dr. Jackson, he had done, he desired leave to resign. The resignation was accepted, and the following letter evinces the commander-in-chief's sentiments on the occasion:—

"SIR,

"*Horse Guards, 3rd March, 1802.*

"I have not failed to lay before the commander-in-chief your letter of the 18th ultimo, with its inclosures. Entertaining as His Royal Highness does the most favourable opinion of your zealous exertion in the execution of your duty, and setting a just estimation on the merits of your former services, he cannot but regret your having expressed a desire to retire on half-pay; at the same time, as you represent your present situation as so little to be reconciled to your feelings, and contributing so little to your comfort, His Royal Highness cannot desire you to continue it, and will therefore submit your resignation to His Majesty.

"I have, &c.

(Signed) "ROBERT BROWNRIGG."

To Dr. Jackson.

The worst of official bickerings is, that they poison the very fountains of zeal and efficiency. Through a persevering spirit of rancorous opposition, the ablest medical officer in the British army

was thus driven out of it, by persons immensely his inferiors, save in respect to their court-influence, and the civic weight which the power of passing enormous bills unaudited and unchecked must always give. It is most likely that, had the duke of York been aware of Dr. Jackson's intention to retire, that the official rebuke of his persecutors might have been more severely couched. It is scarcely sufficiently so for justice. But their persecution did not end there. A report found its way to the public ear, that Dr. Jackson was removed compulsorily, as unfit to perform the duty of physician. As such a report could not fail to make an impression in the army, he afterwards contradicted it publicly, in a work which he published in 1803, entitled, *Remarks on the Constitution of the Medical Department of the British Army, &c. &c.* Having thus been forced to retire into private life, he resumed the exercise of his profession at Stockton-upon-Tees, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants. The work alluded to above, was followed in 1805, by another, entitled, *A System of Arrangement and Discipline of the Medical Department of Armies.*

A very different turn had now very nearly been given to the pursuits of Dr. Jackson, and which would have called for the display of his talents in a field comparatively new, and which, if we regard its extent and its resources, were well worthy of his energy and genius. In adverting to this matter, we cannot withhold our admiration at a rare instance of pure and disinterested friendship arising out of it. In March 1806, Dr. Borland having heard from an officer of rank, that Major-general Simcoe would be soon sent to India in command of the troops, took the liberty of bringing Dr. Jackson's name before him, and with reference to "his military zeal, his professional skill, his general learning, and, more especially, his acquaintance with Arabic literature, his indefatigable application and his inflexible integrity"—suggesting his fitness for a situation in the secretariat. Dr. Jackson being absent, and at a great distance from London, his excellent friend went on to say, "that knowing that his modesty had in more than one instance compromised his own interest, and that of his family, he (Dr. Borland) could not help making an attempt to draw singular worth from obscurity to a useful public station, even though at the risk of being himself deemed intrusively officious." General Simcoe's answer follows.

"DEAR SIR,

"March 12, 1806.

"I HAD the favour of your letter, and I can assure you it will always give me great satisfaction to hear from you on any subject. I have the highest opinion of Dr. Jackson, and the greatest respect for his talents; and had it been my fortune to have been called upon active service, as I had a right to expect, it was my determination to have offered him my best assistance in the line of his profession—in any other way, of course, it would have been a subject of deliberation whether I could avail myself of his services.

"In regard to the East, I do not covet, nor shall I shun, employment in that quarter; as a military man, I shall always be ready to march wherever the government may think my services of public utility—but it has always been my belief, that the civil capacity of the country is unequal to wield its military sword, otherwise there certainly are means by which *all* military men might be employed in Europe, and the throne of the Italian shaken to its foundations. I hope to be of such a party, and am, with great truth,

"Yours, &c.

(Signed) "J. G. SIMCOE."

The coming event had cast a true shadow before: in 1807 General Simcoe was actually nominated commander-in-chief of the forces in India. He had commanded the forces at St. Domingo, and there had an opportunity, when Dr. J. was head of the medical department on that island, of forming his own judgment respecting his qualifications, and military turn of mind. Neither had he forgotten the letter of Dr. Jackson's generous friend. No sooner did the general obtain intimation of his appointment, than he wrote to Dr. Jackson, offering him the confidential situation on his staff, of military secretary. This tribute to his worth, public and private, on the part of so distinguished an officer as the general, was highly gratifying to its object, and the offer was at once gratefully accepted. It was a rare if not a solitary instance, of the selection in the royal army, of a medical officer to such a situation, and it held out to his enquiring and acute mind the means and opportunity of studying the character of the various races and castes, from which the ranks of the East India Company's army are recruited, and of analyzing the local and climatic causes influencing the faculties and conduct of man. He had already come to the conclusion, that education, associations, and institutions, act more powerfully than climate

on the formation of national character; for the historians of the states of Greece and Italy abundantly prove, that in the same regions, under the same climate, a people may at one period be sunk in ignorance and superstition to the lowest level of degradation, and at another elevated to the highest moral and intellectual pitch. In confirmation of this view he looked forward with delight to a residence in India.

While General Simcoe's arrangements for proceeding to India with his family were in progress, government requested him, in conjunction with General James St. Clare Erskine, (afterwards Lord Rosslyn), to proceed to Portugal on a political mission of a few weeks' duration. The mission ended, he embarked at Lisbon in a frigate, the cabins of which had been newly painted; and, unfortunately, the exhalations from the metallic oxides of the paint, so suddenly and injuriously affected his health, that he was landed in a dying state off Exmouth, transported in a boat up the Ex to Topsham, and from thence conveyed to his own residence near Hinton, where he expired. Thus, by the decease of this excellent officer and warm-hearted friend, Dr. Jackson was deprived of a valuable appointment, and of the opportunity of visiting India, one so favourable to his congenial pursuits. It is not possible sufficiently to measure the amount of loss thus sustained by the cause of philosophical, scientific, and statistical knowledge.

The subject of medical establishments, especially for armies, he always considered as of very high importance. It was confessedly complex, for "it comprehends a wide range of general and practical knowledge of military science, as well as a correct acquaintance with the history, causes, and consequences of the diseases to which troops are most liable in the field or in quarters\*." It is evident that he was of opinion that a more general reference to army medical men than has ever held in the British forces, would be advantageous to the health of troops in various ways, as the choice of ground for barracks, quarters, &c. "To these persons (military surgeons) who are supposed to be well acquainted with the nature of things, and with the laws of organic life, reasonably appear to be assigned the duties of investigating the nature of deranging causes, of ascertaining their presence,

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\* *Remarks, &c.*

and pointing out the means of obviating their effects; in short, of keeping the materials in order, and fit for their places in the great arrangement; or of making suitable provision for disembarassing the military movement, by the removal of inefficient parts. The office in its full latitude is of high importance; but it is scarcely ever exercised by officers of the health department in full latitude. In the arrangements preventive of sickness, army-doctors have but a feeble voice: they rarely are permitted to prescribe a rule for obviating the recurrence of disease; their labours are chiefly confined to the treatment of those who are actually sick, that is, to the repair of ineffective parts\*." To know everything, he justly observed, which may be done to retrench superfluity, without encroaching on utility and comfort, requires a correct knowledge of the wants of sick men, not to be learned but from domestication in an hospital. Further, a correct acquaintance with the nature and form of military diseases, is a necessary and preliminary knowledge for the medical chief of an army; but it is a knowledge which can only be acquired by study in the school of experience. Throughout all his works, the most superficial reader cannot fail to see how his army experience and correct acute turn for observation, stamp a peculiar freshness of value on all he reads, in a variety of ways evincing his stores of self-acquired knowledge. It will be seen that between the years 1803 and 1809 Doctor Jackson published several works on the system and arrangement and discipline of the medical department of the army, exposing the enormous abuses, administrative and financial, then existing. It is due to his character for military subordination and regularity to state, that not till his official representations had altogether been disregarded by the chancellor of the exchequer of the day, had he recourse, under the strong impulse of duty, to publication. It was only when his demonstration, that "two-thirds of the medical officers of the hospital staff were not adequately employed, and that two-thirds, or more than two-thirds, of the medicines ordered for the use of the forces destined to act in foreign parts, decayed and perished in store before there was an opportunity of applying them to a purpose:"—it was only when "Mr. Pitt did not deign to acknowledge his communications,

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\* *Remarks, &c.*

even by one of his under-secretaries, that recourse was had to the hands of a printer." Dr. Jackson felt that, with the mass of fact and information in his possession, "he would have deemed himself culpable to the nation had he withheld his communication." It was only then when the official doors were closed in his face, that he made his appeals to the public, which tended to the final explosion of vast abuse, if not speculation.

When the army of reserve was formed at the commencement of the Peninsular war, Dr. Jackson was appointed inspector-general of hospitals. The physician-general and surgeon-general had not been consulted, and they probably considered that this appointment would be regarded as a marked censure of their past conduct; for their proceedings relative to the depot hospitals, when they condemned Dr. Jackson's practice, without an opportunity of judging of it by fair evidence, were now fully exposed in the statements given in his publications of 1803. The commissioners, who were appointed under the authority of parliament to enquire into the conduct and management of the different military departments of the state, directed their attention to the medical, among others, and in the fifth report, which came out in 1808, suggested alterations in that branch of the service, which produced a strong sensation in the minds of Sir Lucas Pepys and Mr. Keate\*. Dr. Jackson had written on different occasions upon the subject of medical arrangement for armies, and the commissioners, it appears, had looked into his books. The physician-general and surgeon-general, with correct prescience, were apprehensive that they might be rejected from their offices, in consequence of the information of the report. Their indignation could scarcely have been applied to the commissioners without a dread of pains and penalties in their official capacity. Dr. Jackson was a safer object, and a great share of that indignation was directed at him, under the supposition that he was the source from which the information of the commissioners had been derived. Mr. Keate published observations on the Parliamentary Report; and, in an appendix, pretended to give an account of Dr. Jackson. This was apparently, Dr. Jackson considered, purposely done for offence, as it was unconnected with his subject, and directly in defiance of the customary

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\* Letter to Sir David Dundas.



discipline of the army. Dr. Jackson moved for an investigation before a military court. Mr. Keate refused to accede; and, as Dr. Jackson was on half-pay, he was precluded from demanding it\*. In consequence of this refusal, he addressed a letter to him, which was laid before the public, proving clearly the groundlessness of the assertions which he had made, or of the facts which he had alleged; and expressing his surprise 'that a man so arraigned should be permitted to hold the office of surgeon-general, till acquitted by public trial\*.' When events in Spain made almost every one desirous to give aid in a cause so noble, Dr. Jackson had it intimated to the Duke of York, that if his services could be useful, they were entirely at his royal highness's disposal, *and that it was a matter of indifference to him in what rank he served.* The offer was referred, through the secretary of war, to the army medical board. The physician-general and surgeon-general replied, that there were various, and, in their opinion, unsurmountable objections to his being employed in the medical department of the army. Here was another blow. They were desired to state them—and did so at great length. It would be foreign to our purpose to enter into the details of them. They were afterwards demolished by the vigorous arm of him against whom they were levelled. In reply to an attack upon his practice, he thus expresses himself, with a truthfulness that loses nothing from the cool contempt with which it is stated:—"If my doctrines and practices be erroneous, it is time that they should be publicly proscribed; but it would be unfair, and it might be injurious, to proscribe them on the bare assertion of the president of the college, who never saw me treat a single case of disease, and who appears himself never to have treated a patient of the class upon which my practice was tried. The illnesses of the soldier, and those of the ladies of the court, are often of a different character; and I am aware that any man of common sense may conceive it, that means which seem harsh, and which might even be dangerous on the delicate conditions of those persons who ordinarily fall under Sir Lucas's care, though powerful in effect, are perfectly safe as applied to violent diseases in the more robust subjects with whom I have been chiefly concerned." The subjoined correspondence will explain itself.

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\* Letter to Sir David Dundas.

"SIR,

"*Medical Board Office, 15th Oct. 1808.*

"In consequence of your letter to Colonel Gordon, dated 6th instant, having been referred, through the Secretary at War, to the Army Medical Board for their report, it becomes necessary to know at what university or college, and at what time you obtained the degree of Doctor of Medicine; and I have therefore to request that you will send to me, as speedily as possible, your diploma of M.D., or an exact transcript thereof, and of the signatures thereunto annexed, for the information of the Army Medical Board.

"I am Sir, &c.

(Signed) "T. KEATE."

*To Dr. R. Jackson.*

*Answer to the above.*

"SIR,

"*Castle Eden, Oct. 17, 1808.*

"In answer to your letter of the 15th instant, (to which, considered as a communication from the Board to which His Majesty has committed the medical concerns of his army, I think it my duty to reply), I have briefly to observe, that I commenced my academical studies at Edinburgh in the year 1768, but that I afterwards studied at other places where I thought I had the chance of acquiring knowledge, particularly at Paris, and that I obtained the degree of Doctor in Medicine in the year 1785, at the University of Leyden, where, as the members of the Medical Board I presume know, it cannot be purchased for a mere sum of money. You require that I transmit my diploma, or an exact transcript of it, to your office for the information of the Medical Board; but this part of your request I cannot fulfil. I carried my diploma with me when I entered the army in the year 1795, as it was probable it might be required of me, and as it was left, with some books and other heavy baggage, at Helvoetsluys, it fell into the hands of the enemy in the year 1794, or beginning of 1795, in common with the other heavy baggage of the army. Such was the fate of my diploma. I never, I believe, was suspected of imposition on the public or the service; but if any doubt remain on the mind of the Board on this head, or if the Board be desirous to scrutinize the legality of the form of my medical diploma, it may satisfy its curiosity, and fulfil its duty, by applying to the Rector Magnificus at Leyden, who will order a copy of it, and also a copy of my thesis, to be furnished from the records and stores of the university. This is all I have to say on the subject.

(Signed) "ROBERT JACKSON, M.D."

*Thomas Keate, Esq.  
Surgeon-general.*

*Copy of a Letter to Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary,  
Dated 20th Oct. 1808.*

"SIR,

"I am unwilling to intrude on your time unnecessarily, but the surgeon-general having written a letter to me requesting to know where I graduated as physician, and further, having desired that I send him, for the information of the Medical Board, my diploma, or an exact transcript of it, I take the liberty of transmitting to you a copy of my answer to his request, as he gives me to understand, that it is made in consequence of my letter to you of the 6th instant being referred to the Board. After the knowledge which the Medical Board possess of me and my services, the demand made in Mr. Keate's letter appears unnecessary; I even feel it as an insult on my honour, inasmuch as it goes to insinuate that I had practised an imposition on the public, and on that account I could not have noticed it, did I not hold it to be a public duty to refuse no information to those who act in official capacities, though I may be aware that a sinister purpose is thereby intended. My diploma was lost on service with my other heavy baggage. As it may be difficult to procure a copy of it from Leyden University during the continuance of the war, if any doubt of its having existed should remain with any one, I can refer to a gentleman now in England, (Dr. Cogan, a man of literary eminence), who was at Leyden at the time, and who, as he had knowledge of the fact, will, I believe, certify to the circumstance of my having received the diploma of M.D. at the time stated.

"I have, &c.

(Signed) "ROBERT JACKSON."

There is a point of endurance, under a deliberate system of injurious and insulting annoyance, beyond which even a good-natured and a meek-minded man will not go. Nature will be nature, and, in spite of all conventional and prudential considerations, will assert its own. Violence is to be deprecated, but when it is excited by stinging and systematic provocation, it will plead for extenuation, according to the amount of previous obloquy. While smarting under a sense of accumulated injury, Dr. Jackson met the man whom he had conclusive reason to consider as his bitter, uncompromising, and unscrupulous enemy. He was hurried into what the law declares to be an assault, for

Who can be wise, amazed, temperate, and furious,  
Legal and neutral, in a moment?

Among the materials placed at our disposal is Dr. Jackson's own account of this transaction. It is written in his own hand,

and was evidently intended to be printed—most probably in some new edition of one of his works (perhaps *The Remarks on the Constitution of the Army Medical Department*) which he contemplated publishing, but did not live long enough to carry the intention out. In justice to his memory, and as an interesting and instructive document of a much-injured but high-souled and noble character, we give it entire.

“The author is unwilling to obtrude himself on the notice of the public, in matters which may be supposed to relate merely to himself; but he believes he will be excused for troubling it with a short detail of matters, not unimportant to the concerns of the medical department alone, but to the discipline of the British army. The author had written books, with the design of giving information on the subject of military health, and it is his duty to explain, to those whom it may concern, such circumstances in his conduct as may appear to affect his character. He was proscribed, it is to be observed, from the medical service of the British army, in the year 1803; and, it may be added, that he was proscribed through secret influence; for the official testimonies of approbation of his professional conduct were ample—as complete as were ever given to a medical man, and as satisfactory as any reasonable person could desire. The British nation stood forward, at one time, as the champion of European liberties against the emperor of France; and, amongst its other undertakings, it attempted, in autumn 1808, to support the Marquis de la Romana, as generalissimo of the Spanish force, which resisted the usurper Napoleon. The marquis was equipped in England; and, among other provisions, he required a British medical officer to adjust the medical concerns of the loyal Spanish army. The requisition of the marquis was known to General Calvert, who was then adjutant-general of the British army, and who was the tried friend of the author, under all the combinations that had been formed to oppress him. The appointment to the superintendence of the medical department of this Spanish force did not, in the general's opinion, interfere with the domain of the British army medical board, and, on that ground, the author's name was mentioned for it to the secretary for the war department, who at once acceded to the proposition, and desired that the author might come to London without delay. The minister at war had communicated on the subject with his royal highness the commander-in-chief, who was said to have approved and consented that a commission to the office should be made out, and entered in the *British Gazette*, prior to the author's departure from England, with a view to give “him authority and other accommodations which the British service could afford.”

The physician-general and surgeon-general were apprized of his arrival in London, and of the purpose for which he had been sent for. The medical concerns of the Spanish army could not in propriety be supposed to be under the control of the British medical board; the physician-general and surgeon-general, notwithstanding, interfered, and put every engine, lawful and unlawful, in requisition, to counteract the resolve of the minister-at-war to the author's appointment. It did not appear in the *Gazette* at the time expected; and the physician-general, exulting in the secret manœuvres of himself and colleague, was imprudent to boast, among his friends and acquaintance, that it never would take place. The report reached the author's ear, and he requested an interview with the minister-at-war, that he might learn the truth. The minister, Lord Castlereagh, was a courtier and a polite man; he assured him that there was no change in the determination of government; but the event shewed that there was a change, and that his lordship dissembled, or that the physician-general spoke from authority superior to the official authority of the state. The interdict which barred the appointment was said to have been obtained through an influence not acknowledged to exist in the British constitution\*. It marked a rancour and malignity in the physician-general and surgeon-general, which, for the credit of human nature, we are disposed to believe has few examples among men, particularly among men of the medical profession. It may be in the recollection of the reader, that charges were made by the physician-general and his colleague against the author, in the year 1801, for improper treatment of the sick in the hospital of the army depot. The charges were investigated by a board of medical officers, appointed specially by the commander-in-chief for the purpose of investigation, and declared to be unfounded. The commander-in-chief, in reliance on the accuracy of the report of the special board, reprimanded the physician-general and surgeon-general, as presenting an unfounded accusation, and censured them severely on the manner of making it up.

"This is the fact; and this ought to have been in the memory of the physician and surgeon-general in the year 1809, when they repeated the charges which were given in in the month of December 1801; charges which had been refuted, and the refutation of which had been accompanied by a reprimand from the commander-in-chief, which, to men of honor, would have been tantamount to dismission from their high trust; for they were told peremptorily that they had abused it. The physician-general took occasion, at this time, to add, that the

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\* This is understood as referring to the late Queen Charlotte.

author was not legally qualified to exercise the profession of physician in Great Britain, and that, in his opinion, as president of the College of Physicians of London, he, the author, was chargeable with *malpractice* in the care of the sick. It was not considered as an opinion of value ; for it was given without knowledge, and it did not weigh a feather in his estimation ; but it was an opinion from high official authority, and as it was received at the Horse Guards, it was important that it should not remain noted in the commander-in-chief's office without an answer on the part of the author. A letter was therefore written requesting that the subject should be referred to the decision of a military court, so that it might be known publicly where the truth was ; for, though the charges had been made and refuted, it was only at the army depot that this was officially and correctly known. The author being on half-pay, was not, in the opinion of the judge-advocate-general, entitled to demand a court-martial, but was told, in rather a courteous manner, that the civil courts were open to him. The civil courts of England are not open to men who have little money, and if they were so open, civil courts are not courts to judge what belongs to military discipline and decorum. The author did not desire pecuniary compensation for the pecuniary losses which might have been sustained through calumny ; he only desired trial, that his conduct might be known, and his character publicly vindicated or condemned ; he considered himself to be injured, and the authority of the commander-in-chief to be insulted and offended. There is not another instance in military record where accusations have been brought against an individual and refuted, the accusers reprimanded, and the reprimand acquiesced in for a term of years, without an attempt to shew error in the facts that brought out the reprimand, that has been again repeated, or, if repeated, that has been allowed to pass without penalty, perhaps without peremptory dismissal from the service. The sentence of the commander-in-chief of an army is decisive ; and the author believes that he is safe in saying, that a military officer who had offended in the manner the physician-general and surgeon-general had done, whatever might be his rank and condition, would have been expelled the army as his slightest punishment. The physician-general and surgeon-general were too high for punishment, or the author was too low for justice !

“The author sought for trial in a military court, but failed in obtaining it ; and as the physician and surgeon-general were insolent, or were conceived by him to be insolent, through the protection of the higher powers, which refused to grant a hearing, he was irritated, and urged to give personal chastisement, as a *dernier ressort*, in denial of law. The two colleagues stood in one predicament, in the estimate of the author ; but the chastisement fell upon the surgeon-general, as the first of the



offenders who crossed his path; he was met by accident, accosted, and after being informed that his conduct was such as deserved it, the chastisement was given by laying a cane upon his shoulders. The act was deemed an assault, and six months' confinement in the King's Bench prison was the punishment awarded. No remark is here made on the sentence of the court. The law of the country was offended by the author; the punishment was in legal form; and it was borne with patience and good temper through all its duration.

"Notwithstanding that the faulty constitution of the army medical board had been pointed out in the writings of the author and other experienced army medical officers, and also exposed by the official report of the commissioners of military enquiry, it continued unreformed until the parliamentary enquiry in 1810, on the subject of the Walcheren Expedition, brought out facts respecting the members of the board which astonished the public, and took from them, particularly from the physician-general, the protection of the higher authorities of the state. They were at last set aside, and replaced by a new medical establishment, consisting of a director-general and two principal inspectors, all men of military experience.

"The interdict of the late board having ceased with its dissolution in the year 1810, Mr. Weir, the new director-general, thinking the author's services might be useful to the troops in the West Indies, asked him whether he would again serve there; assent being signified, his name was submitted to Sir David Dundas, the then commander-in-chief; Sir David demurred, not being disposed to be troubled with a man who was considered insubordinate; Mr. Weir urged, stating that he had not found him so on service. The commander-in-chief reluctantly assented, adding, that the appointment, if made, must be at his (the director-general's) responsibility; Mr. Weir replied, that it should be so. The name was sent to the Gazette, and the author immediately proceeded to the windward and leeward West India Island station. When the tour of duty terminated, he had the satisfaction to produce testimonies that Mr. Weir was fully acquitted of the responsibility which he had so generously and courageously undertaken."

In the year 1809, the subject of our memoir was confined to the King's Bench prison six months for the assault alluded to. At the trial in court he allowed judgment against him to pass by default, making no attempt, through counsel, to screen himself from the consequences of the act, or to mitigate the sentence, which by those conversant with all the circumstances, was considered severe. Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise, as the counsel for the prosecution did not fail to paint in glowing colours the high

official station of his client, and the insubordinate conduct of the accused, which he either appeared to be ashamed of, or did not dare to employ counsel to defend. Thus, by the doctor's inconsiderate or intentional negligence, no extenuating matter was brought to the knowledge of the bench or the jury. The prosecutor had it all his own way, in consequence of the defendant ingenuously disdaining to gloss over a transaction springing from honest indignation, under a keen sense of tyranny and injury. In consequence of this mistaken silence, and no mitigating circumstances being put upon record, the unfavourable impression made upon the court by the speech of the adverse counsel may be supposed to have, in some degree, influenced the judgment. During the period of confinement in the King's Bench, his benevolent character was manifested by his gratuitously bestowing professional attendance and advice upon the sick and ailing prisoners. Engaged for several hours daily in this charitable occupation, with access to books, the exercise of his pen, and frequent visits from his oldest and best friend, Sir Harry Calvert, and others, the confinement was neither tedious nor irksome; in fact, he said, it passed pleasantly. His kindness to the prisoners was so greatly appreciated, that on the day of his liberation he was presented with an address of thanks, signed by every individual; and all of them who were able, assembled at the door of his apartment, and accompanied him to the prison-gate, there testifying the warm sincerity of their gratitude, by parting cheers, and acclamations of "God bless you!" He often mentioned afterwards, that he prized this address from the prisoners, more highly than any diploma or testimonial of merit that had ever been tendered to him.

As mentioned by Dr. Jackson above, in 1810 the government instituted an important change in the constitution of the army medical department. The board, consisting of a physician-general, a surgeon-general, and an inspector-general, was dissolved. It was high time. It had either winked at, or fostered, a system of enormous abuse. The system of hospital management and discipline carried out by Dr. Jackson at the military depot of the Isle of Wight, (now long since become that of the whole British army), was so simple, economical, and effective in all its parts, that it had struck dismay into the hearts of contractors and purveyors, who felt their occupation gone, under

a rule of weekly audit, at which the wine and porter contractor, the medical stores and surgeons' instruments' contractor, the purveyor; in short, the entire host of harpies that had battered on the spoliation of the day, took the alarm. The very official existence of such a man as Jackson was ruin to them. This was only to be evaded by *his* ruin, and that they sought, after the fashion specified in the foregoing pages, to effect, with the aid of a not very scrupulous board, that passed enormous sums, say of seventy thousand pounds even, unaudited and unchecked! He stood the storm firm and undaunted, and strenuously demanded an investigation before a court martial, which the then commander-in-chief, Sir David Dundas, for reasons not known to us, declined to grant. But, as Napoleon would say, the destiny of the board was fulfilled—it ceased to reign\*. The management of the army medical department was now vested in a director-general of the whole, assisted by three principal inspectors, upon a plan analogous to that adopted in other branches of the military executive.

This change opened the door to Dr. Jackson's return to active service, without any sacrifice of his feelings; for it was founded upon the very principles he had strenuously advocated. Accordingly, in 1811, a vacancy having occurred in the direction of the medical affairs of the West India station, this enterprising servant of the public, notwithstanding his previous toils in the torrid zone, came again forward, with unimpaired talents and undiminished zeal, to offer his service, which was accepted. He pursued for several years a most active superintending duty, visiting, at intervals, all the islands and colonies within the military command; finally contributing to the records deposited in the director-general's office a most valuable series of health inspection reports, comprising the topography and diseases of every island and station occupied by British troops in the West Indies, including Jamaica, to which his inspection was extended, under a special commission.

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\* A vitality clings to forms. What-ever has been once instituted has a resuscitative power. Bad systems have a fatal fecundity. The medical board one, it might be supposed, had received its quietus for ever. Thirty years after their extinction in England, where they had

been found inexpedient, there has been a revival in India of physician-generals, and surgeon-generals, forming boards of administration for the army medical department of the Honourable East India Company.

In 1815 he returned to England, and two years afterwards presented to the public the sum of his observations on the recent service, namely, *A Sketch of the History and Cure of Febrile Diseases; more particularly as they appear in the West Indies among the Soldiers of the British Army*. Of this work a second edition was published in 1820, containing, besides other additions, a most valuable summary of his official reports on military positions, barracks, and hospitals, in the West Indies, which had been submitted to the commander of the forces on that station, between the years 1812 and 1815, with the view of directing the attention of the government to the best means of preserving the health and lives of the military in that climate, and, at the same time, of husbanding the military resources of the nation. Of this edition the following notice was taken in the bibliographical record of the *Quarterly Journal of Medical Science*: 'The matter indeed of these two volumes offers a most astonishing fund of information on the subject of fever, and no tropical visitor, in particular, should proceed to his destination without possessing the work. The European physician, too, will find that the veteran Jackson has anticipated almost every modern writer on fever in all those points of pathology and practice in which we excel our forefathers.'

We have become, in self-defence, such a military nation, that whatever has reference to the welfare and health of our soldiers is of importance. Dr. Jackson's sentiments on all such subjects are entitled to the utmost consideration, and deserve to be as widely disseminated as possible. We offer no apology therefore to our military readers for adverting to them. Though himself a rigid disciplinarian, Dr. Jackson considered the Prussian principle of terror as a degrading one, and advocated, throughout his long career, the cultivation of a kindly communion between the British officer and private soldier, deeming that the latter ought ever to be treated as a rational being. 'Whether with the medical or military officer,' he says, 'the heart must be warm with charity, the mind firm in knowledge; for no class of men are more dexterous in probing the rotten parts of the heart, or in unmasking the weak mind of their superior, than the mass of common soldiers.' He goes on to observe, 'The physician restores the sick soldier to health; the military officer witnesses the process; he is in some degree the master of the means, and he is judge

of the effect. The soldier who is consoled by the words of friendship, as he lies feeble and dejected in the hospital-bed, gives courage to the arm in the field when restored to the vigour of health, conquers like a hero, or falls by the side of his officer and friend—his wounds in front, and his face towards the enemy.\* On the same rational grounds, he is opposed to all vexatious restrictions, especially in hot climates and unhealthy countries, in which he often witnessed their ill effects on health and morals. 'In the West Indies, for instance, instead of being restricted from labour, if the soldier were permitted to do for himself whatever he is capable of doing, his health would suffer less than it now does, the mind would be occupied, there would be satisfaction, and fewer of those causes of temptation which in idleness lead them into error.' He even adduces several instances in which hard labour was performed by British soldiers in tropical climates, with obvious effects upon health, morals, and happiness, while the work was under execution. This is precisely what Sir John Moore observed while serving in the West Indies. He condemned the system of leaving the soldier 'to lounge the whole day in the barracks, where the air cannot be good, and where, from indolence, his body becomes enervated, and liable to disorder.' The same distinguished authority concludes that 'with a Roman instead of a modern exercise and discipline, the troops in the West Indies might, I am convinced, be kept healthy.' 'Planters,' testifies Dr. Jackson, 'who may be said to work hard, experience good health, comparatively; even soldiers are healthy when actively employed; they suffer when they remain immured in barracks in ease and apathy.' The entire coincidence of opinion in these two authorities is gratifying as remarkable; and it is here presented to the military and medical reader, as a question bearing essentially on the welfare of troops; though, strange to say, it is one that, up to this day, has not received the practical attention and developement due to it. To the honour of Dr. Jackson be it recorded, that more than forty years ago, he advocated the removal of the European troops to the mountain ranges, in all our West Indian colonies\*. Unhappily

\* Though the following Extract is rather long, it bears so importantly upon the subject of military health, that we deem it right to subjoin it:—

"Where our European troops are

now well located, as respects health, it has happened just as in the West Indies, 'by accident.' But it must not be supposed that it is only in the selection of sites for permanent camps and cantonments

for the welfare of the soldier, the mind of military authority was not at that time prepared for this salutary change. It was not, however, allowed to rest there. The inspection reports, alluded

ments that care is necessary: the occupation of a bad locality, *if but for one night*, may be productive of serious evil, as I witnessed, and suffered from in my own person, in Upper Ava.

Happy the condition of the European soldier, had a tithe of the sums spent in erecting barracks, been applied to purposes of preparing suitable accommodation in positions of ascertained salubrity; but, instead of that, we have all over India, buildings occasionally of good construction, erected at enormous cost, but which are ultimately abandoned, because, from their faulty positions and consequent insalubrity, their inmates are found to die in a proportion to shock even the humanity of governments.

‘The different erections of the company for the accommodation of their troops,’ says Tennant, ‘have cost several millions, and may be regarded as splendid instances of their economical principles giving way to the comfort of their army. The sums thus expended, laid out at the compound interest of this country, would, at a determinate period

not very remote, have equalled the national debt.

The buildings for the troops at Berhampore, lately abandoned for the unhealthiness of the station, are said to have cost, from first to last, the enormous sum of sixteen millions eight hundred and odd thousand pounds sterling.

The details\* are from the office of the accountant-general, and that of the military board.

The whole of this subject, as affecting troops, is of the highest importance: it was owing to the ignorance or neglect of *military* topography, that so much suffering and loss attended the several attempts against Ava during the late war, and that every ultimate object aimed at by government in sending a force to Arracan, in particular, failed: and it was a similar disregard of *medical* topography, that caused the destruction of that force.

The following interesting comparative results of locality and climate have been obtained from documents furnished by the Inspector-General Macleod, and by the medical board, the range of observation being from ten to twelve years:

Stations.	Ratio of admissions per 1000 of strength.	Ratio of deaths per 1000 of strength.
Berhampore . . . . .	2,196	82.742
Dinepore . . . . .	2,398	64.261
Fort William . . . . .	1,883	62.781
Chinsurah . . . . .	1,930	62.954
Cawnpore . . . . .	1,599	47.689
Ghazepore . . . . .	1,438	36.922
Kurnaul . . . . .	938	26.81
Meerut . . . . .	1,109	28.16
Agra . . . . .	1,360	24.33

* The military buildings of Berhampore were estimated, in the year 1757, at } £302,278, or Rupees. . . . . }	3,823,657	14	8
Compound interest on this sum for 77 years at five per cent. . . . .	163,702,404	0	0
Average annual charges for repairs, &c. during 77 years, at the annual average } of Rupees, 18,000 . . . . . }	1,386,000	0	0

Total . . . . . 168,912,061 14 8

Total . . . . . £16,891,206 3 10

Exchange at 2s. per Rupee.



to above, were submitted to the commander-in-chief. It was urged that 'European troops might be stationed in the greater number of the islands in the West Indies, so as to afford every

The above comparative table exhibits the relative salubrity of several of the military stations in the Bengal presidency, to which I could add many parallel instances from the sister presidencies, were it necessary. One only will suffice, that of Secunderabad, in which two causes of very easy avoidance, bad locality, bad barracks and hospitals, have long operated destructively.

There died of the European troops stationed at Secunderabad, during the period of eleven comparatively healthy years, about 79 per thousand of mean strength.

To the actual deaths, however, it is necessary to add those of invalids who may die on their way home, or soon after their arrival there, and which increases the ratio by two or more; but even this leaves it far under the mark; for the strength of the troops, as stated in the older medical returns, exceeds by more than ten per cent. the mean monthly strength, so that, making the required correction for this and the former error, we shall have, for Secunderabad, the very high ratio of ninety per thousand annually, or twelve beyond that exhibited in the table.

The great mortality at this station is referrible to the following causes, namely, the occupation by the troops of one of the worst known localities as regards health, yet surrounded by such as are quite as noted for their salubrity; barracks and hospitals of unusually bad construction, the former being 'composed of two squares enclosing one another, so as to make assurance doubly sure against the possibility of perfect ventilation;' defective drainage and sewerage.

In no station in the south of India, except Masulipatam (which has been abandoned), is the mortality so great; and it is produced, as might be expected, chiefly by fever and dysentery of formidable characters: in short, it would be

difficult to determine which is most to be lamented in this unhappy choice of position, the defects of nature or those of art. There died at this station between the years of 1804 and 1835, the large number of 2620, being officers, soldiers, women and children of the British regiments, inhabiting the objectionable locality and buildings spoken of.

It is sufficient here to state, on the authority of the late Dr. Burke, inspector-general, that the excess of casualties in her majesty's regiment at Secunderabad, over that of any corps in the other stations of the Madras presidency during four years, 'is 117 men, a loss intrinsically of that station, exclusive of officers, women and children.' By another report it appears that:—

In 1804 the proportion of deaths to strength was	1 in 3·75
1805.....	1 in 8·22
1811.....	1 in 5·08
1814.....	1 in 8·73
1815.....	1 in 3·26
1816.....	1 in 6·56
1826.....	1 in 5·26
1827.....	1 in 8·96
1834.....	1 in 8·39
1837.....	1 in 7·10

Average proportion of deaths to strength during 35 years 1 in 11·89.

The average of deaths during 35 years is stated, in a return by the Madras medical board, to be 84·89, making 96·89 according to the corrections, per thousand of strength.

Dr. Burke is worthy of being heard on another important question arising out of this subject, namely, that of finance: it has been stated that every European soldier landed in India costs the state £100 sterling; calculating from which, the intrinsic loss of 117 European soldiers by Secunderabad in 4½ years is £11,700 sterling; but as these 117 men have to be replaced, the doing so will

protection to the civil inhabitant that military force can be supposed to afford, and, at the same time, to be so secured from the impression of the cause of disease, as to suffer little in their health from change of climate; that 'the choice of position, and the construction of quarters, are the points which principally conduce to this effect.' 'That position and form of barrack-construction therefore are, or ought to be, scientifically considered by those who plan and execute the arrangements which relate to the health of the military; that the subject cannot be supposed to be rightly understood, except by those who have intimate and correct knowledge of the power of the causes which act upon human health; that such, incredible as it may appear, are not consulted in the case; that, in disregard of the information which they are enabled to give, the ravage of disease is great at all times, enormously great in some; that the means are not employed, ostensibly on account of expense,' but that such a notion is grounded in ignorance; 'that the expense of filling up the military ranks, thinned by sicknesses which arise from bad position, and badly-constructed quarters, actually amounts, in the course of a few years, to a greater sum of money than would be required to erect barracks of the best form of construction at the most eligible sites in the country, even at the extravagant price of government contract.' He further stated, that materials of various kinds, and of the best quality, 'abound in profusion in most of the islands within the tropics, now occupied by the British;' that the soldiers may be employed to 'construct quarters for themselves or others, in any situation that

cost also £11,700, to which must be added the loss in acclimatizing these latter, amounting, on the lowest calculation, to 1<sup>st</sup> or £1,462, giving a sum total of £24,862 as the actual loss sustained in 4<sup>th</sup> years, or probably as three lacks of rupees in five years. But as Secunderabad would appear to have been a station for European troops for at least thirty years, the cost to the state for that period may be estimated at twelve lacks at least, or about £150,000.

Many persons, it is now hoped, of the class who would save farthings at the expense of the health, comfort, and real efficiency of the soldier, will give ready

ear, and take care thoroughly to understand this kind of reasoning, but who would not be at the trouble even to listen to medical representations. These last are easily disposed of: and whenever it is troublesome to think, they have only to be stigmatized as a *speculative philanthropy*, and the question is set at rest for another term of years. Amongst such persons, we hear continually of the cost of barracks, and rations; but of the cost of men, never." *On the Influence of Tropical Climates, on European Constitutions*, by James Johnson, M.D., and James Ranald Martin, Esq., sixth edition, page 582.

may be deemed eligible from salubrity, whether for the healthy or the invalid, with an increase of health and happiness beyond what belongs to their present condition; that most corps in the service have amongst them a proportion of mechanics, and that 'with these, and professed artificers attached to the ordnance and barrack-departments, the thing might easily be done; that no person who is acquainted with the West Indies, and the circumstances of the British service, can doubt of its practicability.' Such reasons, and many others, were officially urged by him, supported by the most detailed statistical returns, in proof, but 'after the lapse of several years,' and finding 'no preparation made by the executive to investigate, with a view to know the state of the case,' he 'put them before the public' with reluctance, concluding with the following remarkable observation: 'The object, which may be considered an object of national importance, claims the attention of the legislative branch of the government; there is presumption, amounting almost to proof, that it has no chance of obtaining it from the executive.' Many years subsequent to this prophetic declaration, namely, in 1835, we find a member of this very 'legislative branch,' Lord Howick, directing a revival of the enquiries, and, ultimately, the very carrying out of the practical suggestions of our author; and, already, the result has been a reduction in the annual loss of life amongst our soldiers, from 15 per cent. to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. This simple fact is worth a thousand comments. Nothing is so emphatic, in regard to this vast amelioration, as the cold expression of it in figures. It is thus, however, that everywhere, and in all times, truth is found to work its way by difficult, slow, but sure degrees; and many will now be found to bestow a just commendation on the measure, in utter unacquaintance with its author, Dr. Jackson—the unwearied friend of the soldier, through good and evil report, through half a century of service and exertion.

On the important question of military punishments, as on many others relative to military policy, Dr. Jackson's sentiments were far in advance of his time; and while our commanding officers were administering the Prussian system, (introduced into the British army by the duke of Cumberland), with all the orthodoxy and energy of the military school of Frederick, our author declared, that there is not one instance in a thousand where the cat-o'-nine-tails has made the soldier what he ought

to be. There is a fashion in these things. Formerly, the frequency and cruelty of military punishment kept the civil jail and the gallows in countenance. Punishments were frequent, sometimes severe; 'and the manner of infliction, while it degraded the subject and revolted the feelings of man's nature, was not calculated to act on the mind so as to produce contrition, and lead to a change of conduct.' There are thousands, he stated, whom punishment has made vicious and abandoned, who, previously, were but forgetful or careless. He declared that the constitution of British military law was not laid upon a base of science; 'that it is not just, and does not correspond with the general principle of the common law of the country.' Notwithstanding the boast of being the freest nation in Europe, no people in Europe, he said, so easily part with their liberty, and submit so readily to corporal punishment as the English military. These sentiments were published forty years ago, at a time when, doubtless, they were not pleasing to the authorities, and when their publication might compromise his interests. Such considerations, however, weighed not a moment with him, when the promulgation of truth was in question. In his latter writings, he has expressed his great satisfaction at the gradual decrease of severity in military punishments, adding that, 'the persons who have wrought so great a change in the military body of the nation, are valuable men, in the true meaning of the word; but they are not eminent, and thus must be contented with the reward which is within themselves.' Of the best and foremost of the persons here so modestly alluded to, was our author, and it is not the least of the honours due to his memory by the British soldier.

Although Dr. Jackson had become perfectly familiar with the disease commonly called yellow fever, in the West Indies and America, having at three distinct periods of his life possessed extraordinary official opportunities of observing it in all its forms and gradations, in every variety of position, with a keenness of research peculiar to himself; as yet no opportunity had been afforded him of seeing the epidemic malady, known by the same name, which had ravaged the sea-coasts of the south of Spain, at intervals, since the beginning of the present century. In the autumn of 1819, this epidemic having been reported to have made its appearance in Cadiz, Dr. Jackson, anxious to know its nature,

and conceiving that it might be an object of some importance to the British nation to ascertain whether or not it was contagious, made an offer to the government, through the present director-general of the army medical department, to undertake the investigation of the subject, and to proceed to Cadiz for the purpose without loss of time. This offer having been submitted to the secretary of state, was accepted; and such forms of introduction having been obtained (after some delay) from the Spanish ambassador as would ensure protection from his government, and attention from the local authorities of the districts where the disease prevailed, he repaired to Gibraltar. When about to commence his researches, information was received at the garrison, of the breaking out of the Spanish insurrection, the occupation of the Isle de Leon by the insurgents, and consequent interruption of route from Gibraltar to Cadiz. Thus defeated in his immediate purpose, detained inactive at Gibraltar, and seeing no prospect that the road to Cadiz would be open again before the fever ceased to rage, he undertook a journey to the Levant, on his own charges, principally with the view of obtaining personal information respecting the plague; a disease he had never seen, and concerning the nature of which he could not form a sufficiently satisfactory and correct idea from what he had read. In addition to this motive, he had a great desire to see Greece, a country hallowed to his mind by so many classic and spirit-stirring recollections. In prosecution of his plan, he went from Gibraltar to Malta, from thence to Constantinople, to Smyrna, to the Archipelago, and to Athens. From the Morea he proceeded to Patras, and thence to Zante, taking notes of much of what he saw regarding the appearance and manners of the inhabitants, &c., which want of space precludes our making use of as much as we might otherwise have done. On his route he wrote to a friend, stating that he was too late to overtake the plague at Malta or Constantinople, but that he was in hopes to *catch* the yellow fever at Cadiz!

From viewing the site of Gibraltar, as formed by nature, he was not disposed to consider it as altogether a healthy one. A part of the site at the north is alluvial, and not exempt from exhalation; the broken and irregular surface at the south exposes it to vicissitudes of temperature, and currents of air, that strike with force, and are liable therefore to act injuriously on the body

of the soldier, relaxed by perspiration, in the course of his fatigues or duties. He notices particularly the different places and localities in the neighbourhood, as San Roque, Algesiras, &c. He considered the mass of the people in that part of Andalusia as equal, if not superior, to the ordinary peasantry of most parts of Europe. The physical is striking, and the intellectual not inferior when rightly estimated. The manner is reserved, not solicitous to be agreeable for selfish purposes, but not uncivil. The Spaniard, on the contrary, is obliging—apparently obliging—but not obsequious. He is not inquisitive after foreign knowledge, and not curious in politics. He has in fact little knowledge, and gives himself little trouble to acquire any. Apart from prejudices in regard to royalty and the priesthood, they appear to possess sound judgment and much innate goodness. There seems to be a greater than ordinary disposition among the peasantry to carry the products of their own industry, of whatever nature they may be, to the market; and almost every small house in the town is a huckstering shop of the common commodities of the country. They have the external appearance of being an idle people, though they work actively in the mornings and evenings; but they work without the appearance of being driven by a taskmaster. They are in their linen and personals a clean people, though their dusky complexion and growth of hair might lead the stranger to a contrary impression. The peasant in Spain, unlike him of England, wears the best things next his skin: he is not found with a fine outer garment, and a ragged or dirty shirt. The females are very graceful in movement, and cheerful.

He arrived in Malta on the 8th March. There did not appear to him to be any of the common sources of disease at the island that ordinarily produce intermittent and remittent fevers at particular seasons of the year. As far as he could judge, he thought the Maltese very honest. "That they were kind in their nature at the shipwreck of St. Paul, seems to me to be amply testified, and the disposition appears still to adhere to them. They seem to be hasty and passionate, contend about getting a passenger for their boat, or make an uproar for dividing a quarter-dollar that is given in charity for several. The poor beg importunately, and are scarcely to be driven away." Going up the Bosphorus, the view struck him as beautiful; "the natural disposition not shrouded by the hand of art, which puts the surface of the earth



as it were in chains by a load of ornament." "Nature here predominates; her beauties are not overwhelmed under a system of artificial improvement; they are sometimes brought out by accidental touches of taste. The banks of the Rhine are more magnificent, but they are less simple and less pleasing. They command admiration: the banks of the Bosphorus solicit to retreat and contemplation. The Rhine is a rapid stream, the course forward, and easily comprehended; the Bosphorus winds in such a manner that there is often doubt where it may go: it is like a succession of lakes joined at different points. The exterior of the houses do not strike as specimens of architecture. The lower story is often lumbered and not clean; the upper apartments are said to be often most superb in their furniture and equipments." After a week or two's further observation, he continues: "The environ of Constantinople presents an extensive, a varied, and one of the most pleasing views of landscape that nature perhaps anywhere presents. It is not grand and sublime, but it is beautifully diversified; and, when covered with verdure and foliage, must be enchanting." "The number of minarets, mosques, and burying-places, planted with cypress-trees, give the town more the appearance of a village than an European city. The distant aspect is pleasing, disposing the mind to reflection." The diseases of Constantinople, he was disposed to conclude from the general aspect of the locality, would have a tendency to the inflammatory, particularly the local forms of pleurisy, rheumatism, &c. "The extremity of the Golden Horn, and up the tract of 'the sweet waters,' as they are called, is decidedly aguish. The vicissitudes of weather are considerable, the north wind sharp, and sometimes harsh." "The Turkish boatmen and their boats strike the stranger as something singular. The boats are long and narrow, very ticklish, as without ballast, and of no draught. They are clean, most correctly arranged, many of them curiously worked or carved, and, as it would appear, most judiciously constructed for their purpose. There is a decency, a cleanliness, and a propriety in everything, that I have never seen equalled anywhere, and a skill in balancing and adjusting that ordinary seamen do not comprehend. Englishmen work by pure force, the Turkish boatmen have force; but knowledge of the principles of mechanical action, in what relates to their business, seems to be greater

than the force which gives them pre-eminence. They have their own modes, and do not perhaps join their mechanical labours so much into a general system for a general effect as European nations, but in execution, individually, they would appear to be superior: they are not inferior in physical strength. The best boatmen in the British navy are inferior at the oar to Turkish boatmen, either in actual strength or in endurance; and no European nations seem to have such management of the horse as the Turks, or to be so expert in the use of the sabre." "Upon the whole, all external things do not suffer by comparison with Christian Europe."

"The appearance of every Turk is dignified; in fact, every Turk is a gentleman. They are a fine-looking race, muscular, but not clumsy; are rather tall, have strong arms, strong limbs in general, a thick neck, and broad shoulders. They are not in general well set up. They turn the toe in in walking, and roll in their gait. The countenance is grave and majestic." "The Turk appears to be very deliberate in speech, but fluent. Conversation is conducted with politeness and good manners. Everywhere I could not help being prepossessed with the decorum and good breeding that force themselves on notice. The female Turks, such as appear in the streets, which are, presumptively, only of the poorer classes, (the better sort walk out much, but disguised), though well clothed, and respectable in their deportment, are generally of low stature, thick, and well built. They all turn in their toes in walking, and walk very ungracefully. The face is so much covered, that it is not easy to judge of the beauty. It does not appear to be striking. They are not comely. They seem demure. They are not majestic in form, and on the whole appear inferior to the male." "The Turks have a good natural intellect. They appear to think, and actually do think, upon the nature of things and men, more correctly than the mass of European nations. They are not so speculative or eager in the pursuit of gain by the chances of trade and commerce as others, but their judgment, in so far as I can judge, is correct; and they have insight into the character of men, though they do not dress up systems of metaphysics and politics and religion, as those do among whom book-learning is more diffused. Other nations are observant of religious forms of worship, the Turks appear to be

devout, the Deity being present to the mind. The natural qualities of the Turks are good; they seem, in so far as a stranger can judge, to be fond of their children, and to have their chief pleasures at home. They are correct in matters of business, and many of them keep journals of the principal transactions of their life. They have different manners, and less social intercourse for amusement than European nations." "They are naturally generous and honest, and strongly impressed with ideas of justice. They have attained something good as well as something bad, from the form of government and policy under which they live." "But if the rejection of hereditary rank and distinction have given a cast of liberality to the general sentiment and general bond of national humanity; the principle of their association, union, and government; which seems to have been combination for foreign conquest; has, now that the tide is stopped, and rather recoils, left oppression and individual exaction as the substitute." "The women are said to be lively, and not without wit, and not averse from intrigue. The business of the Porte is much managed by intrigue, purchase, or other modes of corruption; and when intrigue prevails against a man, from whatever cause, he soon disappears. Other nations destroy character, and supplant by underhand means, advance by favour, or diminish by enmity. The Turks little regard human life, and take the obnoxious head at once." "They are sparing of the life of animals, even the most noxious reptiles. They do not seem to regard the life of man when it comes in competition with their views." "The late Sultan Selim would appear to have been a philanthropist and philosopher. His days are said to have been the golden ones of the Turkish empire, but his virtues were obnoxious to the prejudices of the nation, and he was removed. Two piasters in his time were equal at Constantinople to four or five of the present. He seems to live in the memory of the people."

Our traveller left Constantinople on the 1st May, proceeding to Smyrna, which he thought might be considered a healthy position, and not to be chargeable as a locality to produce plague, or any other malignant form of disease. The Franks, who are generally well lodged, are healthy. There is remittent gastric fever and intermittent among those who inhabit or sleep on ground-floors, particularly among the inhabitants of

the plain or country, a circumstance also observable in the East Indies. There appears to be an air of greater freedom, or less constraint, among all classes of people than at Constantinople. "The Turk is still Turk, but he is less grave, and seems to be less domineering than in the capital. He has a lofty and commanding countenance, but does not shew any external insolence. A Frank may wander through the town unattended, and stroll about the country in any direction without insult from any one." Throughout his notes we find a strong impression of the natural good qualities of the Turkish character. "The Greek population is less striking in external appearance than the Turk—less brawny, athletic, and muscular. They are perhaps generally of lower stature, clean, and well-limbed, and upright in figure. The countenance is not striking—there is in it an expression of what may be called keenness: there is not, ordinarily, what is termed the open and amiable. They bear in the countenance a good deal of what is said to be the character for adroitness, suppleness, and the endeavour to drive a purpose by address, rather than by a plain and open course. Their word is said not to be of reliance." . . . "Some of the Greek women are handsome—they do not appear to be so generally. The countenance is rarely of amiable expression."

From Smyrna he proceeded to Idro. On the 30th, the entry in his notes is *Athens*, the harbour of which he entered under rather a melancholy impression. It was barley-harvest; "the road is covered with asses carrying home the gleanings of the day. The scene is interesting, infinitely more interesting to my feelings, than the harvest-scenes of Great Britain. The people seem here to work for themselves. They have the countenances of contentment—men, women, and children. There is none of that hurry, bustle, and confusion seen elsewhere, or contentions for procuring extra product by persons who have no interest in what they do, but the amount of the hire they may receive. There does not here seem that remote distinction of master and servant—the labouring man is a peasant of humble desires, and apparently of equality of condition." . . . "In looking over the plain from the Acropolis, and other heights near Athens, the mind dwells, with a melancholy satisfaction, on the scene—the country of the most humane, polished, and intelligent people who ever perhaps appeared on the great theatre of the world.

The simplicity and elegance of their taste prove sufficiently that they studied nature, and looked at her works with an analyzing and philosophic eye. There are so many points of view, so many objects to attract, that we, I believe, could here happily contemplate on what is and has been: it furnishes a daily lesson in the history of man." . . . . . "The people of Athens seem rather to be of an under size than otherwise; they are not generally stout, or well-built; and there is nothing striking in the countenance of either male or female, man or child. The women are ordinary in appearance; they retain their ancient dress; that is, they are not clad in the muslins of England, they wear no stays, and the shape is not graceful." He reached Patras on the 6th June, nearly exhausted with heat and fatigue. His health suffered from over-exertion and heat, and he got himself bled at Patras by a barber. The man wanted to bind up the arm before four ounces were obtained, but the doctor persisted, and seven or eight more were obtained—about fourteen, perhaps, in all. The doctor thought a still freer bleeding would have benefited him. From this, he concluded that the Greeks knew nothing of the effects of bleeding. The man was celebrated as a bleeder, from which it was evident that he followed the most approved practice. The doctor winds up his notice with this remark, "He can never expect to cure a disease by bleeding in the manner he practises it." It took him four days to get to Zante from Patras, although ordinarily the passage is one of twelve or fourteen hours. The Greeks of the Ionian Islands struck him as stouter than those of the Archipelago. They seem to be intelligent. Many of them can read the ancient Greek. There is much freedom among them. The plague, as we have seen, did not prevail during the time of his excursion to the Levant; but as investigation into the nature of yellow fever was the motive for leaving England, he determined to be at Cadiz in the month of August, and reached Gibraltar about the end of July. Notwithstanding his health having suffered, he left Gibraltar for Cadiz on the 23d August, and arriving at Cadiz on the 25th, it so happened that the appearance of the disease was announced the very day he entered the city. The fever was epidemic for two months at Cadiz, where he remained till he satisfied himself of its character; but hearing that the malady which raged at Xeres was more severe

and of greater proportionate mortality, he proceeded thither to ascertain its real character. He was assisted at both places by an intelligent and able medical officer, (Dr. O'Hallaran), whom General Sir George Don kindly permitted to accompany him from Gibraltar, and a statement of his investigation was published the following year, under the title, *Remarks on the Epidemic Yellow Fever which has appeared at intervals on the South Coast of Spain, since the year 1800*. This the last though not the most toilsome of our philanthropist's adventures, evinces the prompt heroism which he was always ready to exhibit in the cause of science; for heroism it is in a man of three-score and ten to forego all considerations of domestic comfort, and to grapple with certain danger, and that in its least attractive form, in order to aid in the increase of knowledge, and the mitigation of human suffering. Science has its forlorn hopes, but they are not heard of in the annals of military glory, and not marked for reward in the tablets of the statesman. We seldom see such zeal and moral courage surpassed, even in the buoyancy and vigour of youth; but our admiration of both is enhanced, when we learn that in his seventy-seventh year, a few weeks before his death, he conveyed to the director-general of the army medical department an offer to waive his rank, and proceed to Portugal to do duty in the military hospitals under a junior, with the British force then acting in that country under the command of General Sir W. H. Clinton.

It is not intended, nor would it be possible in a sketch like this, to give anything but an outline of the various events of Dr. Jackson's long, active, and useful life, nor are materials at present available for the purpose beyond what have served to give such a general delineation of them. The work of our author, now presented to the public in a new form, was first published, or perhaps it would be more correct to say *printed*, at Stockton in 1804. The very circumstance of its appearing in a provincial corner was adverse in various ways to that wide dissemination which its sterling character merited. A second edition, containing the result of twenty years' further observation, appeared in 1824, issued also at Stockton. The author's peculiar modesty also stood in the way of that progress in public estimation, which his volume so eminently deserved. He had no idea of management in regard to the developement of intellectual labour, by



means of the press ; and even if he had, the simple and dignified turn of his disposition would have precluded his using any. The more the work under consideration is known, the more will it be appreciated. It is indeed a very extraordinary production, whether we consider the magnitude of the subject, or the graphic felicity, and philosophical sagacity, with which it has been carried out in all its details. It consists of a regular series of sketches of the military and moral character of nations, from very remote times to the present, drawn with great spirit, fidelity, and discrimination. Even if he had written nothing else, it would give the author a prominent place in the ranks of literature ; and it is no trivial commendation of it, that after the late Sir John Moore had read the first edition, he wrote to the author his impression of it in the following terms : " My dear Jackson, I have perused your military book, with which I am much delighted. There are none of us, even the most experienced, who may not derive instruction from it ; and I only regret that you who possess a soldier's mind had not been a soldier by profession."

Dr. Jackson's indefatigable perseverance to attain results even from the most difficult quarters, may be illustrated by the fact of his having commenced the study of Arabic after his return from America, with a view to the fullest investigation of his favourite subject, fever, from original sources ; and he soon acquired such a perfect knowledge of it as to be able to read with facility, and to understand thoroughly, the writings of the old Eastern physicians. His curiosity being excited by the controversy respecting the authenticity of the poems of Ossian, although not a Highlander by birth, he determined to study the Highlander's language ; a condescension in which he is singular, since he is the only Lowland scholar, so far as we are aware, who has done so. He had, as we have seen, served with a Highland regiment, was much attached to Highlanders, and understood them, therefore he became really interested in the question at issue which peculiarly belonged to the history of the mountain-races ; but being ignorant of their language he could not venture to settle the disputed point in his own mind—a reserve of wise and equitable suspension of opinion, pending an increase of qualification for the task of judging ; which it had been well if others had followed too. He entered eagerly upon the study of the Gaelic language, to qualify him for surveying the ground of argument properly ; and

having made diligent research, after acquiring the language, into tradition, by conversing with old Highland people, and reading and hearing the original poems, he came to the conclusion that the poems, though but improperly translated and perhaps arranged, were genuine, and not fabrications by Macpherson, as has been asserted by several learned men, (learned in all save the language of the compositions), after a rather desultory consideration of the subject, in which the language of the poems upon which the writers so dogmatically decided, entered not at all as an element of the question, it being deemed too barbarous and modern even to merit being studied. A similar contempt for the Irish language (essentially the same as the Gaelic) has tended to its neglect, especially on the part of the English state and church, although it is a key to the hearts of six millions of people, and its acquirement by Irish clergymen, landlords, and gentry, would incalculably extend their influence, or rather create that which at present is non-existent. Were some wealthy philanthropical philologist to do for the Gaelic what Colonel Boden has done for Sanscrit, leave a sum to institute a professorship of it at one of the universities, it would be the commencement of something in the shape of a beneficial system for the Celtic population of the empire.

By his first wife, Dr. Jackson had two sons, twins, a daughter, and another son younger than the twins. The latter were handsome, but were unnecessarily indulged by the mother, and their career was not calculated to gratify a parent's heart, but the contrary. It is supposed that they are both dead. The daughter, a very fine and amiable young woman, received an injury of the head which affected her brain, and shortened her days; in consequence of a violent blow on the forehead, by coming with her full force against the edge of a half-open door in the dark. The youngest boy died while his father was at St. Domingo, and there was a rather remarkable coincidence connected with his decease. The doctor had a restless and very uneasy night with horrid dreams, one of which was, that his youngest boy was dead. He noted this in his journal, and when home letters afterwards reached him from Mrs. Jackson, it appeared that his son had died on the day of his father's dream. Though not superstitious, the circumstance made an impression on him as curious. The doctor's second wife, who yet survives him, was a daughter of the Rev.

J. H. Tidy, rector of Redmarshall, and the sister of Colonel Tidy, 24th regiment, who entered the army at the doctor's recommendation, and who through life continued to entertain for him the greatest regard and esteem.

Dr. Jackson died in consequence of a paralytic affection at Thursby, near Carlisle, April 6th, 1827, in the seventy-seventh year of his age. Dr. Barnes from whose "sketch" we derive the fact, attended him in his last illness; and from him we learn that during the latter period of his life, he often employed himself in comparing the Bible in the original languages with the modern translations. Dr. Jackson's height was about five feet eight. He was erect and muscular, but of a frame inclining more to slender than stout. His complexion was clear and fair, with a slight tendency to florid. He had blue eyes, and his hair was brown before it became silvered by age. His forehead was expanded, well-shaped, and intellectual; and his nose of a Grecian character. His face was generally lighted up with a sweet and benignant smile. In dress he was neat and plain, and in general externals not unlike a well-attired Quaker of the upper class, though without the stand-up collar. The colour of the coat he wore when not in uniform, was always brown or blue, the waistcoat double-breasted, and generally buttoned up to the cravat. His hat was in harmony with the above, being generally broader in brim than is common. He always carried in his hand a light gold-headed cane with a black silk tassel and cord attached to it. At his morning toilet his cold-water ablutions were from head to foot. In walking, his step had something of the military movement. In a *tête-à-tête* conversation, he was open, familiar, and communicative, and with a friend even playful. In large parties or with strangers he was rather reserved and observant\*. His distinctive characteristic was modesty, to which may be added mildness, excepting when roused by insult. He was humane invariably, and liberal in action as well as in sentiment, to a degree that trenched greatly on his means. His private virtues altogether were such that, according to the testimony of one who knew and loved him well, (General Sir John Grey, who commanded at the battle of Punnear) he exhibited more of the character of the true Christian than any man he had ever met.

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\* Dr. Borland's notes.

Cruelty in any shape, even harshness to a brute on the part of its master, revolted him. He was a warm, sincere, and steady friend, as may be instanced by his leaving his home at Stockton-on-Tees for London, on hearing that a friend whom he valued highly was dangerously ill from an infectious fever. Nor did he come merely to attend on him, but to nurse him like a brother, until he became convalescent. He was temperate in diet, of which vegetable aliment formed the greatest portion. He quenched his thirst with water, or lemonade in summer. He preferred the light wines of France to the strong ones of Spain and Portugal, but partook of them sparingly. He liked Champagne when it came in his way, but limited himself to one or two glasses. He conversed freely on religious subjects, and with a deep sense of the importance of the great theme itself. His veneration for pure Christianity rendered him indignant at anything approaching to a systematic corruption of its truths. He felt indeed that the sense which man has attained of devotion to the Supreme Being, is the powerful bond which maintains human conduct in the right course. He clearly points out, though without dilating the subject much, in the work before us, how much perverted Christianity has deteriorated national character and military virtue. The pure morality alone of the precepts of the great Head of Christianity, he conceived could only emanate from a Divine source. He considered the principle of doing to others as we would wish them to do to us, as the practical test of Christianity. He had no veneration for conflicting dogmas and systems, and looked rather to practical and demonstrative movement, than speculative doctrine and intangible aspirations.

He was not, as already stated, partial to private practice, nor did he like the mode of its remuneration. In this there certainly is an awkwardness, that is avoided in the legal profession, by an ingenious intervention between the barrister and the client. To this dislike the circumstance is supposed in some respect to have contributed by his rescuing the wife of General Cazy, who in a fever was given up, and the usual offices for the dead on the point of being performed. The general's gratitude ended only with life. The crisis of fever was ever a particular object of interest with the doctor.

He never used tobacco in any shape, and regretted that the contact of our soldiers with the armies of the Continent during

the war had induced "the filthy practice of smoking" so extensively among the British officers and soldiers. He thought the long-continued use of that plant injurious to health, and that the habit of smoking by the working classes and labourers tended to provoke to drinking, as the inveterate smoker is often also a beer-tipping sot, or an irreclaimable consumer of gin and brandy. If it be a true key of character as stated in the old saying, that *noscitur a sociis*, we need only mention, that Dr. Jackson was on a most friendly footing with Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Sir John Moore, Sir Harry Calvert, General Simcoe, the Hon. William Stewart, Sir Henry Clinton, Sir George Hewitt, Sir George Walker, Sir Thomas Saumarez, and several others distinguished in the annals of their age, to which may be added, that General James Sutherland, as we learn from good authority, has always regarded him almost like a father.

The details of Dr. Jackson's wanderings on the Continent may serve to encourage those who cannot purchase instruction at the great seminaries of learning, to seek it where they can in the wide field of nature, where it costs little but the exertion of seeking it, and it has the recommendation of being always genuine. The first step in the medical man's course is to know man, the subject upon whom as a living being, he is destined to put his professional acquirements to their most responsible and interesting test, upon which his own reputation will depend. He is to have a comprehensive and practical knowledge of man's intellectual capacities, as well as his physical structure, to look at him in his native soil and home, where he is exhibited without art or disguise; and viewing him in this fundamental constitution, to trace him through different tracts of the globe, where he is exposed to a multitude of causes which act favourably or otherwise on health and morals. Dr. Jackson rambled about desultorily, and on no particular premeditated plan, determining rather to be guided by circumstances as he proceeded. He had thus an opportunity of observing the effects which different latitudes, climates, soils, and situations, had on the health of the general mass of the people. These seen by himself, and for himself, without being pointed out by a learned or biassed teacher or guide, the knowledge so acquired became essentially his own, and impressed itself the more strongly on the mind; and he was therefore the more competent to apply it well and readily when he saw occasion. He

was, as we have seen, in a great degree a self-taught philosopher, and could scarcely be called an *alumnus* of any university: yet though naturally a retiring and diffident man, he had the self-confidence, grounded on a thorough conviction of his own talents and acquirements, to offer himself at the university of Leyden, then the most distinguished medical school in Europe, as a candidate for the degree. He was accordingly examined, and obtained it most deservedly, and his conduct and reputation reflect honor on Leyden and its professors. Into the details of his professional reputation this is not the fitting place to enter. Two circumstances may, however, be mentioned as in unison with the general subject. His views in regard to gestation, or exercise in the open air, and cold affusion in fever, were original and decided. Gestation in the open air, and change of air, were adopted systematically by him in the West Indies, North America, the continent of Europe, &c. in the last stages of protracted fever, and in all cases where fever proved intractable. This was done in camp or cantonment, as the case might be; and up to the present day no one has carried out this remedial measure with the same careful boldness, ability, and tact, as he did. His success with it astonished the army, and it is hoped will lead others to tread in his steps, though it may expose them to ridicule, as it did him. He used cold water affusion in the fevers of Jamaica largely between the years 1774 and 1778, and the proof that he did so is furnished by manuscript notes at the time transmitted to the late eminent Dr. Gregory, of Edinburgh. He preceded Dr. Wright in the use of this powerful curative agent by more than ten years, and Dr. Currie by more than twenty.

We have thus briefly (the claims of the subject considered) traced the career of Dr. Robert Jackson. He was, it will be readily allowed, remarkable for intellectual activity and moral energy under discouraging circumstances. He forms another of the many recorded instances, of the successful application of self-educated faculties to the eventful, and not unfrequently embarrassing, calls of life. Nurtured in 'the cool sequestered vale' of a provincial locality, and early inured to self-denial and hardship, we find him steadily marching on, undismayed by the dark or rugged realities in prospective. No one more than he had found

how hard it is to climb

The steep where Fame's proud temple shines afar.



Such a man has not existed in vain, had he only afforded an example in his own person how the pilgrimage of the world is to be manfully gone through without sinking into the slough of Despond, or being terrified by the menacing phantom 'Giant Despair.' He had tasted in no stinted measure the bitterness that runs in the cup of the poor man, but he made no wry faces, and no complaint—no puling querulousness was heard from him. He had been a good deal exposed to 'the insolence of office,' and the 'flouts that patient merit of the unworthy takes;' but he rose continually superior to the buffeting of the exigency, breasting gallantly the billows that would have overwhelmed men of a less resolute spirit. A moral heroism, and a noble disinterestedness, throw their radiance athwart the dark back-ground of his chequered life. It is important that we should not lose sight of the causes of the robust consistency of character which marked him from first to last; seeing that in the midst of the most formidable difficulties, the mind that is true to itself, and in the spirit of honest purpose goes straight to its object, must overcome. The secret of his strength lay in his indomitable zeal, based on thorough principle, and incorruptible goodness of heart. Everything with him became subservient to this. Duty with him was not a hollow or specious word: it was a sharp conscientious goad, as it were, to continual action. It has been observed to the honour of Bacon, that his scientific zeal in his old age led him, during the prevalence of severe snow, to expose himself to its inclemency, in order to analyze its nature, even at the risk of his health; what then shall be said of the venerable Jackson, who at threescore and ten, indifferent to household ease and comfort, goes on a far journey to investigate the laws of contagion, or who volunteers at seventy-seven to proceed on actual military service in the field, *under a junior*? 'He has left behind him (to quote a previous biographer) the reputation of a man of great talents and extensive learning, indefatigable industry, and strict integrity, who was always assiduous in the right discharge of all the offices of public and private life. He was a man of great philanthropy, disinterestedness and humanity; and was ever anxious for the promotion of medical science, and the melioration of the human race. History does not perhaps furnish us with a stronger instance of unbounded and unremitting zeal for the acquisition of useful knowledge, and of unlimited beneficence in promoting the health and welfare of

his fellow-creatures. A man who could leave his kindred and his country to travel in foreign climes, amidst pestilence and death, for the purpose of relieving suffering humanity, and promoting medical science; who without reward, and at the risk of his own health and of his life, would attend the sick, the dying, and the destitute, well deserves the admiration and gratitude, not only of his own countrymen, but also of the friends of humanity in every part of the world\*.

The most superficial reader cannot fail to observe through all his works, the pervading anxiety of Dr. Jackson respecting the health and well-being of the soldier. The possession of health, as he forcibly observed, 'gives power to the arm, and courage to the heart, in confidence of power. The inward activity of the same quantity of physical force multiplies effect, but power and activity are incompatible with feeble health.' Everywhere he urges the necessity and importance of a constant reference on this subject to the experience and counsel of the best military surgeons. But the health of the soldier, 'though the cardinal hinge of effect in armies,' has hitherto not been attended to by those who have had, and who always must have, so large a share of the preservative or preventive part (the 'internal economy and discipline' of Sir John Moore) in their hands. On the ground of universal experience, he asserts, that this neglect will continue until medical officers, 'have that place in the counsels of military communities that is due to science: the health history of the late wars in Europe is demonstrative in proof of the important fact, that military life has been sacrificed in an enormous proportion to ignorance; that is, to the unwillingness of commanders to be advised on subjects which they could not themselves be supposed to know.' Next to his anxiety for the health and welfare of the soldier, was his care that he should in sickness cost as little as possible to the state. It is now matter of history, that the royal warrant of 1st January, 1806, fixing the rate of hospital stoppage at ten-pence a day, originated in the demonstration so often furnished by Dr. Jackson, that the sum of money which feeds a soldier in barracks is sufficient to feed him and furnish him with necessary comforts in hospital. The medical department occasions, in such case, no expense to the state beyond the salary of

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\* Dr. Barnes, *Biographical Sketch*.

medical officers, medicines and lodgings. This must have effected enormous savings to the state; and we have shewn in a preceding page, how much his exposure of the former wasteful system of the medical board, must have led to the change for the better that took place, while his plan substituted for the colonial contract alone, saved £80,000 to the British government\*.

Remarkable as was our author for personal disinterestedness, yet in every matter affecting the credit and efficiency of his department, considered as an essential and integral part of the army, he felt and wrote as became his high character for honor and just consideration. He declared that if ever medicine emerge from its low condition, 'raising its head so as to fix its station among the sciences, it is more than probable that it will owe its good fortune to the medical officers of armies, and more likely to the medical officers of the British army than to others.' He urged the claim of the medical department of the army to a share in military honors and distinction, on the fair ground that, 'as the medical staff shares in the fatigues and dangers of war, in just return it is entitled to a share of advantages;' so also thought Napoleon, designated by the historian of the Peninsular War, as "the greatest man of whom history makes mention, the most wonderful commander, and most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman." The great surgeons of the French armies deserved all their military honours, and their master conceived that to withhold them, would have been alike unjust and discreditable to a service, which, perhaps more than any other, needeth the fostering care of the state. "A consistence in the system of recompences," he thought demanded that the leaders in military surgery, and the bestowers and curators of lasting benefits on the fleets and armies of France, as well as on humanity at large, should be honoured and distinguished. Upon this question, it is presumed that there will be no difference of opinion amongst men of enlarged and just views. How then, it may be asked, came an officer who conferred on the British army such undoubted and lasting benefits to die unrewarded and undistinguished from the crowd? What

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\* Surely the widow of the man who effected such savings ought not to be neglected by the state in her declining years. In plain words, ought not a pen-

sion to have been settled upon her? We think so, and we think public opinion will ratify it, since we can assure the reader that such aid is very needful.

are the honors that such a man as Dr. Jackson would not have graced? How long, it may be asked, would the discipline of the army, *esprit de corps*, and the ascendancy of glorious aspirations in the country be maintained, with zeal, if military officers were left, as a return for their best and most enthusiastic exertions, to 'the reward which is within themselves?' If all reward were confined to this species as respects military officers, would it not be considered as absurd and unjust; and if so, why should medical officers be left merely to the internal consciousness of desert? It is very possible that medical men themselves are partly to blame for what looks like cool neglect on the part of the state. The language of many of them would lead to the conclusion, that they repose upon a certain quietism of conscious merit, that stands in the place of all external stimulation. They smile with a sort of pity at the notion of any decorative recognition on the part of the state. To alleviate human misery, and to relieve the pangs of suffering, this of itself is sufficient reward for any man. If so, why do not the wealthy and the noble take to the profession, and enjoy this luxurious consciousness in full perfection, seeing that it surpasseth all that can be done for *amour propre* from without? Granted, that the medical officer *has* at times the noble consciousness of god-like privileges in giving hope to despair, and life to the dying, binding up the most desperate wounds, and restoring the shattered limb—has he not also his uneasiness of spirit, his mortifications, and his slights of class? Is there nothing besides for him but his pay and allowances? Can the life of the spirit of man subsist entirely on a consciousness of Protestant Benedictinism and professional philanthropy? Is he not an officer as well as a healing man? Does he not share the perils of the military officer, and is he not exposed to dangers of his own, in which the military officer does not share? Does it not require quite as much courage to walk alone into a ward reeking with contagion, as it does to stand fire with hundreds and thousands of others, all emulous and excited by the sociality of glorious enterprise, and the *certaminis gaudia*? He shares in both?

To seek truth in the lair of nature, and to develop it inductively, was with Jackson a necessity of being. He appeared perpetually to rise superior to depressing influences, and to feel the calm ennobling conviction, that all that is not sterling and true, all that is merely showy, factitious, and plummy, shall assuredly be

consumed like stubble; while the fine gold of truth will come purified out of the furnace of time. His soul was not insensible, but on the contrary, keenly alive to the claims of true fame. The Dalilah of mere notoriety, and conventional plausibility and adulation, had no attractions for him. He had a true perception of the fame that is imperishable—and appealed to posterity. To his desire for this fame, such as was worshipped by the brave spirits of hoar antiquity, he made his ease and comfort subservient. His passions were but the servants of a commanding, vigorous, and enlightened will, under the guidance of an unprofessing, but sincere piety. The public good was not a cloak of pretence with him, under which he sheltered snugly his self-individual interests; but rather a breastplate of proof, with which he braved danger and obloquy at the call of duty. Nothing shews this so convincingly and beautifully, as his promptness in old age, when men are usually most tenacious of punctilio, to give rank and seniority to the winds, when the occasion seemed to demand a generous and voluntary sacrifice: he stood not, as we have seen, at seventy-seven upon the order of precedence in the etiquette of position, but was ready to fall in under a junior in the service of his country. Let every one in his sphere, when the emergency requires it, go and do likewise.

Conjoined with his fine zeal, we find a characteristic modesty—characteristic not only as regards the individual, but the class of men of true genius; for genius is ever modest, and never magnifies itself save defensively. It cannot be vain for the simple reason that it is proud. It is simple, unaffected, and dignified in the assurance of its own worth.

In an age when a material philosophy appears to have invaded the sanctuary of the ideal, as caring for none of these things, and when nought seems to be valued, but what can be cooked, worn, or grasped, whatever enhances the imaginative and the venerable should be cherished warmly. We are not at all disposed to deny that words have somewhat too much taken up the place of things in certain systems of education. Let not the ardent and aspiring mind, however, that finds a congenial pleasure in classical studies, be debarred of them. Emphatically does the practice of Jackson, of always having by him, for contemplation and reference, the Greek and Latin classics, prove how sincerely he agreed with the 'noblest Roman of them all.' *Hæc studia adolescentiam*

*alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium præbent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, &c. &c.* That such studies were a solace to him, says something also for his country, as furnishing the poor man with that sustaining education which is religion's best safeguard, and next to it in preservative power against idleness and vice, as well as the most invigorating incentive against the mephitic vapours of disappointment and despondency.

This is not the place to speak of his professional publications, which we briefly dismiss by saying, that they are characterized by vigour of thought, close observation of nature, and originality of views. The work, however, by which he will, if we mistake not, be best known to posterity, is the one before us. The reader who expects mere dry essays on military affairs, will be surprised as gratified in turning over its pages, to find that he is under the guidance of a masculine and profound intellect, which traces the progress of society throughout the world, inductively and admirably, while professing only to treat of the economy and discipline of armies. Already it has received the *imprimatur* of a hero's approbation—of him who was left 'alone in his glory' on the height of Corunna. The author has brought to his work the light of a wiser philosophy than was too often the fashion of his day. He demonstrates that the basis of all strength is religion, morality, and order, and that without these military power has no permanence of cohesion. He unfolds in a perspicuous manner grand views of national character, and the hosts of history are marshalled before us in more than review array. We have in his pages a clear insight into many motives, and a lucid estimate of the action and re-action of causes upon the human heart as wielded in mass for a power of offence or defence. One principle runs luminously through the whole, that *discipline* is the hoop that keeps together the staves of this great state vessel, military power; and that much indeed depends not merely upon the nature of the hoops, but the quality, seasoning, and fibre of the staves. An army should be carefully recruited, and if amenable to perfect discipline, and sensible to sympathies of patriotism and religious impression, it must be invincible. He convincingly shews that appearance in forming the materials of armies is not reality; that materials ought to be arranged according to the measure of actual force; that sensibility to the principle of action ought to be rife



in every part of the military machine. His very key-note is, 'that certain classes of men possess certain distinctions of character physically and morally; and that the combination and proper adjustment of the classes in an army or military instrument, according to their properties, deserve the attention of the tactician and military commander in an especial manner.' We find throughout the work, the experience of sublimated common sense in unison with the love of ancient times, in which the light of a rare practical wisdom is brought to bear alike on times remote as the present. All that is most valuable in the abstracts of the sage and the moralist is happily blended with the technical requirements of the tactician and the warrior. Ancients and moderns, friends and foes, fellow-countrymen and foreigners, are all impartially mustered in review by one whose glance is very penetrating, and whose knowledge of man is as extensive as it is just and discriminative. All are weighed rigorously in the balance of the sanctuary, and rated according to their merits and defects, nought extenuating, nought over-colouring. Nothing is overlooked. The great and the little are well considered, and each has its appropriate place and limits; for our author, like all who have been remarkable for large capacity, was as keenly observant of the minute as the great; deeming nothing that enters into combination, less or more affecting results, as beneath notice or calculation, and no whole as too great for the due analysis of its parts. The work is one which no military man should be without, nor should it be absent from the library of the statesman. The greatest general, as well as the most astute politician, may refer profitably to its pages. The style is clear and forcible throughout. It has its faults, and they are obvious to the hypercritical. Its peculiarities are perhaps sufficiently accounted for by the author's early disadvantages, the hurry incidental to his active life, and the resolution to which he adhered of reading no translated work. His language is sometimes homely, not to say rugged; and repetitions may be detected, arising from a conscientious solicitude to be thoroughly understood in what he felt to be of grave import; but the critic will never find obscurity, feebleness, or a going about the bush to insinuate a truth rather than to state it boldly. All is simple, undaunted, truthful, and impressive. There is indeed, as it were, a martial grandeur in the procession of his subject, like the solemn march of

a mighty host. His sentences have often a reflex action on the mind, that draws back attention again to the consideration of their weighty truth. They are pregnant with thought, and a very succinct remark perhaps brings on a train of meditation. Notwithstanding the obligation upon him, from the nature of the subject, to do justice unto all, and to testify uncompromisingly respecting the comparative qualities of each, a fine vein of patriotic sentiment is perceptible throughout, though never obtrusively prominent; and a manly, honest, and plain-spoken spirit of freedom breathes over all. He has a downright scorn of conventional reserve where the truth should appear, stating results or inferences without mental or party reservations. He seems to have estimated the working of the aristocratic principle in armies at its just value, deeming, with a powerful writer of our day, "that for any great purpose of peace or war, the middle classes of the empire are the saviours of their country."

We have thus endeavoured, as far as our materials permitted, to give a plain and intelligible account of a very uncommon man. He was rather with armies, than of them; that is, in regard to personal *status*; and yet, who has described what armies have been, are, and ought to be, so well? He was essentially a soldier in his feelings, habits, and objects, though a philosophic one, withal. He owed something to circumstances, but more to talent and integrity, and not a little to true genius. We never see him at a loss. In the barrack, the hospital, on the march, or in action with the enemy, he was ever useful, humane, efficient, and brave. He was always going out of self, and studying to benefit others to the utmost of his power. It was the same in private life. Friendship with him was a sacred and staunch bond—a living fountain, springing from the depths of his pure humanity. That he was not altogether overborne and crushed by a cruel system of persecution, was owing, in a great degree, to the salient energies of his own mind, and partly to the support of that excellent friend, whom his merits had bound to him with chords of steel, the right gallant and steadfast Sir Harry Calvert, and of the commander-in-chief, that high-minded, generous-hearted prince, who was, indeed, not only the soldier's friend, but the friend of the soldier's friend wherever he recognized him.

The grave received Robert Jackson as a shock of corn in his season. He descended into it, not as is often the case, with long lingering ailments, tottering pace, faculties for years benumbed, affections blunted, and feelings withered. No, but with an eye to the last of unquenched vivacity and intelligence, a countenance glowing with benevolence, a mind still unsated and thirsting for science, and a heart as vividly alive to the claims of friendship and goodness, and as tenderly overflowing with pity for human suffering, as in the days of his prime. This was a man whom a king might have delighted to honor. Something, it may be conceived, in the way of distinction from the common herd, was due to him, as a man, and as an army medical-officer; were it only for his admirable system of hospital finance, which had saved hundreds of thousands to the state, and his sanatory measures that saved battalions from disease and death. Surely for one who had turned the power of subtle analysis so largely to the public good; who had said boldly in his place what it behoved a patriotic public servant to declare; surely a practical philosopher with such a far retrospectiveness taking a calm bird's-eye view of the historical horizon, or a just and penetrating one of the contemporary epoch, and giving his views to the world with such force, originality, freedom and freshness, merited some public mark of regard! Be that as it may, had he written nothing but the work before us, he would be acknowledged as a public benefactor; for who deserves the title better than he who, unfolding the volume of human nature, impresses the great lesson that what is merely aggressive and vicious, however strong for a time, will assuredly eventually perish; that only the defensive, the patriotic, and the right, will stand the shocks of time; and that nothing is truly strong, consistent, and enduring, but what is correct in principle, and scientific in its adjustments. He has written as with an iron pen upon the rock, so that all men, but especially his countrymen, may read and reflect upon the great truths each in his place, that without a never-sleeping discipline perfect in all its parts, and a sterling piety with its corslet of holiness, no country can defend itself with armies, and no armies can be eventually victorious. But promotion cometh not from the east or the west: it is often the result more of accident than a recognised principle. If it came from a fixed principle of doing honor to all to whom honor is due, without reference to aristocratic

class-leanings and influence, then would it be unintelligible how a man like Jackson came to be so overlooked or wilfully neglected as he seems to have been. His name is not to be found in the distinguished, by Gazette. Why, we leave it to those who cherish this exclusive system to declare. If we ask, what order usually conceded to men of the people he would not have graced, we can easily anticipate the reply of the wise. If we ask, what the sovereign or the government did for such a truly noble and soldierly character, in the way of conferring distinction, the answer is as simple as was the cast of his own vigorous intellect, and amiable disposition—**NOTHING!** His only reward then was the internal one—a sufficient one for a good man perhaps, but for which he owes nothing to rank or power. The reflexion of this internal reward is all the honor his memory has as yet received, which will become enhanced as his works are better distributed, known, and appreciated. We find then that a man eminent for his public spirit, his services, his varied information and learning, brought up in a military school, and throwing out his ideas continually for military purposes of improvement; a man remarkable for his chivalric contempt of death in the cause of duty, no less than for his general disinterestedness, nice delicacy, and scrupulous integrity in every relation; a man esteemed highly too by many whose regard of itself stamped the honor and merit of the recipient: we find that seventeen years ago, one who was all this, died in England in comparative obscurity, unnoticed by the authorities of the day. All this happened, too, to one who had conferred important benefits on the British army; and it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that such palpable public neglect could not have occurred in the case of any individual in any other walk of life, having a moiety even of the intellectual and moral ascendancy, or the claims of hard, honourable, and faithful services, possessed by **ROBERT JACKSON.**

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*Dr. Robert Jackson's Works.*

(1) A Treatise on the Fevers of Jamaica; with some Observations on the Intermittent Fevers of America; and an Appendix, containing some Hints on the Means of Preserving the Health of Soldiers in Hot Climates. London, 1791. Octavo.

(2) The Outline of the History and Cure of Fever, Epidemic and Contagious; more especially of Jails, Ships, and Hospitals, &c.; and the Yellow Fever. With Observations on Military Discipline and Economy, and a Scheme of Medical Arrangement for Armies. Edinburgh, 1798. Octavo.

(3) Remarks on the Constitution of the Medical Department of the British Army, with a Detail of Hospital Management; and an Appendix, attempting to explain the Action of Causes producing Fever, and the Operation of Remedies effecting a Cure. London, 1803. Octavo.

(4) A Letter to the Editor of the *Edinburgh Review*. London, 1804. Octavo.

(5) A Systematic View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies. 1804. Quarto.

(6) A System of Arrangement and Discipline for the Medical Department of Armies. London, 1805. Octavo.

(7) An Exposition of the Practice of Affusing Cold Water on the Surface of the Body for the Cure of Fever; to which are added, Remarks on the effects of cold drink, and of Gestation in the open air, in certain conditions of Disease. Edinburgh, 1808. Octavo.

(8) Letter to Mr. Keate, Surgeon-General of the Army. London, 1808. Octavo.

(9) Letter to the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, explaining the true Constitution of a Medical Staff, the best Form of Medical Economy for Hospitals; with a Refutation of Errors and Misrepresentations contained in a Letter by Dr. Bancroft, Army-physician. London, 1808. Octavo.

(10) Second Letter to the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, containing a Refutation of some Statements made by Mr. Keate. London, 1808. Octavo.

(11) Letter to Sir David Dundas, Commander-in-chief of the Forces. London, 1809. Octavo.

(12) Sketch of the History and Cure of Febrile Diseases, more particularly as they appear in the West Indies among the Soldiers of the British Army. 1817.

(13) A Second Edition of the above Work, with many Additions. 1820. 2 vols. Octavo.

(14) An Outline of Hints for the Political Organization and Moral Training of the Human Race. Octavo, 1823.


(15) A View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies; with an Appendix, containing Hints for Medical Arrangement in Actual War (being the Second Edition of No. 5). Stockton, 1824.





ON THE  
FORMATION DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY  
OF  
ARMIES.

BY THE LATE DR. JACKSON.



## ADVERTISEMENT


TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

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THE present Work was offered to the public, to be printed by subscription. A considerable number of names were given in, and it was put to the press. The printing being finished, the Book was sent to the Military Library, Whitehall, to be delivered to order.

The Director-General and the Medical Officers of the British Army are entitled to the Author's warmest acknowledgements on this occasion. The countenance which they gave to the Work in prospect, is cherished by him as a testimony of good opinion, and, if their approbation descend to it in substance, he will be much gratified, as he considers them competent to judge, from their experience of war, and their acquaintance with the powers of the human constitution.



## THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO

### THE SECOND EDITION.

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THE Author of the present volume takes leave to inform the reader, that he published a work in the year 1804, entitled, *A View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies*. The matter of the work was thought, by a few of the military who took the trouble to peruse it, to be good, that is, true in fact, and not without utility. The manner of putting it together was not graceful; and, from that or other cause, it did not obtain the notice of the public. It slept in its cradle for twenty years. It is now raised up from it, grown in size considerably, and somewhat differently fashioned; but not yet so fashioned as to give expectation of a good reception in the world. The schoolmaster who read lectures on the Art of War to Hannibal, was ridiculed as a pedant speaking to a master; and it is not probable that the physician who ventures to give instruction on the mode of forming, training, and maintaining the instrument of war in discipline and efficiency, will escape with lighter censure from the tribunals of the present time. The attempt will be deemed an encroachment on the military province: it is not so in fact. An estimate of materials is primary to the erection of the military as well as other fabric; and as medical men are, or ought to be, from the nature of their studies, better acquainted with the materials of which armies are composed than men of other professions, the author is not disposed to admit the charge of encroachment—not even to allow that he has exceeded the limit of his station in doing what he has done. He desires to be useful. He has no pretension to the talent which commands distinction; but he has common sense like other men, and he does not presume to offer anything, on the present occasion, beyond what common sense has pointed out to him in a wide field of experience. That his

experience has been wide will not be denied, when it is known that he is in his seventy-fourth year, that he has served in three British wars, that he has often been near the scene of service; and, moreover, that he has had the opportunity of seeing, so as to observe and minutely to look into, the condition of most of the armies of the military powers of Europe. He has thus seen how things are brought together, how they are put together, and how they are kept together; and, taking these things into consideration, he does not regard himself as altogether incompetent to the task which he has assumed, namely, that of laying down the fundamental beams of a military structure, not that of adorning the structure for the *coup d'œil* of parade, or of manœuvering it, when formed, for hostile contact in the field of combat. These belong to princes or commanders *ex officio*; and no attempt is made, in the present case, to take the office out of their hands.

The materials of armies are collected in different ways. They are collected, for instance, by conscription or general levy, by purchase with money as commodities of traffic, and sometimes by force and fraud, vulgarly called kidnapping. The conscript may be supposed to be reluctant to arms, the mercenary has no attachment beyond the value of his hire, and the inveigled or kidnapped is necessarily repugnant. It is evident to any one who takes the trouble to consider things in their true relations, that an army formed of materials so heterogeneous as those alluded to, cannot, without the infusion of an extra spirit of activity, move consistently in its course, or strike energetically in its act. The several parts of the structure tend, by their natural inclinations or acquired habits, to different developments; they counteract each other in their movements, consequently produce a jarring or imperfect effect. As the materials of armies are collected variously, so they are put together superficially, that is, by size and external resemblance, not by power or capacity; and as size and power are not connected by an undeviating law of nature, the act of the product is not, as now said, consistent in its manner of proceeding, or efficient in its effect; as the act of a body united scientifically by internal



power. This, which might be supposed *à priori*, is proved in experience by trial. The evil arising from the rule commonly adopted in tactical arrangement is serious and important; and, as the writer is desirous to do good, he has, with all due deference to the masters of the military art, taken the liberty of suggesting an expedient, through the well-considered application of which the inconveniences complained of may be in some degree obviated. The expedient is simple. It merely implies the examination of properties, and the substantiation of powers, prior to the act of combining or putting together. Correspondence in power, rather than size and external resemblance, is here assumed as the rule of arrangement. The rule comprehends no mystery; and, if it be properly understood and correctly executed, it is reasonable to suppose that the movements of the military body thence arising will generally be in harmony, the result of the act effective as a result of correct combination. The measure proposed, fanciful and absurd as it may be thought to be, promises union in action, in so far as depends on physical capacity; and it thus goes a great way in bringing military operations under rules of scientific calculation.

The value of augmenting the force of the military instrument, by a scientific adaptation of its several parts to one another, is evident to the commonest understanding; the value of animating the instrument so formed, by the influence of a strong and consistent principle of action, is not less obvious, but it is not so easily attained. The impression of fear *a tergo* is the ostensible engine employed to move, or to regulate the movement of military force; but, as the impression of fear acts by aversions, no certain calculation can be made of the effect of its operation. Human nature recoils from danger wherever it presents itself; and, in spite of the drillings of tacticians, human nature retains its propensity to fly from the greater evil. The soldier, according to this principle, recoils from the danger which threatens to destroy his life. He advances to encounter it, as urged by a cause of paramount force acting on the rear, or as attracted by something connected with the danger in

front which his soul covets. The tactician assumes the impression of fear as the engine of military movement; but he does not, in the writer's opinion, assume it on grounds that are correctly founded in the true constitution of man's nature. It is the object of the tactician's labour to make the soldier brave: it is a solecism in reason to attempt to do so by acting on the cowardly ingredient which attaches to the human condition. Where fear moves the act, there is no exercise of judgment; and as there is no independence of mind within in such case, there can be no calculation of the acts that are without. The impression of fear restrains from retrograde where it is placed in the rear—it does not stimulate to a forward course except by collision; and as acts from collision are blind acts of force, the military act thence originating is necessarily at random—the fortune of war thrown entirely on a table of chances. But while the engine here assumed as the mover of military action is degrading to human nature in its principle, it is not true in its act as judged by human experience. It is not capable of forcing an army to overcome a strong obstacle; for it is a fundamental law in the constitution, as now said, that man acted on by fear, and by fear only, recoils from the greater danger; he thus fluctuates between fears, and is not a soldier in the true sense of the word, for he has not a principle of action within him.

If the impression of fear *a tergo* be insufficient to move, or to sustain military force in movement, in the face of strong danger, the tactician who forms an army for practical use, will, it is presumed, seek for other means of animation through which he may hope to attain his purpose. The attachment which the human race forms for the soil on which it draws its first breath, is one of the most general, and perhaps one of the strongest, of the attachments which characterise the human species. It is an instinctive feeling of independence—a primary and constitutional injunction to maintain the constituted sphere against the encroachments of external force. The earth is the inheritance of man; and man clings, by constitutional instinct, to the defence of his inheritance. He claims independence for himself; and, by an act of instinctive kindness and generosity,

he desires to maintain the independence of the weaker parts of the creation that are planted within his circle. The mind is ennobled by assuming the office of protection; and, while ennobled by the expanding idea, it is filled with gratitude to the Creator for the benefits which itself enjoys, and for the power which it possesses of affording the benefit of protection to others. The simple son of the earth is a patriot by what may be called innate propensity; and he is a generous patriot in his primitive or unadulterated condition. He is the material of a national army; but he is a material not to be found in what is called the civilized world; or, if found by chance, he is so managed and moulded by art that national sentiment, oppressed by assumed authority, is suffocated and ultimately extinguished.

In defect of national military sentiment, or in counteraction of its operations, a phantom of military glory is called up by tacticians to animate military force to exertion; but it is only a feeble and an uncertain substitute, after all the pains that are or can be employed in bringing it out. The operation of military glory moves in all its steps by the transgression of moral justice, and as such is an unhallowed motive to be applied to the animation of an army; but even if hallowed, it is not of extensive influence on the military mass. It rarely touches the common man, unless by a species of frenzy under that universal and radical revolution, which, extinguishing artificial distinctions and formal institutions, leaves the country open to the common eye as the common object of attachment. The operation is then energetic; but it is seldom of long duration.

The springs of military action alluded to not existing in the military recruit, or not being stable and calculable in effect, the tactician is forced to seek for others more common, or of more dependence. Patriotism, or love of country, is a legitimate principle in war, inasmuch as it implies defence of the native soil, as the rightful inheritance of the inhabitant. It is legitimate; but it scarcely has an existence among the nations of Europe at the present time. Military glory is a phantom which acts

on the imagination, and as such cannot be calculated in its operations. The desire of aggrandizing the condition by force and fraud is unjust in itself, and unhallowed as a motive for war; it is, notwithstanding, the common motive for collecting armies, and it is the principal motive which keeps armies in activity. The passion of cupidity is an aggrandizing passion. It has a forward course; and, in this forward course, it amasses materials and organizes them into armies, by a process that may in some manner be called instinctive. The desire of money to buy bread fills the military ranks; the hopes of spoil stimulate to exertion. The man of arms is purchasable as a commodity of traffic, and applicable to all uses; consequently an instrument of unhallowed purposes for a bribe in money. Money becomes, in this manner, the moving engine of armies; and, in the language of statesmen, it is the sinews of war. It is not denied that it is the sinews of predatory or royal war; it is the canker-worm of national war, that is, war undertaken for the defence of the native soil, and the general and individual independence of the native subject. If we permit ourselves to look at the question with the eye of the philosopher, money will be found to have a corrupting and enslaving influence everywhere, inasmuch as it uniformly, and more effectually than any other engine, brings man under the dominion of the most sordid of the human passions. This is proved in every page of human history\*.

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\* In looking at the radical operation of money on the military instrument, it will be difficult to find an instance, in the whole field of contentions, where human liberty has been vindicated, and a true form of government established, through the aid of money. This remark, which may seem to be irrelevant, is elicited by looking at the situation of the Greeks, who are now contending in arms for the vindication of their liberty, and the sovereignty of the soil which covers the ashes of their fathers. The Turk is the sovereign of Greece, arbitrary and cruel; and the Greek

abhors him. Besides abhorrence of tyranny, the Greeks have a feeling of the free condition of human nature, stronger and more radical, in so far as appeared to the writer, than any other people in Europe. They were oppressed, and rose up against oppression. Many of the wealthy and generous of the English nation desired to give them pecuniary aid, as believing pecuniary aid to be a remedy for all evils. They meant well, but they did not act wisely; for they did not consider that the operation of money is radically corruptive; that it acts partially on society, and, by acting par-

Besides suggestions on the selection of military materials, and the modes of animating the military ranks when mechanically formed, the writer has added such remarks on training, discipline, and economy, as occurred to him in a course of long observation. His view of training and discipline will be deemed severe by those who have been nursed in the lap of luxury; it will *not* bear hard on those who possess the powers of a healthy constitution. The primary rule in training and discipline consists in trying and mea-

tially, dissevers the social or national union, which rests on a basis of equality and common good; consequently, that it cannot do otherwise than act sinistrously on the affairs of Greece. Where foreign gold glances on the eye, the lustre of liberty is obscured, and the edge of the patriot sword is blunted. A poison is secretly conveyed in the money-donation of the generous, the patriot spirit and independent mind being insulted by it, as by a tender of charity. It is different with foreigners, who have taken a place in the ranks, and identified themselves with the cause of the Greeks—these are friends in reality, entitled to wear the patriot laurel.

The Greek cause strongly engages the sympathies of mankind. It is a noble cause; but we must not conceal from ourselves that the issue of it is yet doubtful. The dangers are considerable; but they do not arise from want of money. They arise from want of union; and want of union, even discord, instead of being diminished, is likely to be increased by the operations of money, particularly by foreign donations. A leader of paramount force of genius, capable of attracting every eye and rivetting every exertion to one point, is the desideratum of Greece; and, in so far as we can judge, it has not yet appeared as a native product, except in the late Marco Bozzaris, who appeared to have been a fit leader in a cause of liberty. The noble Englishman who recently attached himself to the Greek standard possessed the quality which Greece wanted: his presence threw a brilliant ray of hope on an other-

wise dark prospect. Lord Byron's original mind, electric genius, and patriot spirit, as of the first excellence, promised much. He had an intimate knowledge of human nature, and of the motives of human action, however disguised. The exquisite tact of discernment, and the ardour of spirit which he possessed, enabled, or would have enabled him, to animate the torpid to exertion; and his judgment, which was sound in all great things, could not, together with the force of his character, have failed to convince the Greek, that the nation which seeks to be free, must achieve its freedom by its own arm, and its own pecuniary means. Foreign aid is of no real dependence; and foreign donations of money, instead of rousing, have a direct tendency to lull, benumb, or vitiate the patriot spirit. Lord Byron was not bred a soldier, and soldiers will think that his value, as a presumptive military leader, is overrated. If not bred a soldier, he was born a man of genius; and a man of genius becomes a general, in a contest for liberty, on grounds superior to the drillings of the Prussian school, even if Frederick himself were drill-master. The hopes anticipated from the exertions of this sublime spirit and heroic man are now gone, and the independence of Greece is in danger. It is not denied that foreign gold may expedite the expulsion of the Turk from the Greek territory; but it may be added, at the same time, that foreign gold will introduce a master not less inimical to true liberty than the Turk himself.



sure powers of exertion, in matching them, and in exercising them when matched in such a manner that the exerted act of the whole be comparatively as the act of one. This is the point to be worked: and it is an attainable point, but it is not easy to be attained.

The economical rules of the present tract will be deemed equally harsh as the rules of training and discipline. They may be harsh, but they are not impracticable. Heat and cold, hunger, thirst, and other privations, not inferior in degree to those which fall to the lot of soldiers in the service of the field, are not unknown to the writer; and though his physical powers never stood high in a scale of comparison, he rarely yielded to the hardships under which stronger men complained, or sunk. The sufferings of the common mass were sometimes great in the scenes where he has been; but when the causes were examined correctly, the sufferings were found, for the most part, to be owing to bad management, rather than to real physical necessity. If a commander be without knowledge, that is, without correct knowledge, of the physical powers and moral dispositions of the troops which he leads into a field of difficulty, their safety may be compromised to his ignorance, and he justly blamed for the evils which ensue. On the other hand, if the troops themselves have not foresight and discretion, as a fruit of training and experience, they will suffer hardship through their own defects, in spite of the care and intelligence of the commander.


A sketch of the military character of the nations which are or which have been most eminent in war, is thrust, by way of digression, into the pages of the present volume. The execution is defective; but should the younger class of military readers be induced, by the perusal of it, to study the grounds of military science, that is, to analyse the records of history, and to seek for the principle which gives success to arms, the undertaking will not be altogether useless. It is important that the young officer know the character and power of the instrument with which he acts, as well as the nature and character of that against which he is destined to act. Some part



of this, it is presumed, may be attained by a close study of military character, as it stands in the records of national history; and with a desire to contribute a mite towards the attainment of an object so important as that alluded to, the writer has brought the principal armies of ancient and modern times under view, considering the view as grounds on which the young military mind may reflect with advantage. \*

The subject of the present work has been under the author's consideration for upwards of twenty years. He has looked at it without prepossession, as desirous to ascertain the truth. He believes that many of the hints which have occurred to him would tend, if properly understood, to diminish the miseries which are common in military life; and in that belief he has put them together, and now presents them to the public, gratified if they do good; at any rate, satisfied with himself, as acquitted of a duty which he conceives to belong to the station in which he has acted.

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ON THE  
FORMATION, DISCIPLINE, AND ECONOMY  
OF  
ARMIES.

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PART I.

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ESTIMATE OF QUALITIES, AND SELECTION OF  
MILITARY RECRUITS.

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THE selection of persons who are possessed of intellectual and physical capacity for the practice of war, and the systematic instruction of persons so selected in approved forms of discipline for the accomplishment of purposes, may be regarded as an object of high national concern. It conduces to the preservation of national independence from the aggressions of foreign force, and on this ground demands the deepest attention of patriotic statesmen, and the closest study of scientific soldiers.

The properly united action of the several parts of military force which constitutes an army, may be regarded as the main hinge of success in the field of battle; hence military tactic, which is the science of estimating power, and of arranging separate and independent parts into a whole, so as to concentrate the force of many, and to render the force so concentrated capable of being applied to a given point of attack with precise effect, cannot be otherwise regarded than an important science, not only with those who aim at conquest, or the subjugation of others, but with those who desire simply to maintain a given station, and to assert independence in their own circle. Every human being who inhabits the earth has a sphere and station assigned to it by the Creator of the universe; and every one has an innate desire to move in that sphere, and moreover a given quantity of force allotted for the maintaining of the movement. The condition is primary in man's constitutional organization; and it is important, as comprising a precise rule of individual physical independence.

But, besides the physical independence belonging to the individual, masses of men, when contingently brought together in the business of life, tend, by what may be called almost instinctive propensity, to form associations and to combine powers, sometimes offensively, for conquest or extension of the common sphere, sometimes defensively, for the maintaining a common station against the real or supposed aggression of others. The act which results from this combination is artificial and political. Whether it be directed to assert independence against the encroachments of external force, or to extend its own sphere by applying combined force to the oppression of neighbours, it is the condition to which tactic and the military art are rendered subservient.

Whatever be the object of organizing a military force, whether defence or conquest, it is obvious, in order that it be effective when applied to purpose, that the base be laid on sure grounds, and that all the subsequent steps bear directly on the base. The principle commonly assumed by tacticians, as the base on which the military instrument is formed, is factitious, that is, an appearance presumptive only of the reality. That which is here assumed is real, as implying in its conditions that nothing be admitted into it which has not been tried and proved by experiment to be sound and suitable. The ordinary tactician assumes the idea that human materials are capable of being accurately estimated by appearance; and on this idea he proceeds to arrange them in the military fabric according to external resemblances. In so doing it is no arrogance to say that he commits a fundamental error. A fabric, constructed by the external resemblance of parts, is pleasing to the eye by superficial uniformity; it is even impressive at first sight, in the presumption that strength and beauty combine and move together by innate correspondence. There is fallacy in the assumption. Appearance is not reality. Strength in the field and uniformity on the parade are not the same thing; nor are they to be judged by the same rule. The useful, consequently the desirable, arrangement of military materials, consists in the order and union which result from the movement of the instrument under all forms and degrees of exerted action. Every soldier of experience knows that the extent of exertion, and the endurance of toil, cannot be measured and calculated by external appearance, as the height of the stature and the symmetry of the limbs; and hence, if that rule be

assumed as the principle of arrangement, and acted upon as an admitted truth, there is no cause for surprise if the act be discordant when the powers are exerted to their utmost, and that the machine so constructed actually separate and fall to pieces under rude trials. On the contrary, if the materials be arranged according to measure of actual force as ascertained by experiment, rather than according to the quantity and appearance of the animal mass as it strikes the eye of the observer, a firm and permanent mechanical connexion will be assured under every possible form of exertion that can arise; inasmuch as a place is given in the fabric to every individual part according to the power which it is known to possess, and the endurance which it is qualified to sustain. The physical capacities are here supposed to have been tried, and to have been proved to be equal, or nearly equal, to one another; hence if, with this equality of capacity, the sensibility to the principle of action be equally prominent in every individual part of the machine, there are grounds to believe that, as the physical power of every part is balanced justly, so the movement will be just throughout—united and irresistible in its effect according to the measure of its power. An army so formed may be killed entire; it cannot be routed.

It will not be disputed that a preliminary knowledge of the structure of the animal body, and of the laws which regulate its economy, is, under all views of the case, an indispensable requisite for those who select the materials of armies, assign to the parts their several stations in the fabric, and superintend the movement of the fabric which they form through all its tactical evolutions. Such knowledge is important, but it is only to be attained by scientific study; and, on this ground, it is presumed that every person who assumes the office of tactician will previously instruct himself in the science of anatomy, and make himself acquainted with the common laws of animal economy, so that he do not, when he proceeds to act, put things of opposite natures together through ignorance. It is from this source only that he can be qualified to know correctly how an animal body acts, and what it is capable of enduring before it fail in its action. The rudiment of the science is presented to the student in the school of anatomy. It is an important rudiment; but it is not all that the tactician requires. A knowledge of military history, particularly of the revolutionary history of nations, where the mind appears

in all its native vigour, is mainly necessary to enable him to act scientifically in his proceedings. He is taught by the science of anatomy and physiology to calculate what man may do; he learns from history what he has actually done.

What is now mentioned may be considered as preliminary science. It is of value; but valuable as it may be, the tactician, without practical experience of war in all its forms and aspects, will still be defective in qualification for the duty of his office. It is necessary to guard against the influence of opinions built upon hypothetical foundations; and for this reason it is proper that those who train troops, or who prescribe rules for the training of troops, should know, by experience, what are the effects which change of climate, vicissitude of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, rest and idleness, activity or exertion, produce on the body of man. The tactician must therefore have actually experienced a soldier's life in the various conditions of service, eaten of his bread, and slept under the covering of his blanket, to be competent to speak precisely on the subject of what is the best military regimen, or to what extent privations and toils may be endured without injuring health; that is, without destroying the capacity in the individual of preserving an effective place in the military fabric. These are important points to be known and ascertained; and it is presumed that, from the sources of knowledge and experience hereafter stated, those persons who reflect upon the connexions of cause and effect will know precisely to what extent a soldier may bear and suffer without being disabled, and in what manner, and to what extent, his powers and capacity for war may be improved by education and discipline, so as to be rendered superior to the common mass. The knowledge is comprehensive: complex in appearance, it turns upon a simple hinge.

The prompt application of superior force upon given points of an enemy's position decides the fate of battle. The power of conducting this part of the military duty belongs exclusively to the military officer. The province of the author extends no further than to furnish suggestions for a scientific preparation of the instrument; that is, to aid in forming a structure, from a mixed mass of materials, which may be firm in itself, and capable of maintaining a regular and consistent movement in all its evolutions in the face of opposing force. As the duty of the author is confined to the preparation of the instrument,



an estimate of the properties of the materials becomes the first step in the undertaking. The quality of the materials may be viewed under six different heads, namely,

1. According to race.
2. Latitude of climate.
3. Soil and local situation.
4. Age and period of life.
5. Stage of society—pursuits and occupations; and, lastly,
6. Estimate of powers and capacities, as existing in the actual constitution of the individual.

§ 1. *Peculiarities according to race.*

PHILOSOPHERS have speculated, and continue to speculate, respecting the modes through which contingent causes operate, or have operated, in producing the distinctions of race which now obtain among mankind; but they have not attained a satisfactory explanation. There is an imitative power in Nature which acts, and appears to propagate subsequently, certain forms of configuration which were produced originally by force, error, or deviation. But though this be admitted as an apparent fact, it is not known, nor can any idea be formed of the nature or force of the contingency, which first transmuted a white man to a negro, or a negro to a white man, on the supposition that all men are derived from a common parent. Man is various in appearance; but, however various he may be, he is the same animal wherever he is found—propagated in the same manner, attaining maturity through a similar process, possessing nearly equal physical power, and nearly an equal term of physical existence, moved to act by similar desires, and restrained from acting by similar impediments. Such is the general base of man's common nature; but, with this common base, there are distinctions of race which, though they may have been at first produced contingently and artificially, have at last so grown into habit, and have become so ingrafted in the animal organism, that they are ultimately considered as peculiar and primitive. The speculative discussion of the subject is left to professed physiologists; it belongs to the author's province simply to state the fact, namely, that certain classes of men possess certain distinctions of character physically and morally, and that the combination and

proper adjustment of classes, in an army, or military instrument, according to properties, deserve the attention of the tactician and military commander in an especial manner. Races differ, and new forms result from the combination or union of those that are opposite. The change consists generally in a mean between extremes. But besides the neutral effect here noticed, an extension of size or stature, elegance of figure, symmetry of limbs, ease and grace in movement, are more striking in the mixed class than in the original. The mixture produces a species of culture, or physical improvement, which is capable, if well directed, of being carried to great extent and of attaining to great perfection. On the contrary, in those who religiously preserve their blood free from foreign mixture, the external appearance is less varied, less brilliant, and less attractive; and, in spite of the controlling influence of political causes, the features of the mind have always a strong resemblance. It is thus that a Jew maintains the Jewish character, whether in Asia or Europe—presumptively from his blood, as well as from the moral institutions of his nation.

Those classes of the human race which preserve their blood free from mixture with strangers, while they have less variety in external appearance, and perhaps less variety in the scope of mental capacity, than those who cross and recross at pleasure, have more endurance in action, firmer attachments to purposes, and less desultory impetuosity. This is a physical truth. The explanation of it is difficult; but it may be illustrated and comprehended in some degree by those who study the animal fabric, and who are acquainted with the laws of animal economy. In brute animals—horses, sheep, and cattle—the mixture of different races is observed to change the qualities, to improve the beauty, and to enlarge the size: it diminishes the hardness and the security of the physical health. In man, the mixture of different races improves beauty, augments the volume of the bodily organs, and even perhaps expands the sphere of intellect. It diminishes the power of enduring toil, and renders the habit more susceptible to the causes of disease. As stability of health and endurance of toil are more particularly connected with the races of men which are least mixed—a ticklish balance of system, rapid and desultory action, more peculiar to the product of opposite natures; so from the one may be selected soldiers capable of enduring hardships and fatigues, of resisting the action of the causes of

disease, and of persevering firmly in purposes; from the other, soldiers of quicker preceptions, more animated but less steady action—such, for instance, as results from impulse rather than sentiment.

The proper arrangement of those military materials, which are opposite in their qualities to each other, is an important part of the tactician's duty; but not an easy one. Without previous study and intimate knowledge of the character of separate parts, a fabric formed from these separate parts cannot be properly put together; consequently the action cannot be expected to be consistent, uniform, and effective, throughout the varied scenes of war. This is an obvious truth, but it is ordinarily little regarded. If regarded, it is warrantable to infer that the act of the military instrument might be rendered consistent throughout; at least, consistent to such an extent that the military officer might bring every part to bear with its full power in the day of battle, notwithstanding the varied aspects of the scene on which the collision may take place.

## § 2. *Climate.*

THE latitude of climate in which man is born and in which he constantly lives, manifestly operates upon the physical structure and efficiency of the corporeal frame; and, notwithstanding the controlling influence of institution, modifies, in a greater or less degree, the intellectual expression of the mind. Differences, as influenced by this cause, are observable among the nations which inhabit Europe, Asia, and Africa; even the aboriginal inhabitants of the western continent, though of one race radically, have, in a similar manner, shades of difference in bodily power and mental evolution, according to differences in the climate which they inhabit.

Heat is a general and active agent on animal life. The conditions of temperature, as marking heat and cold, may be justly considered as causes whereby which the developement of physical powers and mental capacities are materially accelerated, or retarded. The growth, or expansion, of animal bodies that are similarly constituted, is artificially accelerated by heat, and artificially repressed or retarded by cold. It is thus that the inhabitants of warm climates arrive earlier at maturity than those of temperate or cold regions. They arrive soon at matu-

rity; but they do not, perhaps, attain the highest perfection of which man's nature is capable. In climates where the temperature is uniformly hot, the atmosphere almost uniformly serene, the expressions of bodily power and mental character may be supposed to be uniform, inasmuch as they are moved into action by the application of a comparatively uniform cause. But, as man's physical structure possesses only a given amount of vitality by which it grows and expands, and as heat is the mover in all physical operations, the growth attains maturity at a comparative early period in hot climates, in consequence of the regular application of stimulative power; but it does not exceed a given limit. On the contrary, in the frozen regions, where the sun has little force, the fund of irritability not being duly excited by the application of heat, the power of expansion remains in some degree dormant: hence, the inhabitant of the cold climate does not, in defect of stimulation, attain the highest point of perfection of which the constitution of his frame is capable. In the middle regions, vicissitude of heat and cold, and the strife of elements, stimulate, repress and expand, in alternate successions; and, in consequence of this exercise or alternate movement of the material, the physical and moral powers develop with great effect. The assertion here made is an ascertained fact; the explanation of it corresponds, in a certain extent, with the operation of a regular physical law; for, as power expands, and endeavours to extend its limit, in action, so something is acquired in the intervals of rest which strengthens the function of developement. Hence we conclude that, as vicissitude in heat and cold, which gives comparatively great play to action and reaction, is necessary to carry growth to the proper point of perfection, so it is only in climates liable to such vicissitude that the highest physical perfection of the animal body is ordinarily found. Man differs in appearance, attains maturity earlier or later, acquires perfection in a higher or lower degree, in some climates than in others; but he is fundamentally the same animal in all, and possesses, through all, the same foundation of constitution on which are built his virtues, or his vices. Climate operates, as now observed, in bringing forth, or in repressing his perfections, and in rendering his powers more or less effective in action; but it is to institution that moral action is principally to be ascribed; and on this ground

it may be presumed that the inhabitant of the temperate region has the best chance of attaining eminence in war: it is so in general, but not universally. The favoured region may, and frequently does, produce the sluggard and the coward; the least propitious produces occasionally heroes of the highest cast.

Nations, in whatever climate they may be planted, have vicissitudes of fortune—the outline of the rule, which obtains in the organic growth of the individual, maintaining itself in the combinations of the political body. No nation—no European nation at least—has preserved, for any great length of time, a brilliant and active exertion of its powers to the full extent of the capacity. The exalted become vapid after expansion; the hour of splendour passes away, and the animating spirit moves on to illuminate another class, or another nation. Nothing is stationary in the physical world; and nothing is permanent, or even of long duration, among the human contrivances which are laid on a base of animal desire, whether of ambition, avarice, or sensual gratifications. The body of man changes daily, and the social fabric, constructed with this changeable material, follows, with more or less modification, a similar rule.

### § 3. *Locality.*

BESIDES the differences which attach to mankind from distinction of race, as connected with latitude of climate, there are shades of difference and resemblance among the same class of people according to the nature of the localities which they inhabit, that is, according to qualities of air, soil, and situation of place under the same or nearly the same parallels of latitude. The effect of air, as damp and heavy, dry and light; of soil, as fertile or unproductive; of locality, as flat or hilly and mountainous, is manifest in the vegetable production, observable in the brute animal, and even perceivable in man.

In champaign countries, of a rich soil and moist atmosphere, the animal production, whether man or beast, attains a comparatively great size or wide expansion. The human race is usually tall and straight in figure; the muscles are large and full. The animal power is of a high measure; but it is a clumsy power connected with weight. Action is not energetic; and the operations of the mind, though correct and regular, are generally slow.



On this ground, though power and perseverance may be looked for in troops born and bred in low and fertile countries, activity and enterprize do not belong to their nature.

The inhabitant of the hilly, dry and barren country rarely attains to the same height of stature as the inhabitant of the moist and fertile plain; and, while thus inferior in volume, he is also usually inferior in the quantity of actual force. But, though inferior in brute force, he for the most part possesses a firmer muscle, more energy and more rapidity in movement, more vivacity of temper, and more quickness in the operations of mind.

In hilly, or rather in mountainous districts, the structure of man's frame is firm and compact; the mind is bold and steady; the ideas elevated, and frequently sublime. From such properties, conferred by locality, mountaineers have a claim to be first selected for soldiers. They are ordinarily, as already said, inferior in size, and often inferior in positive force to the inhabitants of the level country. But, as simple force rarely decides the fate of battle in the present times, and as the active mountaineer possesses the power of rapid movement, he is capable of promptly applying his force to the just point of attack, and has thus almost always advantages in the actual practice of war over the bulky product of the plain.

It is obvious to common observation that a difference obtains among the inhabitants of mountains and plains under the same parallels of latitude; and, though it is readily admitted that impressions, connected with the modes of life usually pursued in different situations, have a share in producing differences of effect, yet it is most probable that the great and fundamental impulse, which determines the distinctive character in this case, arises from the operation of those physical causes which act upon all, and are common to the mass of the people. The grandeur, majesty, and precision, with which objects present themselves in mountainous countries, make deep impression on susceptible organism, and necessarily command attention. Cataracts, precipices, and the fury of the elements in storms of wind and rain and thunder, as they strike the imagination forcibly and awfully at the time, so they leave an impression of sublime sentiment in the mind, which grows and expands with reflection in the calm which succeeds. In tumultuous scenes a channel is opened for the course of grand ideas; and, while the ideas are thus expanded



and exalted, experience is gained of things which are common, and often formidable in war. The judgment is tried; and the mind acquires confidence, because it gains knowledge. If the impression of grand objects be often repeated, lofty ideas consequent to the impression are ingrafted in the constitution physically; and the operations of the mind assume a cast of the noble and dignified as the necessary impress of the original. The mind expands as the eye overlooks the extended valley; and, while expanded, it acquires an animating sensation from its relative position, engendering sentiments of pride, freedom and independence: an ordinary man thus becomes a hero. But, while the mind is expanded through the mere circumstance of occupying an elevated position, its view is at the same time confined by the distinct boundary of the circle. It turns inwards upon itself, and learns to know itself; and, as its views are compressed by narrow and distinct boundaries, objects within the boundary create a special interest in all, and thus closely unite society. The frequent repetition of grand impressions upon susceptible organs implants a physical grandeur of conception in the constitution of the frame; while, as now said, the circumscribed boundary gives that warmth of affection to the inhabitant, and that attachment to the locality, styled love of country, which constitutes a character of virtue and heroism. But, while the objects which nature presents in mountainous countries are thus calculated to engender a strong and elevated mind; so the more usual occupations of life are there calculated to form an active and hardy body. In climbing mountains and in descending precipices, the limbs and lungs experience an exercise which contributes to the increase of their powers; the eye learns to judge of distance; custom teaches the manner of managing and husbanding strength, and of measuring with precision the necessary exertion for the accomplishment of purposes. Mountaineers, thus bred and thus educated, possess constitutionally a large share of those qualities which are essential to soldiers; and history bears testimony to the intrepidity, the activity, and the promptness of decision, of this class of men in circumstances of difficulty and danger: they are, moreover, the chief patriots among men.

§ 4. *Age or Period of Life.*

BESIDES the differences which attach to the physical power and moral character of man from race, latitude of climate, and local situation, period of life influences materially the efficiency or non-efficiency of the official act of the individual; and, as such, the age of the soldier is a matter of some importance to be attended to, when the materials of armies are selected and arranged in their places for military service. In youth, action is rapid, impetuous, and desultory, but it is not steady and persevering; desires are fierce, but they are changeable. Youth is the period for enterprize: the desire of glory then captivates, and transports the actor beyond the bounds of calculating reason. The young man is ready, even eager to attempt; but, as his acts are chiefly acts of impulse, and as such, not sure, it belongs to the judicious military commander to place the object which gives the impulse in a prominent view, and so to dispose it that it may remain prominent in all the differing conditions which the service presents. If it be veiled, or obscured by accident, the mind, not yet confident in itself, wavers and fluctuates; hence retrograde, and route from retrograde, is to be reckoned among the contingencies incident to young soldiers.

In mature age, action is vigorous, steady, and persevering. Things are known by experience; purposes are determined with a resolute mind; and a sentiment of honour, as connected with the desire of glory, dictates the preservation of character. Hence persons who have attained mature age are the persons to constitute that part of an army which is destined to decide the battle by constancy of courage and the grasp of power. In such the power of execution is matured; ardour of enterprise is not impaired by age; and habit in combat may be supposed to have blunted sensibility to common dangers. Ardour of enterprise abates in the advanced period of life, even power and vigour decline; but, as old age is tenacious of what it possesses, old soldiers maintain with obstinacy the honours of their past life; hence the veteran defends his position with firmness. His courage is excited by dangers; difficulties are even necessary to bring it out; we may therefore be allowed to say that his proper station is in a post of trust and responsibility.

§ 5. *Stage of Society—Pursuits and Occupations of Life.*

BESIDES the differences of power and character observable among mankind according to race, climate, local situation, and period of life, the stage of social progress, and mode of daily occupation, influence the qualities of the subject in a greater or less degree; consequently they affect, in a corresponding manner, the condition of fitness or unfitness for war. It is in the early and semi-barbarous periods of society that military qualities shine forth with lustre. The mind then ambitious and ardent in its pursuits, is bound firmly to its purposes by the ideal phantom of glory of conquest. Glory of conquest assumes a vigorous growth in this stage of society, inasmuch as it is not marred or distracted in its course by the variety of fantasies which play on the passions in civilized life. The body is healthy and active, inasmuch as it is not pampered and enfeebled by the luxuries of the table. The mind is firm and resolute, as not rendered capricious and morbid by indulgences; consequently, the semi-barbarian is the person among the sons of man who is best capable of sustaining privations, and of enduring the fatigues of war, without injury to his health.

Among the civilized and polished nations, where avarice of money, and a desire of sensual gratification, usurp the place of ambition and the desire of military glory, which are the predominant passions of the barbarian, the mental pursuit diverges into a multitude of channels. The physical power, rendered unduly irritable from excess of previous ease and indulgence, loses that constitutional firmness which is the basis of courage and perseverance. Hence the strength sinks under hardships incident to war; and the mind, morbidly sensible at the approach of danger, inasmuch as it is engrossed by security, ease, and pleasure, revolts from scenes where accidents, toils, and privations, are daily occurrences. It is thus that luxurious nations, and luxurious individuals, are constitutionally cowards, from abhorrence of hardships and self-denials. If they manifest bravery, they are usually stimulated thereto by incitements of sensual and selfish gratification,—vanity, the bribe of money, or the hopes of promotion.

The human body, which is so formed as to be acted upon by external causes, and so constituted as to assume, from the action of these causes, a certain routine of movement established into

habit by repetition, and rendered capable of supporting itself in its established routine with comparatively little fatigue and pain, in consequence of the habit so engrafted, acquires different degrees of preparatory education, from pursuits and occupations of life, which fit it generally for the purposes of war, or directly for a respective place among the component parts of an army. Hunting, of all the pursuits or occupations of man, is most directly preparatory of war; but hunting is only a general occupation among savage or very barbarous people. Among the polished nations of Europe, it is an amusement reserved almost exclusively for the pleasures of the great. It is thus neither a general nor a common pursuit of the people; but, where it is pursued as a principal business of life, it is calculated to bring forth, and eminently to improve, the military qualities of the individual: it may be regarded, in fact, as a primary school. It confirms courage, and sharpens address. If the object of the chase be the destruction of the ferocious and bold animals, the hunter insensibly acquires courage, intrepidity, and above all, promptitude in danger. If the prey be timid and shy, he acquires address and management. His perceptions are sharpened, his thinking faculties exercised in contriving the means of entrapping, and of thereby accomplishing his purpose. In both cases he acquires readiness in seizing the fit opportunities for acting; and, while familiarized with the toils and the fatigues that are incident to war, he insensibly gains knowledge of ground, and learns to judge of distance—a knowledge useful to the soldier and highly necessary to the officer. From this class of persons, by obvious inference, sharpshooters and other irregular troops are to be selected.

Herdsmen, whether employed in guarding sheep, horses or cattle, stand, as prepared by habits of life, in the next degree of fitness for war to hunters. Herdsmen are familiar with much of what occurs in the service of a campaign—vicissitudes of heat and cold, and changes of weather. They are generally accustomed to that frugal and homely mode of living which is essential to military excellence. They are hardy, and inured to bear bodily toil; and they are moreover furnished with opportunities of learning, from the observation of causes which act upon their flocks, the impressions of fear or confidence which belong to position. Hence the shepherd, who becomes a soldier, estimates,

with greater correctness than others, the advantages and disadvantages of ground. The fact is true, however humbling to human pride to acknowledge it, that causes of fear or confidence act upon flocks of sheep and armies of men by a similar rule. On this ground the pastoral life may be regarded as a school in which the man who is destined for a common soldier acquires some valuable properties, and in which a man destined to lead an army has an opportunity of gaining useful information respecting animal nature, by analyzing the facts of history which fall under his observation.

The mere husbandman, field-labourer, or rural mechanic, learns little from his occupation which particularly fits him for military service. But, as causes of action are ordinarily little varied in rural life, and as labourers are almost always in action, the daily routine repeated through a series of years makes a strong and characteristic impression on his frame, gives mechanical firmness to the body, and leaves a simple and paramount sentiment on the mind which constitutes courage. The husbandman is healthy, as he lives in open air and subsists on simple food; his arm is powerful, as practised in that species of field-labour which calls forth the exertion of power, and confirms it by routines of exercise. Possessed of these qualities, his station is an important one in the fabric of an army. It is that of grenadier or reserve, the force which decides the fate of battle when the affair quivers, as it were, on a doubtful balance.

It is not easy to point out the essential primary difference of fitness or unfitness for military service among the numerous classes of artisans who abound in civilized nations, and who ordinarily fill the ranks of armies in times of actual war. Some are more useful than others, from what they have learned to do in their civil occupations. They are all nearly on a level in point of preparation for military life at the time of their enlistment. Artisans have ordinarily a ready use of their hands acquired in the practice of civil arts, and from this perhaps it is that they learn the manual exercises with more facility than others. They are accustomed to mechanical movements in their daily occupations, and, being apt scholars in exterior forms, they assume the military air speedily. But, while artisans readily acquire those mechanical or parade manœuvres, which are reckoned essential parts of the soldier's education, they are inferior to the others in the service of the



field—to the hunter and the shepherd, in intelligence of things similar to those of war; to the husbandman, in bodily strength, in endurance of toil, self-denial, constancy, and firmness of courage. They have, notwithstanding, an useful place in the composition of an army; and, as prepared by primary education, they may be best employed to fill up the battalion, or that part of the military instrument which acts principally with fire-arms.

§ 6. *Selection of the Army Recruit; Rule of adjusting his place in the battalion according to an estimate of his bodily powers and mental capacities.*

SUCCESS in war, in so far as regards the mechanical soldier, depends upon possession of force and the power of its prompt application; consequently force and activity must be always kept in view in the selection of persons who are destined for military service. But, as quantity of force, and the power of prompt application, are not always proportionally joined in the same subject, it is a matter of importance to enquire into the properties of the materials individually, so as to be able to estimate the power of each separately, previously to fixing its place in the integral corps, or regiment.

There are tacticians who, in estimating and selecting the materials of an army, direct their attention to the qualities of the mind as well as to the figure and form of the body. There are others, and by much the greater number, who, regarding the mere quantity of the animal mass, form their judgment of power and activity by superficial signs of external configuration only. A knowledge of the previous life, under which habits are acquired, or mechanical routines of acting established, obtains consideration with one: knowledge of the previous life does not appear to engage the attention of the other, for it is not supposed to lead to any thing useful. Such is the fact: it is left to the reader to judge which of the two builds on the best foundation.

Man is an animal of imitation in all his steps and gradations; and animal action assumes, through frequent repetition, a constitutional habit which becomes in some degree a second nature. This happens almost invariably in the history of human life; and, if the fact rest on a general foundation, it is reasonable to suppose that the best military subjects are those whose occupations in



civil life have the nearest alliance with the business of war ; and, for a similar reason, that as an army is a compound body, consisting of parts which are applied in different manners for the effecting of a common purpose, the selection and arrangement of the materials in the fabric will be best directed by an estimate and knowledge of the individual parts in their previous habits, confirmed by trial in illustrative experiment. It is admitted that, though an army be only one body in the whole, it is still necessary that it consist of parts of different character in detail, so that it be prepared to meet the enemy with advantage under the various presentations which a military action assumes.

The adjustment of this part of the subject is entirely military. The author is unwilling to overstep his bounds by encroaching on it ; but, as he has undertaken to examine and to estimate the radical qualities of the materials of armies, he thinks he may be allowed, without undue presumption, to state the purposes for which an army is to be prepared, and the general line of conduct which it may be expected to pursue in its endeavours to accomplish its object. It is the purpose of a military action to gain a superiority over the enemy. The points on which the success turns are various : the following seem to be the principal. 1. A precise knowledge of what is to be done, and of the mode of doing it in the most effectual manner. This belongs to the general-in-chief ; and though the general be allowed to receive informations, and to adjust preparatory measures, through various means and instruments, the ultimate conclusion and plan of execution must be his own in all cases. 2. When the plan of battle is formed, the first step of progress in the action consists in the rapid occupation of such points on, or near the scene of action, as command objects which are important to success, either as connected with annoyance of the enemy, or security of the selected position. 3. When the points alluded to are occupied, the direction of the mechanical power, as united by force and supported by courage, for the accomplishment of the end, is the next and main object in the conflict ; and, lastly, if the attack fail, the condensation and compression of what is left into the best form of security for effecting a retreat, in a deliberate and soldier-like manner, finishes the military operation. The necessity of retreat arises from miscalculation ; to effect it with credit is the most difficult part of a soldier's duty.

The first part of military force is allotted, under proper officers, to the purposes of ascertaining the positions of the enemy, of judging of his countenance previously to action, and of meeting his various irregular presentations when he begins to advance. As such it must be active in its movement, ready in forming judgment respecting ground, and skilled in the best manner of concealing its operations; for, as it must approach undiscovered, it is desirable that it retire unhurt. The practice of fowling and hunting gives a preliminary education for this part of the soldier's duty; inasmuch as address, similar to that which is acquired in hunting and shooting, forms the most conspicuous quality of force of this description. The force so described is not supposed to fight a battle; but it is of great value in covering the front and flanks of an army against surprise, or in clearing away annoyances which harass the line or column as it advances to the scene of the main combat.

The first step in a military action, namely, the act of seizing positions which, to a certain extent, assure the command of ground, and which have thus in some degree the power of multiplying force, is allotted to that species of troops denominated light. Light troops are supposed to be swift of foot, so as to be capable of moving with celerity over difficult ground, to be powerful in strength, so as to seize difficult posts against opposition, and bold in courage, so as to maintain the posts which they seize. Herdsmen are the persons best prepared by previous habit for this species of warfare. They are ordinarily swift, and they move with safety on rugged and uneven ground; they further endure the exertion of running without commotion, or with less commotion than others, as being more inured to it. They are armed with the firelock and bayonet, and drilled like other soldiers; but their proper drilling, it may be remarked, consists in firing at a mark in different positions and at different distances: their manœuvres and their exercises are chiefly to be directed to traverse irregular grounds, in different orders of tactic, and at different rates of celerity.

When the mode of battle is ascertained, the commanding positions being seized and occupied by light troops, the mass of the army, advancing in line or column to the grand attack, commences the close conflict by the application of mechanical power from musketry. The force is missile. The rapidity with which it is thrown, and the precision with which it is directed, may be supposed to command the balance of effect; and, in so far as re-

spects precision, the execution may perhaps be best committed to that part of the army which is drawn from artisans, as persons comparatively expert in manual operation.

When fire-arms fail in making such impression as induces the enemy to retire, another part of the machine is ordered to advance to the combat, in the expectation of bearing down resistance by the superiority of physical force. The character of this part of the instrument, as armed with the bayonet, is power; above all, courage and perseverance. It is supposed to move under one impulse, and to live under one sentiment. Victory or death being its motto, it admits no retrograde step into its catechism. The class of field-labourers and countrymen furnish this grenadier force in greatest perfection: for, among such, the arm is usually powerful to impel, and the mind firm to maintain.

In arranging the different parts of which an army consists, no provision is supposed to be made expressly for the purpose of covering a retreat. The forward movement only is in the eye of the soldier; yet the retrograde is sometimes necessary, and, when necessary, it is well to know the description of troops to whom a duty so difficult to be properly executed can be best committed. It is not to be expected that young men and new soldiers, who are taught to look forward in war, and to keep victory always in the eye, can be trusted to protect the dispositions that are necessary in retiring from the field. The object which engages the attention, and occupies the thoughts of the soldier, is forward. It changes form; and it is obscured or lost when retreat commences. The mind is then in some manner blank; so much so, indeed, that if the idea of glory, attached to a forward movement, and giving activity to that movement, be lost in the unexpected retrograde, confusion arises and route ensues. It is owing to discipline, and knowledge of the real nature of things, that a retreat is conducted without confusion in the face of an enemy; and it is to experienced troops only that such duty can be safely assigned. But besides the confidence which insensibly insinuates itself into the mind of the soldier from experience of war, there is something connected with an advanced period of life which diminishes the disposition to panic and surprise, so natural to the human race at unexpected occurrences. Old men have less ardour and less constitutional irritability than young ones. They have more firmness and more patient courage; they have also a more correct experi-

ence of things, and they probably know, from their experience, that an enemy is most formidable to those who run away. Veterans are, on these accounts, the best qualified to support an army under the disasters incident to retreat; and for this reason, the grenadiers, or reserve of an army, ought to consist of veterans; that is, of men of mature years and actual experience in the field. The grenadier, according to the writer's idea of a grenadier, cannot retreat from an action where he is principal: he may cover the retreat of others consistently with the character which he assumes.

An army, composed of different parts according to the suggestions here proposed, is furnished with the means of seizing advantageous positions, of estimating the designs of the enemy, of attacking him with adequate means of offence, or of resisting his attacks with courage and resolution. The whole power of the machine combines in action for one purpose; but, as the different parts of which it consists have different functions, it is obviously a matter of consequence to select the materials of the different parts from classes of society which have more or less constitutional difference in their qualities; and, when so selected, to arrange them in their places according to their relative degrees of fitness, so as to produce one uniform and consistent act in the shock of battle. It is from the effect of united action in the field, the result of union of physical power and mental energy, not from the uniform *coup d'œil* of a parade, that the military name of a nation finds an honourable place in the page of history: and hence, as it is common sense, so it ought to be common practice, that correspondence of action, rather than uniformity of appearance, be adopted as the rule by which military organization is directed.

The qualities which are supposed to be ingrafted on animal action, by habits of education and manner of life, are evidently of importance in themselves, and may reasonably be expected to influence the opinion of the tactician, in the mode of classing the materials of individual parts of the military instrument for various purposes in actual war. Besides the qualities acquired by habit and manner of life, the properties of the individual, as they depend upon physical organization, deserve attention; and they generally obtain it, though not always on true grounds. Great strength often belongs to great bulk of body; and where man is opposed directly to man, it is reasonable to conclude that the greater power will prevail over the lesser. But in the present time, when

the fate of battle is often decided by fire-arms, to which the hand of a man of six feet does not give more power than the hand of one of five, it is not easy to see the reason of the rule which so generally influences the choice of those who select subjects for the formation of armies. It is admitted that a column of troops, of unusual stature and great weight of body, gives an idea of comparatively great power and execution; and it is even true that, in consequence of such idea, the young soldier is often struck with fear, and leaves the field without fair trial. Such occurrence does take place; but it is only an uncertain contingency, and cannot, in fair reason, be calculated upon as a foundation for success in war. This is obvious to ordinary apprehension; but, granting that some contingent good may be expected from the impressive appearance of the bulky mass, it cannot be denied that the disadvantages naturally connected with it are real and positive—more, it is presumed, than sufficient to counterbalance the effect of chance panic upon the imagination of the timid. It is evident to the common sense of every one, that a body of men of unusual size presents an object of proportionally great volume for the marksman; and, as it is generally known that such body moves with little comparative celerity, it necessarily suffers a comparatively great destruction from missile force before it can reach the point of attack. But—besides the positive disadvantage of greater volume, and, from probable slow movement, comparatively long exposure to destruction from fire-arms—before the superiority of bodily power, if any such exist, can be brought to bear, it is well known, to those who have seen and estimated the effect of severe campaigns, that men of large size are ordinarily the first to fail under fatigues; and medical men know, from observation, that they commonly suffer from diseases in greater proportion than others. These are facts which cannot be disputed; and, if they be admitted to be true, it will not be attempted to maintain that bulky men are the best subjects for ordinary military service.

There is a fixed standard of height for persons who are admitted into the British army; and, as it is fixed by regulation, the writer has nothing to observe upon it. Besides height, the beauty and symmetry of the figure influence opinion, and determine preferences in the choice of soldiers. The idea of beauty is relative. The eye is attracted by what fashion or

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taste considers as such ; but, if the beautiful be separated from the useful, the judgment is biassed, and the decision will be in error. The graceful shape and form of perfect symmetry are seldom connected with power, activity, and that inexplicable fund of endurance which supports toils and fatigues with constancy and firmness. On the contrary, it is usually observed that cross made persons—persons whose joints are large and prominent—possess great powers of action and long endurance of toil. The observation is true, and the reason of its truth is obvious. The form of body alluded to furnishes an advantageous lever for the action of muscles ; and on this ground, bodies so constructed are patient of toil, inasmuch as their movements are effected with comparatively little effort. Hence, instead of grace and symmetry of form, a rosy colour and delicate texture of skin, large joints, prominent bones, swelling muscles, rough and elastic integuments, are true military properties. They are the real beauties of a soldier, as they are the surest marks of the capacity of enduring the fatigues of war. On this ground, it may be supposed that the tactician, who comprehends the principles of his art, will not fail to bear in mind that the aspect which is penetrating, bold, and determined—the movements which are powerful and energetic, rather than languishing, soft, and graceful—are the properties which stamp the value of the military recruit : they constitute the beauty, as they mark the utility.

But, whatever be determined to be the standard height of the recruit, it is necessary that the condition of general health, and the efficiency of the power of the limbs, be correctly ascertained by examination and competent trial, so that no other than sound materials be placed before those who are appointed to organize a military fabric for a military purpose. In order to attain this important object, it is customary to direct army-recruits to be accurately inspected by army-surgeons. The duty imposed upon the surgeon in this case is not to select what is in every way good, but to reject what is absolutely unfit. Among the points to which his attention is directed, in the execution of this duty, the following are the principal. Whether the recruit be well placed, or capable of being well placed, upon his haunches by art or military drilling ; whether he possess the natural and full power of all his limbs, with the free and perfect motion of all his joints ; whether any weaknesses remain from



sprains of the joints, particularly of the knees and ankles; whether there exist any impediment to free action from hurts, fracture of bones, or other causes; whether he possess the full power of expanding the chest in all postures and attitudes; whether the eye be free from disease in its substance and in its appendages, the vision clear, and strong, and perfect at night; whether the sense of hearing be acute and distinct; the speech free and unembarrassed; the parts about the throat without disease, disposition to disease, or marks of the ravages of former disease; and whether the belly be compressed, the reins firm and elastic. Ruptured persons are proscribed by regulation from the lists of the British army; but, in young recruits, no disposition to this disease, no defect or impediment about the secret parts, of such nature as may in any degree interfere with the exertions of active service, ought to be passed over as indifferent. Ring-worm, scald head, and other loathsome deformities, which are contagious, and which are not easily eradicated, should be banished from the army; for if it be desirable that an army be effective, it is not proper that any one be admitted into the ranks in whose constitution there exists an open or latent blemish. Military service often entails the necessity of a rapid march; consequently the feet and legs of the soldier are essential parts of his person; and for this reason, the state of their efficiency, and the chances of their continuing efficient, ought to be correctly ascertained at enlistment. Besides the form of the leg, the power of which is ordinarily judged by the firmness of the calf and the sinewy structure of the ankle, the skin ought to be sound, firm and elastic, free from varicose veins and other signs of congestion. The condition of the toes of the feet are by no means unimportant. Much inconvenience arises where they crowd upon each other, or where they are of such form as favours the growth of corns. The nails of the great toe are sometimes prevented with difficulty from growing into the flesh: this ought to be looked into in the surgical examination of the recruit, for it is often a great inconvenience to the soldier.

The above are visible impediments which impair action, and on many occasions mar the performance of military service; but, besides these visible blemishes and impediments, of the presence of which any officer of common observation may judge, and the effects of which officers of experience may calculate, there are

others which cannot be ascertained without a considerable degree of professional discernment, or properly estimated without practical experience of war. Among these may be reckoned a disposition to scrofula, without the open marks of the disease; a disposition to consumption of the lungs; catarrhal defluxions, apt to degenerate into consumption; adhesion of the lungs to the sides, indicated by impeded respiration under exertion; asthma; prominence of the stomach; loose and flaccid reins; mesenteric obstructions; hæmorrhoids; disposition to dropsy; obstruction in the urinary passages; and lastly, epileptic fits.

Many of the causes which impede the performance of the animal functions are visible to the eye, and may be estimated to the full extent *à priori*; others only discover themselves upon trial in great exertions. As it is only from uniformity of power under exertion that union of action can be assured, and as this is the point which essentially contributes to success in war, a standard for the measure of the powers of exertion among recruits, is not less necessary in sound reasoning for the construction of a military instrument, than a standard for the measure of the height of the stature. In order to ascertain this important point, the writer conceives it to be proper that every person who enters into the army should be brought to trial in walking, running, leaping, climbing hills, and traversing irregular and broken grounds. It may be fairly admitted that a full-grown person, who is not capable of marching at the rate of four miles in the hour with firelock and knapsack, is not eligible for a soldier, destined for field-service. If his wind fail in walking briskly up hill, or if his joints be weak, so that he do not move with speed and safety over broken grounds, it would be unwise to enrol him on the lists of an active army. The failure of individuals on a campaign, or in a battle, by destroying union of action, on which success depends, often defeats the effects of plans that are fundamentally well laid. Misfortune is thus entailed on the army, which might have been avoided by foresight: the cause is trifling in appearance, but important by its consequences.

Besides all that can be learned from a professional examination of the state of health, and from actual trial of the powers of bodily exertion, with a view to determine the value of those persons who allot themselves to military service, a knowledge of the animating spirit of the parts individually is essential to suc-

cess in action. This knowledge is important; but it is not easily attained. The qualities of the human mind are various. Enterprize and intelligence, intrepidity and perseverance, are the most material in military service. It does not often happen that the same person possesses the whole in equal perfection. The first two, according to the writer's observation, are most frequently found in persons of low or middle stature; the latter two, in those who exceed the common standard. The observation now made has a foundation in nature; but no one can pretend to define the limits of it, or to explain its cause; and, though it be admitted that the character of mind is in some degree connected with bodily appearance, and influenced by organic forms of structure, yet the precise laws are inexplicable in our present imperfect state of psychological knowledge. We are therefore forced to say, that the higher progress which is to be made in arranging the materials of armies by knowledge of mental qualities, must be sought for at the immediate source—in the actual observation of the individual material at the point of application; of course, the effect produced will depend on the capacity which the person entrusted with the high office of constructing the military fabric possesses, in reading those characters of mind which are only obscurely written.

The root, and even the shoots, of military qualities result, as already observed, from peculiar properties in the different races of the human species, from period of life, habits acquired by long practice in particular forms of action, and lastly, from configuration of structure. But, while these qualities attain a certain degree of physical efficiency according to the operation of contingent causes, they are capable of being carried still further, even to something like perfection, by the results of systematic institutions—military or political. The qualities of the soldier are thus improved by culture; they are impaired by neglect, and they are overturned, or annulled, by modes of life which engender conditions unequal to the difficulties and hardships of war. Nations have national propensities, and these propensities are formed into character by tacit, or open institution. Institutions engender habits by a continuance of mechanical routine; and may even so confirm them that they may be calculated with some certainty of result. The Spartans, the Romans, and the Swiss, stand on record, as the people whose institutions were most scientifically and syste-

matically digested for military effect. The Spartan was a soldier from necessity: he became a hero through institution. The Spartan territory still produces the same forms of body as it did in the time of Leonidas; but the military and moral institutions are neglected or corrupted, and the Spartan character is no longer found on the Spartan soil. The Roman nation was warlike in the early periods of the Republic. Extension of territory was its object; and all the energies of man were turned into a military channel to attain the extension. Military prowess made conquest; conquest brought riches; riches brought arts and luxury; and luxury so undermined the warlike character, that the Romans lost their sovereignty over mankind, and the expansion of their faculties, as moving on the base of insulated passions, served only to multiply and expand their vices. The Swiss are naturally warlike. Every Swiss is a soldier by profession, as well as by inclination. The military institution of the Swiss was calculated to preserve the independence of the Swiss territory. It abstained from encroaching on the territory of others; it was thus radically just. The Swiss at one time esteemed themselves, and they had a right to do so. They were proud as soldiers, independent as a nation, and they were courted for their alliance. They are now changed; for, though they still maintain a mechanical pre-eminence in the use of arms, they are no longer regarded as arbiters among the nations of Europe. They have lost opinion in themselves by the loss of independence, and with that they have lost national pride and primitive moral character\*. They are still natives of the Alps: they are no longer the invincible Swiss of the sixteenth century, who, though they received a price for military service in the field, reserved truth and honour to themselves as a property unalienable.

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\* Written shortly after the subjugation of Switzerland by Napoleon.

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## PART II.

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### A SKETCH OF NATIONAL MILITARY CHARACTER.

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THE general testimony of history seems to shew that brilliancy, and what is termed grandeur among the human race, moves periodically from one class of men, and from one part of the globe to another, in the manner of a tide. The simple and circumscribed mind of the savage is acted on by the impression of new objects. It feels, covets, and appropriates; and thus emerges into the state of barbarism. From barbarism it advances progressively to a given point of civilization or refinement; and to this state of refinement it develops a factitious grandeur of incalculable extent. But the grandeur, though brilliant to the eye, is not stable or of long duration. It wanes, sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly. The faculties contract; and, if they do not contract to their original narrow sphere, they dwindle to comparative inanity and insignificance.

To trace national character in its rise and progress, to mark its movement during its elevation, and to note the causes of decline and the degree of depression to which it subsequently sinks, belongs directly to the province of the historian and philosopher. The proper investigation of it implies a labour not consistent with the design of this work, and not within the reach of the author's means and capacity. But, though circumstances do not here permit a scientific research into this interesting field of speculation, it may still be useful to notice cursorily the nature of the principle through which one nation exalts, or has exalted itself, above another in military pre-eminence, and how it maintains itself, when so exalted, in power and splendour. There is uniformity in the proceeding throughout; such as indicates that the operation depends on the action of a law which obtains generally throughout the human race, from the rudest traces of savage life, to the pinnacle of grandeur and refinement; and from the pinnacle of grandeur and refinement, to the lowest point of degeneracy and debasement of which man is susceptible.



In the purely savage state, the activity of man is confined to the act of procuring what may be called the physical wants of his nature. Man, as a mere animal, is without the ambition of conquest, even without foresight to secure provision for future subsistence: he eats when he is hungry, and sleeps when he has done with eating. The first operations of animal life are mechanical acts of impulse, and as such merely organic. The individuals of the human race, endowed with capacities of perception, but without knowledge of things attained through reflection, wander at random in the unoccupied wilds of the globe. The sensibility of organism is impressed by new objects; and new desires arise mechanically in the constitution as the consequence of new impressions. The desire of extending the sphere of action, and of consolidating the product of the extension which is contingently made, may be considered generally as the first operation of the civilizing mind. The savage, constituted with a propensity to appropriate, traverses the globe, and seizes whatever impresses his sense as an object of desire; for, as he has no conception of what is termed property, he is not conscious that he commits injustice when he takes for himself that which is in the possession of another.

The history of the present race of men goes no further than to a history of migrations and violences. The case is simply and uniformly conquest and colonization—from the early periods of the piratical invasions of Greece, to the modern settlements of the Spaniards and Buccaneers on the continent and islands of America. The ignorant savage widely dispersed in the woods, or the enfeebled voluptuary and debased inhabitant of the luxurious city, is thrust out and enslaved by the energetic and warlike barbarian and robber; who, enriched by his conquest, rendered luxurious by riches, and deteriorated by the indulgences of animal appetites, submits sooner or later to a similar fate from others that are less unworthy than himself.



## CHAPTER I.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SPARTAN STATE.

SPARTA furnishes a striking example of the value of law and institution in raising a nation to moral and military eminence, and in maintaining it for a length of time in respect in all the conditions of the elevated station. The Spartans, previously to the time of Lycurgus, appear to have been worse than barbarous: they were corrupt and ill governed; the rich were few and insolent, the poor were numerous and oppressed. Lycurgus, who seems to have been born with great powers of mind, and with genuine goodness of heart, saw and felt the evil; and, pitying the forlorn condition of his countrymen, he planned and digested a reform in the laws, such as constituted a singular and almost incredible revolution in the scheme of human government. He eradicated and destroyed the seeds of the prevailing anarchy, and ultimately succeeded in establishing a moral and military institution, which is without parallel in the history of the world for consistency and good effect. The military institution of Sparta is the sum of military excellence: it deserves, above all others, to be studied by statesmen and generals, inasmuch as it develops principles of the utmost importance for the government of men and the formation of armies.

The desire of extending the sphere, and of consolidating the extension made, is obviously the leading desire of man, whether barbarian or civilized. The action which ensues from such desire characterizes human activity, and raises man above the mere animal. It is brilliant in its dawn; but it is precarious in its course and issue. If it be not regulated by a principle of justice, or reciprocity of action and reaction among the constituent parts, it exceeds its bounds tumultuously; and, encroaching on the sphere of others, disturbs the constitutional balance of things with one another. It assumes what may be termed an artificial centre of action; and it thus forms a partial accumulation of power, which, offending the law of justice, prepares materials for change or revolution at a future time. It is probable that Lycurgus saw this truth in all its extent and relations; and, as

he knew that moral or political revolution is accompanied with misery and often with danger, he, with a knowledge of things that no legislator had ever before employed, and that no one has yet effectually imitated, arrested error in its course, and formed a government which gave freedom to his country, and held out a prospect of permanent happiness to its inhabitants.

Lycurgus constructed a new system of discipline for Sparta; and, in so doing, he must be supposed to have acted on a model. History gives no information upon what model he acted; but it may be presumed that it was the fabric and economy of the animal body, which furnished him with the idea of harmony in structure, and was guide to him in the construction of his edifice. The animal body is organic and functionary throughout its whole extent. Every part has its sphere; and, while every part preserves its sphere and executes its function, neither advancing beyond, nor falling short of its proper limit, the action of the machine is regular and consistent, and health is perfect according to its rule. Irregular action constitutes disease; and disease terminates in the death of the part, and ultimately in the death of the whole. Lycurgus had seen the world in the course of his travels; and, as he was a man of observation, it is fair to suppose that, viewing the animal body as a system in which there is no useless or offending part, and, taking this system as the model of his imitation, he constructed his political machine in such manner that every part of it was functionary and effective; no excrescence or refuse being anywhere permitted to exist within its circle. All the parts of the animal body are only parts of one system; consequently all are necessary to its existence and well being; and though some are apparently more important than others, yet they have only one common life to animate them effectively and equally to their duty, according to the condition of their organism. Physical health consists in an equal balance of action throughout the whole extent of the animal body; hence, if there be accumulation in one part of the body beyond another, the balance is destroyed and health is interrupted. In such a case of bodily disease, it is previously necessary that local errors be rectified, or equality of balance restored between the parts, before a remedy of general operation can be supposed to excite and maintain a form of action analogous with that of health. The body of man is a part in the

system of the universe, and it is animated according to a general rule. The political system is a creation of man, artificial in its construction, and animated artificially. It moves and acts according to the rule prescribed; but its movements will not be correct, or its operations effective, unless the animating spirit be strong and commanding, and every part within the fabric be so adjusted as to receive the influence of the spirit, and to obey its impulse on equal terms, according to constitutional conditions. Lycurgus, it is presumed, was aware of this fact, and fully sensible of its importance; but he had difficulty in bringing it to bear in practice.

The organization of the human race according to a general principle, that is, the preparation of a condition for the operation of a general remedy, may be regarded as a great labour at all times: it was Herculean at Sparta. Sparta might be considered at the time of Lycurgus as an animal body in a diseased state. It was disfigured by congestions, excrescences, and weaknesses; that is, property was in few hands; the poor were numerous; and, as there were no laws, or no laws of power and effect, injustice and oppression prevailed everywhere. The case was complicated; and, in such a state the remedy could only be devised by a man who was wise, and applied by one who was bold. If it be allowed to revert to first principles, and to estimate man as a part of a whole, the remedy is obvious and easy. But obvious and easy as it is in fact, and just as it would be found to be when tried by reason, no person, except Lycurgus, ever succeeded in applying it with permanent benefit. The stagnation of property in the hands of individuals here existed to an injurious extent. Such is an evident evil—in fact, a disease in the republic of human beings, as much as the swollen liver or carbuncled face is a disease in the animal system. Every form of congestion within the animal frame must be allowed to be actual disease; that is, a centre of new action, or new mode of life, which counteracts the mode that is original and constitutional. In a similar manner, the stagnation of property in the hands of few may be considered as a centre of new action, foreign to, and disposed to counteract, the primary constitutional act and proper life of the state; which consists, as already said, in reciprocal action and reaction throughout the whole extent of the fabric. In a country oppressed, not with the bulk of its capital, but by

obstructions to the free circulation of its wealth, there exist governments within government. Property is the engine of power; and, where this operates, the ostensible government only maintains its preponderance through the quantity of property which it is capable of applying to the purchase of support. The whole operations of a state so constituted turn on a balance of influences, direct or indirect. The appearance is brilliant; but it is uncertain in duration, for the structure contains within itself the materials of revolution and decay.

Lycurgus seems to have been aware that a nation could not be rendered happy, free, and secure from change, otherwise than by placing one object in the eye of every one, and by placing it so advantageously that every one might be attracted by it with nearly the same force. The soil or country which gives man birth, which gives him the food of his infant years, which contains the ashes of the dead whom he venerates, and the persons of the living whom he ardently loves, appeared to Lycurgus the first earthly object of man's devotion. Impressed with this idea, he constituted COUNTRY, or the inviolability of the Spartan territory, to be the soul and moving principle of his commonwealth; and, having established this principle as a basis, he put every engine to work, which he was capable of commanding, to render the force of its action irresistible. Possession is the first desire of man: tyranny and thirst for rule are natural consequences of acquired power and riches. Lycurgus was a man of too much discernment not to discover that the existence of individual property creates an individual self, and that self never fails to obscure the love of country, and the duty which man owes to man as a part of the same collective body. It may be presumed that he was acquainted with the fact, that no rich nation ever defended itself long, or resisted aggression with heroism; and, as he knew the fact, it may even be supposed that he had penetrated into the cause of it when he reduced the Spartans to a common level in respect of property, and presented them, in lieu of it, with a common country, destined to command all their attention and to engross all their attachments.

The Spartans were divided into tribes, and the land was divided into lots, each lot calculated to return a quantity of produce sufficient for the sustenance of a Spartan and his family. The land was unalienable; and the produce of it, which was returned

by a helot or slave, might be considered as a military salary—equal to furnish subsistence, not sufficient to purchase superfluity. The Spartan citizen was entirely military, and so strictly bound to the honour of arms, that he did not degrade himself with labour of any kind; not even with agricultural labour. The division of lands, or rather, the appropriation of given portions of land to return an equal ration of provisions to every privileged Spartan, laid the basis of a correct and rigid economy. This, with the institution of a common mess-table, effectually precluded luxury of living. As every member of the Spartan nation was furnished with a ration of provisions according to one scale, so every one, without exception, was obliged to eat in common, unless after an excursion of hunting, or the ceremonial of sacrifice to the gods.

The institution of a common mess-table acted as a powerful cement of the Spartan policy, both in a military and moral point of view. It served to obliterate self and selfish gratification; and had the effect, to a certain extent at least, of uniting the whole Spartan people as one man in defence of a common country. Every individual contributed monthly one *medimnus* of meal, eight *congi* of wine, five *minæ* of cheese, and two and a half of figs, with a small piece of money for the purchase of seasonings. From the nature and amount of this contribution, some idea may be formed of the Spartan manner of living. The quantity allowed is sufficient for sustenance, but not more than sufficient. Besides the regular contribution levied from every privileged member, there were casual presents from those who sacrificed to the gods, or who were successful in hunting; but, with all these contingencies, there was nothing that could give a Spartan the means of indulging in the pleasures of the table. The quantity of Spartan diet was defined by law. The order and decorum of a Spartan mess-room were judiciously laid and rigidly conducted; and the moral and military instruction there exhibited was important. Cleomenes, who renewed the institutions of Lycurgus, and who was perhaps the greatest of the Spartan kings, stands forward as a model for the imitation of sovereigns and warriors in the economy of his living. It was proved clearly, by his example, that true greatness does not consist in splendid entertainments; on the contrary, it may be inferred, from his and other examples in well

authenticated history, that sumptuous living, ostentatious splendour, and true greatness, are scarcely compatible with each other.

Lycurgus divided the lands into equal portions, or into portions calculated to yield equal revenue; thereby precluding inequality of income. He adopted iron as the representative of money—an expedient which, while it diminished the desire of accumulating cumbrous riches, preserved Sparta from a multitude of foreign nuisances. No Sybaritic adventurer sought a country from which he could only carry away iron as the reward of his services. The Spartans were thus allowed to retain their primitive simplicity, because they had not the means of purchasing refinement and corruption from their civilized and mercenary neighbours.

The constitution of Sparta was entirely military; consequently, no one was held to be of value who did not occupy a part and perform a function in the state. The legislator excluded from his fabric what was actually useless, and in that he did wisely: he destroyed what was weak and imperfect, and in this he acted arbitrarily, it may even be said sacrilegiously. The law of sacrificing the imperfect offspring, even under the sanction of judges, cannot be considered in any other light than murder. But, while such in itself, it must at the same time be admitted that it was a law of high political importance to Sparta. It impressed the idea on all, and impressed it most irresistibly, that the defence of the country was the object for which man lived, and that those only were valuable who were capable of acting effectively in that defence. It was by the opinion of judges that the infant was removed from the stage of life, or that it obtained a place in the political system of the state. To maintain that place worthily was the first passion planted in the breast: it grew and expanded equally among all. The Spartans were thus proud in the consciousness of their own importance. They were submissive to the law—and all Spartans were equally submissive to it; no one claimed exemptions.

The new-born infant, after examination and approval, was carried home and laid upon a shield. A spear was placed before its eye; hence it might be supposed to grow up in familiarity with arms. If so treated, its first ideas would naturally be those of war; for, as things were so placed before it that it might acquire



ideas as it were by its own observation, it would, it may be presumed, enquire into the nature and use of what it saw; and, as what it saw was an instrument of war, it may be supposed that it was acquainted with, and perhaps enamoured of, a military weapon, while it was yet in the cradle. It was under no constraint, and it was acted on by no fear. It may therefore be fairly supposed that both its bodily and mental powers were speedily developed; and, as there were no bad examples before its eye, it may be easily conceived that, while its acts were vigorous, they were also just. At the age of seven it commenced its public education; and after that period its parents had no direct control over it. It was then under the law, the magistrate, and the citizen; for every citizen was bound to instruct and correct according to law. The whole Spartan nation was thus on constant duty, superintending and under superintendence.

One of the most respectable citizens of the republic presided over the education of the children. He divided them into two classes, and placed a young person, distinguished for his discretion and courage, at the head of each of the classes. The scholar obeyed without hesitation, and submitted to punishment, where he had done wrong, without murmur. The discipline increased every day in rigour. The hair was cut short; the feet and legs were bare; and the whole body was occasionally exposed to weather in a naked state. Every one was inured to hardship—to bear heat and cold, and to sleep hard, any where or any how: no one was indulged with the luxury of baths, or frictions with oil. The young Spartan was enticed to look at things with his own eyes, and to exercise his own mind on all things that regarded his own occupation; he was, in fact, so trained as to become a man within himself on every point that relates to war. The system of education thus pursued kept him steadily to the point of business: it tried and proved his temper, his obedience, and his courage. No military system, of which we have knowledge, appears to have been laid on so correct a basis as that of Sparta; and no people appear, in any period of the world, to have taken the same pains with the Spartans to improve those physical powers of the body which contribute to give it effect. The females were equal to the males in heroism of mind; and with the finest symmetry of form, they possessed the greatest energy and elasticity of muscle. Health and bodily activity were not incompatible with the Spartan idea of

beauty; and hence the young females attracted the notice of the male by the display of power in the field of exercise, rather than by the languishing graces of movement in the dance, or by the dazzling tints of colour which animate the cheek.

The Spartan youths received only a slight tincture of book-learning; but they were taught the manner of expressing themselves clearly and concisely on fit occasions. They were qualified to bear a part in the dance and song; and cherished a taste for simple poetry, chiefly such as related to the history and heroic acts of their nation. The inspectors, or Ephori, visited the youth daily to mark their conduct; and examined them occasionally to ascertain their progress. They were particularly watchful that they did not become fat. Fatness was thought to argue effeminacy; and it is in fact unseemly in a soldier. The greater part of the time of the Spartan children was spent in the school of exercise, where the courage was tried and proved in all kinds of combat. By the exhibitions of courage and power manifested on these occasions, the chiefs of the state had an opportunity of knowing the character of the materials of the military fabric, of putting them together by a rule of science; that is, of so matching the force and temper that the whole might act in union on ordinary occasions, and might even continue to act in union in the severest conflicts of battle. The Spartan youth did not know to yield, to shrink from pain, or to acknowledge a defeat—he preferred death to a confession of weakness. The honour and independence of his country was the idol of his soul from earliest youth. The idea was constantly present in the thought, and gave elevation to the mind.

When the Spartan youth attained the age of manhood he did not cease to learn. Education was perpetual; it did not terminate at a given period of life. Swimming, wrestling, running, ball-playing, and the other exercises of the gymnasium, besides those more directly military, occupied a great portion of his time. When these exercises and the ordinary military evolutions ceased, the young men repaired to the gymnasium of the youth, to witness the amusements, games, and contentions of the junior classes. From the gymnasium of the youth they adjourned to the general rendezvous of the citizens, where all descriptions of people met for the sake of conversation. The young there listened with attention to the discourses of the aged, and heard

with pleasure the remarks of the wise on the history of men and nations. The object of the Spartan institution was the elevation of the Spartan character to an eminence of military and moral excellence; consequently the examples of heroes and great men only were placed before the eye of the scholar. No crooked schemes of narrow policy obtained notice; and no acts of wickednesses which disgrace human nature were even so much as mentioned in a Spartan assembly. The Spartans were what the world regards as an illiterate people: there were, in fact, many among them who could not read or write. No one pursued the sciences or cultivated the arts, and no one deigned to touch an instrument of labour; yet the Spartan never was idle; and, though not book-learned, he possessed real knowledge—he acquired, from artificial representation or from actual experience, a correct idea of all those things which relate to war. The physical powers of his constitution were improved to the utmost point of improvement by habitual exercise: the powers of his mind were condensed by the removal of extraneous objects; and they were often inflamed to enthusiasm by the stimulation of their paramount object—the love of country. The Spartan was presented, in the course of his education, with most of the contingencies which happen in war; and from this source, perhaps, when in action, he often seized the reason of a thing as it were by intuition. His country was always in his eye: it animated all his actions, and absorbed his very soul. The idea of country is simple and comprehensible; and the impression, as not obscured or blunted by the obtrusion of self, supersedes all technical instruction. The Spartans had no written laws. Their institution was a living law of discipline, giving power and activity; and, contrary to what happens in written laws, it did not become a dead letter. Every part watched and superintended another; and the machine was so joined that every one was capable of feeling, of judging, and rectifying first errors. Every senior was a law to the junior, and the sacred idea of country was a law to the whole. A political machine so animated, and so guided in its movements as the Spartan state appears to have been, was in little comparative danger of going wrong; or, if it did go wrong, it could not continue long in its course of error. The entire of the Spartan nation, like a regiment on parade, was always on duty, or under superintendence. It moved only by the word of

command; but that command was inseparable from honour and duty. Honour and duty were common to all, and equal in all: it is in such equality that freedom consists. The spirit of the Spartan constitution was directed to form and maintain good conduct—the spirit of common political constitutions is only active to inflict punishment for offences.

If soldiers could ever be termed invincible, it must have been the soldiers of Sparta. The pains which were taken to improve the physical powers were unremitting; and the principle, through which the means of improvement were applied, was well considered, and well calculated to produce effect. The condensation of mind and the force of character, which were given to the Spartans by the mode of training adopted by the state, were never given to any other class of men in an equal degree of perfection. The sum of the discipline consisted in engendering a habit of obedience to superiors as organs of law; in inculcating perseverance in toil and difficulty as a test of worthiness; and in implanting the paramount sentiment—to conquer, or die in the field of battle, as an honourable sacrifice to the safety of the country. The law of Lycurgus, which banished individual self and selfish gratification from the Spartan policy, confirmed the courage of all; for, as individual selfishness is decidedly a source of fear, the penetration of the lawgiver who acted on a fact, true in itself, but rarely admitted in practice, may be considered as the determination of no ordinary mind. The courage and virtue which effected the eradication of self against preponderating causes of opposition, must ever command the veneration of mankind, and leave Lycurgus as a lawgiver unequalled in history.

There is some confusion among writers on the subject of the formation and division of the Spartan force. The *enomotia*, or squad, is the denomination of the lowest division in the Spartan army. It consists of thirty-two persons; the *pentecostys* consists of four squads or *enomotiæ*; and the *lochos* of four *pentecostyæ*. Such was the arrangement and proportions of the Spartan army at the battle of Mantinea, according to Thucydides; but Thucydides acknowledged the subject to be obscure, the Spartans studiously concealing their military principles from the observation of foreigners. Xenophon lived at a later period than Thucydides, and lived moreover under circumstances which gave

him an opportunity of being intimately acquainted with the Spartan system. The Spartan *mora*, regiment or division, according to Xenophon, consisted of four *lochoi*; the *lochos* of two *pentecostyes*; the *pentecostys* of two *enomotiæ*. It is not possible to reconcile the difference between Thucydides and Xenophon on this head. Some may suppose that the arrangement and proportions were different at different times. Others may incline to believe that one of the writers, most probably Thucydides, as he knew the Spartans only as enemies, had not been well informed. But, be that as it may, it is generally admitted that all orders descended from the commander-in-chief to the *polemarch*, or commander of the *mora*; from the *polemarch* to the *locharch*; from the *locharch* to the *pentecostarch*; from the *pentecostarch* to the *enomotarch*, who passed the word to every man in his squad. Every one comprehended the force of the order, for all were intelligent in the art of war, and capable of conceiving the end and object of such evolutions as were ordered to be performed in the face of an enemy; consequently, while the will of the chief was obeyed as an order, the execution was animated as an act. From this we may understand how the Spartan phalanx became irresistible in attack, or impenetrable in defence. It was cemented in its foundations by correspondence of physical power, and it was animated throughout by intelligence, and devotion to duty.

The Spartan phalanx consisted of eight files in depth. The files were at intervals of six feet from each other when disposed in open order; when disposed in close order, the distance was three; and in locked order, one and a half. The open order was the ordinary order for march and evolution; the close order was the order for attack; and the locked order, that in which attack was resisted. The front rank consisted of tried and known men; the rear rank was also select; those on whom there was the least dependence were most interior. Thus placed, they gave momentum to the machine by their weight and physical power; and they were maintained in their places, or prevented from recoiling, by the support of the rear files, which consisted of men of trust. The parts were classed in the phalanx according to their powers and capacities; and the covering file was matched, as nearly as possible in its qualities, to the file in front;

so that when the whole or any part of the front failed, the second file, or an individual of the second file, filled up the vacant space, without occasioning disorder in the line.

The Spartans were familiar with all known and approved evolutions in war; and it may be presumed, from the pains that were taken in matching the power in the primary arrangement, that the evolutions were performed with great precision and celerity. The phalanx inclined to the spear or right, to the shield or left, obliquely, and without confusion. The rear occasionally became the front, or the front the rear, by the shortest and most simple operation: the Spartans were thus qualified to engage both front and rear at the same time.

The Spartan soldier was armed with a spear, a short sword or dagger, and covered with a shield or buckler. The buckler was oval and large: it was fastened round the neck, and at the shoulder by means of straps. Cleomenes changed the clumsy oval buckler for the Macedonian shield, originally invented by the Carians. This was fastened on the arm by a ring or handle, so as to leave the man at liberty to employ both hands in giving force and direction to the spear. Cleomenes was a systematic tactician: he adopted the Macedonian pike, as well as the Carian shield.

It may be a question with military men, (and such only can determine), whether the arrangements of the Spartan or Macedonian phalanx are preferable. The Macedonian phalanx, from the manner of its composition and equipment, is a machine scarcely to be resisted, if it be applied with all its force; and hardly to be penetrated, if the position on which it is placed be good; but it is evident at the same time that, as it less easily adapts itself to broken or irregular ground, it is little manageable in such places as are ordinarily the theatre of military actions; it was therefore less frequently employed, even by Alexander the Great, than the Spartan phalanx, which he knew by experience to be sufficiently powerful to move the feeble enemies that opposed him. The phalanx constituted the force and chief dependence of the Spartan army. It possessed the character that properly belongs to grenadiers. Solid by its arrangement, and invincible in its spirit, it was only to be discomfited through the inferiority of its arms, or the superiority of the enemy in



generalship. Some idea of the manner in which it acted may be learned from the instructions of Tyrtæus\*. The order of

\* The instructions of Tyrtæus, while calculated by their ardour and spirit to rouse the most torpid courage, and to inspire a sentiment of heroism and resolution in every man who is susceptible of feeling, contain an admirable lesson for the conduct of the soldier in the actual shock of battle. The instruction defines the position at the point of conflict, and the force of the language rivets the mind solely to the execution of duty, through the most powerful of the motives that can be supposed to operate on man. The whole is a military catechism of the first order of excellence: some parts of it are here subjoined.

(A.)

"With good heart let us fight in defence of this our fatherland, and for our little ones let us die—we will not be so niggard of our lives as to grudge them in such a cause. Ye who are in the vigor of youth, ye are expected to stand by each other in the battle; it were a shame for you to set the first example of a coward's flight, or poltroon's fear. Nay, rather summon up the mighty spirit of bravery in your hearts, and count your life as valueless in a combat with illustrious warriors. But as for those veterans, whose limbs have lost their nimbleness, I warn you that ye flee them not, and so desert your seniors. For this were a shame indeed, that a veteran hero should be seen to lie where he fell in the foremost rank in advance of the youthful soldiers—that he whose years have given him a hoary head and blanched his beard, should lie in the dust as a brave hero would expire. \* \* \* \* \* These things were a shame to be exhibited before men's eyes, and it is a deed which would call for vengeance to behold his nakedness discovered; for he was in every way as goodly as the young are now, even so long as he had all the bloom and elegance of youth about him—goodly for the sons of mortality to look upon, and such as might kindle love

in women when he was alive; but now he hath fallen in the foremost rank. Therefore let each one keep his post manfully, planted firmly on the earth with feet apart, and biting his lip with resolution."

(B.)

....."having covered his thighs, and the calves of his legs below, and his breast and his shoulders with the bulging surface of a broad shield, whilst in his right hand is brandished a sturdy spear, let him shake the awe-inspiring crest upon his head, and in the execution of valiant deeds let him learn the art of war; and let him not with shield in hand keep beyond the reach of missiles, but let each one, coming to close quarters, wound a foeman with a long spear or with a sword, and so destroy him. Having grasped a sword or spear, let every one place foot to foot, and clash his shield against his foeman's shield, and crest against his crest, and helmet against his helmet, and breast against his breast, and so struggle with his antagonist in mortal combat. But ye light-armed skirmishers, wherever any one of you can find a shield, crouch beneath it, and do your part in routing them with massive stones, and hurl your smooth and polished spears against them, whilst ye keep your position close by the heavy-armed."

As Tyrtæus has described the manner in which the Spartan soldier was expected to conduct himself in the actual conflict, so Thucydides informs us, in his description of the battle of Mantinea, in what manner the manœuvre was conducted with a view to gain advantage at the onset. Some part of it is here transcribed for the satisfaction of the reader. "After this came on the engagement, to which the Argives and their allies marched with vehement impetuosity; but the Lacedæmonians slowly, and to the music of many pipers stationed in the ranks

battle presented the closest union of force and the utmost exertion of power; while the arrangement was calculated to bring forth the most determined spirit of perseverance in effecting the execution of a purpose. It exhibited a machine in which every part was active and exerted to its utmost. Besides the phalanx, which was the pride and confidence of Sparta, the *Sciritæ*, who were horsemen, and drawn from a dependency of the Spartan state, always occupied one station in the army, namely, the left. Their conduct was distinguished on most occasions; and their exertions contributed on many to the success of the Spartan arms. Light troops were employed in the Spartan army; but they were comparatively in little esteem: they appear to have been chiefly subsidiary or mercenary.

The Spartan soldier was, for the most part, in a state of ease or relaxation when he entered on a campaign, or encamped in the field before the enemy; but even then the military exercises were not neglected or forgotten. After exercise, a frugal repast was spread upon the ground; and, after the repast, hymns were sung in chorus in honour of the gods. The last office may be supposed to have exalted the man within himself, and to have confirmed his courage against all the accidents of war. When the homage to the gods ceased, the Spartan reposed on his

ranks by military law, and not for any religious reason, but in order that, by stepping by measure, they may advance evenly, and their ranks not be disordered, as is usually the case in large armies in their approaches."

The force of the character of the Spartan nation, considered as the result of political institution, has perhaps no example in history. The conversation which the banished Spartan Demaratus is stated to have had with the Persian monarch Xerxes, gives a striking instance of it: Demaratus himself was a living picture of it:—"To this praise all the Dorian Greeks are entitled; but I shall now speak of the Lacedæmonians only. You may depend upon it, that your propositions which threaten Greece with servitude will be rejected; and if all the other Greeks side with you against them, the Lacedæmonians will engage you in battle. Make no inquiries as to their

numbers, for if they should have but a thousand men, or even fewer, they will fight you.

"I will never presume to engage in fight with ten men, nor even with two, nor indeed willingly with one; but if necessity demanded, or danger provoked me, I would not hesitate to fight with any of those, who are said to be a match for three Greeks. The Lacedæmonians, when they engage in single combat, are certainly inferior to other men, but in a body they are not to be equalled. Although free, they are not so without some reserve; the law is their superior, of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of you: they are obedient to what it commands, and it commands them never to fly from the field of battle, whatever may be the number of their adversaries. It is their duty to preserve their ranks, to conquer or to die."—Beloe's *Herodotus*, b. vii.

arms. His duty was always in his eye; and it may be presumed no other idea, except that of victory, presented itself to his dreams.

When the order of battle was adjusted, the phalanx with one object in view, and absorbed, as it were, in the idea of acquiring glory, or rather of performing duty, moved on to meet the enemy, in accord with the sound of music. The cadence of the music contributed to preserve cadence in the step and order in the ranks; and the sentiment which it inspired, acting by a common impulse on the mind of all, denied entrance to foreign impressions. The Spartans were thus united. They were animated in action, but they were not impetuous. They considered themselves as parts of a common instrument, obedient at all times to the commanding power; hence offensive action ceased instantaneously as if by magic, the Spartan resting peaceably on his shield, when the signal was given to stop the slaughter.

As the Spartan phalanx advanced to meet the enemy in a cadenced step and in correct order, so it retired from the field with regularity, however reduced in number. Every man was obliged to produce his shield after battle, as a proof that he had fought, or retired as a soldier ought to do—collected and in possession of himself. If he threw away the shield, he was disgraced for ever, and all his relations were sunk in grief. The act of throwing away the shield argues fear; and fear had no place in the Spartan catechism. The Spartan mother and the Spartan wife rejoiced, at least were proud of themselves, when the son or the husband fell honorably in the field of battle: those only were mourners whose relatives escaped from the unfortunate battle of Leuctra.

The Spartans stand alone among nations as conquerors of themselves. They attained, through the discipline of their institution, the view of a sentiment which commanded their actions to the right channel, and to the right channel only; consequently the genuine Spartan, who was a man at all times, exulted in no success, and desponded in no reverse. He was always conscious of having done his duty; and never entertained the idea that he was capable of doing more than his duty. The phalanx was the most perfect military instrument, the most correct mechanically, and animated with the best spirit of action of any force that

ever appeared on the theatre of war. The Macedonian phalanx, from the length of the pike, and the greater impulse which might be given to the pike through the manner in which the shield was fastened on the arm, was irresistible on the plain; and the Roman soldier, as covered by the shield and armed with the sword, appeared to be capable of working his way safely and successfully in irregular and broken grounds beyond all others; yet neither the Macedonian nor the Roman, though formidable by the manner in which they were armed and in which they manœuvred, possessed the same tone of animation and the same adjustment for joint action as the Spartan phalanx. The Macedonian and the Roman fought for conquest and spoil: the Spartan for justice—his own defence, or the protection of those who were unable to protect themselves. On this ground, no one can refuse to give to the Spartans a tribute of praise for their heroism in the field, and an acknowledgement of gratitude for their apparently generous conduct to defenceless neighbours. With a very small national force, the Spartans continued for centuries to be the arbiters of Greece. There is reason to think that their office was upon the whole justly administered; but their power, or perhaps their virtues, excited jealousies; and they were at last considered as tyrants rather than protectors, and not perhaps without cause. When state policy is influenced by ambition of power, or desire of riches, it never fails, however brilliant its course may have been, to terminate prematurely and in misfortune, inasmuch as it moves under the influence of a passion which is in direct contradiction to the law of nature. The Spartans appear to have been impartial judges in matters of dispute between independent nations in the early periods of their history; but human institution is liable to corruption, and the virtuous Spartans appeared in process of time, perhaps from the deference that was generally paid to their decision, to assume a high tone and to dictate a will, often without an ostensible reason. They were opposed by the Athenians. The Athenians were ambitious of power and dominion, enterprising in spirit, fertile in genius, of great comparative skill in seamanship, and possessed of a high sense of feeling on the subject of general liberty. A war commenced between these rival states, called the Peloponesian war, from the whole of the people in the peninsula being more or less implicated in

the contest. The Athenians were powerful at sea, and thereby had the opportunity of multiplying their offensive attacks. The Spartan force consisted in its phalanx, which was strictly speaking defensive. It was not competent, from the smallness of its numbers, to meet the desultory inroads of the enemy at all points; and under such necessity, a marine force was provided as extra aid. As Sparta did not possess the means of doing this within itself, and as the money of the time was necessary for the provision of what was wanted, it had recourse to negotiations or bargain; it even went so far as to receive pecuniary assistance from the enemy of the Greek name, in order to effect the overthrow of the Athenian power.

The Spartans finally defeated the Athenians, and deprived them of their liberty; but they lost their own institution, so as to degenerate, from just and heroic Spartans, who despised riches and renounced foreign conquest, to ambitious, avaricious, and mercenary tyrants, who trampled on the rights of man. Lysander may be thought to have laid the foundation of this melancholy change, by shewing to his countrymen the power of money, and by permitting the luxurious habits of the East to contaminate the soldiers of the country of Lycurgus. Agesilaus finished the Spartan disgrace when he became a mercenary in Egypt; and he left an indelible stain on his country, when he sold himself to the highest bidder, because he fancied it was for his country's political advantage to do so. The Spartan character is not irreproachable; but the military arrangement is admirable. It will ever be a model of imitation for those who aim at eminence in war, or who, more strictly speaking, desire to attain perfection in tactic for the better protection of their country and its institutions.

## CHAPTER II.

## ATHENIAN.

THE Athenians and Spartans were rivals in power, and opposite in character. The Spartan government presents a phenomenon in the history of mankind. It was the only government in ancient or modern times which claimed a consistent basis, and which moved consistently on the basis for a length of time. The members of the Spartan community were born and educated under a rule of order; and the love of order and decorum was so engrafted on their organism by habit, as to engender a sentiment which was imperative as a law of nature. The discipline of the Spartan institution commenced at an early period of life. It was applied judiciously, and it acted effectually in establishing the dominion of mind over the appetites and desires of animal sense: mind ruled at Sparta—the body obeyed as an instrument\*.

\* The character of the Athenians is contrasted with that of the Spartans in a speech made by the orator at Corinth, at a congress of the States prior to the breaking out of the Peloponesian war. Whether actually delivered by the orator in the style and manner reported, or manufactured by the historian, it is a document highly important in itself. The outline is well sketched—the leading points of difference are well marked. “They are projectors of novelty; quick to devise, and rapid to carry into execution, their schemes. Your aim is only to preserve what you already have; to devise nothing fresh in plan, and in execution not even to accomplish what is barely necessary. Again, they are enterprisers even beyond their strength, and venturers beyond the limits of prudence, and in adversity ever hopeful. Your characteristic is ever to accomplish what rather falls short of your ability—to even distrust the surest deductions of reason—and in adversity to fancy there will be no end to your troubles. Furthermore, they are bustlers, as opposed to you procasti-

nators—roamers, while you are home-sleepers—for they think that by their absence they may gain something more; you imagine that by aiming at further acquisitions you may injure your present possessions. They, when victorious, pursue their advantages to the farthest; and when defeated, are found the least to fall back. Their bodies, too, they employ for the state, as if they were any one's else but their own; but with their minds completely their own, they are ever ready to render it service. And as to whatever they may devise, and not accomplish, they regard themselves as deprived of what was their own; but what they may pursue and acquire, they esteem trifling compared to what they shall in future attain. And if, indeed, they be any where foiled in an attempt, they make up the deficiency by expecting something else, as if in compensation of their loss. For they alone place the possession, and the expectation of what they meditate, on the same footing, and that from their celerity in setting about what they determine upon. And thus



The Athenian was the converse of the Spartan. Athenian acts were acts of impulse from direct feeling. As impulses which act on animal sense are numerous and variously modified; and, as Athenian acts were the consequence of direct impulse, with little modification from political institution, the effect was anything but consistent. The Athenian acted unsteadily, and sometimes contradictorily; but he also acted generously, and often heroically, inasmuch as his acts sprung instantaneously from the sympathies of man's common nature unfettered by insulated and selfish policy. The Athenian felt acutely on all occasions, acted promptly on many; and, fancying himself to be the champion of liberty, he fought enthusiastically, and persevered courageously, under great difficulties; for he was absorbed in the idea that liberty is the common inheritance of man. It is so in fact; and it was expressly to this sentiment, and its consequent impassioned action, that Greece owed her deliverance from the threatened yoke of Persia. The acts of the Athenian people were generous in most instances: they were even noble and exalted in some; but, as they arose from the direct impulse of contingent causes, they were capricious and uncertain—sometimes timid and unworthy. History proves the fact; the explanation of it is not incomprehensible.

The Athenians were not ostensibly so much of a military people as the Spartans; but they were naturally bold and enterprising, active and intelligent, fertile in resources, ready in evolution, expert in executing combined movements, superiorly well calculated for desultory warfare, and skilled in the conduct of sieges above all other people of the time. They possessed great energy, both physical and moral; and they only required to be properly moved and skilfully directed to execute great things: they were, in fact, soldiers of the first character for daring enterprise and rapid execution. The feeling connected with the possession of liberty was the spring which moved the Athenian to

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do they drudge on, amidst toils and perils, through the whole of their lives. And least of all men do they enjoy what they possess, being always occupied in making fresh acquisitions. No holiday know they, nor esteem they aught save that whereon they may perform some necessary business. For they deem in-

active quietude a no less evil than toilsome occupation. So that if any one were to sum up the whole, by saying that they were born neither to enjoy rest themselves, nor let others enjoy it, he would speak but the truth."—Bloomfield's *Thucydides*, book i.

act. The suspicion that liberty was threatened with danger united the whole in common defence; and defence was then undertaken with an ardour that does not rise to the same height from any other cause. Under its domineering influence the act was cordial; and, where the genius of a leader was capable of giving it just direction, it was irresistible.

The rigour of the institutions under which the Spartan youth was trained and educated, continued to operate without remission, and maintained every one in his station, even in advanced years. At Athens every individual was his own master. The will of the people was the sovereign. But, as the will of the people fluctuates with casual impulses, the expression of it was only strong and consistent where it was connected with an idea of liberty, in which all participated. As the preservative power of the Spartan institution kept every one within his sphere, and urged every one to his duty through its discipline; so the Athenian preservative power, which literally resided in the people, was unstable in itself, as leaving every one master of his own act. Every Athenian was free and entitled to suffrage, consequently every one was a member of the state; and, as a member of the state, his faculties were exerted individually, or permitted to move in their own channels. Genius, as constrained by no rule of education, started up everywhere, and often rose to eminence from a humble source. The man of genius was encouraged at Athens, while his exertions were useful and subservient to the people. He was envied when he attained distinction; and he was feared when he became eminent. Whether dangerous or not in reality, he was often supposed to be so by elevation; and, in anticipation of the chances of evil, he was reduced to his level by fine or imprisonment, expelled from the territory by banishment, or adjudged to the punishment of death by suffrage. Many of those who were eminent in virtue were persecuted, banished, or destroyed, under the pretext of preserving a balance of equality among the members of the state. This occurred often; and the occurrence confirms the remark, that absolute power is everywhere the same—and everywhere a tyrant. Monarchy permits no part in the political circle to leave its sphere so as to rise to independent eminence: democracy, jealous of usurpation, permits no one to remain eminent lest he should become a master.

The Athenian people consisted of different tribes, inhabiting

different districts of country, and professing different views of arrangement in the fabric of political government. Prior to the time of Solon, anarchy and oppression reigned at Athens—contentions and quarrels were common. One tribe was violently democratic; another was presumptuously aristocratic; and a third was moderate and reasonable. Some were rich, and insolent from their riches; many were poor, and oppressed in their poverty—even reduced to slavery by the accumulation of debts. The state was in fact tumultuary; and among this restless people there were, as was reasonable to expect, bold spirits who aimed at revolution, or an entire new order of things. In this perplexity, the more prudent part of the community looked to Solon, who was respectable in private character, and of considerable political influence, as the person best qualified to find a remedy for this miserable political condition. Solon had visited foreign countries, partly as a merchant, but principally as a philosopher and statesman, to collect information respecting the causes which augment the happiness, or rather which diminish the miseries of mankind. He was supposed to have acquired knowledge of the subject from observation, and was, therefore, constituted legislator for the Athenian community, then in a state of distraction. Solon was a man of judgment and address; and, proceeding upon the maxim (*το ισον πολεμον ου ποιει*) that equality precludes the occurrence of war, he framed laws which checked the ferment for the time, and eventually improved the moral condition of the people; but he instituted no system of education which formed a new people, as had been done at Sparta by Lycurgus. Solon possessed talent; but he was not perhaps endowed by nature with such comprehensive views, and such boldness of character as belonged to Lycurgus; and moreover, being only one of the people of Athens, he could not present himself with the same legislative authority as the founder of the Spartan institution, who was of the royal family. He appears however to have considered things with foresight, and to have balanced them with discretion; insomuch that the contending parties were induced to wait with patience for the result of his enactments, each in expectation of advantages to his own class or order.

Solon did not, as has been observed, revolutionize the Athenian state, and institute an entire new form of policy. The basis of the

old organization was retained; but a new principle was added, which may be said to have electrified the mass of the people, and to have produced all the great men and famous things which have given immortality to the Athenian name. The people, which in almost all civilized nations is the mere instrument of usurped power, became at Athens, through the operations of suffrage, (at first sight a trifling concession) the source and essence of power itself. In consequence of this privilege, even the lowest of the Athenian people had the right to vote on measures of policy and war. They decreed and sanctioned decrees; and employed all the talents within the circle of the state as instruments of execution. They were in fact sovereign; and the moving principle of the government adopted by them appears to have consisted in the impression, that liberty belongs to all men as a common inheritance. The position is physically and indefeasibly true; and, while true, it is important; for it cannot be denied that if a system of government were laid on such a basis, the whole of the parts comprehended within the circle of the community being equally impressed with the sentiment, and every one of the parts being confined to the execution of its own function only, (without which no real liberty exists,) the nation would be strong, because animated equally throughout, and it would be happy in the mutual correspondence of parts united by general sympathy and affection. Such is a desirable condition of human society; but it obtains nationally in no country in Europe in the present times; and, if ever it did obtain at Athens, it was not of long duration.

The Athenians were acute in their perceptions beyond any people on record; and, as first perceptions are ordinarily just, they felt strongly the impulse of what is right; but, though they felt impressions quickly and often justly, the political organization of the state was not such as gave union, promptitude, and decision to political acts. The aggregate of people has generally a just sense of common things; and, if not sophisticated by education, or biassed by the influence of designing men, the opinion of the assembly is rarely unwise. It often, it is admitted, acts under the impulse of the moment, and what it decrees wisely, it sometimes forgets to execute vigorously; for it is easily diverted from the object by the intervention of another impulse. In this manner, the Athenians of latter times, when the mind, distracted and dissipated through the refinements of art, became the plaything of

orators, proceeded rapidly, and often precipitately, to declare war, and to vote the means of carrying it on; but were apt to forget what they had done, and the decree was often the whole of the act.

The general principle of Solon's policy rested on the maxim, that equality, or just balance of power among the separate parts of the human race, precludes war. The whole powers of his genius were exerted in contriving the means of preserving the supposed balance; but, as the parts consisted of various orders and classes which differed in their views and propensities, this was not easily preserved. The Athenian machine was complicated; its movements were liable to be deranged through the solicitations of the animal appetites which urge individual aggrandizement, and over which it was difficult to find legal control. The idea attached to artificial balances of power, implies in itself that the parts of the state are innately hostile to each other; that is, that the state is heterogeneous, or discordant in its constituent materials. Such was in fact the composition of the state in question. The mixture of classes and characters excited emulations which were favourable to activity; but as the activity was liable to strike into different channels, the acts were acts of union only when moved by a cause of paramount force. The energy which results from the impression that liberty is the inheritance of the mass of the people, and that all parts of the military instrument, even the most inferior, are animated with the feeling of conscious independence, was the bond of the Athenian state, and of the Athenian army. This sentiment is powerful in its operation—so much so indeed as often to compensate for want of precision in mechanical tactic. The scope of action connected with consciousness of liberty, embraces intelligence, activity, and enterprize. It moved the Athenians to great undertakings in speculation of advantages: it even supported them under great difficulties as earnest of success; but it did not long maintain them in a secure and steady course of conduct. The Athenians were instruments of impulse and feeling, not organs of mind and sentiment through the influence of education; hence their union was only assured by a strong cause imminent and always present; and their combined efforts could thus only be appreciated and applied to purpose by a leader of superior genius, who knew the springs of action in the human mind by something like intuition.

As the people of Athens differed in moral and political cha-



acter from those of Sparta; so the principle which regulated their military arrangements was different, and, in some measure, opposite. The basis of the Spartan preeminence consisted in constancy and firmness. The mind was directed to the object exclusively; the body was trained, by force of institution, to act in one channel in the attainment of it. The Athenian eminence consisted in the daring spirit and energetic action of individuals, proceeding from individual feeling and conscious importance of individual independence, fostered and confirmed by the privilege of participating in national councils. The circumstances of the Athenian territory determined the mode of warfare which best suited the genius of the people; that is, maritime expedition and desultory aggression. The Athenian ships were the best of the time—the crews the most experienced. The army excelled the armies of other nations in conducting sieges, and in connecting the duties of sea and land-service for a special purpose. The intelligence, activity, quick perception, and daring spirit of enterprise, for which the Athenian was distinguished among his contemporaries, rendered him formidable in desultory warfare, ready and apt in all forms of movement; insomuch that Athenian light troops foiled, and, on some occasions, discomfited the renowned phalanx of Sparta. The Athenian phalanx was perhaps less impenetrable in battle array than the Spartan; it was less resistible in the charge than any other force similarly armed. The Spartans fought the battle of plain courage and discipline: the Athenians fought the battle of courage and address; and when directed by a leader who knew how to animate every part, and to concentrate the collective force to the proper point of attack, they were impassioned simultaneously, and their efforts were beyond those of the mere machine of tactic and discipline, however perfectly constructed. The Athenians were the first of the Greeks who advanced on the enemy at the accelerated pace (*δρομος*), corresponding perhaps to what is now termed double quick time. The expedient was adopted at the battle of Marathon; which was a masterpiece of generalship on the part of the commander, and of heroic conduct on the part of the soldier.

The Athenian military force consisted of three classes, namely, 1. *οπλιτης*, armed with spear and dagger, and covered with a shield; reserved for the phalanx or main battle. 2. *πελταστης*, armed with a light spear and javelin, and protected by a small shield or



target; destined for desultory aggression, that is, the seizing and maintaining positions for covering the important movements of the phalanx. 3. γυμνῆς, without defence from armour, but provided with missile weapons for annoyance, as javelins, bows and arrows, slings for stones, and leaden bullets. The first is analogous to the select grenadiers of the moderns, the second to light infantry, and the third to riflemen or sharp shooters.

The phalanx, or main battle of the Athenians, consisted of the natives of Attica. It was drawn up in battle array according to tribes or communities. In consequence of this arrangement, together with mechanical correspondence of power, there was probably a more than usually intimate union of mind arising from sympathy and affection; there was concurrence of opinion from association in a common cause. The light-armed (πελταστοι) were partly native, partly foreign: the slingers and archers were entirely foreign. The horse, like the phalanx, were native; and they were of a good description—alert and enterprising. The Athenian army, thus composed, might be considered as prepared for every species of warfare; and no species of warfare was too arduous for its daring. If the Athenians were less firm to resist than the Spartans, who had no other sentiment but to conquer or die, they were more impetuous and more ardent in attack. They were superior in address and manœuvre; and, as they acted from impulse, they quickly read the countenance of things, and seized the fit occasion for acting with an energy, superior to that which proceeds from the formal command of the general. The desire of aggrandizing and extending the sphere of dominion moved the Athenian people to war; the allurements of spoil filled the military ranks and urged to exertion; the idea of liberty and independence cemented the union of the parts, and instilled the opinion that the hostile act, as diffusing liberty and happiness wherever it went, gave to the Athenian military an importance above all other arms. The Athenians were revolutionists in the act of war: they were often tyrants in the exercise of government. Few nations sustained reverses with a better courage than the people of Attica; and scarcely any were more daring in undertaking dangerous things. As gamesters, they refused no chance of fortune however high the odds might be against them; and, like gamesters, they were prodigal of what they gained—more desirous to acquire than cautious to preserve.

## CHAPTER III.

## MACEDONIAN.

THE great Macedonian empire, a creation of the sword, rose up in majesty in a poor and semibarbarous country. Phillip, who was the founder of it, possessed talent from nature; and he improved his powers by associating with the eminent men of the age in which he lived—soldiers, statesmen, and philosophers. He studied at Thebes, where he acquired a scientific view of tactic and military discipline under Epaminondas. He became a general, and manifested skill. It is not pretended that he was original in genius; but it is undeniable that he extended the utility of tactic, and applied the knowledge which he possessed of it to the accomplishment of his purposes, with unprecedented precision. Lust of power and dominion was the dominant passion of his soul. His actions moved under the impulse of this aggrandizing passion; and every measure which led to its gratification was legitimate in his system of morals. As Philip formed an army expressly for conquest, he studied the properties of its several parts with mathematical precision; and he seems to have so adjusted them in their places that the phalanx, when brought into action, was scarcely either to be penetrated or resisted. Instead of the spear, the common offensive weapon of the Greeks, Philip armed the Macedonian with a pike eighteen feet long; and he further, in imitation of the Carians, contrived to fix the shield upon the arm by means of a ring, so as to leave both hands at liberty for giving impulse and direction to the pike. It is obvious, at first sight, that the Macedonian phalanx was less penetrable and less resistible than the Spartan, inasmuch as it possessed a deeper mechanical connexion, and more force of impulse, from the weight of the body which moved it. It was in fact an impregnable bulwark, or an irresistible torrent, in the level plain: it was unwieldy, unmanageable, and consequently feeble, on broken and irregular grounds. Philip did not, in constructing the phalanx, act, as already observed, on a new principle; but he so changed the face of things as to make an impression on those who opposed him, which proved his instrument to be actually a new invention. Its power was

formidable both in appearance and reality ; but Philip's political arts and intrigues were still more formidable in assuring his purposes, than the mere force of the instrument the construction of which he had thus modified. The Greek nations were jealous of each other. They were divided in their views ; and Philip hesitated at no means, however unhallowed, which fomented their jealousies and forwarded his own machinations. He was deep in the arts of deception ; and with the blandishment of a courtier, often acted with the barbarity of a savage.

The Macedonian phalanx was different in some respects from the phalanx of the Greeks. It was formidable, almost irresistible, when moved into action on proper ground, adjusted correctly in tactical order, and cemented scientifically by correspondence of physical power. The Macedonian nation apparently bound in feudal servitude, was, prior to the time of Philip, dispersed among mountains, and principally occupied in watching herds of sheep or cattle. As pastoral, it was poor, homely in attire, and unacquainted with the arts of civilized life. It had even so little energy, and so little knowledge of war, that its flocks, which were its sole property, were exposed to the daily depredation of the warlike barbarians who lived contiguous. In this state of things, Philip, who was a man of talent, a philosopher, and a tactician, succeeded to the throne of Macedonia. His subjects were ignorant and credulous. He allured them from the mountains where they dwelt, collected them into towns, stimulated them to exertion by infusing into them the spirit of aggrandizement ; even succeeded in persuading them that war was glory, and that robbery was an honourable employment for man. The Macedonian peasant thus deluded, and transplanted to a new soil by art or force, was marshalled in military array under sound principles of military science. A spirit of ambition, or desire for spoil, was infused into him ; and that spirit, aided by new arms and armour, and a new mode of arrangement for battle, exalted him to a high rank among the warriors of his time. Ambition of conquest was the motive of Philip's activity, and no moral barrier, as already said, stood in the way of accomplishing his purpose. With a fine appearance, a commanding eloquence, and capable of swallowing a large quantity of wine without beastly intoxication, Philip was the idol of his countrymen : he was even admired by the polished nations of Greece. He had the

skill of a mathematician in combining and applying different powers to mechanical purposes, and had the knowledge of a philosopher in discriminating characters and profiting by the prejudices and ignorances of mankind. By the help of the acquirements alluded to, he was enabled to select and organize a formidable army. The order of his arrangement was laid on a principle of science; and the materials of which he had the command were, as new men, easily moulded to his will. They were simple, as emerging from barbarism, ardent and of strong conception, as men unaccustomed to the artificial refinements of civilization and the luxuries of high living: as such, they were fit subjects for the rugged trade of war. They did not perhaps reflect or reason: they followed the impulse of the aggrandizing propensity of human nature, and credulously believed that the splendour of conquest constituted their own glory, while it was that of their leader only. Philip was systematic; and, like other system framers, he permitted no genius except his own to expand and flourish; consequently his officers were for the most part mere instruments of execution.

The life of the hunter and shepherd may be justly considered as a primary school of war; and, as the Macedonians were hunters and shepherds, they were good materials for the formation of an army intended for offensive operations. Philip had conquest in his eye as the end of all his pains and labours; and, as he was a deep politician, he contrived, with much address, to inspire his people with a similar passion. The brilliant period of the military glory of the states of Greece was past when Philip made his appearance in Macedonia. Morals had degenerated; and military science, though still studied systematically, had lost much of the spirit which animates and urges to bold undertaking. The Athenians had declined in virtue and warlike energy; but still remained enterprising and generous defenders of human liberty. The Spartans, though recently discomfited and consequently humbled, were still military, and, in point of discipline, before the other states of Greece. Philip was a man of penetration; and, ambitious of conquest as he was, he appears to have considered it to be a rash attempt to enter into direct war with the Greeks on what may be called an equal footing. He sought for artificial means to aid his purpose, and discovered a way of influencing the sensibilities or fears of the enemy by appear-

ances of novelty, and at the same time of infusing confidence into his followers by modelling the tactic into a form which carried with it an air of originality. He condensed his phalanx in such a manner that it scarcely could be resisted in its forward course, or penetrated when drawn up in position. He changed or improved the armour, both for offence and defence; and, though he built his structure on the base of the Spartan phalanx, he increased the power of it in such a manner that the Spartan must, from mechanical necessity, yield at the point of conflict. With this instrument, formed on knowledge of mechanical powers, directed by military skill, and aided by numerous contingencies which chance presents and genius applies, Greece submitted to his power, and Asia trembled for her safety, when his career was arrested by the hand of an assassin. Alexander succeeded to the throne. He was young and ambitious, and prosecuted the views of his father with ardour; in fact, carried them into execution with zeal, and with an eclat that is still without parallel in the history of mankind.

The eclat of the expeditions and conquests of Alexander is unparalleled. His acts so far transcend the common history of conquerors, that they are considered by many as fictions of romance. They are notwithstanding true. There is positive evidence that Alexander not only overran, but that he conquered, and organized, in a very short time, an immense tract of country between the Hellespont and the Indus; and, if we consider the perfection of the discipline, the precision of the tactic, and the devotion of the troops to a leader, who not only possessed military skill from science, but also such a share of intuitive military genius as few leaders appear to have possessed, the doubt vanishes; and the events, however extraordinary at first sight, are shewn to be natural consequences of the correct measure and just application of the means employed. Many of Alexander's acts were hazardous, and some of them were rash; but the plans of his great battles were laid on a base of science, and applied in experiment with a precision that excites wonder. It requires more penetration, and more military knowledge than the writer possesses, to detect error in the combination of his great movements; and, as the plans were scientific, there is no instance of defective precision in the application of them where he was himself present. The phalanx was impenetrable. It



might in fact be deemed a citadel: the archers were excellent—expert and bold; the cavalry were the best of the time; and, while all were perfect in tactic and correct in discipline for purposes of movement, they were united as one man by exemplary devotion to their chief.

Arrian, an historian not unworthy of Alexander, describes the campaigns so circumstantially, and at the same time with so much candour and freedom, that we are enabled to form a pretty fair estimate of this conqueror's character, both military and political; and also to form some idea of the perfection to which tactic, discipline, and the military art, had arrived in the Macedonian army at the commencement of the war with Darius. No military machine was ever better adjusted in its parts, and none, notwithstanding that it consisted of many different nations and people, was ever perhaps so well animated in all its extent, as the army of Alexander. The sieges and passages of rivers shew skill, resource, constancy; in short, all the qualities that are necessary to constitute a general. The intrepidity, perseverance, and exertion of the soldiery, have scarcely a parallel in history. The length of the marches on some occasions, the constancy and firmness on many, were they not well authenticated, could not be credited, if we allow ourselves to form a judgment of probabilities by the powers and temper of the present race of men, even of the best of them.

The motive which urged the Macedonian to invade the Persian dominions was said to be retaliation for the insults offered to Greece at former times; but, it was in reality the ambition of conquest. The enterprize was undertaken at so great apparent hazard, that military calculators of moderate capacity pronounced it to be the enterprize of a madman. It was, however, conducted in a bold and masterly manner, under the highest discipline, and with the greatest ardour that was ever perhaps witnessed in war, and it succeeded completely. The paramount power of Alexander's genius maintained the Macedonians steadily in the forward path to conquest and glory. The soldiers were credulous, superstitious, and open to imposture; and, as a new people emerging from barbarism, they were ardent in their pursuits. Alexander, who was politic and discerning of human character, acted on their credulity, and occupied them so much in combat, or in military evolutions preparatory to combat, that they were not



permitted to think and reason. They moved in the path into which they had been conducted without reflection, and pursued the phantom of glory through many difficulties. But, taught by dear-bought experience that conquest and glory do not constitute happiness, and that the ambition of their master had no limit, they recollected their homes, refused to proceed, and obliged the son of Jupiter Ammon to desist from the prosecution of undefined conquests in unknown countries. A man of less genius and less force of mind than Alexander would have lost his command, and probably his life, on this occasion; but a heroism, which was beyond the measure of men's conception, assured submission, and repressed murmurs, in the midst of the greatest hardships and sufferings which human nature can sustain. Alexander died prematurely; but he lived too long for his reputation. In military science he had perhaps no superior; and in intuitive genius and heroism he is equalled only by Charles of Sweden: in brutality, he was not surpassed by Peter the Great of Russia.

The writer has attempted to give a cursory view of the military system of the three great warlike powers among the Greeks; namely, the Spartans, Athenians, and Macedonians. The spirit or principle of the system was different in each; the execution was admirable in all, according to the principle on which it was laid.

The spirit of the Spartan military institution was just; the plan of execution correct. The protection of country, considered as unity, and as such equally interesting to the soldier in the ranks and the sovereign on the throne, was here the ostensible motive for preparing a military instrument of defence. The materials of the instrument were put together according to a knowledge of man in all his relations, physical and moral; and the structure, when complete, was applied to its purpose with skill, and generally with success; insomuch that the Spartan military system may be considered as the basis of military institution—a sum of military excellence, in so far as it goes.

The Athenian institution was original; but it was of another cast. The Spartan machine was correctly organized, and it moved according to a rule of order which maintained every part in its station; the Athenian was, comparatively, loose. It moved by impulses. The separate parts were susceptible, but not in the

same degree of perfection; the great political acts only appeared among the Athenians by strong and domineering causes, acting on, and absorbing as it were, all the sympathies in one. Every Athenian was a man in himself: he thought, reasoned, and acted for himself. The combined act was often tumultuary from this cause; but, when all the parts were excited by a common impulse, and directed by a common sympathy, the movement was grand and animated, and the effect was irresistible. It is to the animating spirit of liberty and pride of independence, to bodily activity and superiority of intelligence, to the desire of fraternizing, as it is termed, and diffusing liberty and happiness among other nations, that the Athenians owed their success in war. They were often generous and great; sometimes dissipated and forgetful; but, upon the whole, they were a noble people, possessing more compass of mind, and more of the sympathies of human nature, than any other nation can be allowed to claim. As military, the Athenian phalanx was good—inferior only to the Spartan. The light-armed, namely, target and spearmen, were excellent—active and intelligent, brave and prompt. They harassed and annoyed, and on some occasions, especially on broken and irregular ground, they discomfited the Spartan phalanx itself.

The Macedonian military instrument was different in spirit and construction from either of the former. The Spartan army was systematically organized on a constitutional basis, through observation and knowledge of the effects of correspondence among physical powers and moral propensities; and it was held in union by the sacred name of country. The Athenian was organized as it were contingently. Its power consisted in revolutionary energy, its bond of union in love of liberty. The Macedonian was an artificial machine, the instrument of a despot, formed for the accomplishment of purposes of ambition. The parts were passive; that is, they had no action of their own, either as a consequence of individual feeling, or as a constitutional sentiment from national institution. Obedience was rigorously exacted; and it was assured by extinguishing the faculty of reflection. The talent, which is powerful to execute, found a place in the Macedonian military system, and was cherished as a subservient quality; the genius, which presumes to think, if it did appear, did not exist with safety. The physical materials of the Mace-

donian army were various. They were examined and tried, their powers measured, and the adjustment in the fabric made according to their degree of power. The mind, or that sense of feeling which gives animation to human acts, was studied, its perception levelled to a common standard, and its activity directed to a common channel, by rigorous force. An automaton was thus formed of human materials, the action of which was mechanically correct, as impelled by external impulse, principally the fear of punishment. The construction of this instrument, which moved solely by the voice of the leader, was the work of Philip of Macedon; at least, if he was not the first who assumed the idea, he was the first who carried it to systematic perfection on a great scale; and he is not yet perhaps equalled as a tactician by any of his numerous successors—not even by Frederick the Second of Prussia, the most celebrated tactician of the last century.

If the Greek system of military tactic, discipline, and evolution, be studied and traced to its principles, it appears to have been laid on a scientific basis, and to have been carried to as high perfection in execution as human powers can well go. No people of whom we have any knowledge possessed such a share of intellect as the Greeks. Moreover, their bodily powers stood high in the scale of exertion. War was their study; and, with the advantages which they derived from nature, the perfection which the art attained under their experience is not more than what might have been expected. The invention of gunpowder, and the use of fire-arms, introduced changes into the mode by which man destroys his fellow man; but there is no principle, in the science of the art, yet discovered, that was not known to the Greeks in the time of Alexander. Their precision, and promptness of execution in manœuvre, surpassed what the most distinguished of the moderns have yet attained. This is strongly demonstrated in the retreat of ten thousand Greeks from Persia, under the direction of the Athenian general Xenophon. The undertaking was a bold one; and, if the result had not been well authenticated, we should scarcely have thought it to have been possible; for, judging by the histories of the present time, we may safely say that the finest of our modern armies would have gone to pieces under half the difficulties that presented themselves to this band of ten thousand. This masterly retreat, though a

strong, is not the sole example of the discipline and energy of Greek soldiers. The army of Alexander performed marches and sustained fatigues with a discipline and resolution which astonishes, and which forces us to confess that we are as yet only children in the management and practice of war. The Greek nation possessed physical powers of the first order; and its armies derived advantages over the most of modern armies from the mode of their organization. The Greek force was classed by tribes. The physical correspondence of powers, thus known by observation, were adjusted by a rule of knowledge; and the moral propensities, predominant in the tribe, were united in the common act by the tactician's foresight. Those of the Greeks who were mercenary, fought in bands, under a similar impression as the modern Swiss, or the Brigands of the middle ages. Their conduct was often heroic; and, as war was their trade, they were not only skilled in the use of arms, but were men of faith and honour according to their rule: as such, they were different from the mercenaries of modern times, who are levelled to an equality of brute power, and held together by the external impression of fear, or bribes of money. The Greek, though a mercenary, had a sentiment of honour—a high sense of independent military virtue, and an innate veneration for liberty. In taste and literature the Greeks are unrivalled. In military tactic, discipline, economy, and even in manœuvre, Greek history is the school of the soldier. The picture of Spartan dignity, of Athenian spirit and generosity, warms the military mind to enthusiasm; and, at the same time, maintains it in the path of honour by the prominence of the example to which the eye is directed.

## CHAPTER IV.

ROMAN.

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THE origin of the Roman empire, like that of most others, is veiled in obscurity. Its earlier history is a tissue of fable and truth, so interwoven with each other that they scarcely can be separated. Romulus, the founder of it, was no more in his origin than a freebooter or robber; but marauding being, in that age of the world, a prominent occupation of the human race, no disgrace attached to the practice of it; on the contrary, the usurpation of power, and the establishment of dominion by force of arms, were held to be the qualities of superior men. Romulus, as the chief of a band of adventurers, may be supposed to have been a man of great daring; and it may be concluded, from what he achieved, that he was also a man of talent. He possessed extended views of policy; and succeeded in establishing dominion over the minds of his followers by the fascination which attaches to genius, or by intimidation derived from the power which he had tyrannically usurped. The banks of the Tiber are regarded as the place of his birth and the cradle of his greatness. When he ripened into manhood, and his destinies began to expand, he chose a position near his native river as a stronghold for the protection of his followers and the reception of their booty; he surrounded it with a wall, and dignified it with the name of *City*.

The bond which had united Romulus with his followers in the unsettled and vagabond life of freebooters, acquired power in the new city. It there assumed the name of government; and the first record of the proceedings, as noted by the historian Livy, furnishes an example of a well digested system of military organization. Every individual of the freebooting band was efficient; and to each, under the primary constitution of the organization, a station and function were assigned. The body politic was a whole, constituted on a base of reciprocal connexion, and prepared to move in action through a common desire to extend their sphere by force of arms. Thus, as all parts were incorporated, all participated in the act, and all shared in its pro-

duct according to rank and condition. Romulus, who was no more than the captain of the band originally, was chosen its sovereign in due form; and aiming, or suspected of aiming at constituting himself its tyrant, he disappeared in a thunder-storm—supposed to have been murdered by his council or senate.

The Romans were little more during the life of Romulus than organized robbers. They do not appear to have acknowledged any other law in their external relations except the law of force; and they would, it may be presumed, have fallen to pieces like other robbers, had not a change been effected in their moral conduct through the institutions of Numa. Numa, who was elected sovereign at the death of Romulus, was a retired and studious man. It may be presumed that he had observed the laws of nature with care, and that he endeavoured to investigate and appreciate the causes which preserve good order and harmony among men. We conclude that he discovered, in his researches into nature, that all living things are destined to move in defined spheres, and that every egression from the sphere constitutes an error, which lays the foundation of premature destruction to the individual, or the aggregate of individuals who form political associations. This balance of equality among the parts, which exists and acts by the same law in the social aggregate as in the individual frame, appears to have made impression on the mind of the newly-elected king; who, while he recommended the observance of it to his subjects, gradually and with great address engaged the mind to the contemplation of its ultimate cause; and thus opened a view to the contemplation of the Deity as ruler of all human things. Under Romulus, the Romans were literally brigands; under Numa, they became men and citizens of the world, inasmuch as they were impressed with the sentiment, that moral obligation among men is a fundamental law in the constitution of things. The impression of this sentiment on the human mind constitutes religion. It is an important impression; but it was not easy, perhaps not possible, to give it the ascendant among a rude people, accustomed to live by the sword on the spoil and plunder of their neighbours. The reason of the thing, in the simplicity of its truth, could not perhaps have been received by a body of people such as the founders of Rome. Pretension, or imposture, was therefore called in aid; and pretension, acting on credulity, excited an emotion which ripened



into an active sentiment. Numa, with much art and some mystery, succeeded in planting a strong and consistent sentiment in the mind, which so far regulated and controlled the moral act, that, under its influence, the Romans, from lawless freebooters, became modest and moral citizens. The current of their desires was diverted from pursuits of war and plunder to the channels of right, in imitation of that general law of the Deity which maintains order and harmony in the universe. The laws of Numa, considered abstractedly, are wise and good, dictated by a spirit of philosophy similar to that of Pythagoras. Through their influence, the environs of Rome were converted, from a scene of war, rapine, and bloodshed, to peace and contentment; and the Romans, from a band of robbers, were changed to a society of brothers—religious and affectionate to each other, and respected by those who lived near them.

Of the kings who followed Numa, some were wise, some warlike, and others wicked and tyrannical. Tullus was more fierce than even Romulus. He was prompt in war; and, though his character was savage, we must allow him the credit, (if it be so deemed,) of introducing the Romans into the path of systematic military science. He renewed the warlike spirit which had been for some time dormant; but he did not, by so doing, expel the sentiment of religion which had been engrafted in the mind of the people by the institutions of Numa. Tullus disappeared, after having roused the dormant spirit of war; and Ancus, one of his successors, conceived a plan of conquest or military progression, and conducted it scientifically, so as to give form and stability to the Roman dominion. Colonies were planted in some cases, and in others, the conquered were removed to the metropolis. It is in this reign that the declaration of war by herald was adopted—a declaration which constitutes an important era in the laws of military honour.

Next to Numa, Servius Tullus ranks as the most distinguished of the Roman kings. He was eminent for his virtues and accomplishments: he might, in fact, be considered as an enlightened prince in an enlightened age. He organized the political relations of the state with an appearance of knowledge and deep consideration; and he formed a system of equipment and preparation for war which proves him to have been a man of no mean capacity. He established a census, divided the population

into classes, adjudged military services according to the amount of property which the individual possessed, and made material improvements in the armour, education, and tactic of troops. He was not only respectable, but eminent among kings. He was murdered by his son-in-law Tarquin, at an advanced age, and while he was in the prosecution of his benevolent labours. Tarquin assumed the sovereignty, and was one of the most insolent and vicious of tyrants in the records of history; but such was the power of his means, and the address and skill with which he applied them, that there is reason to believe he would have established absolute despotism at Rome, and reduced the Romans to the most abject of slaves, had not the conduct of his son Sextus, by outraging a sacred right in society, excited the whole mass of the people to revenge. The act—the violation of the person of a respectable woman—wanton, as it was wicked in mode of execution, roused indignation and united patrician and plebeian by common sympathy to pursue its author to punishment. Irritated by this outrage, the senate and people decreed the expulsion of Tarquin and his family from Rome. This was effected; but not without a severe struggle. Tarquin possessed courage and military science; and he was, besides, a master in the address and artful policy of the Greeks. The Romans, however, had feelings of resentment which united them, they were supported by a determined spirit, and a natural sagacity and practical knowledge in the use of arms enabled them to measure the sword with Tarquin. Though unequal in the science of war, and far inferior to him in the manœuvres of politicians, they were patriotic, and that was everything.

The Roman state, when first formed, might be considered as a compact between military adventurers and their leader. Here every part had a sphere and a function, so that there was no refuse within the incorporated circle. It is inherent in the nature of power, however attained, to arrogate to itself, and to encroach on the rights of others. It belongs to the constitution of man's nature to preserve its sphere, and to resist encroachment. In consequence of these innate propensities in human nature, contentions between the Roman kings and the Roman people were common. The kings usurped—the people resisted. The last appeal for decision, even in royal times, resided in the people; but, as the desire of usurpation never sleeps, the opportunities for

encroachment were watched assiduously, and applied so successfully, that liberty was nearly extinguished at Rome before the abrogation of the royal office. After the expulsion of the kings the state was new modelled, and a system of government was framed and put in activity, which had some claim to the name of constitution, inasmuch as every Roman citizen was comprehended within its prescriptions. The chiefs of the executive were elective—and they were chosen annually; the deliberative, or senate, was hereditary and permanent. The supreme power, as centering in the people, existed constitutionally at all times; but it was only brought forward on important occasions, and was only impressive through its weight and quantity. The executive was absolute in command, and as a military executive imperative; but it rigidly obeyed the constitutional law, and, for a time, executed its office with modesty. The senate, in correspondence with the character which often attaches to aristocratic privilege, laboured unremittingly to extend its power, or to constitute itself sovereign. The people, constitutionally a part of the state, were firm and confident, and long and strongly resisted oppression. They were even violent at times, and they aimed on some occasions at revolution, that is, a political arrangement on a new basis. These contentions were violent: sometimes they threatened danger to the very existence of the state; but they were upon the whole salutary, as tending to improve the moral condition of man, to establish a basis of liberty, and to form a chain of connexion through all ranks, firm in its foundations, and consistent with order and good government.

The Romans were soldiers and field-labourers at the early period of their history. Their character was thus formed in the school which gives preeminence to man over his fellows, inasmuch as it improves physical power, and supplies the means of attaining knowledge of things that are analogous to those which occur in war. The Roman people were simple in manners, observant of good faith, and of the obligations of an oath beyond personal interests, even beyond the preservation of life. They were integral, or constituent members of the state. They claimed freedom at elections, and asserted, with firmness, the rights of their class. They resisted the oppression of the nobles; and they obtained the means of protection through the appointment of officers to superintend their corporate concerns. These commanded the respect of the aristocracy through a cogent argument, namely, power

supported by numbers. The tribune was the legal protector of the people; but, even in spite of his authority, the tyranny of the usury laws brought many to slavery; and the insolent spirit of the aristocracy otherwise loaded them with grievous vexations. The noble Roman regarded the plebeian, whatever might be his intrinsic worth, as a being made of coarser clay, a mixture with whom, by matrimonial alliance, would contaminate the blood for ages, or for ever. This, and other insolences of the patricians, roused the spirit of the people, tried their firmness, and maintained a conflict at Rome for many years. The contentions slept under external dangers: they revived when the danger passed over; but, notwithstanding the evils which they occasionally threatened, they served to improve the mental faculties of both the patrician and plebeian: they were, in fact, the efficient cause of the Roman preeminence. The Romans did not possess the fine genius of the Athenians, nor the self-denial of the Spartans. Their object throughout was selfish aggrandizement; and they possessed, in an eminent degree, that species of sagacity which conduces most to attain it. The meanest of the plebeians was proud of the Roman name: the greater number of them honoured the gods, and were religiously scrupulous in preserving their faith. If they were at any time alarmed, even panic-struck by dangers which threatened their country and political constitution, they took refuge under the protecting shield of Deity; and thus fortified, by an appeal to the justice of heaven their resolutions were strong and their acts determined.

The principle on which the Roman government was laid, and on which it moved, may be considered as the innate propensity of human nature to expand its sphere. The motive stimulated the original founder to invade the territory of his neighbours. It operated with more or less force on the different kings who succeeded; and it adhered to the republic, as the essence of its constitution, in all its history. The desire of conquest was organized, and so consolidated into system by the senate, as to ensure stability; for the act was in a great measure exempted, in virtue of the corporate constitution, from the contingent weaknesses, follies, and vices, which attach to individuals.

The Roman state, which was a corporated military constitution, formed on an aggrandizing basis, was wise in its proceedings. It was comparatively free; and, for a long course of time,

it was exempted from the intoxication of power, which stupifies and sends man back to his original obscurity, or to a state even lower than obscurity. It was proud in the glory of its arms; but was wise in the manner of manifesting it. Its ambition, it is admitted, was great; but it was more rational, and it was laid on a better basis, than that of any other of the conquering people who stand in the page of history. The power and stability of the Roman government rested on the liberty which belongs to election, and in the participation which every citizen claimed in the functions of the state. This functionary importance of the people was, as now hinted, the strength of Rome. It produced a soldier who was proud, and independent, inasmuch as he earned glory for himself and for the state, rather than for his imperious temporary commander. The senate, as a corporated aristocracy, laboured without ceasing to augment power and to extend the circle of empire. It contained, among its members, a large proportion of men of sagacity; and it learned from experience that it could only succeed in maintaining sovereignty by cultivating the powers of the mind, so as to give evidence of the superiority of mental endowments over the mass of the people. The people possessed a portion of freedom, strong natural sense, and a strong sentiment of virtue and honour. The nobles were born and educated with high sentiments of prerogative: they were commanders in prospective, and they studied the art of war with diligence. As politicians, they investigated principles, and practised the art of governing by influence of speech, as well as by the authoritative word of command. The senate was sagacious and observing; and measures, which had not been provided for by the wisdom or foresight of the first legislators, were adopted by it as occasions arose through experience or accident. Facts were noted, principles were investigated, and improvements were incorporated into the military system, or rather amalgamated with it so judiciously that it was not easy to see from whence they had been taken. Men who possess liberty are often refractory and sometimes tumultuary. The Roman had liberty, and he was not tame in spirit; but he was susceptible of national honour, by means of which he might be led to every national enterprize; he even became devoted to the object through the impression of a religious sentiment attaching him to a point of duty. No people in the record of history understood the political power of religion better than the Roman



senators, and no state applied it with more decisive effect. It is a blasphemous impiety to suppose that the Deity can be turned, by the prayers and oblations of man, to a purpose that is not right. The laws of heaven are eternal, and do not change; but man is changeable, and if, in his difficulties, he fix his eye on an object of eternal truth and justice, he purifies himself, and approaches to the object animated with a new spirit and a courage beyond mere animal courage. The patriot soldier, who looks to heaven for the approbation of his conduct, enters the field of battle with confidence and trust: he executes the duty of his station as a duty enjoined by a superior being—not dictated by the arbitrary will of a mortal, weak and liable to error as himself. The individual, or the army which is moved to act under the impression of a sentiment of this nature, may be deemed invincible: it may be killed entire—it cannot be conquered.

The sovereign power often employs the religious impression of which man's nature is susceptible as an engine of state; but, as no power ever applied it to more purpose than the Romans, so none ever perhaps acted under it with greater sincerity than the military of that nation. The approbation of the gods was solicited in all great affairs; and, when obtained, it gave confidence in battle, stimulated the individual to acts of valour, and supported courage in discomfiture. It was important to obtain the sanction alluded to. It was supposed to imply a basis of what is just and right, and thus to give confidence; for it was commonly believed that fortune forsook the standards of the army which fought in an unjust cause. The Romans—patrician and plebeian—were sincerely religious, observant of the obligation of an oath against worldly interest, even though the oath had been extorted through fear or coercion. The operation of this principle was the guardian of Rome for a long series of years.

If we analyze the Roman soldier, as educated and prepared for war through the influence of political institution, we at once perceive that aggrandizement, or extension of the sphere by direct power, was the primary passion of the soul. It was the motive of the founder, and it subsequently acted with force on all who bore the Roman name. The innate animal desire of expansion, which was the motive of Romulus, stimulated the ordinary Roman to act; the spiritual sentiment, or impression of religion engrafted on the Roman character by the institution of Numa,



cemented the act so as to give it force and permanence. The Roman was eager to undertake from animal desire, and firm to execute from spiritual institution. It is to this firmness and constancy, proceeding from the sentiment of religion and the sacredness of the military oath, that Rome owes, in the opinion of the writer, her eminence and her long duration in empire. As the Roman people were in their own nature ambitious of power, and supported in their purpose by the application of a religious sentiment; so their domestic habits, as farmers and labourers, their frugality, and their contentment with competence acquired by the fruits of their labours, contributed eminently to maintain them in a physical and moral condition fit for the execution of their public and private duties. Few Romans, patrician or plebeian, were rich in money or valuable things in the first days of the republic; and, in these days, there were few Romans who did not love their country better than their life. The manners were chaste, the social affections strong, the domestic virtues eminent; and, as the Romans were great among nations, so it is presumed they were comparatively happy among men.

The character of the patrician received its impression from the operation of the same general cause as the plebeian; but it received it with advantage. The patrician order constituted an hereditary aristocracy at Rome: it uniformly laboured to extend its sphere, to arrogate power to itself by encroaching on the liberties of inferiors, and to add to the general empire by encroaching on the territory of neighbouring people. The principle of aristocratic corporation is watchful—and here it never slept. The education of the patrician was strictly a political and military education, directed to the attainment of means calculated to influence opinion in the senate, and to command armies in the field. The art of speaking in public assemblies, and that of conducting armies in the field, were the chief studies of the higher class;—they were almost its whole occupation. As a race not yet enervated by the effects of the luxury which follows conquest, the character of the patrician was firm and resolute, the view sagacious, the act condensed and powerful. The Roman people during their virtuous days were under the impression of a strong religious sentiment. The patricians publicly professed it; and, in so far as we can judge, they professed it with sincerity. Aggrandizement and political preeminence were the objects of

pursuit in the Roman republic. They were sought with ardour ; but the Roman, notwithstanding ambition and desire of power to excess, observed a scrupulous adherence to good faith. He never departed from the obligations of an oath ; or, if he did, it was with fear and trembling, and from causes so urgent that they were deemed irresistible necessities. The fact was strongly exemplified in the war with the Samnites. Faith and honour were there given up to political expediency ; but they were sacrificed with reluctance, and the act was so artfully covered by a veil of sophism, that the dereliction of the principle was not perceived by the simpler people. The spirit of the Roman soldier could ill brook disgrace ; but a Roman could not, at that period of the republic, have supported existence under the formal violation of a promise solemn as an oath. State necessity was urgent ; and the senate, which was honourable, but more ambitious than honourable, employed deception, with a view to render the services of the soldiers, who surrendered at the *furcæ caudinae*, available to the state. The soldier, believing himself acquitted from his obligation in virtue of the decree of the senate, that is, that the surrender of the consul and chief functionaries fulfilled the condition, hastened to enrol himself under new standards, rushed to the combat with eagerness, and avenged his honour with an unexampled fury in a subsequent combat. The soldier was religiously bound to his word, even to his detriment ; the senate, though religious and honourable, acting under the impulse of power, fortified by an opinion of expediency, adopted a measure of state policy which its conscience did not approve.

The military preeminence of the Romans was what may be called artificial. It arose from the operation of laws and morals, the direct result of military institution. The motive which acted on Romulus and his band of freebooters was, as already observed, aggrandizement by force of arms. This motive, in some measure innate in human nature, and ready to be moved into action at all times, was bridled, or reduced into order, by the institutions of Numa. It was reanimated by subsequent kings ; and the principle became national by the establishment of a republican form of government. The Romans do not appear to have possessed a physical constitution superior to the neighbouring people of Italy. They were of common stature, rather under than above the standard of the country where they lived. But, though not

gigantic in size, they were well made ; muscular action was rapid and strong ; and, as they were inured from infancy to field-labour and military exercises in the open air, they were little sensible of changes of weather : frugal and temperate in manner of living, they were comparatively healthy ; they were thus physically fit subjects for the practice of war.

The outline of character now given attaches to the Roman citizen—patrician or plebeian. It was the product of physical, political, and moral causes, that is, the result of formal law, domestic habits, and physical constitution. The military pre-eminence was the fruit of military training and actual practice in war. The Roman, as already observed, was a man of ordinary stature ; energetic in action, but not of extraordinary force considered as brute force. The military institution was laid on a scientific basis. The training was conducted by systematic rules calculated to ascertain and measure relative powers, with a view to render them applicable to general purposes. The leading points of Roman discipline are only touched in this sketch. Those who cultivate the military art, and occupy themselves with the investigation of the causes which contribute to form the man into the soldier, will study the subject at a higher source.

Recruits for the Roman armies were selected from country labourers, in preference to the population of towns. Under the reign of kings, and in the first days of the republic, the soldiers were almost all field-labourers ; and as such they were simple in manner, and hardy in bodily frame. They were set apart for military life at the age of puberty or early youth ; that is, before the routine of domestic habits had so firmly impressed a character on the constitution of the mind and body as to adhere to it through life.

On the subject of selection, some of the Roman tacticians were guided chiefly by appearance, and height of stature ; others, comparatively regardless of stature, gave preference to strength and energy in actual exertion. Moral character was considered as important to the recruit in all cases ; but it is almost unnecessary to say, that moral character belonged to almost every Roman, plebeian or patrician, in the infancy of the republic. A sentiment of honour, ambition of power, and love of glory, stimulated the Roman soldier to action : modesty, a sense of shame, or dread of disgrace, supported him under difficulty,

and rendered him in a manner insensible to danger. The nerves were firm constitutionally; and they were steeled, artificially, against alarm and panic, by an impression of religion, which, as sanctioning duty, is paramount to all other impressions.

The Roman recruit was selected as a person fit for war in the view of constitutional qualities; he was drilled according to rule by the estimate which was formed of capacities; and, when completely drilled, he was placed in the ranks by tribe, according to the correspondence of physical powers and mental sympathies—not according to the resemblances of exterior form. The just correspondence of the limbs in movement constitutes the basis of military tactic; and, on this head, the practice of the Romans was rigorous, methodical, and exact. Twenty thousand paces in five hours constituted the ordinary rate of marching in the Roman army; twenty-four thousand paces in five hours constituted the march of alert or exertion. The rate which exceeds twenty-four thousand paces in five hours amounts to running. The measure of running cannot be defined: the practice of it was here executed in cadence, and with great precision. Besides exercise in marching on common roads and in champaign countries, the soldier was accustomed to march, and trained to run at different rates of velocity on irregular grounds, careful at the same time to preserve the order of the ranks unbroken. He was practised in leaping, for the purpose of improving the powers of exertion, and giving knowledge of their extent, whether with a view to be applied to the surmounting of walls and leaping ditches, or of clearing impediments that interpose themselves to the military route. The soldier marched, on ordinary occasions, at the rate of twenty thousand paces in the space of five hours; and he marched at this rate under a load of sixty pounds weight of baggage. The load may appear at first sight to be oppressive: it is so in a very inferior degree only in actual trial. If the weight be so placed as to bear equally on all parts of the body, the difference of fatigue in a steady march, loaded or unloaded, is not material, as estimated at the end of the journey. This the writer knows by experience; and he may add that, if an enemy appear in the course of the march, the soldier, as disencumbered from his load, has a feeling of lightness and buoyancy as if he had risen from restraint, or acquired a new accession of strength

by release from pressure. Besides the pains which were taken, in the course of training, to improve the powers of the limbs, so as to sustain the fatigues of marching in order and cadence, the art of swimming was taught systematically, and practised assiduously, so as to be available for every contingency of service. The exercises now mentioned were parts of training; and the manner in which they were conducted, while subservient to the military purpose, increased bodily strength, improved health, and steeled the habit against vicissitudes of heat and cold, or the effects of rain and scorching suns.

The Roman manual consisted of various parts of exercise, which were more or less connected with each other, and which were generally interesting to the soldier, inasmuch as the utility, in application to practice in actual war, was distinctly figured to the learner's mind. The exercise at the stake was considered as the first exercise in the system of training. The recruit was furnished with an osier shield and a wooden club, each of them double the weight of the military shield and sword. With this hurdle and club he approached the stake, as he would have neared an enemy, practising all modes of attack, and taking care to leave no part of his own body uncovered. He submitted to the exercise at the stake twice a-day; namely, in the morning and in the afternoon. It was an important practice, regarded in some measure as the rudiment of military training. The Roman recruit was principally instructed in the mode of giving point; for the Romans knew that wounds inflicted by the edge are comparatively less mortal than those which are given by the point, particularly where the more vulnerable parts of the body are protected by armour. It is further to be remarked in this place, that those who acquired knowledge in the use of arms with facility, and who attained dexterity in the practice of the customary manœuvres, were constituted temporary teachers, and rewarded with a double ration; that those who were slow in learning were fed with barley, instead of wheat, and restricted to that species of food until their proficiency was acknowledged. After a certain degree of perfection was attained in the exercise at the stake, the recruit was instructed and practised in throwing the javelin—a practice which was continued until a reasonable certainty in striking the object was attained. The art of shooting with arrows was taught scientifically; also the art of using the sling.



In latter times, leaden bullets were substituted for stones, and actions of considerable extent appear, in the declining days of the empire, to have been decided by that form of missile force alone. Besides the exercises now mentioned, the recruit, and even the trained soldier, was exercised carefully in mounting on horseback with arms, namely, sword drawn, or pike couched in an attitude for striking. He mounted on the right or left, in fact, in any way that occasion presented. For this purpose wooden horses were placed under cover in winter, and in the open field in summer. The recruit first practised vaulting without arms; and when he was capable of doing this with facility, he commenced vaulting with arms, and, finally, in an attitude for action, guarding himself at the same time as if he were in the ranks of the enemy.

The Roman soldier was armed in the earlier period of the republic, and protected by armour similar to that of the Greeks and neighbouring states of Italy. After he became stipendiary, and war began to be prosecuted systematically with a professed view to territorial conquest, the arms, armour, and order of tactic, submitted to occasional changes. Hints of improvement were borrowed even from enemies. They were resolved to their principles, and incorporated into the existing system. No practice was adopted or servilely copied from another, without the manner being understood in which it acted through all its connexions: the Roman tacticians amalgamated foreign excellencies—the base of the Roman system was still preserved.

The armour of the infantry soldier consisted, in the best days of the republic, of a shield, a helmet, a coat of mail, and an iron boot or greave for the right leg: the arms consisted of a pike, a javelin, a sword and dagger. The body was thus well protected; and the weapons of offence seem, on a close consideration of reasons, to be particularly well contrived for execution. The Roman sword is a decisive weapon; strong and short, it is under the power of the arm in most situations, whether for offence or defence.

A Roman soldier, single or combined with others, might be considered as a model for the practice of war—in armour, arms, and dexterity. The Roman army, as new modelled in the wars with the Latins, and improved in all its arrangements by the light of science, consisted of three orders or lines—*hastati*,



*principes*, and *triarii*. To each of these orders a certain number of cavalry and skirmishers, namely, bowmen and slingers, were attached for the defence of the wings and the annoyance of the advancing enemy. The *hastati* were placed in front, that is, they formed the first line in the order of battle; the *principes* were drawn up directly in rear; the *triarii* were behind the *principes*. The first line was close and compact, with a view to sustain attack; the second was open, with a view to receive the first into its intervals when forced to retire, the third was still more open than the second, so as to be capable of receiving the whole, when the necessity of retiring occurred. The third line, filled up and rendered compact by the accession of the *principes* and *hastati*, remained in position, either to sustain the attack of the enemy, or to advance upon him suddenly and furiously when he approached near his station. It seems to be implied in the fundamental arrangement of the plan of the Roman battle, that the *hastati*, when overpowered, should retire upon the *principes*; and that the whole, when they could no longer resist, should fall back upon the *triarii*. This seems to be the original view; but the Romans appear in practice, like the generals of modern times, to have oftener supported the first lines by bringing up the reserve, than to have retired upon it with a view to sustain an attack in position, or to advance from their position upon the advancing enemy as a tiger springing upon its prey from a lurkingplace.

The question of bringing up the reserve, or of retiring upon it, is a curious and important one. It deserves the attentive consideration of military men who have seen war, who have studied its principles; and who know the power of appearances on the sensibilities of human nature, in spite of all that can be done by art to counteract them. A soldier who obliges his enemy to leave his position, advances in pursuit of him with an accession of courage, in belief of his superiority; and he who retires from an advancing enemy, does so with diminished courage, under an impression of his weakness. This is fact; but, while admitted as true, it is also to be observed, that if the advancing soldier gain confidence, he often loses that closeness and compactness of order which gives strength in the shock of battle; and it is also known that, as flushed with success and light in heart, if he meet with an enemy unexpectedly rushing to a charge as in recoil, he is liable to be struck with surprise, to retro-

grade in his turn, and not unfrequently to fly. There are few people of military experience who may not have seen something of this kind; and, if the case be viewed in all its bearings, the plan of the Roman order of battle must be admitted to be excellent, if the front ranks be good, and the *triarii* genuine veterans who are not appalled at appearances of danger. If this be not the case, the plan is hazardous, even so far as to commit ordinary troops to total rout. The historian Livy has described the Roman order of battle with precision, previously to the action with the Latins; and he has given an example of the effect of this arrangement in that affair, which the military reader may peruse in the original, if he be so disposed.

The primary education of the Roman soldier was, as has been briefly stated, conducted in such a manner as to improve the capacity, and to ascertain the extent of the power of the individual, with a view to attain the knowledge of adapting him correctly to his place in the military instrument. The disposition of the instrument, and the application of its different parts in the field of battle, appear to have been resolved to principles, and adjusted to purposes with scientific knowledge. The system was in fact a whole, founded on knowledge of man's capacities, physical and moral. All the movements were under influence of something that was common to every Roman; and things were so presented by the commander that every man, of common capacity, was qualified to form opinion of the purpose and utility of what was doing. This is scientific training. When the soldier was considered as perfect in the primary part of education, he was led to the practice of evolution and complex movement; that is, to open and close the ranks with facility and with safety; to preserve distances while moving at an equal and cadenced step; to double with rapidity and with order; to form the square with celerity; and, from the square, to pass suddenly to the triangle or wedge. The practice of forming and moving in the *hollow circle* was also recommended, and to a certain extent practised; in a word, pains were taken by the drill that the young soldier should comprehend the principle on which he was directed to act, as well as the purpose for which he was required to submit to modes of acting which implied severity. The Roman soldiers, fully accoutred and armed at all points, were obliged three times in the month, with a view that

they might be always fit for field-service, to march ten thousand paces from the camp and to return the same distance, part of it at the ordinary military pace, and part of it at the accelerated pace; and this they were accustomed to do, not only on the plain, but on rugged and broken grounds.

The Roman legion was the basis of the Roman army—in fact, an army in itself, well adjusted by its composition to meet the contingencies of war in all its presentations. The legion, so named from its selection, consisted of Romans. An additional force of auxiliaries was attached to it—at first allied and national, latterly mercenary, and composed of the vagabonds of all nations. The legion was divided into cohorts. It was, as now said, an army in miniature, possessing every description of force that is employed in war, namely, skirmishers of all kinds, cavalry, and solid lines of heavy armour. The numerical establishment of the Roman legion appears to have varied at different times, and it would also appear that changes had taken place in the manner of bringing it into the field of battle. The subject is obscure; and, as the writer does not presume to solve the difficulties that attach to it, or reconcile the disagreement which is found among historians in their incidental observations on the Roman armies, he simply transcribes the detail of the composition from Vegetius, a professed writer on the military art, who lived at a period of the Roman empire when the institutions were known and formally practised, but when the spirit which animated them in the early days of the republic was gone. According to Vegetius, the legion consisted of ten cohorts. The first cohort, to which the grenadier company of modern battalions bears some analogy, was stronger in number and higher in estimation than the others: it was entrusted with the care of the eagle. The ranks of this cohort contained eleven hundred and five infantry, to which were added one hundred and thirty-two horsemen in mail. It was the head of the legion; and, when the order of battle was formed, the other cohorts dressed their ranks by it. The second cohort contained five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse; the third, the fourth and the fifth, the same number. Those of the third, as the centre cohort, and those of the fifth, as the left of the line, were selected on account of strength and valour. These five cohorts constituted the first line. The sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, consisted each of five hundred and

fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse. The whole amount of the legion was thus six thousand and one hundred foot, and seven hundred and twenty-six horse. It was raised to a higher number on some occasions ; some of the other cohorts, besides the first, being filled up to a thousand or eleven hundred and five.

The legion had officers of different ranks ; some to command in action, others to attend to economical concerns in the camp and field. The arrangements were systematic, apparently designed with foresight and knowledge of the subject in all its latitude. Among others, the causes assigned by Vegetius for the selection of the centurion are so distinctly noted, and so important in themselves, that it is matter of surprise that they have not been adopted as grounds of selection by nations who are ambitious of that eminence in war which only can be attained by a good army. It was required, for instance, that the centurion be of good stature, that he possess muscular power, so as to be capable of throwing the spear and other missiles with precision and to strike with effect, that he be skilled to use the sword dexterously and vigorously in offence, and to manage the shield adroitly in defence ; in fact, that he be acquainted with everything that belongs to arms ; and moreover, that he be sober, vigilant, active, more prompt to act than to speak, zealous to maintain his company in discipline, to enforce the regular practice of military exercises, and to take care that the whole be properly clothed and provided with good shoes.

Vegetius describes very minutely the field disposition of the legion as prepared to meet the enemy. His account may be considered as a description of the Roman order of battle ; and for that reason it is here transcribed. The cavalry were placed on the wings ; the line of battle was dressed on the first cohort, which was stationed on the right ; the second cohort was formed on the left of the first, the third occupied the centre, the fourth was on the left of the third, and the fifth on the left of the whole, so as to constitute the left flank. The heavy armour consisted of helmet, coat of mail, boots, shield, sword, dagger, leaded javelins in the shield, and two other missile weapons—one called pilum, with a triangular head of iron nine inches in length and a shaft of five feet and a half, another called vericulum or verutum, with a head of five inches, and a shaft of three feet and a half. The first rank were *hastati*, the second, *principes* ; behind

these stood the whole host of light-armed. The *triarii* fully armed, and couched as a tiger to spring upon its prey, were placed behind the whole. When the order of battle was formed, the first and second rank, or *principes* and *hastati*, remained in position; the *triarii* rested upon the knee; the skirmishers provoked the enemy to battle; and, if their efforts caused him to retire, they followed and annoyed him in the retreat. If they were unequal to resist, they retired behind their own line. The heavy-armed then took up the combat, and fought with sword and javelin. They remained in position as a wall of iron. If the enemy fled, they did not follow: the pursuit was committed to the light-armed and cavalry.

The economical regulations of the Roman armies appear, from the testimony of Vegetius, to have been digested with a correct systematic knowledge of all the concerns of military life. Among others, the formation of a stock-purse for every cohort, and a general purse for the whole legion, may be considered as one of the wisest measures that has, perhaps, ever been practised by a military power to beget a mercenary attachment to the service. It made a family, and created a common property, maintained sympathy and union, common view and common purpose, through all the parts of the corps. Promotion moved in a circle through the different parts of the legion, according to an established rule; for instance, the promotion was from the first cohort to the tenth; and, from the tenth, it rolled back to the first through all the cohorts in succession, with better pay and higher rank in the successive gradations as it advanced to the right. By this means the captain of the first cohort was intimately and experimentally acquainted with the character and condition of every cohort in the legion: the whole was in fact organized with a knowledge of the qualities of individuals, and of the operation of the causes which beget mutual sympathies and mutual dependence.

The writer has endeavoured to bring together some points of information concerning the Roman army, which he believes may assist the young reader in forming an opinion respecting the causes which acted upon the military character of that people, and carried it to a point of eminence which other nations have rarely, if ever, attained. The impression which characterized the Romans through all their history, was received from the original



compact which obtained among them as freebooters. The act of their combination was direct rapine of goods, and subjection of the owners. This was the simple rule at the outset; it became complicated in the course of time. There is no state, within the annals of history, that appears to have been so well calculated by constitution for subduing nations, and for maintaining them permanently in subjection after they were subdued, as the Roman. The senate had a long life as an aristocratic corporation. Its object was acquisition of territory, and its sagacity, aided by the commanding tone of a deceptive philanthropy which it often assumed, knew how to consolidate what it acquired on a comparatively solid base. The love of liberty is inherent in mankind; and, though the Romans might gain a battle by superior generalship, superior valour, or greater skill in the use of arms, the conquest of a country and submission of the people could only be assured through fear or illusion. It was attempted to be assured in the present case by forming colonies of citizens and soldiers, and by granting to the subdued subordinate privileges, which flattered their vanity by admitting them to what was called fraternization.

The Roman military character retained, throughout its existence, the stamp of its original impression. It was rendered respectable, at an early period, through the operation of religious sentiment ingrafted upon it by the institutions of Numa. The physical constancy of the material was secured by frugal and modest habits which belonged to domestic life: its power was excited to exertion by emulation in glory, or through fear of powerful neighbours. The people of Italy, more particularly the Latins and Samnites, were not inferior to the Romans in physical force and courage. They were superior in general knowledge and liberal arts: they were inferior through defect of vigour in their constitutional government. The obligations of the religious sentiment were there comparatively weak; and the executive, among the Latins and Samnites, did not assume the prompt and condensed decision which it did among the Romans. The Roman command was absolute in the field; it was impartially and rigorously executed. The punishment which the consul inflicted on his own son for acting without order, appears at first sight to be savage and inhuman. It was in fact an act of virtue of unparalleled value; for it is to rigour in the execution of laws that Rome owes her safety and her eminence.



The Roman military character was formed and perfected under the wars which were carried on with neighbouring states in Italy. While the Romans fought within the confines of Italy, against Latins, Samnites and Gauls, they might be considered as, in some measure, struggling for independence; and, though a system of conquest was even then in the view of the senate, the causes which provoke war were so disguised, and so artfully presented to the people, that they believed in the opinion that war was defensive, necessary, and just. The Roman military character, in the early periods of the republic, was national; the service voluntary or levied; the expense personal. The expense was sustained with difficulty; and, in relief of this, it was decreed that the soldier should be supported by an allotted salary. The boon was received with acclamation; and its first effect probably gave increased energy to war. But, though tactic and mechanical execution may be reasonably supposed to have been rendered more perfect as a consequence of more entire devotion to military pursuits, and exemption from the care of providing subsistence; yet, if we read the Roman history with attention, we can scarcely fail to observe the commencement of military degeneracy soon after the troops became stipendiary; and particularly after war was undertaken solely for dominion over independent nations. In the second Punic war, the Roman army, though perfectly drilled in all ordinary manœuvres, appears to have lost much of its national value. Its frugality, its modesty, and its high sentiment of religion, disappeared. These virtues did not in fact stand higher among the Roman soldiery than among that of the enemy, which was professedly mercenary. We have no evidence to justify us in saying that the moral virtues of the commanders for Rome were superior to those for Carthage; and, if the moral virtues were not superior, the military virtues of no one, except perhaps Marcellus and Scipio, made any approach to those of Hannibal.

The Romans, whether pressed by difficulty, or urged by the desire of conquest, encroached on the vitals of the constitution in the second Punic war. The purity of election was corrupted, and the people were rendered instruments of faction through deception. Scipio was personally amiable, and he possessed military genius; but he was ambitious; and, as he was popular, he may be considered as the first who opened the road to systematic corruption

at Rome. Through his great qualities and popular manners he stepped over the boundary of the laws and usages of the republic; and, thus, he gave example that a leader might rule the nation by party or unfair means. The humiliation of Carthage at the termination of the second Punic war, and its final overthrow in the third, accelerated the decay of virtue among the Roman people. The object of the Roman government was now declared to be the subjugation of all the nations of the earth; and, in the attempt to execute this, all the institutions of the republic were overturned. The armies ceased to be national; and the state, after being deluged in blood by the rancorous ambition of contending factions, sunk into abject slavery under the most fortunate of the rival chiefs who was dignified with the name of emperor. The military history of the Romans possesses little interest after the termination of the second Punic war. The ambitious spirit of the government was flagrant; the spirit of the soldiery was licentious, rapacious, and mercenary. The picture was occasionally enlivened by the prominence of a great character, and sometimes may be relieved by the contemplation of a good one; but, upon the whole, the scene was corrupt: morals were disgusting, civil liberty became extinguished, and the human character sunk latterly to the lowest point of degradation under the despotism of vicious tyrants. Rome was respectable; and she might be held to be invincible, as founded on a republican base and supported by equal laws executed with unrelenting severity. She lost sight of her original, became aristocratic and factionary, finally monarchical, and despotic, and sunk into the dust in the midst of mortifications. Her fate, though striking, is a common fate, such as happens to every nation which violates the barrier of political justice, by encroaching on the rights of its neighbours.

## CHAPTER V.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE MIDDLE AGE.

THE Roman empire arose from small beginnings, and extended itself widely, and, as extended beyond just bounds, it was preserved with difficulty from falling to pieces. It was unwieldy by its magnitude, and exposed to dangers by the character of the heterogeneous materials which were latterly introduced into it. It consequently split into two empires, namely, one in the West, of which Rome was the capital; and one in the East, the centre or capital of which was fixed at Byzantium, a locality beautiful beyond description. The empire in the West declined daily in vigour, and lost respect. Its extremities were pressed by barbarian hordes, and its centre had little power of recoil. The Roman soldiers were skilled in tactic and acquainted with all the forms of military evolution; but they were mercenary, and did not possess that love of country which is the bulwark, and the only bulwark of safety when states are in danger. In the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era, swarms of different races issued from the East in a warlike attitude, overran the Roman provinces on the West and South, possessed themselves of Germany, France, Spain, and part of Africa, established their power in Italy, sacked Rome, and dissolved the Roman government. These invaders, who were warlike tribes in migratory progression from East to West, are described by their enemies as barbarian, almost as savage. It is not pretended to say that they did not commit barbarous acts; but the skill and address with which they conducted military enterprizes may satisfy the unprejudiced that they were not ignorant of the art of war, that is, of the art of slaughtering their fellow-creatures according to a system of science. Besides skill in war acquired by experience, migratory tribes may be supposed to possess a common sentiment or feeling of equality, derived from participation in a common act. The Roman nation consisted, in the late periods of its history, of slave and master only. The barbarian invaders were, on the contrary, confederate warriors in compact with each other; consequently they might be supposed to have some idea of the liberty and independence of the human,

condition; and thus to have some feeling of what is due to man merely as man. It is on this ground perhaps that they are deemed authors of representative government. They appear to have introduced it into Europe; for there is no evidence of its having existed, in this division of the globe, prior to the invasion of these barbarians.

The Roman empire was nominally Christian at the time its government was dissolved; and, barbarian as the conqueror was, he did not interdict the exercise of the Christian worship to the conquered people. The worship went on under the superintendence of a religious chief. The chief, with the art which belongs to the sons of hypocrisy, found the means of converting the conqueror to an observance of the ceremonies of the Romish church—not to the spirit and practice of the Christian religion. The pontiff obtained an accession of power by the dominion which he gained over the powerful invader; and, as his ambition was insatiable, and the human race ignorant and credulous, he may be said, without a figure, to have usurped a throne in heaven, and obliged all the new sovereigns of the West to bow before it. He styled himself Pope, or Father, and impiously assumed attributes of power which belong to no created being. Human indignation cannot rise higher than it rises against the Roman pontiffs. They were sacrilegious impostors—not simple impostors in common things. They assumed a viceroyship of divine power, veiled the Creator from the view of his creatures by artifice; and, arrogating to themselves the power of binding or loosening upon earth, they may literally be said, by diverting worship to themselves, to have extinguished the religion of Jesus Christ; or, in other words, to have expelled the true worship of the Deity from the earth.

Italy became nominally Christian at an early period; but a great part of Europe continued pagan until the time of Charlemagne. Charlemagne may be considered as a man of extended views for the age in which he lived. He established an extensive empire, digested a code of law into systematic form, and displayed such pomp and magnificence in his exterior as might be supposed to have its origin from the East. Charlemagne's empire was what may be called vast. It was broken up at his death, part of it being portioned out in allotments to the principal officers of his household for particular services. So divided,

it constituted a number of principalities, independent in internal jurisdiction, but bound in allegiance to the head of the empire by military service.

The military character of the nations who invaded and conquered Europe is not easily estimated. There is reason to believe that they brought with them a certain feeling of liberty and independence of mind existing among themselves as associated adventurers. The spirit of individual liberty diminished when they became stationary, and it disappeared when they became nominal Christians, that is, vassals of the church of Rome. Independently of the practice of local customs, which adhered to the people from time immemorial, and which indicated something of the relations of man with man on the base of equality, all human acts were now shackled by direct force, or by indirect instruments of fraud and delusion. The human mind was extinguished, or turned into the retrograde channel, wherever the church obtained dominion: the tyranny was insolent and intolerable. Quarrels and contentions were frequent among its vassals; and Christian princes were at this time its vassals. War, plunder, and bloodshed, were the prominent features of the time; namely, war as principal, war as auxiliary, or war for the bribe of money and the spoils of the field; in strict language, men were robbers or assassins almost universally—they were not Christians in reality. Where robbery and assassination were exercised to extent, power was obtained by the chief; and power, in common opinion, constituted virtue and honour. Such seemed to be the moral and military state of Christian Europe in what is called the middle age.

The Arabs or Saracens, who had emerged from obscurity in the seventh century, rose rapidly to eminence in the East. Their territorial acquisitions were considerable, and among others they possessed themselves of the holy land. They were tyrannical and often overbearing in manner, particularly to those who were not of the Mahomedan faith. They appear to have ill-treated some Christian pilgrims in their religious visits at Jerusalem; and, in consequence of this real or supposed persecution, the furious zeal of the hermit Peter was employed to rouse the indignation of the Christian world to avenge the wrong. Stimulated by the harangues of the enthusiast, the European princes undertook a joint expedition to Syria, with a view to conquer the land in



question; and thereby to assure the free exercise of devotion at the holy shrine. The war was carried on for a length of time with varying success. Both Christians and Saracens were familiar with blood; they rioted, as may be said, in the slaughter of their fellow-creatures. But, as the Saracens were at this time a comparatively refined and enlightened people, the Europeans, being often in contact with them, could not well fail to imitate and improve. The mind received a new impulse, and rose to a comparatively high point of value by the accession of ideas of honour and heroism as applicable to war. Instead of the insulated routine of slaughter, plunder, and party feuds, which characterized the barbarous ages subsequent to the fall of the Roman empire, sentiments of gallantry and enterprize of chivalry, implying a high refinement of mental idea as their motive, became a fashion, even a rage, with a certain class of the warriors of Europe. The enterprizes were chivalrous, and the horrors of war were somewhat softened by the infusion of heroic sentiment; but it is not easy to say how far the science of war and the economical arrangements of armies were improved on the occasion. The organization of the warlike force of Europe still rested on a feudal base; and the shock in battle lay for the most part in trials of strength in close combat, that is, in a hammering on coats of mail from morning to night. But, though the savage horror was softened by an intermixture of gallantry, the motive of aggression remained the same. The life of the commander, knight, or man of condition, who fell into the hands of an enemy, was saved as a trophy of pride, or to be ransomed for a sum of money; the mass of the soldiery, if not enslaved for profit, was ordinarily slaughtered with little remorse, as if they had been mere cattle. The greatest part of Europe was Christian in name at this period; it was not, as already said, Christian in reality. War, plunder, and the destruction of the species, was the leading occupation of the race: justice, brotherly love, and charity, though the injunction of Jesus Christ, commanded no respect. The dominion of the church was paramount; and history supplies many proofs to shew that the church had in view the extinction of knowledge and truth, that it might thereby perpetuate its power as arbiter of human destinies. There were local bursts of liberty, civil or religious, on some occasions among the people; but the mass of mankind still remained in ignorance of themselves, enslaved to religious



prejudice, or to the tyranny of feudal chiefs, through fear or delusion.

The discovery of gunpowder and the invention of fire-arms effected a change in the mode of carrying on war. The art was studied scientifically with a view to discover the best mode of applying the missile force with effect. Missile force, acting independently of physical strength, placed mankind in some degree on a level. Manceuvre and stratagem have place among the rudest of barbarian warriors; systematic movements, and combinations in movement, are only found among those who make a study of the scientific art of human slaughter. The tactic and movement of Greek and Roman armies were revived, and in some points improved after gunpowder was discovered. Fero-cious barbarity in the application of brute force was so materially diminished, that the campaigns of modern times seem as royal pastime compared with those of the middle ages.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### MILITARY CHARACTER OF ORIENTAL NATIONS, NAMELY, ARAB, TURK, AND TARTAR.

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#### *Arab, or Saracen.*

THE exterior form and the physical powers of the human race are evidently moulded and modified by the influence of climate and locality; the internal character, or moral temperament, is formed, or at least modified, by circumstances which present themselves contingently in localities, and by the discipline of institutions established upon a basis of science. The rugged and barren parts of Arabia appear, by description, to be not unlike the rugged and mountainous highlands of Scotland—with the excep-tion of different latitude and a higher temperature. Similar objects make similar impressions on man, according to a general law of animal nature; and, in correspondence with this law, the Arab and the highlander of Scotland resemble each other in many points of character. Besides the likeness which may be thought to

be produced by influence of localities, the form of government—patriarchal in both—appears to have brought these distant people more directly together in resemblance to each other than perhaps any other cause that was applied to act upon them. The pastoral and social form of life moved on one base in both; it was modified more or less distinctly by accidental circumstances. The government was patriarchal; the attachment to the chief was devotion—not mere obedience. Feuds between clans or tribes, resentment and desire of revenge for injuries sustained, real or supposed, characterized both. Both were proud of ancestry; and both preserved their history in memory rather than in written record—and they preserved it correctly. Brilliant achievements were embodied in song, diffused among the people; and, while a national record, they were an incentive to deeds of glory. The impression made by the scenery of a wild and mountainous country would appear to have produced the poetic mind both in the Arab and Scotch Highlander. Their ideas were often sublime; the language forcible, whether descriptive of scenery, of manner and character, of conflicts in war, or of tender scenes in love. The Arab and Highlander were both brave—even fierce in the conflict of battle. Patient, courageous and hardy, with a love of country the most ardent, and a devotion to the chief the most determined, the ancient Arab, as well as the Highlander of Scotland, may be supposed to have furnished materials of the first order for the formation of armies.

The Arabs, prior to the time of Mahomet, were idolaters. They appear to have drank to excess, and gamed to desperation. They boasted of dissoluteness, and gloried in shedding the blood of enemies. Their resentments were implacable: they may be said to have rioted in the slaughter of the field: the very women were fierce. Regarded as robbers by surrounding nations, the Arabs considered themselves to be at war with those who were not in their alliance, or under their protection; but, on this ground perhaps, they were not worse than the polished nations of modern times. The Arab was terrible to an enemy—he was generous and hospitable to a friend or stranger who obtained his protection; and he was of inviolable faith where faith was pledged. The difficulties of the country, the obstinate love of liberty, with a contempt of what are esteemed luxuries in polished life, enabled the Arab to resist the arms and arts of the Romans,

when the Romans were in the zenith of their power. They were thus, with the Highlanders of Scotland, almost the only people who preserved their independence against the preponderating force of Rome. Whether Arabia and Caledonia, defended as they were, could not be conquered by Roman courage and Roman arts, or were not thought to be worth the expense that would have been incurred by a conquest through force, it is generally admitted that they were not conquered, so as to submit to incorporation with the Roman state.

The Roman republic, stimulated by ambition to invade all accessible parts of the earth, and to civilize, as it arrogantly pretended, the barbarian or child of Nature, had subjugated almost all Europe, the Mediterranean coasts of Africa, and a considerable portion of Asia, before the Arabs or Saracens were known beyond their mountains and their deserts. Ambition of conquest was the moving engine of the Roman republic; organization of the conquered people into a nominal colonial fraternity, as the bond through which the acquisition was to be maintained, was the object of the Roman policy. The Roman arms were successful; and the design of retaining what was acquired by force, was apparently wisely laid on the limited participation of citizenship. But the policy, well planned as it apparently was, like all human designs which originate in a false view of things, and move on an unequal base, undermined itself, and, finally, terminated in ruin. The Roman republic had run its course; and the population of its extensive domain was broken in spirit, and sunk in effeminacy, prior to the appearance of Mahomet in Arabia. The moral and religious doctrine of Jesus Christ had a nominal existence within the circle of the Roman empire for some centuries prior to this epoch; but it was only, it is presumed, in the cottages of the poor and humble that its true spirit was felt and known. It was not acknowledged, even in name, by the rulers of the people, until it was corrupted; that is, until the means were discovered by which it might be rendered subservient to purposes as an engine of state. The doctrine of Jesus Christ inculcates love and charity to all men as common brothers; it of course virtually interdicts war, which destroys human life. War is the child of ambition, the product of a passion to subjugate and domineer over equals; as such, it is unjust; that is, it is violence, subversive of that fundamental

law and order of harmony, which is impressed on sublunary things by the hand of the Creator.

The Christian religion was the nominal creed of the shattered fabric of the Greek and Roman empires, at the time that the Arabian prophet promulgated the doctrine of the Koran; but the religion was as shattered and inconsistent as the fabric of the political empire. The population, conquerors and conquered, might be said to be in a state of decrepitude. Without love of country, and without the strength of mind which characterizes society as it emerges from barbarism, they made no connected and scientific resistance to the inroads of the Saracen arms.

The new system of religion which Mahomet, after long labour and severe conflicts, established among his countrymen, electrified, and, in a manner, new modelled the whole frame of the Arab mind. It is not easy at this distant period—it even perhaps would not have been easy for those who lived at a contemporary period—to determine what was the real character of the person who effected this change; that is, to pronounce clearly, whether Mahomet was a deliberate impostor from the beginning; or, if he began to act under a peculiar hallucination of mind, and ended his act as an impostor, through circumstances which arose contingently in his proceedings. He appears to have been acquainted with the histories of the Old and New Testaments. He venerated the patriarchs and the prophets; and he never mentioned the name of Jesus Christ except with a respect which may be termed devotion to his character. He stated, distinctly, that Jesus Christ was the interpreter of the will of God, and that his entrance into the world was not as that of common men. Mahomet, whether a deliberate political impostor, or an enthusiast, under a peculiar form of mental hallucination that contingently degenerates into imposture, was a reformer of morals; and, if the sword had had less to do in the propagation of his doctrine than it had, his name might have been mentioned with respect, even by the followers of Jesus Christ. The Mahometan religion, abstracted from the impious assumption that it proceeded from the Deity, communicated to Mahomet by the angel Gabriel, is a devoted form of aspiration, implying absorption of the sensibilities of the creature into the boundless goodness and mercy of the Creator. It appears, by its effect, to have

electrified and sublimed the human character at the time, debased as it was by Pagan idolatry, selfish Judaism, corrupted Christianity, and the various vices which attach to hypocrisy and imposture. The law promulgated by Mahomet, as a law descending from the Deity, was propagated by the sword; it thus, contradicting itself, forfeited all claim to divinity, and became, in the eye of reason, an engine of human imposture, for a political purpose. It was, in fact, a powerful engine for the extension of empire; in an incredibly short time the Saracen name was carried by means of it over Syria, Persia, Asia Minor, Egypt, the northern coasts of Africa, Spain, some of the islands in the Mediterranean, India, Tartary, &c. It is not clear to the author, after reading the Koran again and again, that Mahomet himself was actually an impostor: it is perfectly clear that imposture belonged to Abu Bekr. Abu Bekr was a hypocrite in grain—a long-headed man, acquainted with the weaknesses of human nature, and the means of turning these weaknesses to account. He was mainly instrumental in conducting the machinery of the Koran; and to him, more than to Mahomet, the establishment of the religion is due. The early successors of Mahomet were of varied character. Some of them were men of genius—men of great force of mind, some were generous, just, and real believers; but, more of them were political believers only, cruel, tyrannical, and literally insatiate of blood. Antipathy to other sects, and intolerance of other forms of worship, grew with the success of the Saracen arms. The jealousies appear at last to have gone beyond the literal meaning of Mahomet. The hatred is now rancorous, rendered so, it may be presumed, by the resistance which the propagation of the doctrine met with from Christian powers, particularly the Knights of Malta.

The early Saracens, as emerging from comparative barbarism, were a new people; and, like other new people, they evinced strong powers of mind. They had good sense; and, as proof of it, they condescended to adopt many of the economical regulations, even some of the military views, of the people with whom they fought, and whom they actually subdued; but they did not adopt them servilely, so as to surrender their judgment and national character to the dictate of foreign military masters. The general principle acted on by Saracen armies appears to be a common principle,



namely, annoyance by missile force at a distance, fury in the charge, and perseverance in conflict at close quarters. The Arabs excelled in cavalry. The Saracen conquest was generally rapid, partly by the infusion of the principle that it was a duty to propagate religion by arms, and partly by the disorganized condition of the opponent. The conquest, so attained, was consolidated by the rigorous establishment of the laws of the Koran. Sultans and khalifs were dethroned, generals and viziers beheaded; the dynasty was even changed; the religion remained the same. One class succeeded to another in rapid rotation; for absolute power, however acquired, following its own rule, acts blindly or capriciously, and thus runs into error, and precipitates itself in ruin, so as to leave the field open to some other master in fraud or violence who triumphs for a time.

The Saracens appear, from a superficial view of their history, to have been drawn into close action, by planting a signal in front attracting them to advance to a point of honour. They united at the point, and rushed forward to close with the enemy under the impressive sound of *Allah*. The word *Allah*, as a condensed and simple sound, impressing the most sublime and commanding sentiment that enters into the human mind, may be supposed, if skilfully applied, to produce the most firm and concentrated act that belongs to man. It does so in fact; for the charge of a well organised Mahomedan army is almost irresistible, if it be made with skill. The power of the Saracen military force seemed to lie in close combat. The individual looked on the naked point with a steady eye, and even smiled as he writhed upon the spear. He was fierce in combat; and there was a period in his history when he was a soldier of the first quality. He seems still to retain his courage; but systematic organization and discipline have added nothing to his value.

The Arab had genius and good sense as a son of Nature. Some of them were learned, and many were lovers of learning. Those who invaded Spain were scientific—and magnificent in matters of taste beyond example. The Saracen power extended widely and flourished vigorously for a time; but, following the steps of other military creations, it lost vigour, declined at a certain point of expansion, and finally fell to pieces through the operation of the baser passions of the human mind, namely, ambition, avarice, selfishness, insolence and bigotry. A generous



hospitality characterized the Arab; but it was bottomed on national pride: kindness and humanity on a general base did not appear to be a part of his character—shedding of human blood gave no remorse.

*Turk.*

THE Turk, another of the military nations which figured in the East, and which still retains an extensive dominion in Asia, and even some share of power in Europe, possessed at one time a well adjusted military organization. The Turk and Turcoman appear to have been originally pastoral and warlike migratory tribes. They came to the Saracen khalifs as military servants, and finally became military masters. They placed and displaced according to their pleasure; and, after their power had attained a certain growth, they advanced to the West, dissolved the Greek empire, and threatened the remains of the Roman. The external appearance of the individual Turk is majestic; and, whether acquired by the habit of command among conquered nations, or belonging to constitutional qualities of race, they have a loftiness and authority in air and manner more strikingly conspicuous than in any people in Europe. The very child looks like a master; insomuch that the Turk strikes the eye as the born lord of the human creation. He is dignified and reserved, of a placid countenance, and possesses a singular command over the expression of the purposes of his mind: he is decorous and well bred as a gentleman; respectful to old age, and profoundly reverential of progenitors; but with all this, he is not amiable and interesting, or one to whom a stranger is disposed to give confidence. He is proud and self-important; and, if kind, like others who conceive themselves sovereign, he is kind by condescension—not through a feeling of sensibility to a brother. It is not easy to penetrate the Turkish mind, and it is not wise to be confident in the knowledge of it. The Turk acts by espionage or secret information; and he acts with secrecy, so that his purposes are rarely seen until they are executed. The disguise of countenance is perfect; insomuch that a Turk is said to order the execution of a fellow-creature, even to perform the act of execution, without changing a feature of the face. In Turkey, as in many countries, there is little trust in the promises of those who are in power; it is even

said that a promise of safety is often held out to the offender at the time that the warrant is actually sealed for his execution. The Turk is cleanly in person, observant of propriety in all external relations, a perfect master in the arts of dissimulation—but not a flatterer, at least of Christians. The spirit of the government is despotic; and the character of the people here, as in other places, takes its leading feature from the character of the government, the rule descending from the seraglio to the lowest collector of the miri. The expanding power of the Turkish government is exhausted. Forward progression is impracticable, and the machine is only kept from falling to pieces by management, namely, a species of intrigue or espionage, conducted in all its steps under the influence of bribery with money. Every official person within the Turkish dominions is prone to exact—many of them are rapacious; and, when they become rich through rapacity, they live in the lion's mouth—ready to be swallowed up whenever occasion offers. It is dangerous to be rich; and, as the property of the criminal is confiscated to the state, the crime is easily framed—allegation being generally tantamount to proof. A government which moves on this base cannot be a happy one; and, as Turkey is governed under this rule, while it presents a melancholy picture of the condition of the human race, implies a very uncertain chance of duration. The Mahomedan religion is a despotism in itself; and, as now practised, it is a tyranny persecuting to extremity. The government is tyrannic; but it is fortunately exempt from the insolence of the hereditary aristocracy which domineers in the majority of Christian European states.

The Turks are a people of great physical power, and they may be supposed, from a preponderance of bodily force, to be superior in the shock of battle to almost any of the European armies of the present day, if they were armed in the same manner and fairly joined in combat in the open field. But, though the power of the Turkish military strikes the eye, as irresistible in the charge of battle if properly applied to the point of attack, it is evidently less alert than many, and less fit for the service of the field than most. It is little instructed in tactic, and comparatively unapt in military movement: it is thus often—almost always indeed—defeated by European skill, not by European power or European courage. The Turks lived formerly in the field, and were accustomed to conquer. The habit of life is changed, and

conquest has deserted their standards. They notwithstanding, degenerated as they are, still retain their courage; but undisciplined, little skilled, as little practised in the evolution and tactic of Modern Europe, they are liable to be taken by surprise, and to be sometimes struck with panic. The Turkish military is literally a militia, rather than a regular army, according to the present idea of European tacticians; and, as it consists of various nations and different castes of Mahomedans, it is capricious in temper, and not of dependence in action: the different parts of it are sometimes at enmity with each other, even to strife in arms.

But, though the Turks cannot be said at present to be systematically organized as a military body, there was a time, when Europeans were only masses of armed men, or mercenary military bands, that the Turks had a scientific primary education, which has not perhaps been excelled by any of the innovations of recent times. According to authentic testimonies, the Turkish armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were formed of excellent materials, and put together with great skill. Children of the best promise, frequently children of Christian parents, were carried away by the Turkish conqueror, collected at depôts, instructed in all the forms of education that might be required for their future destinations; namely, reading, writing, the doctrines of the Koran or law of Mahomet, exercise in the use of arms individually and collectively, and such forms of tactic, in complicated military evolution, as were useful for the prosecution of scientific war on an extensive scale. When thus prepared, the captives, as they might be called, educated in Mahomedan rites, and moreover rendered important as incorporated with Turks, were entered into the corps of Janissaries, with all the advantages that a primary systematic education could be supposed to give them. An army, formed after this model, could not be otherwise than formidable as a military instrument, inasmuch as every part was sound in its physical constitution, homogeneous in appearance, presumptively equal in courage, and as nearly balanced in physical power as possible. When the corps was put in motion, the act was consistent, for the parts corresponded with one another throughout all their extent; hence a corps of Janissaries might actually be regarded as a military machine, calculated on a scientific principle to give out a precise and calculable effect.

War seems to be the great trade of sovereigns, and the forma-

tion of armies the great occupation of European princes ; but, zealous to excel each other as they are, they do not as yet seem to have attained the same base of science for the execution of their purposes as the Turks of the times alluded to had attained. The materials of European armies are ordinarily fortuitously collected. They are put together by size or external appearance ; and they are ordinarily forced to assume the military air and military gait by rigour of drilling. The internal temperament and the habits of the recruits, often discordant from each other, do not amalgamate ; they are only kept in contact by constraint. The Turkish army, as formed of materials which had received one form of primary education, and which looked to conquest in war as an injunction of religion, might be supposed, with good reason, to be superior to the common armies of Europe, except in so far as they were inferior in arms, armour, and the contingent advantages resulting from military skill. Most nations advance to the charge of the enemy with shouting, under the idea of giving an impulse to courage and union to the offensive act ; but, of all the words employed to excite energies and cement union, no European nation has a word of charge of such concentrated and commanding force as the *Allah* of the Turks. The word *Allah* maintains union by the simple impression of sound ; it infuses courage by assuming the protection of the most important sound that passes through human lips ; it is thus a pass-word of great import.

The constitution of the Turkish army appears, according to the report of Busbequius, who had the opportunity of seeing and of observing its movements when it was in the zenith of its glory, to have been the most perfect model of a military instrument that has ever perhaps been produced on a great theatre of war. It is now otherwise. The spirit of conquest, which was the soul of the Turkish nation, as a nation that lived as it were in the military camp, is now lost. The Janissaries still retain their name ; but they are different from the Janissaries of the great Turkish sultans who conquered Greece and fought in Europe. The Turkish government is now decrepit, indeed, far advanced in decrepitude. It is maintained by intrigue ; and it is in some manner in dread of itself. The Janissary corps, as of different sects and different interests, often quarrel and contend with each other, so as to keep the sovereign on the watch to find out the means by which he can best do away with what is obnoxious or

dangerous. Jealousies and envies are common, and rapacity reigns throughout. The state is literally in the market; and it only continues perhaps to be a sovereign state through a feeling of Mahomedan pride, which supports it in its difficulties as the greatest and most respected power in the Mahomedan circle of the earth.

*Tatar.*

THE religion of Mahomet extended in every direction, and penetrated, among other distant countries, to Tartary at an early period. The history of the Tatar nation is little known prior to the time of the prophet Mahomet. The Tatars differed from Greeks and Romans, and other civilized people of Europe; but it cannot be said, in strict propriety, that they were barbarous. They had their own customs and their own manners; and they had, moreover, a code of legislation of a character which proves that they had studied, and that they actually comprehended, the fundamental principles of political organization. The mind was strong, as the mind of a pastoral nation acquainted with the face of Nature might be expected to be; the warlike virtues, though not of the European fashion, were eminent. When the power of the successors of Mahomet began to decline, or rather when it actually had declined to a low ebb, the Tatar Timur arose as a meteor, dazzling the world by its brilliancy, and intimidating all those who lay in its course by the dangers of its contact. Timur, though remotely related to the house of Gengis Khan, may be said to have risen to power from comparatively small beginnings. It is not clear that he was more than a common emir—some say he was less. He was thus a soldier of fortune; and, having collected and organized a band of followers for military enterprise, he applied it to action with skill and promptitude, and with nearly as much justice as others apply military force. His achievements were bold: his name made an impression, and his power spread with a rapidity that scarcely has a parallel in history. The history of his enterprises, and the establishment of his power, have been recorded by both friends and enemies, that is, by professed panegyrists and by professed calumniators—even by himself, in a work which is the most valuable memoir perhaps that has been put before the public by a sovereign prince. Timur may be supposed to have known the proper motives of his own acts, the causes



which impeded their course, or which conducted them to their issue. As he was too proud to be uncandid, we may give him credit for truth; and we actually find him placed, by his own account, in a middle station between that which his blind panegyrist on the one part, and his professed calumniator on the other, assign to him. The Persian, Ali Yezid, held to be one of the most elegant prose-writers in the Persian language, has written a history of Timur in the highest extravagance of praise. In common with the writers of the East, Ali Yezid estimates the character of the warrior by the quantity of the blood which he sheds. Timur comes in for a large share of his esteem on this account; for, according to the pompous descriptions of Ali, he waded to a throne through seas of blood, and of blood so wantonly shed, that the European reader turns from his steps with horror and disgust. The Arab, Arabschah, a professed calumniator of the Tatar prince, employs a profusion of oratory, namely, all the tropes and figures of exaggeration, of which the Arabic language is susceptible, to blacken his character; and, though he may be supposed to have omitted no calumny that ever reached his ear, he has, notwithstanding, left Timur in possession of several of the qualities which constitute a great man, and even of some which belong to a good one. His own Institutes, whether written by himself or under his direction, furnish convincing proof that he was a man of genius and original mind. He was not only a scientific tactician and a rigid disciplinarian; but he was a general of great foresight and of eminent skill in conducting combined movements. Besides this, Timur appears to have been deeply read in the knowledge of mankind, and of course deeply skilled in the politics of states. He does not appear, by the most authentic records of his history, to have been cruel in his natural disposition; but he was, like the greater part, or almost all the sultans of the East, not more restrained by sympathy of fellow-feeling from shedding human blood, than from shedding the blood of cattle. It is obvious in the history of Timur's campaigns and expeditions, that his military system was scientifically and systematically digested, and that his order of battle was judiciously and scientifically laid. He was cautious in deciding; but he was prompt in acting when he had decided; in fact, he was a military phenomenon of which there are few examples. The late Emperor of France may be thought to have made some approach to Timur



in his views of war and conquest ; but he was infinitely inferior to him in wisdom, even in genius of contrivance, and particularly in resource in circumstances of difficulty. Timur had a mind of compass and reflection : he was a man within himself. Napoleon had ambition to excess, and self-opinion to disgust. His engines were force and imposture. The military machinery was magnificent ; it astonished and it often acted with energy ; but when it was disconcerted by accident, Napoleon discovered no genius in putting it right. He was in fact a little man, or rather no man, under disaster ; Timur was always a man.

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## CHAPTER VII.

### GENERAL MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN NATION.

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THE people known under the collective name of German has been long celebrated as a warrior nation, distinguished from early times for force and courage. The early Germans were numerous, powerful, and brave ; but little is known of their history and manners, except from chance notices in Cæsar's Commentaries, or the short but masterly memoir of the historian Tacitus. It is vain to conjecture where the Germans of Cæsar and Tacitus now are ; for Germany Proper, like all the rest of Europe, was overrun subsequently to that period by strangers, who, emigrating from their country in swarms, conquered, settled, and assumed the sovereignty of the soil of the districts which they invaded. These appear to have brought with them language and customs ; and, with what are called barbarian manners, a species of pomp and magnificence among the chiefs, which claims alliance with the manners of the East, that is, a lordly insolence belonging to men who consider the human race as the property of the powerful arm. It is impossible to say, at this distance of time, in how far the aboriginal German was mixed with, destroyed, or expelled by the recent invader. The northern division of these warrior hordes—Norwegian, Dane, Swede, and Anglo-Saxon—passed beyond the limits of the German continent, embarked on expeditions of free-

booting and piracy to distant places, sometimes with a view to settlement and permanent occupation, sometimes as a mere inroad for plunder. The southern division invaded Italy, France, and Spain, passed the strait of Gibraltar, and planted colonies in Africa.

The German nations, as independent of each other, were attacked, subdued, converted to nominal Christianity, and organized into certain forms of political association by the genius of the Emperor Charlemagne. After the demise of that monarch, portions of this vast territory were formed into principalities, as rewards to the different servants of the imperial household, and considered as appendages of the empire. The princes of this appointment, whether electors, bishops, or others, assumed the pageantry of a court, raised and maintained a military force, and exercised municipal jurisdiction; but, as bound to the empire by service, they were not absolutely sovereign, and, as not sovereign, they could not be expected to rise to eminence in the great theatre of the world, either in war or otherwise. The political connexion between the empire and its vassals was more or less complicated and liable to jarrings. It was gradually weakened, and finally almost dissolved. The Elector of Brandenburg, one of the electoral class, was created king of Prussia at an early period of the last century; and Prussia, as a new kingdom, rose in a short time to the highest military reputation of any state in Europe. The electors, several of whom have lately become kings, had an extensive territory and a strong military force; but, as electors, they were not independent sovereigns. Their troops were for the most part good in the ordinary sense of the word; that is, well appointed, and well practised in military training; but, as troops of a subordinate power, it was not to be expected that they should become troops of the first military character, particularly where they only appeared in the field of war as mercenary auxiliaries to foreign princes. The whole of the German territory seems to have been originally in military vassalage to the empire; and the mass of the inferior population, with the exception of the inhabitants of a few emancipated cities, was in military vassalage to kings, princes, electors, bishops, and barons. The people was thus a commodity of traffic for war, at the disposal of their masters. The vassal form of connexion between sovereign and subject, notwithstanding its radical fault, is not

without advantages. It is liable to abuse, and the abuse has been at all times flagrant in Germany, particularly in the states of petty princes and feudal barons, who have trafficked, and continue to traffic unblushingly, in hiring their people for war; which, as viewed with the eye of reason and truth, may be considered as hiring for assassination. The practice is sanctioned by long precedent. It was apparently adopted, and it is maintained under the opinion, that the vassal is a commodity to be employed for his lord's advantage, like other stock of the farm; and, as long practised, it is not thought to be criminal against the general law of society to go on with it. Germany is the great mart of military recruits; and Great Britain is the great customer. Strong detachments of German subsidiary force fought for British pay, both in the American revolutionary war, and in the wars of 1793 and 1803. Besides subsidiary German force, commanded by native officers of the subsidized state, numerous corps, both cavalry and infantry, were recruited in Germany by composition with the proprietors of particular districts in the late war with France. They were disciplined as British, subjected to British military law, and considered as, in some degree, a part of the British army. Together with those entire corps, a number of stray Germans entered, and still enter as recruits into the ranks of British regiments, more especially into the 60th; an opportunity is thus furnished to those who have served abroad to observe the conduct, and to form an opinion of the military character of the native German, both in the field and in quarters, on what may be considered as fair grounds of information.

The German subsidiary force, whether Hessian, Hanoverian, or other, appeared to the writer to be orderly and exact in the performance of its allotted duty, regular and mechanical in the actual conflict, not impetuous in attack, and not obstinate in maintaining a position after the intention of abandoning it is made known: it is thus fair to conclude that the heart is rarely in the act of the hand. The infantry corps which are recruited in Germany, and led partly by British officers, may be considered upon the whole as troops of a fair character—they have no claim to excellence. The cavalry corps are conspicuous, more perhaps for care than for adventurous courage. The German dragoon is almost always kind to his horse, and careful of him so as to preserve him in good condition in circumstances where cavalry,

under the care of British soldiers, are sickly and unserviceable. The German dragoon is trustworthy on duty. It is not said that he is superior, perhaps not equal, to the British in the actual conflict of battle; but he is of more reliance for ordinary service, especially for covering positions and maintaining communications between different parts of an army. The corps of infantry are good to a certain extent. The individuals who are mixed in the ranks of British regiments with subjects of Great Britain and Ireland, are generally of a steady character, sufficiently intelligent for common soldiers, and ordinarily trustworthy, in so far as vigilance and attention go. They are soldiers by trade, and it could not be expected that they should be anything beyond what belongs to their trade. The German soldier is as good perhaps as a mercenary soldier can be expected to be. He cannot be supposed to be of the first excellence as a fighting soldier, and he appears to occupy only a middle place as a moral one. He is comparatively indifferent to everything except himself, and the duty that is formally imposed upon him, the non-execution of which subjects him to punishment. Spoil is an incentive to activity; and German sharp-shooters, as incited to enterprize by the hopes of obtaining the spoils of those who are in advance, may be considered as long-shot assassins. The German soldier takes from an enemy's country, and not unfrequently from a neutral country, those things which suit his purpose; but, unlike the troops of some other nations, he rarely destroys wantonly, or carries away mischievously, that for which he has no occasion. He seems as if he were born to be a mechanical soldier, that is, to take care of himself and execute his prescribed duty by routine. He has little feeling of generosity or humanity; and, whether drilled to indifference, or constitutionally indifferent, he is so punctilious in duty as to suffer a sick comrade to perish with thirst, rather than encroach on the orderly's province by reaching to him a drink of water. This will be considered as perfection of discipline; but it is a perfection which one does not admire, and to which, it is presumed, no rigour would be sufficient to bring a native of France or England.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SPANISH NATION.

SPAIN, whether the climate and position, or the character of the people who have possessed, and who still possess it, be brought under view, presents an object of more than common interest to the historian and military philosopher. The general aspect of the country is striking—grand and beautiful in some places—rugged and dreary in others; not upon the whole infertile, but rarely well cultivated. The people, like most other people in Europe, are mixed in blood. Besides the aboriginal, whose local existence precedes the records of history, the blood of Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, Saracens, and other chance adventurers, more or less united by the justlings and contentions of many ages, but not so perfectly united that the marks of distinctive character are altogether lost, may be supposed to exist, and actually do, in Spain.

The coasts of Spain were invaded by the Carthaginians at an early period of European history; and, as the Carthaginians were at that time all-powerful at sea, some of the maritime districts were seized and occupied by them. The Spaniard was oppressed, or thought himself oppressed; and as the Romans, who were humane when it suited their purposes to be so, were rivals of the Carthaginians, they volunteered their aid in deliverance. The Carthaginians were obliged to retire, or to contract their limits: the Romans occupied their place. The Romans, ambitious of power, and wise in the ways of obtaining it, contrived to bring the whole of Spain under subjection; but they did not do so without trouble; and they never perhaps could have done it without underhand management; that is, without the expedient of exciting and fomenting quarrels among the different independent tribes who held the country. No people in the records of history evinced more courage and determination in defending their townships against an enemy than the Spaniards of early times; and events in the late peninsular war prove sufficiently that the spirit is not yet extinguished. No people were superior, perhaps few were equal, to the ancient



Spaniards in faith and honour, or what may be called obstinacy in adhering to their purpose. They were brave in spirit, and hardy in body; and it is fair to infer that the force of the Roman empire could not have prevailed against them, if the whole population of Spain had been united in one object, and conducted to the execution of it by a leader of ability. Some parts or districts in the peninsula made great resistance, and for a long time baffled the power of Rome: it is even presumed that Spain would have triumphed over Rome herself, but\* for treachery or casual misfortune. Spain, thus overrun, was finally numbered among Roman conquests. It submitted to Roman civilization; that is, to Roman luxury and Roman effeminacy; and in that state of degeneracy it was invaded, subdued, and occupied by one of the migratory warlike nations which inundated Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries.

It is not known correctly in what manner the conquering Goths mixed with the subdued Spaniards, nor to what extent the new people effected a change upon the manners of the old. The Goths appear to have been a high-minded race, pompous and somewhat fantastic in their habits. The original people, it is reasonable to suppose, were more or less changed by force, or assimilated by imitation, to the character of the conqueror; they, notwithstanding, retained a considerable share of the original disposition; and they still seem to retain something that is distinctive of character.

The Christian religion had been carried to Spain by some of the early converts, and was nominally the religion of the state prior to the Gothic invasion. This is true according to the letter; but it is proper to remark that, prior to that period, the purity of the Christian doctrine had been stained by its professors, insomuch that it was in reality an engine of state policy, rather than a true worship of Deity. The Goths were pagans and idolaters; but they were not perhaps very firmly rooted in their idolatry. They appear to have been easily converted to the Christian worship; for they were Christian at the time that Spain was overrun, and partly subdued by the Saracens. The Saracens were at this time an enlightened people, comparatively with Europeans. They were eminent in arms, arts, and sciences, and even perhaps more religious, in the true sense of the word, than Christians; that is, their worship of the



Deity was direct, and presumptively devout. The Spaniards were compressed by the invaders—they were not subdued. They possessed a spirit of independence and a feeling of liberty, which, whether a quality of the native of Spain, or the attendant of migratory association, did not leave them in misfortune: it adhered to them, and seemed to preserve them from abject submission. They held fast to the mountains of Asturia, expanded from thence as from a centre; and, after much hard fighting; and some good fortune, they finally drove the Moors from their country. The Moors were expelled in form; but there still remained among the people, particularly in the southern provinces, a large proportion of Moorish blood, more or less of Moorish character, and strong traces of the fine symmetry of form which belongs to the Moorish race.

The Spanish nation expanded with force and rapidity after the expulsion of the Moors from the Spanish territory; and circumstances occurred, in a short time thereafter, which contributed to raise the Spanish name to an eminence of wealth and power which had no parallel in Europe at the time; for Europeans had not then fallen upon the expedient of creating wealth by the fiction of paper, or borrowing on state credit. The Western world, which abounds with mines of gold and silver, was discovered by Columbus, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and, soon after its discovery, Spain was inundated by an influx of the precious metals, which gave her an influence in the affairs of the world until then unknown. The stimulus of gold and silver excited, and it still excites, the Spaniard to activity. The whole nation became ravenous, so to speak, in the pursuit of gold; and this unhallowed desire, suffocating the sympathies and finer feelings of the heart, gave rise to crimes which stained the Spanish character in a manner that no atonement can expiate. The Spaniards not only destroyed the Indians for the sake of the gold which they possessed, but they condemned the living Indians to gather gold from the bowels of the earth for Spanish uses. Cupidity was here the cause of Spanish activity, and it operated with great effect. The cupidity still continues; but the power and energy of mind, necessary to its forward action, are in a great measure lost or expended; and the Spaniard has, in consequence, sunk into a degraded condition, from which he cannot be expected to emerge, unless through such a revolution in thinking as brings out a

new base for the organization of human society. The eyes of the Spaniards, at least some part of them, have been lately opened to their condition; and Spain has obtained, through their exertions, a certain form of political organization, which, though it does not appear to be laid on the base of a true constitution, has evidently done some good. The Spanish new constitution\* prunes the product of error: it has not destroyed the root from which it springs; and, in this manner, the Cortes are kept in a constant state of vigilance and activity to repress reproduction, or to ward off accidents to which the movements of a fabric erected on a faulty base are exposed. The root, or material of counteraction, still exists; and if it can be gradually seared and thus destroyed, the Spanish Cortes will have achieved the greatest act that ever was performed by man; namely, the restoration of effective political health, without the subversion of the root of the disease by the violence of convulsion. It is doubtful whether there be promptitude and decision in the Spanish councils sufficient to effect the purpose in all its extent; that is, to counteract the complicated machinery that is planted against the new edifice by a treacherous and tyrannic priesthood, prejudiced nobles, bigotted and energetic women, who detest the vulgarity of liberty and truth. But be the final result as it may, the Spanish nation, at least the Cortes, has shewn, by its conduct, that it is not inferior to any nation in Europe in good sense and discretion, and that it is superior to most of them in liberality and good temper.

The population of Spain exhibits considerable diversity in appearance, indicating more or less mixture of blood—the whole has, notwithstanding, something Spanish which marks the distinctive of nations. The higher class claims, for the most part, a Gothic origin. Many are of a grand and stately deportment, a pompous, reserved, and ostentatious manner; but, whether derived from Goths or Saracens, it may not be easy to determine. The higher classes, who live within the circle of the court, are different from the people. They seem, like the higher classes of other countries, to have acquired the artificial character of courtiers; and, as the kings of Spain have not, for a long time past, been kings of the native blood, and as the court has been a more despotic, at least a more bigotted and priestridden court

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\* The constitution of 1812.

than almost any other in Europe, the Spanish nobles who are brought within its verge assimilate to its manner, consequently retain no sentiment of the independence which belonged to the Spaniard of earlier times. The court-noble is a mere creature of purposes; and, as not acting for himself, he does not rise to eminence.

The priesthood exercises an impious species of tyranny in Spain. Its labours have been incessant, and they appear to have been successful in converting the whole of the population of this extensive kingdom to the purposes of its will. The crime of the priest in Spain is avarice; and from that source the character of the whole people has been contaminated with a baneful infection. Between the priest and the inquisitor the liberty of the human mind, and, with that, the religion of Jesus Christ, may be said to be extinguished; and while the mind is enslaved spiritually by the priest, the body is in some measure enslaved politically by the sovereign\*, who has ruled according to his will for a long time past, and carried his rule into effect through military force—foreign or native. The revenues of the state are farmed; and, by that means, a portion of power is widely and arbitrarily diffused among the farmers. The people have no security from exaction; and the government, with the greatest income of gold and silver of any, or perhaps all the states in Europe, is actually in poverty, and almost always in arrear to its servants, except those who have the power to levy their own salaries. It does not belong to this place to go into detail of abuses and causes of abuse. The fact is only brought under notice, inasmuch as the practice pursued enfeebles the government, demoralizes the people, tarnishes the character of the soldier, and frequently defeats the execution of his duty. The higher classes seem to have lost much of the noble and chivalrous character that was ascribed to Spaniards in former times. The people still retain strong lines of the character of aboriginal Spaniards, more or less disguised by mixtures of blood and the crimes of corrupted Christianity.

The Spanish arms have had their epoch of glory; but little of it, since the expulsion of the Saracens, was native or genuine; and it was not of long duration. The Spanish armies have been so much mixed with foreigners for a long time past, that it is not easy to know what literally belongs to Spaniards. The native, as

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\* Ferdinand VII.; he died in 1833.

insulted and degraded by the preposterous policy of the sovereign, could scarcely be supposed to rise to excellence. Spaniards have often acted with the French in recent times in the field; but it cannot be said that they have distinguished themselves, either at sea or on shore: they were secondary, and they acted under disadvantages. They acted with the British in the late peninsular war; but they did not act cordially. They were considered as auxiliary where the cause was their own; and they were moreover frequently disgusted by the haughtiness of their Protector. The Spaniards are proud and important in themselves, too proud to act cordially in subordination to others; hence no just opinion can be formed of their real value as soldiers, from the manner in which they were associated on that occasion. The guerilla force was independent, and purely Spanish. It had a national motive, and it acted with an energy which manifested a Spanish resentment. Whether allured by the hopes of spoil, or instigated by a desire of revenge, it was a formidable force. It annoyed and weakened the French; and in reality contributed more to discomfit them, at least to disgust them with the war, than their ordinary defeats by the regular army. The Spaniards, it is admitted, even by those who undervalue them, fight well and obstinately when in position. The people, even the female part of the people, have perseverance, courage, and heroism, under the pressure of misfortune, which belongs to no other European people in the same degree. The regular or organized force of the Spanish nation is embarrassed, and of no dependence under movement in the open field: it does not even bear a high name for courage in the ordinary proceedings of common war. Whether its defects in the field be owing to want of training, want of confidence in commanders, or to peculiarity engrafted by inveterate habit on the physical constitution of the individual, may be difficult to determine with precision. This however must be admitted, that the Spanish people possess a firm and resolute courage where their honour is pledged, and that they retain the power of reacting consequent to an impulse of injury for a longer time than any other people in Europe. They do not forget; and they never forgive where they can avenge.

The Spaniards were distinguished, among the troops of the sixteenth century, for superiority in the use of the matchlock. They occasionally undertook great and hazardous enterprises; but they were generally such as marked persevering, firm, and steady

courage, rather than impetuous bursts of action through sudden impulses of passion, &c. Spain can scarcely be said to have been at war as principal, or to have acted with a genuine Spanish army, since the introduction of the now prevailing system of military tactic. Native Spanish troops, as comparatively unpractised in war, are only in an imperfect state of discipline; and as such, it would be unfair to form opinion of what they might be from what they now are. The people of the Spanish peninsula have a character different from the character of most others in Europe, inasmuch as a Spaniard retains his own individual feeling, his sentiment of honour, and his sentiment of resentment of injury offered to his country after he is absolved, according to the ideas of the time, from allegiance to the government under which he had lived. The instances of this national reaction are numerous: two pointed ones are connected with the British nation\*.

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\* Soon after the capture of Gibraltar, in the year 1705, an attempt was made by five hundred gentlemen of Spain, in co-operation with other Spanish troops, to retake the place, not so much perhaps that it was important as a station, as that it was an insult to Spain that it should remain in the possession of a foreigner. The five hundred who devoted themselves to this enterprize landed in a cove at the back of the rock, scaled a precipice that seems scarcely practicable, and lodged themselves in St. Michael's cave until the following night, which was the time agreed on for the combined attack. The attack made by the five hundred succeeded; the other failed. The five hundred were now in possession of the principal work on the south; but the whole force of the garrison being at liberty, by the failure of the attack on the north, to turn against them, they were assailed, overpowered, and, as might have been expected, put to the sword. The enterprize, which was conceived under a strong feeling of patriotism, was so heroically, and even so wisely conducted, as to furnish a striking example of what Spaniards are capable of doing under the idea of avenging offended

honour. The design was practicable, but difficult; it failed by accident.

Buenos Ayres, in South America, fell into the hands of the British in recent times, almost without resistance. It was recovered by the inhabitants; who, as it would appear, felt themselves insulted by the presence of a foreign, and particularly a heretic force. The place was taken by a British general and a British commodore, without the order or sanction of the state. As it was taken without order, it was expected that it would have been given up without hesitation, and with an apology for the unwarranted act. This was not done. Great Britain is commercial. Its government is moved, and maintained in movement, by the power of money arising from the activity of manufacture and commerce; hence it is influenced in its acts, even beyond propriety, by the prospect of mercantile gains. It was supposed that the possession of Buenos Ayres would open an extensive mart for British manufactures, it was therefore determined, unjustly as the conquest had been made, to attempt to recover it from its present possessors and original owners, at the expense of a great armament. The attempt failed; and



The higher class of Spaniards, with the exception of those who live within the immediate circle of a bigotted and arbitrary court, appear, though degenerated, still to retain something of the chivalrous spirit of past times. They are punctilious in honour according to its mode, firm in courage where the point which excites the courage is distinctly fixed, pompous in manner and boastful in words, disposed to assume the magnificent, even to exaggerate in details of matter of fact, hospitable to excess in expression, not deficient in act conformably with their own ideas of hospitality; jealous of preferences even in their parties of social intercourse. The majority of the gentlemen may be supposed to be the descendants of the Gothic invaders. If so, the Goths must have been a people of an elevated cast of mind; such a people in fact would have been an honour to human nature, had not the baneful doctrine of priests and the rigorous discipline of inquisitors perverted the mind to error, or intimidated it through fear of punishment from seeking after truth. The gentleman Spaniard as thus prevented from looking at nature, and from studying to know the God of nature in simplicity and truth by the use of his own intellect, is driven, as it were by necessity, to unworthy pursuits; namely, gaming,

and the violation of the rules of international intercourse was here punished directly, as may be said, by the hand of a special Providence. The case of Buenos Ayres is important, as illustrative of the character of the Spanish nation. The retaking of it from the English furnishes an example of the existence of a spirit of recoil in Spaniards, which does not belong, in the same degree, to other people; and the defence of it, after it was retaken, furnishes a proof of the resolution and courage of the common Spaniard in maintaining positions which regular troops would scarcely think defensible, or persist in defending. It is evident that the general who lost Buenos Ayres was not what he ought to have been in caution and foresight; and it will not be maintained that the general who was sent to retake it, was a general of a capacity calculated to succeed in any thing that was difficult or dangerous.

But be that as it may, the fact as it stands is sufficient to shew that the Spaniard is not to be ranked among the common herd of mankind, who quietly suffer themselves to be transferred from master to master, like the stock of a farm. The case alluded to is not creditable to Great Britain in its motive; and it proves, among other things, that the passion of commercial gain is blind, moves blindly, and punishes itself by its own rapacity. A little knowledge of the history of the human mind, added to what almost every one knows of the powers of religious prejudices among Spaniards, might have been sufficient to satisfy those who are acquainted with history that it was folly to attempt to maintain a conquest, or to establish a colony in a Spanish province in South America; for the Roman Catholic religion must cease to exist, before the bigotted Catholic can be a faithful subject to a heretic king.



intrigue, and other vices which are not forbidden by the fathers of the church, or which obtain an easy pardon, however deeply they offend morality. The Spaniard thus becomes a votary of sensual appetite; and, in this pursuit, he loses patriotism and courage.

Spain might be expected, from the various events of which it has been the theatre, to contain a great mixture of blood. The stock of the conqueror Goth may be presumed to predominate in the interior; the mixed on the sea-coast towns: consequently the character is different. It is original, comparatively simple and elevated in one; it is artificial, complicated, and mean in the other; it has a trait of Spanish in all. As the Spanish peasant has, it may be presumed, courage like other men, and, as he is more attached to the honour of his country than most other men, it may be fairly supposed, if he were instructed in the use of arms, trained and practised in the movements which are necessary for military operations in the field, that he would be equal to any one of his contemporaries in the actual practice of war, particularly in that species of warfare by which a country is best defended. The conclusion is fair; examples in proof are numerous; and, looking to the history of fact, the presumption is strong in the mind of the writer, that, had a man of genius and patriotism arisen among the Spaniards in recent times, the French, who obtained the country by treachery, would have been expelled from it by force without foreign assistance. There was no genius, and little patriotism among the higher classes of Spaniards at this period of degradation. The nobles were mostly pusillanimous, imbecile, or mercenary; and the commercial class were ready, as might be expected, to embrace the most promising chance of increasing their gains wherever it was; and it was apparently at one time on the side of the invader. Spain was overrun; the government, already disorganized by its vices, was dissolved; and a new dynasty was established in its place, when Great Britain started up as the champion of an insulted and degraded people. The act was blazoned as an act of generosity: it has, in reality, no claim to the name; and it did no good to the Spanish nation. The enterprize was not undertaken to restore the country to the people; it was undertaken to prevent it from falling into their hands. The uncontrolled spirit of the people is dreaded by all

governments that are built on the base of legitimacy; and it was presumed, not without reason, that if the people were permitted to go on by themselves, they would become sovereign. They were therefore directed by their lordly protector to fix the eye on Ferdinand the Seventh as their lawful monarch, and to do all things in his name and as it were under his authority. It may be presumed that a people of ancient blood, with a high sentiment of national honour, felt itself degraded by the injunction, as well as by the presence of a foreign military force pretending to liberate them from a foreign yoke, as if they were themselves coward and unworthy. The mass of the people were not gratified at the time; and events proved that they had no cause to be thankful. Liberation from Napoleon, for submission to Ferdinand, was not in fact a profitable change. The Spanish peasant of the interior is a man of character. He maintains his own way of thinking, and pursues his own purpose with exemplary perseverance. He is brave in his own way; temperate in manner of living; hardy in bodily frame; not impetuous in temper, but determined in pursuing his object where it has the sanction of his mind, or the resentment of his soul. His resentments sleep; they are not buried; and from that cause it is reasonable to suppose that the dominion of the French, as a dominion of foreigners, would not have been established in Spain for many ages to come. The dependents of the court, the creatures who are pleased with the pageantry of royalty, and the swarm of commercial adventurers, with whom money is country itself, might have been, and actually were, in general gained to the usurper; the mass of the peasantry were averse; and, though curbed, they were not subdued. The Spaniards are slow in their movements; they are firm, as said repeatedly, in their designs, where the design is national and connected with honour. Silent and reflecting, they are capable of conducting complicated enterprizes with skill and energy; and from this cause it may be concluded, that had the French not been driven from Spain in the manner in which they were, they would have been exterminated, before the lapse of a century, by a people who neither forget nor forgive the insults that are offered to their honour.

The Spanish peasant, considered abstractedly in himself, is a man of strong natural sense, and of correct observation in the

common affairs of life. He seems to think, to reflect, and analyze; and, as proof of his power of comparing and analyzing, he often speaks in proverb, or by analogy—a mode of expression indicative of reflection and comprehension of the connexion of causes and effects with each other. This quality of reflection and analysis may be considered as proof of his fitness for the practice of war in the field—not, it is admitted, as a part of a mechanical instrument that has no self-directing power, but as an instrument that is animated throughout by its own energies, and in which every part has a view of the general object which excites and supports its action. The reflecting character of the Spaniard is apparently generated, at least fed, by the occupation which he pursues in his native plains and mountains. The peasant, whether sheep-herd, cow-herd, hog-herd, or labourer in the field, has time for reflection. He is not a money-driven hireling, as man is in many parts of Europe; and, having thus some power over himself and his actions, he observes what is before him with a certain feeling of independence, and reflects on its causes and consequences with some exercise of judgment. Knowledge arises from reflection; hence the peasant, though altogether unlettered, is actually wise from the exercise of the faculties that are within himself on subjects that are before his eye.

The comforts of the domestic life of the Spanish peasant stand fair in comparison with the comforts of the domestic life of the peasantry of most parts of Europe, if the estimate be made by the rule of nature, not by the rule of foreigners, who consider the customs of their own country as the standard of perfection. The Spaniards are upon the whole temperate in eating and drinking: their fare is simple, but it is generally abundant and acceptable to the taste through habit. The houses in which the peasants lodge are ordinarily good as farm- or peasant-houses. The walls are substantial: they are generally clean, for they are often whitewashed, both within and without; the floor, whether earthen or paved, is seldom washed, not even carefully swept; but, in so far as the writer has seen, it rarely presents anything that is disgusting, compared with the hovels of other peasants. There is no superfluity of furniture in the peasant's house, or even perhaps in the houses of the higher classes; but there is usually what is sufficient for necessary purposes. The Spanish peasant is ordinarily of an olive or swarthy complexion; and, being

averse from ablution with water, he is not personally clean, and rarely free from vermin. He seldom undresses to sleep; and he has thus few of the pleasures which belong to a clean skin and change of apparel. The costume or dress is peculiar, the fashion gaudy and somewhat fantastic, indicative of the coxcombry of barbarous times. The cloak, which appears to be an indispensable appendage of the peasant's dress, is worn both in summer and winter: it is often threadbare and ragged, when the other parts of dress are good, even gaudy. The linen is generally clean, and comparatively fine for the peasant condition; a circumstance noticeable also in some parts of Ireland. The Spanish peasant is attached to the national costume, and faithfully adheres to it. The gentleman adopts the fashion of France or England, and is so punctilious in the adjustment of the different parts of his apparel, as if the toilette were the study of his life. The female peasant, like the male, wears linen finer than might seem to be attainable by persons of her condition. She has more-over a millinery taste, however coarse her clothing may be. The females of higher rank have a grace peculiar to themselves, an ease and elegance in the manner of attire, that the ladies of other countries scarcely attain, even at great expense.

The Spanish peasant, in so far as the writer observed, is not humble and obsequious in manner; neither is he blunt, rude, and boisterous. He is ordinarily kind and charitable to those of his own caste and country who require proofs of his kindness and charity; he is even civil to strangers who address him with civility, particularly with a catholic salutation. The Spanish manner is reserved, dignified and important—such as indicates something of preeminence from an opinion of noble or ancient blood. The Spaniard is proud of descent, delights in titles and high-sounding appellations; but he is rarely petulant, arrogant, or overbearing to those of inferior condition, though he holds them at a distance in matrimonial alliance. The mass of the nation is pastoral or agricultural—and it seems to be satisfied with its occupation. Such of the handicraft trades and arts as are necessary for the common purpose of life, are cultivated to a certain extent; but the ingenious arts and grand manufactures, excited by the spirit and conducted by the genius of speculating monopoly, have hitherto made little progress in Spain: the people are not, in fact, the playthings of changing fashion. The Spaniard is indo-

lent, and idle in common opinion; but, with this indolence and idleness, he retains something within himself which belongs to the sentiment of independence. Extensive commercial operations are little known in Spain; smugglers, traffickers, and carriers, are numerous everywhere.

But though the spirit of manufacture, arts and commerce, as the mover of the great operations of intercourse among nations, has made but little comparative progress in Spain, Spain has, notwithstanding, mechanics and artizans in sufficient number, and of sufficient proficiency, for the purposes of a reasonable people. The Spaniards have an inherent spirit of pride, a desire to be thought principal; and it is from this cause, perhaps, that every person who possesses a few dollars becomes a trafficker on his own account, rather than a subordinate part in the machinery of others: hence towns and villages abound with hucksters. Nothing is splendid, and little is superfluous, in the shops of the country-towns; but necessary things are in sufficient quantity. Contraband trade is carried on to great extent in all the districts near the sea. The prevalence of it may be thought to mark the existence of a spirit of liberty and independence, manifesting an unwillingness, abstractedly from the bait of gain, to be controlled by the arbitrary enactments of the exchequer. The peasantry of the interior may be regarded generally as peasantry of the national blood, possessing national sentiments, and manifesting the lines of national customs long inherent; the peasantry of the sea-coasts and sea-port towns, as a mixture of many nations among whom the marks of the genuine Spanish character are more or less obscured, and in many points obliterated, contain a great proportion of people of prey, rapacious to excess, and unprincipled as any sea-port vultures in Europe.

National character may be thought to result from the reiterated impressions of a series of given causes acting on the organism of different divisions of the inhabitants of the earth, whether presented casually by the combinations of nature, or artificially by formal laws of institution. The first differs according to the contingencies of locality and the forms of social order which obtain contingently among the different divisions of the race; the second differs according to the spirit and force of the institution which constitutes the formal fabric of the law. The sense which man has attained of devotion to a Supreme Being,



who is the cause of human existence, and of the existence and orderly movement of all things within the circle of the universe, is the principal bond which maintains human conduct in the right course. Where the sense of the connexion is duly felt, and justly estimated in all its relations, the acts of man move in harmony, and give happiness as a result of the act. Where the connexion is not immediate, and where it is not duly felt, the Deity being veiled as it were from the view of the creature by accidental error, or deliberate imposture, the appetites and desires of animal nature spring up suddenly, assume superiority, stimulate to action, and bring error and confusion into all the proceedings of life.

The remark now made may perhaps be deemed out of place. The author only premises it, for the purpose of opening a view to the effect which a perverted form of the Christian religion has had, and still has, on the moral and even on the military character of the Spanish nation. The character of the population of Spain has one grand base, namely, a feeling of pride or self-consequence as Spaniard. This character has existed for long, and it still exists; but it has been masked and perverted by a number of contingencies from its plain expression. The Christian doctrine was carried to Spain and diffused to some extent at a comparatively early period of the Christian era; but, as said before, it was not received into Spain, or any other country in Europe as a national religion, until it was corrupted so as to be subservient to the secular purposes of the state. The very base of the doctrine was thus subverted. The law of the Deity was veiled, so to speak, from the view of the creature by the art of man. Fictions of machinery were substituted in the place of the universal Creator; or they were interposed, as necessary engines of introduction to the throne of heaven, by a scheme of presumption and wickedness so detestable in its nature that language cannot find a term sufficiently strong to reprobate it. It is scarcely possible to suppose human nature to be so completely wicked as to form the deliberate systems of error and superstition that have been engrafted, and which still remain engrafted on the Christian doctrine by the machinations of the priests. Whether actually so or not, it is charitable to believe that the sacerdotal devices have arisen by accident, and grown to their present magnitude, as deceptions on the imagination of the deceivers themselves. Jesus Christ unveiled the operations of the Creator to the view of the discern-



ing and reasoning part of the creation. The followers of Christ, who pretended to digest the Christian revelation into forms of observance, with a view to aid or facilitate human devotion, mistook the course. Instead of labouring to remove, they seem to have laboured to replace the veil, or to bring man back to idolatry; in other words, they endeavoured to imprison the Deity so to speak, or to claim the Divine essence as a property of the priest by class. The enormity of the attempt cannot be characterized by common language; and if an apology, similar to that offered in this place, be not admitted in palliation of what was done by the bishops of Rome and their dependents, the Catholic fathers must appear to those who think and reason to be monsters of impiety and arrogance—of a degree of wickedness beyond the conceptions of a common mind. The sentence is a harsh one; and as human nature, which is not bad in its real constitution, only becomes bad by accident, and only continues in a bad course by mistake, that is, misconceptions of interest, it is reasonable, at least it is charitable, to believe that the first step was a step of contingent error, and that the impulse to it, striking upon a spring in human organism which moved the passion of vanity and self-importance, or some other passion of self-approbation, urged on the course of error, and that the error thus laid was confirmed into habit by long practice, or by the appearance of advantages which arise from privilege. The priesthood may be supposed to have acquired power in Spain in the manner stated, that is, by appropriating the Deity to themselves; and, having obtained the initiative, whether by design or accident, they laboured to extend it; and, as it was extended according to the law of fungous growth, it established its dominion in such a manner that the nation became a sacerdotal creation in the literal sense of the word. It had no action except through the priest; and, as the priest acted by imposture in producing delusion, the people were precluded from a view of the source of moral truth and from knowledge of themselves. The priest, in approaching the Deity, adapted a machinery of etiquette, analogous to the machinery which adjusts the ceremony of admission at the courts of mortal princes. The spirit of the Christian religion was thus lost. The idea that saints and other dead persons have power to intercede with the Deity in behalf of living men, is absurd to common sense. It is revolting to the reasoning mind by its impiety, inasmuch as

it encourages an opinion that the justice of heaven, like the justice of earthly courts, is capable of being perverted through the interest or intercession of individuals—saints, priests, or women. The saint or the Virgin is the channel through which the Spaniard is permitted to approach the Deity. The saint, as a saint, is a fictitious being; and the supposition of intercession is a fiction which offends common sense. If there be no deliberate design of imposing on credulity in the supposition of such intercession, there is manifest ignorance of the relations which subsist between man and his Creator—such ignorance as could scarcely be supposed to obtain, and which could not in reality exist, if the mind were left to its own simple operation. The Spanish priest rules all religious movements, veils the Deity by assumption, obscures the source of morals, even engrafts his own passions and propensities on the mass of the nation, and thus changes it to something analogous to himself. Avarice is the dominant vice of priests in Spain; and it may be said to be incorporated, through example, into the very constitution of the common man. Every Spaniard covets money, and many covet it beyond the common standard of covetousness. Gold strikes its infection by the medium of the eye, instigates to crime, namely, theft, robbery, and murder in numerous instances, by mere ocular impulse. The Spaniard has a propensity to game, with a view to gain money; he has a propensity to hoard, for the pleasure of hoarding and looking at the hoard. The propensities are different in appearance, they are one in reality, that is, different expressions of love of money beyond sufficiency. The Spaniard approaches the Deity only through the priest, devotes himself to the will of the priest, whom he regards as his protector in heaven and his shield against the justice of law on earth. The church is an inviolable asylum for murderers and assassins; the church is thus tyrant in Spain, superior to the law of the land. Religion, or devotion to the will of the Deity, is that alone which makes man happy; at least, which preserves him from the impression of causes which lead to unhappiness. Devotion to the priest, who is an engine of imposture, is the source of moral degeneracy. The vice which proceeds from high authority communicates its character to inferiors: it disfigures nations by the engrafting of errors which do not constitutionally belong to them, and Spain may be ranked in the number thus led astray.

The people are enticed to dissimulation, even to simulation by example: they are protected by sacerdotal authority, and absolved by it from crimes which, according to the laws of common justice, deserve the punishment of death.

Besides the predominant influence of the priesthood in forming and modifying the moral character of the inhabitants of Spain, the mode in which the civil government was administered in past times, may be regarded as a cause which conduced materially to add to the moral deterioration of the people. The Spanish nation does not appear to have known liberty, not even the shadow of it, since the accession of Charles the Fifth; and they had in fact no distinct conception of it at the invasion of Napoleon. Ambition of conquest was the passion of Charles, as well as of Napoleon. Cupidity of money, as the dominant passion of the human race, filled the ranks of the army with recruits. The armies of Charles were mercenary; the materials, collected from various nations, consisted of all kinds of vagabonds. They were well trained to arms comparatively—good prize-fighters—not patriotic soldiers. The successes of Charles seem to have arisen from combinations in design and force of means produced by money, rather than from superior military skill and heroic courage in the field. The ambition of the Spanish monarchy was then great. It waned after the time of Charles; or rather, the genius which is necessary to give ambition a forward course was lost. As the spirit of ambition declined, the cupidity of money increased, with an increase of religious bigotry and political imbecility that eventually brought the nation to a state of extreme degradation. The Spanish possessions yielded gold and silver in abundance. The state collected with rigour: it was notwithstanding poor, for it did not know the base upon which the system of proceeding which amalgamates riches with the state, is laid. The Spanish government is rapacious in its spirit. It placed its revenues at farm, and thereby delegated the spirit of rapacity to all its collectors. These, whether governor, general, or other magistrate, levied their salaries, &c. from the contingencies which occurred within their jurisdictions. They levied with a severity amounting to extortion, or compounded with a dereliction of principle which offended honesty and corrupted morals. There was thus a train of exaction throughout Spain; and, as much latitude of discretion was given to the instruments of exaction, there was much oppor-

tunity for evasion, for oppression, and for fraud. Everything was transacted through the deteriorating operations of money; and it is positively asserted, that the very troops who guard the shores against the entry of contraband goods, were, and even are, on some occasions, hired to unload a contraband cargo, and to pass it safely into the interior. Few of the lower officials refuse to open a prohibited barrier for a bribe in gold or silver; and, whatever moral error may be implied in the act, the dispensation of the priest relieves the conscience from the idea of offence. The fiscal tyranny of the state, independently of the chances of the gain of money, urges the individual to contraband trade, in revenge, as may be supposed, of an act of arbitrary oppression; and hence, while the sea-coasts of Spain are more or less in revolt against the fiscal laws of the state, the basis of morality is undermined, truth and faith everywhere violated for the sake of a trifling illicit gain.

The population of the different divisions of continuous soils manifests more or less difference in ostensible character; and whether the difference be constitutional and hereditary in a particular stock, or artificially formed by institution and confirmed into habit by long continuance in a given routine of practice, the general feature of difference is still noticeable. The Spaniards are perhaps the most conspicuous among the nations of Europe, in so far as respects the possession of a distinctive peculiarity of character. National character reposes on a general fundamental base. The national act, however disguised, moves ultimately on the base; and, in the present case, the act of the Spanish nation may be said to move on a base of national pride,—an opinion of self-importance not easily separated from a Spanish mind. It was this sentiment of national pride, stimulated to action by circumstances, which enabled the Spaniards to sustain the sieges of Saguntum in former times, and of Saragosa and Gerona in the present; in short, which roused and brought out the mountain-population in bands against the formidable Napoleon, when the country was in a manner abandoned to itself. The Spaniards are not people who act suddenly and blindly from the impulse of passion. They are not hasty; but, when roused by insult, they are not easily appeased. They conceal their resentment of injury on many occasions; they do not forget their revenge on any. They appear to be subdued; they recoil and revenge when not

expected. They are slow in their movements, military or other ; but they are persevering in their purposes once they are formed. The recoil, in resentment of injury, is often long delayed by the Spaniard : when it comes it is rarely incomplete, inasmuch as it is the execution of a design well matured by reflection—not a burst of passion. The Spaniard is boastful, or speaks in the superlative degree as a soldier. He is not open and prompt in action as a man of simple courage, but he adheres to his purpose through difficulties and disguises with much obstinacy, insomuch that it is not easy to say when the mind of a Spaniard is completely subdued. He has good intellectual capacity where he is at liberty to exercise it, a peculiar wit and humour, an apparent simplicity, and at the same time an acute and shrewd observation, with a strong bias to his interests in all his manoeuvres. He does not appear, as now said, to have that prompt and forward courage which darts boldly on the enemy ; he requires an object in a forward position to solicit, or an instigation in the rear to urge to the advance.

The labouring peasant of Spain differs from the labouring peasant of most countries in Europe. He hires himself for a given time and for a given purpose ; but he is not a mere drudge for daily, monthly, or yearly wages. He reserves a portion of his liberty for himself, and cannot be counted on for continuing to labour for other men's pleasures or profit. He is a man of some trust, where he accepts a charge : the Spanish house-menial is generally an outcast, manifesting a strong disposition to pilfer. The Spanish male is sedate, slow and reserved ; the female is cheerful in temper, prompt and energetic in manner, exhibiting everywhere, even in mountain-villages, an elasticity of character and facility of address peculiar to Spain. The male has something of the air of a cavalier ; the female has the grace and elegance of the inmate of a court. The rustic female, in the *coup d'œil* of a theatre at a bull-fight, has an appearance of polish and good breeding, as if she were of the high blood of Europe. She is captivating at first sight, but is little instructed in knowledge beyond the knowledge of the courtesan, and does not appear to possess or to cultivate the finer sensibilities of female character which excite the permanent love and esteem of the other sex. Her mind is ordinarily filled with the prejudices of the priest ; her life spent in amorous intrigue, religious



or other devotedness—in a word, she is a syren in youth, a harpy in old age.

As Spain is a country of considerable extent, the people of its different districts shew considerable variety in aspect of countenance, and more or less difference in manner and habit; they consequently may be supposed to have more or less fitness for war according to difference of locality. In some provinces they are comparatively low in stature, compact and well knit in their joints, hardy in frame, and capable of enduring great fatigue. They are of good stature, erect figure, light body and long fork in others, consequently well calculated for services which require force as well as expedition. They are upon the whole good as mere military materials, not inferior to any in Europe—superior to many. The Spaniards are temperate in eating and drinking, patient in toil and persevering in purposes. Familiar in their ordinary occupations with much of what occurs in war, they are in a manner at home in the field, and on that account less liable to suffer in their health by the contingencies of severe campaigns, than the over-fed peasantry of fertile countries, or the masses of refuse which will fill the ranks of armies from manufacturing towns in time of war.

The Spanish army had its day of renown, even as a regular army. It has been in the shade for some time past, not from deterioration of the material, but from the operation of causes which counteract the national spirit, and do not supply its place by a correct system of mechanical training. The Spaniards have peculiar national properties. They are devoted to their country by a feeling of pride; they are deliberate in their councils, determined in their purposes once they are formed. Their natural habits are not remote from those of military life; and in physical power, and physical endurance of toil, they are equal, if not superior, to most of the peasantry of Europe. The military preeminence of the Spaniard is found principally in the defence of positions; and, as the defence of position, implying the defence of the native country, is the only legitimate ground of war, and that alone which the Spanish nation regards as warrantable and suitable to the condition of Spain, it may be thought to be a primary object with the reformed Spaniards, while they pretend to adhere to the fundamental rule of right, to investigate the causes of things with rigour, so that they may attain to a know-



ledge of principles with accuracy, through which the end, pursued with discretion, may be attained with certainty and effect by skill and courage. The chief renown of the Spaniards has arisen at all times from defence of position, or from maintaining a combat with fire-arms at a given distance, and under protection of something like a bulwark. The ordinary courage sinks at the presentation of a pistol; and, it may be presumed, would not be proof at the near presentation of a firelock. It is firm against the naked point, at least the point of a sword or dagger—the writer cannot pretend to state the resolution and constancy with which it sustains the charge of the bayonet. The Spaniards do not appear to be people of the common herd, who may be moulded into any form the tactician chooses, and brought to that state of perfection in machine-like movement, which explodes a given number of rounds from the firelock, advances in regular order by word of command, and retires from the conflict with the same indifference as from a day of common field-exercise. They may be made soldiers; but it must be by the operation of a principle different from that of fear acting on brute matter.

It belongs to the tactician, who forms troops for military service, to study the character of the subject physically and morally, to train and put together according to powers and capacities; and it particularly belongs to generals to apply the instrument, when thus formed, to the point of attack in the manner by which it may best act with advantage. It has not fallen to the lot of the Spanish nation to meet with this good fortune. The national spirit has been insulted for a long time past by the introduction of foreign troops, as the guard and truest dependence of the throne; and in the late war the nation was not thought equal to its own defence. The military force was in manner disorganized when Napoleon invaded Spain; the work of war was consequently soon done. It was only when the government was dissolved and the nation had no leader, that the character of the Spanish people developed itself. But as the patriotism of the Spaniards was not allowed by crowned heads and the privileged classes to go to its own issue, consequently the Spanish troops, as not principal in their own cause, were little esteemed during the whole of the peninsular contest. The Spaniards, notwithstanding the contempt in which they were

held by their protectors, gave proof of unsubdued spirit. The guerilla parties destroyed the invaders in multitudes; they were, in fact, a main cause of their expulsion. The organized troops of Spain fought by themselves, or were present in the field with their allies. They appear to have been capricious in temper, even when they fought by themselves; their energy was rarely conspicuous, for the leaders were without genius, and incapable of animating them with the true spirit of a soldier. In the other case, they were the inferior instrument, where they ought to have been the first: their pride was offended, and they were lukewarm where they ought to have been ardent as flame. They had not justice done them in training, for their character does not seem to have been studied and known. They had no advantage of being brought into the field under a national leader of prominent character; for Spain, unlike countries in revolution, did not produce a single general, except some few guerilla chiefs. These were not only zealous, but they were skilful as partizans, and revengeful as people personally offended.

The constitution of 1812 was formed in the name of Ferdinand; it was rejected by him when he returned to Spain; and it was imposed upon him in the year 1820, chiefly through the efforts of troops who were in preparation for foreign service. These, whether dissatisfied with the nature of the intended service, namely, the office of combatting the rising liberties of America, or animated with the patriotic desire of aiding in giving a free and rational constitution to their country, evinced much good sense, temper, and humanity, in the manner of conducting their enterprize. Their conduct impressed the writer, who was in Spain at the time, with sentiments of respect for the revolutionary chiefs, as it gave him reason to think that the people of Spain were not the playthings of ferocious and savage passions. Cadiz and the Isla de Leon were the scene of the insurrectionary explosion; the province of Andalusia was the field of what may be called the campaign. The royal general, who commanded at Algesiras, was ordered to assemble a force at or near Chiclana. A detachment of the patriot insurgents under Colonel Riego, not quite two thousand in number, left the Isla, made its way through the country, and entered Algesiras in the absence of the commandant, O'Donnell. The people of Algesiras received Colonel Riego favourably; but his situa-

tion was precarious, and he did not remain long among them. The royal general, O'Donnel, had a superior force in movement; and Riego, not considering it to be safe or proper to remain long in one place, moved to San Roque, and from San Roque to Malaga. His rear-guard was attacked on its way to Malaga, and he lost some men. Threatened by superior numbers, he abandoned Malaga; but maintained himself in the strong grounds in the south parts of Andalusia, until the country declared itself for the constitution of the Cortes of 1812.

The appearance of Riego struck the writer with sympathy and respect. He was modest and unassuming, thoughtful and reserved; in fact, he looked like a man who had something within him. He was close in council: no one knew what he meant to do; but all were ready to follow him to death—in the then language of the day. Riego was aware at the time he passed through San Roque that his situation was a dangerous one—almost a desperate one; for he had doubts, or, rather, little hopes of the co-operation of the other part of the army, and without that his destruction was certain. Refuge among the mountains was before him; but he, it is presumed, revolted from the idea of hiding himself in fastnesses, as a measure unbecoming the character of a man who had taken arms to give liberty to his country.

The royal and the revolted troops were part of the same army. They had been selected for a particular service; and they had the appearance of having been well selected. They were well equipped and well accoutred: not so gilded, or so minutely punctilious in manual and manœuvre, as the high-dressed battalions of the professed military sovereigns of Europe, but they were perfectly well adapted to the service of the field; and the economical arrangements, in so far as the author was able to see, were substantial, and good for a soldier. The royal troops did not appear to be discontented; but they testified no animation, and would have been pronounced at once, by an indifferent spectator, to be lukewarm. The patriot or insurgent, though their situation was not one of promise at the time alluded to, were cheerful and animated, inspired to enthusiasm, according to appearance, by the importance of the cause in which they were engaged. The patriot song, though not of the first class of merit as the expression of an electrified mind, made impres-

sion on the soldier as sung by himself: it was difficult to perceive its operation on the townsman or peasant. The peasant of the south part of Andalusia is of a stately and formal exterior. He is reserved, and it is not easy, on ordinary occasions, to read his countenance; but here it seemed to betray him, in spite of himself. He was not transported with joy; but his sombre countenance was enlivened so as to indicate feelings of inward satisfaction. The followers of Riego complained of the apathy of the people of Andalusia, and the indifferent spectator might, perhaps, be disposed to join with them in their censure; but, in considering the subject dispassionately, he would, it is presumed, be more inclined to applaud discretion than to censure want of feeling. Spain had not been permitted in recent times to look at the principles of national government, and Spaniards do not perhaps think much on the subject. The people of Andalusia, though not vociferous, were evidently enlivened by the hopes of something which they only knew by name; but they saw difficulties in the way of obtaining it, and they were slow to commit themselves in expressing joy. They were not politicians, but they had good sense; and were so far acquainted with human history as to know that common revolution is rarely any other than the transfer of power from one tyrant to another. The constitution of 1812 was not, it is admitted, a constitution for a people who had not attained to a true view of moral conduct; but there were hopes that, if it were allowed to act, the condition of Spain and Spaniards might be ameliorated by the effect of its operations. The Cortes, it must be acknowledged, had an host of insidious enemies to combat in the fathers of the Church, the Holy Alliance of the potentates of Europe, the king, and the nobles; and the constituent Cortes, unfortunately, had not gone to the true base of legislation, which alone is that which could have supported them. The attempt to do so would have been deemed revolution direct; and, as such, a heresy in European politics. The partial legislative reform was therefore adopted. It pruned, but it did not eradicate evils; and if it eventually succeed in giving a good and stable government to the Spanish nation, the experiment may be justly held as the greatest of human achievements that history records. The roots of error were permitted to remain—in compliment to those

to whom no compliment was due: they will bud, and perhaps bear the fruit of confusion, in spite of the counteraction of the Cortes.

The above remarks, on the military character of Spaniards, were written in Spain in the year 1820, some time after the constitution of 1812 had been accepted by Ferdinand. There was then a hope, though not a confident one, that the condition of Spain would be ameliorated by the labours of the constituent Cortes; and, though the constitution could not be said to be built on a sound base, it was not impossible but that it might have done good, had the king been honest. Spain, it may be remarked, had been long and deeply diseased as a political state; and, in this state, it presented itself as an easy prey to the ambition of an insatiable and unprincipled conqueror. The country was invaded by Napoleon, emperor of France—the government was dissolved—the king was carried away captive—and a new dynasty was placed upon the throne. The act of aggression, contrived by treachery and executed by force, directly insulted the people of Spain; and, as Spaniards are susceptible of affront, and strongly revengeful of injuries which offend their pride, the mass of the people rose up in resistance, and made war upon the usurper. They hoped to rescue their country from foreign rule; and, that they might preserve it when rescued, they attempted to frame a system of law and government for its effective protection in future. Whether the persons who assumed the office of framing a constitution for Spain did not see the base on which alone political constitutions can move with harmony and effect, or whether they were not permitted to look at it, and to act on it by commanding circumstances, the new constitution, instead of being laid on a true and simple base, consistent with the law of nature, was laid on a base of artificial excrescences; namely, rank, property, and privilege, the product of the fraud and violence of former times, and as such vitiated and unfit. It is not hereby meant to insinuate that the intention of the Cortes was otherwise than good; but it is to be regretted that its members were not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature as they relate to man, to become legislators for a disturbed country; or, that they were not sufficiently bold to act on their own knowledge, in contradiction to the opinion of others. The constitution



was framed in the name, and as it were under the authority, of the captive king. It limited his royal power; which did not please him when it was presented to him at his return to Spain. It was called representative; as such, it implied an exercise of mind and freedom of thinking—a privilege which had been long denied to the Spanish people. The influence of the king, priests, and nobles, was diminished by the laws of the constitution of 1812; but, improvidently it may be added, a sufficiency of influence was left to them to be mischievous, if they were so disposed. The measure of curtailment was unwise. The Cortes ought to have known, that taking away a little irritates as much as taking away the whole. It is obvious to demonstration, in the history of mankind, that power has no gratitude; and the fact is confirmed in recent events in Spain. The king, priests, and nobles, whose powers were only very gently curbed, were irritated to excess; and they pursued the Cortes to vengeance, through the influence which was unwisely left to them by the laws of the constitution.

The constitution of 1812 was formally accepted by King Ferdinand, in the month of March 1820. He then swore to observe the conditions of it; he plotted, from the instant he had sworn, in what manner he might best overturn it. It is admitted that the constitution is weak as an instrument of government to rule a people, who can scarcely be said to have a moral principle, or a religion, except the will of a domineering priest; it was inefficient in its operations, as counteracted by the king or chief executive. But though weak, the Spanish constitution cannot with any justice be said to be wicked. It insulted or offended no other independent people; and it was so specious in its promises of security and happiness, that Naples and Portugal were induced to imitate it; but they copied it, in so far as is commonly known, without any officious interference on the part of Spain. Its measures were moderate, intended to remove an inveterate disease without a strong remedy. It failed; but it is not improbable that it might have succeeded, to a certain extent at least, had Spain been left wholly to itself; for there was reason to expect that the eyes of the nation might have been so opened as to attain a liberal and general view of things in the course of time, and that the counteraction of kings, priests, and nobles, as unavailing, would have eventually subsided. This event



appears to have been dreaded by the club of sovereigns who impiously assume the title of Holy Alliance, and who are openly leagued to banish human liberty from the face of Europe. The French army acted as the vanguard of this sacrilegious combination, and restored Ferdinand to absolute power, without much bloodshed, but with an eternal stain on their own character.

It is not pretended that the constitution of the Spanish Cortes was an efficient instrument of government for a corrupted state. Its ameliorating power was weak; and it did not distinctly and clearly open to public view the true source of morals. The priest, with his legends of fable and imposture, was still the instructor of the people; and it is unnecessary to say to what object his instructions ordinarily tended. The Cortes, constituent and administering, was evidently deficient in promptitude and energy of action. Spain, though fertile of good sense, discretion, and liberality, was singularly barren of genius, or that bold and electric spirit which sees by intuition, and acts without balancing by grains of reasoning. The situation in which the Cortes were placed was one, it must be admitted, of great difficulty; and not aware, perhaps, that the middle course is the worst in cases of extreme difficulty and danger, the members of it compromised the nation and themselves to destruction, through reverence for the name of a perjured king. There was evidence before the Cortes, sufficient it is presumed for legal proof, that Ferdinand was false, and that many of the nobles, and almost all the priests, were acting treacherously against the state of which they were a part, and to which they had sworn fidelity. With this conviction, and it was no half conviction, the nation, or the Cortes as the organ of the nation, were justifiable, and would have been justified, in the most rigorous court of law, to suspend the royal function, to strip the nobles of their rank and privileges, to confine the priests to their monasteries, to proclaim the sovereignty of the people, and to diffuse the gospel of Jesus Christ over Spain, as the true code of human liberty and human morals. The measure proposed implies revolution; but revolution was the only means that could have saved Spain; and it was a measure not only justified, but commanded by necessity, when the country was invaded by a foreign force for the purpose avowed. Revolution was the anchor of hope in Spain;

but it must be confessed that it could not have been easy to give it effect. The Spaniards, whether through inherent property of constitution, or through long subjection to a brutalizing priesthood, are deficient in that elasticity of mind which kindles into flame at the electric breath of liberty. They are proud as Spaniards; but they are not acutely sensible to encroachment on their rights as independent men. Their pride of independence was obscured, or suffocated, by the prejudices of the training priest; and, as such, it would not have been easy to have convinced them by arguments of reason, that men are constitutionally equal to each other. The object to be accomplished it must be confessed was difficult; but if a proper view of it could have been given to the Spanish people; and had the idea been properly presented to them, that the soil of Spain was their inheritance, it may be presumed that they would have risen as one man to defend it—without bribe of money, and without swerving from the laudable act through unworthy motives. And moreover, if they had felt the power of the pure doctrine of the Christian religion, they would have been men within themselves—with courage on principle to maintain the sphere in which they had been placed by the universal Creator, but with no will and no courage to encroach on the sphere of others. That implies violation of the law of justice, which a true Christian will not violate to attain the highest point of human elevation.

The French penetrated to the south of Spain, without meeting with anything which deserves the name of resistance, except in Catalonia. They entered Spain under the shield of the priest, and with their hands full of gold—a protection and aid which availed them more than courage and skill in war. The opinion of the priest rules widely in Spain; and few Spaniards have courage to resist a bribe in hard money. These auxiliaries, with the treachery of the leaders of the Spanish army, made the French conquest an easy one. The Cortes was not decisive. It talked well, loudly and speciously; but it did not act boldly and promptly; not it is presumed from want of patriotism, or even from want of courage, but from want of genius for action. The Guerilla parties did something; and Mina, the chief of Guerillas, did a great deal. It is scarcely to be expected that he alone can save Spain from degradation; but he has given, and it is to be hoped that he will yet give, proof that all Spaniards are not worthless.

If what is said of him be true, he is entitled to rank with Wallace and Scander Beg as a patriot and enterprising man.

The conduct of the Spanish troops of the line has disappointed the expectations of many. There is cause to regret their uselessness; but, if things be considered in their reasons, there is not much cause to be surprised at what has happened. Spain, it must be borne in mind, has not been a military power for a long series of years; and the natives of Spain have not, moreover, been the chief military trust of the kingdom, even in recent times. If this be so, it may be reasonably supposed that the military character was not held in esteem; and as such, had little chance to be eminent. Good sense is common; but military genius, or genius of prompt action, is in a manner denied to the people of that country: under tyranny they dare not permit the mind to aspire. When the constitution of 1812 was accepted and proclaimed in 1820, it was fair to suppose that, as the nation was in some degree renovated, the military spirit would have declared itself strongly, and military organization would have been studied in its principles, so that a system of tactic and discipline, such as is best calculated for defence, which was the avowed object of Spain, would have been laid on a true basis, and conducted systematically to something like perfection. The writer cannot pretend to say what has been done on this head; but it is unfortunately proved that, whatever may have been attempted, nothing useful has been effected. The king was averse from the constitution; and it could not be expected, even if he had capacity to institute the organization of military force for the defence of the constitution which he had accepted and sworn to defend, that he would encourage the prosecution of it while he was actually plotting to overturn it. These, namely, the want of truth in the king, and the lack of military spirit and military genius among the people, were impediments to the formation of a new military system; but besides these, the Spaniards, if the author has read their character rightly, are not subjects to be moulded into common military form by ordinary tacticians. Frederick of Prussia himself, it is presumed, would have failed, if he had applied his principle to Spaniards. Spaniards have caprices and peculiarities which require to be studied in order to be known; and, when known, to be applied to purpose by science and impulse of genius. Recruits were brought together, and arranged

into regiments of the line on the present occasion. They were probably drilled carefully to common manœuvre; but it is fair to believe that they were not animated with the feelings of national soldiers. They saw the constitution only imperfectly; they were not amalgamated with it, and did not generally perhaps feel the true electric spirit of national liberty. Hence there may be cause to think that they were deteriorated, rather than improved, by their military training and military habits. The eye was taken from the country by incorporating the peasant with a stipendiary class, and nothing was substituted in its place calculated to command attention. The Spanish soil had been long barren of military genius capable of animating the soldier to national enterprise, or of implanting in him a principle of honour which preserves from degradation. The troops not well drilled, or not perfect in tactic so as to act in the field as a military machine, were exposed, by contingencies, to the operation of various causes which are calculated to tarnish honour. They were ill paid; and, in want of bread, they were tempted to tamper with their duty for money to buy it. They had not the honour of soldiers; and they might justly be considered as the most degraded portion of the Spanish nation; consequently the event which has recently taken place, in so far as it depended on the regular army, could not well be expected to be different from what it has been.

Ferdinand is restored to absolute power. The constitution of 1812 is annulled, and a new order of things has begun, or is about to begin. It is impossible to say precisely what may be the result of the new order; but it is plain that a cloud of horror, bloodshed, and misery, hangs over Spain, and threatens to desolate the country. The Spaniards have not perhaps had as yet a true view of human rights and liberties; but the word is amongst them, and will not, it is presumed, be lost. Ferdinand is faithless, vindictive, and insolent; but, blinded by passions and prejudices, he is not wise. His counsellors, if opinion can be formed by the acts of the regency, are absolutely imbecile; and from this it may be concluded, that if a hostile collision again take place between the patriots and the king, the king will fall; for his late conduct must have undeceived the most stupid of his subjects, that he is no longer worthy of trust: he is both wicked and worthless.

The present is the most important era, in so far as regards

the human race, that stands in the records of history. Man has been a prey to man from the beginning of the world to the present time. Individuals have overrun the earth, slaughtered the people without mercy, or reduced them to slavery by force; but these acts were generally the acts of individuals. The present age witnesses something more impudent, and more complicatedly wicked than the attempts of former times. A club of European kings have formed a conspiracy to bring the human race to the condition of cattle, to extinguish the human mind, and to make the human carcase the property of an individual for his pleasures and purposes. The act is declared. It is a deliberate act and firm resolve of Christian princes; and, hypocritically as it may be clothed in language, it implies, in the writer's opinion, rebellion direct to the will of the Creator, if the Creator's will can be known by manifestation of the law which maintains the universe in order and harmony. If man be permitted to form opinion on things which fall under his observation, he has not room to doubt that the human race is one creation; and if one creation, that one law is sufficient for its government. The law, as traced in its minutest operations, consists in action and reaction in reciprocity, that is, a law of justice equally balanced among all parts of the human creation; or, as intelligibly expressed in the Christian code, "the act of doing unto others as we would that others do unto us." This law is the law of justice, and it applies equally to all conditions. Every one is functionary, and no one is more than functionary of a defined office. If this be granted, it is obvious that if the inhabitants of any given district of the earth choose to form an association among themselves for internal security and defence against foreign aggression, the law by which they are to be connected and bound together must be so laid as to bear equally on all and every part within the circle of the association; consequently it must be just in its conditions to all, and executed with inexorable severity on all. The functionary is appointed for execution, and for execution only; he can neither make a law, nor stay the operations of a law already made and sanctioned. It is an insult to man's common sense to suppose that an individual, of common clay with other men, should forge a patent from heaven to rule his fellows according to his will. It argues ignorance in the people if they believe it; and it reproaches them with worthlessness if they can be purchased

with money to aid in carrying the practice of it into effect. The Holy Alliance has declared itself sovereign by its own will : the people will be beasts in reality if they do not resist, and declare themselves independent of the Holy Alliance. If man know himself, he will not encroach on the sphere of others, for the act is an offence against justice ; and if he know himself, and reverence the law of the Creator, he will not yield his sphere, or a hair's breadth of his sphere, through intimidations of human force.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH.

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THE population of Transalpine Gaul, consisting of various nations more or less connected with one another, was of a warlike character from the earliest records of its history. A people, bearing the name of Gaul, sacked Rome at an early period of the Roman republic, and was only prevented by accident from totally annihilating it. The inroads of the Gauls into Italy were frequent at subsequent periods ; and they were sometimes so formidable as to threaten the safety of the Roman state. When that state expanded, so that the whole of Italy was at its command, Gaul was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a view to conquest. It was in fact subdued and added to the list of Roman provinces ; but it was not subdued easily, and it would not, it is presumed, have been subdued at all, had the Gauls been united, so as to act cordially in its defence in concert with one another. Cæsar, who conquered Gaul, was the greatest captain of the age in which he lived, and as such, may be supposed to be competent to form opinion on the military merits of his opponents. His testimony is favourable to them as soldiers ; and their qualities then were not very different from what they now are in the inhabitants of modern France, namely, impetuosity in the onset, want of constancy and perseverance in conflict, elasticity, or ready recoil after discomfiture. The fact of the Gaulic character as recorded by Cæsar, is of the best authority—and it is important



as a fact in the history of mankind. It goes to prove that military qualities, if not absolutely produced by circumstances of locality, are modified by them to a certain extent; and it corroborates the opinion, that those who invade, conquer, and become lords of the soil, though they subvert the existing government and establish a new government in its place, do not subvert or annul the radical character of the inhabitants of the country subdued.

The Gauls, when subdued by Roman arms and Roman arts, were organized into political society after the Roman manner; but they still retained the base of the Gaulic character. They received Roman laws, Roman civilization; and they sunk, by imitation, into the vortex of Roman sensuality and Roman vice. As they had no part, or only a subordinate part in the government of themselves, they may be supposed to have been nearly indifferent to the interests of those who maintained dominion over them. The Roman central government was now fluctuating, factious, and corrupted; the provincial administration was weak, and in a manner insulated. In that state of things, a migratory tribe of warriors from beyond the Rhine entered the confines of Gaul, and usurped dominion over the Roman province by force of arms. The human race seems to have been under a general warlike movement in the fourth and fifth centuries. The tide of migration rolled from the East and North-east to the South and West of Europe, in wave after wave, with irresistible force. The tribes came in clusters like dislodged bees; but they did not come in confusion; they were organized according to rule, though under migration. The sword was their right to possession. In so far as is known, they were of a lofty and masculine character, stately and pompous in manner, chivalrous in spirit, and not ungenerous in sentiment. These qualities were conspicuous in the Franks, who displaced the Roman power in Gaul, assumed the sovereignty of the soil, and gave a name to the country which they had seized by force and claimed as a conquest. The feudal tenure of lands, constituting a military fief, seemed to be the bond of connexion, or symbol of society, among these warlike tribes. It was introduced into France, and it continued to prevail, with more or less modification, until a recent date.

The Christian religion was established in Gaul at the time of the invasion of the Franks; and as the Christian church adheres to the superior power in almost all cases, the fathers of

the church put themselves under the protection of the conqueror. It was their interest to assure it; and that they might attain it and trust in it, they laboured with zeal to convert Clovis to their faith. The Christian religion, as often said, did not become the national religion of Gaul, or any other known country of Europe, until it had ceased, in the proper sense of the word, to be the religion of Jesus Christ. It was corrupted in Gaul; and it was so loaded with superstitions, at the time of the invasion of the Franks, that it might be said to be a religion to priests, rather than a religion to the Creator. The conduct of the sacerdotal class, as judged by the simple fact of history, without making allowance for the inability of human nature to control its own acts by its simple reason, presents itself as a sacrilegious tyranny—the most nefarious that ever was practised upon man. It is charitable to believe, though it may not be perfectly true, that the enormities alluded to arose from actions the spring of which was little known to the ostensible actor. It was the product of passions, which, once they obtain footing, work by their own rule, deaf to the voice of reason, and averse from the remonstrances of truth and justice. Brotherly love and charity form the base of the Christian character; and brotherly love and charity, as exhibited in its first operation, removed the veil which had obscured Deity from human view, without looking to compensation for its labour. Those who had devoted themselves to the preaching of the Christian doctrine obtained respect through the office which they had assumed. Respect brought power; power brought wealth as a bribe for favour; and wealth, changing the ideas of the mind, so corrupted the feelings of the human heart as totally to disfigure the Christian character. Instead of the humility which characterised the Author of the Christian doctrine and his disciples, the fathers of the church assumed an air of important arrogance, so as to constitute themselves the channels of communication between man and his Creator. Jesus Christ may be said to have unveiled Deity to man's apprehension; the fathers of the church laboured to cover it up, inasmuch as they inculcated the necessity of the intercession of favourites for obtaining notice and protection from the throne of heaven—an idea which, while it insults common sense, is impious as applied to the universal Creator, whose essence is justice and truth to all on equal conditions. The Franks were pagans at the time they

invaded France. They became Christian; but Christianity was then so corrupted that they did not perhaps gain much by the exchange. Real Christianity makes man sincere and true; corrupted Christianity makes him a machine of hypocrisy and imposture.

The French, inasmuch as they were a tribe of migratory warriors, manifested at all times the character of a military people. They are forward and adventurous as soldiers; and they were eminent in early times as champions in the crusades to the Holy Land. Ambitious of power and dominion, and drunk with the idea of military glory, they were, and still are, a restless race, rarely long at peace with themselves or their neighbours. France has produced men of military talent on many occasions; but the reign of Francis the First was the most conspicuous for valorous captains. The late revolution was fertile of genius; for objects which excite genius were then laid open to the view of the multitude. The wars of Henry the Fourth were memorable for a peculiar species of generosity and high spirit. Henry himself, though not perhaps a consummate commander, was a heroic and noble-minded man: his captains were numerous, and some of them were distinguished for talent. Turenne raised the military fame of France, at a subsequent period, to high eminence. Heroic and virtuous in himself, Turenne was the cause of heroism and virtue in others; and, during his time, the French army was respectable, even eminent. The wars of 1792 and 1803 mark important epochs in the military annals of France. The revolution of 1789 alarmed the sovereigns of Europe. Under alarm, they approached the French frontier with armed force, in the hopes of repressing commotion, and of establishing royal authority in all its splendour. The collision took place; and the French obtained successes, which, as the successes of an armed mob against troops in the highest order of discipline, frightened princes and confounded tacticians, who had been accustomed to calculate the issue of combats in war by rules which apply to regular military machines, put in motion by word of command, and directed by the skill of privileged commanders.

The French revolutionary code of legislation, execrated as it has been, may be said to rest on the base of the Christian doctrine, "Do unto others as you would that others do unto you." The operation of the doctrine on society was seen, examined, and

digested into system by the spirit of philanthropy. It was developed in the assembly of the nation by commanding powers of eloquence ; and it seemed, when developed, to have produced such conviction on the people as flows from reason. The promise of happiness was fair at the outset ; but its course was scarcely begun, when its harmony was disturbed by selfish passions, and counteracted by intrigues which worked insidiously, and incited the nation to violence. The throne was overturned ; hereditary authorities were abolished ; and the base of the projected government was laid on a primary condition of equality among the people as a body of brothers. The principle is true in its foundations, if the Christian religion be true ; but it was brought to act at this juncture as revenge, or retribution for fifteen hundred years or more of feudal bondage. The principle of the revolution opened the view to the primary condition of man's nature ; and it may thus be supposed that the ancient Celtic stock, emancipated from feudal chains, and electrified by the spirit of liberty which belongs to man, rose up as the actors ; and, with the energy which belongs to youth, carried the military glory of the country to a height unexampled in the history of nations. But, be the causes and the steps of the elevation of the French nation what they may, it is incontestible that it attained a distinguished eminence in war in an incredibly short time. French peasantry, presumptively the Celtic stock, were now the prominent characters. The French peasantry, it may be remarked, possess a fair proportion of the physical and mental qualities which render men fit for the practice of war in the field. These qualities are brought out and improved, unintentionally, in the primary schools of education. The French are, upon the whole, below the medium standard of the male population of most countries in Europe ; and they are inferior in bulk and positive force to many. But, though of a low stature comparatively, and of inferior brute force generally, they are active and elastic, and have the force which they possess at ready command. They are ordinarily well placed on their limbs, and well poised at the haunches ; consequently they move with ease and freedom, and sustain long marches with facility. The French soldiers are alert ; and they may be said, with perfect truth, to be inferior to no soldiers in Europe for the rapidity and order of their movements in all conditions of service. This quality, which is of great value in war, is principally to be ascribed

to primary education and national mode of life. The exercise of dancing is the amusement and pleasure of the French people, and it may thus be supposed that the discovering of those bearings and attitudes, which are most connected with easy movement in dancing, becomes an object of study with the nation; for the exercise of it gives pleasure. Ease in movement is favourable to long endurance of motion; hence dancing, while practised for pleasure and amusement, serves to improve the pliability of the limbs; and, as such, it may be considered as one of the means which conspire to increase the capacity of continuing exercise, military or other, with little comparative fatigue. The idea now thrown out may be thought to be fanciful: it is, notwithstanding, founded in reason, and it is proved to be true in experience. The cadence which is connected with or belongs to dancing, is a cause not altogether without weight in facilitating the performance of forward movements in the field, even in facilitating retrograde movements under discomfiture when the necessity of retiring occurs—a duty which the French execute better, or in what is called a cleaner manner, than the troops of any other European military power with which we are acquainted. The French, when dispersed by accident, gather rapidly and group in order as if they acted in all their movements under a constitutional habit of cadenced step.

The French possess, as now said, much bodily activity according to the quantity of their power. They are, moreover, easily impressed by new objects, particularly by phantoms of military glory and desire of military fame; consequently they are easily led to every variety of combat which presents a novelty. They are vain individually, and ambitious nationally to such extent, that national glory always stands prominent in the eye of the genuine Frenchman. If not so firm to resist as many, and not so powerful in the attack at close quarters as others, they are constitutionally impetuous, and susceptible of an enthusiasm which, striking by flashes, achieves great things where it is well directed. The French are not easily read, so as to be correctly classed; but they may be said to belong to that class of human beings who act by impulses on sensation, rather than by sentiment, the product of reflection. They are light and volatile, apparently capricious and uncertain, in temper; but, as they possess much constitutional sensibility, and are easily excited, they become

steady in their attachments by a judicious application of the means which excite the attachment. They are, in fact, efficient instruments of war in the hands of a general, who has knowledge to discern the spring which moves the proper act of the different races of men who compose armies.

The French do not, as already observed, possess the same degree of muscular force as many of the nations of Europe. But, while inferior in this respect, they are superior to most in activity and in that tact of mental sensibility which reads the countenance of things at first sight. Their power of perception is quick; and, while the power is quick, the impression is comparatively just; hence it is fair to conclude that the French, from quick perception, mental activity, and celerity in movement, are excellently fitted by nature for the practice of partizan war. Inferior in the power of the arm to many, as well as in constancy of courage to others, they are less calculated to resist than to attack; consequently they are most available as soldiers in services of forward movement, such as operate by appearance rather than by the impulse of actual force. The French are light in figure and lively in manner. They were not conspicuous in the time of the monarchy as condensed and solid mechanical masses, either on parade or in the field; and they do not appear to have attained to distinction on that head, even in the time of the republic. Swiss and other foreigners were considered at one time as the bones of the French military machine; the native French were the garniture—the parts conspicuous for enterprize and desultory activity. The military character of the nation was in a manner enchained in the time of the monarchy; for it was obscured by the preference which was given to foreigners. The war of the revolution brought it out in its own colours, and established it on a true and national base. The defenders of France were a mere mass of men not organized as soldiers. They had little formal discipline; they were without experience; and they were, in fact, regarded in the light of a mob by the soldiers of the regular school. The exterior appearance, it is not denied, was mob-like; history proves that the interior was organized. The union, produced by the sentiment of liberty and love of country, then seen as it were for the first time and ardent as flame, was intimate, and it was better cemented in the shock of battle than that of troops kept together by impressions of fear only. The French peasantry are



intelligent and brave, active and enterprising in themselves. With these qualities, cemented and kept in action by devotion to a cause which touched the heart of every one, more was done for France by this ridiculed and ragged mob, than could have been effected if all the population of the country, without the electrifying spirit of liberty, had been drilled systematically to military manœuvre by Frederick of Prussia himself. It may be added, perhaps, that had rigorous measures been necessary for the formation of a soldier, they could not have been attempted at the time. The feeling of republican France was abhorrent from the brutal mode of military training which prevailed in Europe at the commencement of the revolution; and the French tacticians, who appear to have been men of genius, shewed their good sense and discernment in not offending it. The purpose was attained by other means—more effectually attained perhaps than in any other army then in the field of war.

The success of the French arms did not arise, in the first years of the republic, from causes which usually give success to the operations of regular mechanical armies. The French were apparently loosely organized. With the exception of the reserve, they were not formed into compact lines and columns, so as to have the exterior appearance of solid walls and impenetrable masses of men bristling with iron; even the reserve was not so selected and adjusted in the ranks by size and exterior resemblance as to present the appearance of a military instrument mechanically correct in the disposition of its parts. The order of the ranks was comparatively open; and the expression of individual activity was still observable in the most compact and perfect of the French battalions—in short, a French soldier was not a simple part in a common machine; he was a man individually, and the mind was buoyant in itself. The battalions were loosely organized, according to the ideas of modern tacticians. The generals had little or no experience in war, at least as commanders of armies; and, under these circumstances, the success which was obtained may appear to be a problem of difficult solution: it is not however insoluble, if things be examined and resolved to principles. The French have quicker perceptions than any other military nation in Europe; and they act promptly according to their perceptions. They became a new people from the lights which were evolved in the course of the

revolution. They had lived long under the arbitrary rule of kingly or feudal power; and, as they were now emancipated by an act of force, they ran wild in liberty, like persons escaped from the confinement of a gaol. France presented itself to the people as a country created by themselves. They were enamoured of their creation, enthusiastically attached to it, even devoted to death for its preservation from the fangs of the combined princes who darted upon it as upon a common prey. The flame of liberty ran through the whole of France with the rapidity of lightning, and with a character of infection so strong, that those who had been sent in chains to serve in the ranks became ardent in the service as if they had been originally volunteer. The French are more liable than most people to be transported by their passions; and, under the influence of passion, they often commit excesses, and sometimes crimes; but they are not intrinsically a cruel or a vicious people. The republican army rose daily in military reputation, and its moral conduct was exemplary. The fact of the good moral conduct cannot be denied; and, if an explanation of it be sought for, some part of it, at least, may be found in the horrible atrocities which prevailed in the interior of France at a certain period of the revolutionary war—horrors of such atrocity as sent the best moralised part of the male population to the armies on the frontier, as to an asylum. But whatever may have been the cause of the fact, the enemies of the republic are obliged to admit that the division of the army, which forced the allies to retire from the Netherlands, manifested a high sense of honour, and gave proof of humane and generous conduct in their progress through the country, that scarcely has a parallel in history.

France has had a fair share of military talent at all periods of her history: she appears to have had more than a common share during the revolution. The mind of the French nation had been employed on the subject of legislation and government. Such form of employment naturally drew it to a consideration of the relation in which man stands with man as a member of a common class of beings. Exercise in the field of reasoning may be supposed to have been constant and severe; and it may be reasonably supposed to have opened a view to the principle through which the Creator maintains the order and harmony of the universe, namely, action and reaction in reciprocity. The

fact of reciprocal action and reaction was seen and appreciated by the constituent assembly, and the universality of the fact apparently led the assembly to lay the base of national legislation on the stable foundation of the Christian tenet, "Do unto others as you would others do unto you." The tenet is a demonstrative truth as a base of morals; and it is held by those who assume the Christian name to be directly a Divine injunction. It was assumed by the French, as now said, for a base of legislation. It is the only ground which admits of a solid and consistent political structure; but the assumption of it was considered by the princes of Europe as a heresy, leading to the subversion of thrones and altars. The priests, the nobles, and others, who were born in high stations and nursed in prejudice, withdrew from France. The Christian princes of all castes and denominations combined to invade, with a view to repress insurrection, and chastise its authors for their insolent audacity. As the dangers which threatened religion, were included among the pretexts for the combination of princes, the French nation considered itself as persecuted by a Christian faction; and, under the rule of an outrageous demagogue, interdicted the Christian worship in the territory of the republic. The act was violent. It was done in resentment, with a view to retaliation—it was not the general sentiment of the inhabitants of France.

Few men of high birth or military reputation adhered to France during the revolution; men of talent started up among the people everywhere, particularly in the army. The French had a system of military training and discipline prior to the revolution, on a similar base and as perfectly executed perhaps as in most European countries. But it did not suit with the present condition of things; it was therefore expedient or necessary to form a new one more corresponding with the existing circumstances of the people. The scheme seems to have been adopted at an early period of the war; and, in so far as a non-professional man can be allowed to judge, it was laid on a more scientific base than any other of the systems of training that obtain among the great military powers of Europe. In these, appearance of uniformity is the object sought to be attained; coercion is the instrument employed to attain it. In the French, utility and effect prevail over uniformity of appearance; knowledge of animal structure, and acquaintance with capacity of action in different

structures, are deemed necessary to adjust and measure the effect. The exercises of manual and manœuvre are performed in the French army with a celerity and precision that cannot perhaps be exceeded; the explosions from the firelock astonish by close repetition. The effects of movements and evolutions in the face of an enemy, as studied in their reasons, are presented to the eye of the soldier, while under training, in such a manner that he may be supposed to comprehend the design, and execute the measure—not passively as a part of a machine, but actively and with energy as an intelligent being. Besides practice in manual and movement, which is the ostensible object in military training, pains are taken by the French tactician to lay the base of correct interior economy in the elements of the army; hence the recruit is instructed in the best manner of taking care of himself, with a view to enable him to maintain his efficiency as a part in an instrument of force. He is instructed, for instance, and scientifically instructed, in the best manner of dressing the raw material of the ration, so as to form a wholesome and savoury mess; and from this, and other knowledge that belongs to interior economy, he suffers less privation and fewer hardships in the field than the troops of other nations similarly circumstanced, particularly than the British, who, the most brave perhaps of any soldiers in Europe, are the least competent of any to take care of themselves. The French system of training appears to be very perfect according to its rule. The system of *strategies*, which was digested at an early period of the war and acted on with effect, presents a striking outline of military science as drawn from a knowledge of human things. It is said to have been sketched by Count Carnot, a man of the first class of eminence as a speculative soldier, and of the foremost rank as a citizen of honour and virtue. The general principle, in so far as chance observation, or the testimony of creditable witnesses can be depended on, consists in forming a reserve of select men in a safe and commanding position connected with the scene of action. A swarm of sharp-shooters, sent out in every direction, masks the movement of the advancing force, and feels, as it is termed, the different points in the enemy's line. The sharp-shooters commence their fire at a great distance, and advance progressively until they ascertain the practicable points in the position, even sometimes maintain the combat thus

commenced so obstinately, that the enemy is intimidated, and abandons his ground before any other than sharp-shooters make their appearance. When the position of the enemy is laid open, the lines and columns advance to the attack; sometimes they succeed, sometimes they fail and retire: they advance again; and, again repulsed and pressed, they rally under the protection of the reserve. In this manner, the conflict continues with fluctuating success until a point be gained in the enemy's line; or, until the French themselves, unable to make impression, think proper to desist. There are peculiarities in the manner in which the French conduct an action in the field different from the more usual practice of the time, and which, as laid on a plan that has been correctly reasoned, deserve the especial consideration of military men. The sharp-shooters, and even the regular battalions, commence their fire at a great distance, often fire at an elevation; and, as they are said to fire on many occasions without ramming, they fire with great celerity, so as to give the idea that they calculate to make impression on the enemy by noise, rather than by the actual destruction of bullets. The French bring forward cannon in a bold manner, and use it freely in action. If the battle go against them, they abandon it, apparently without concern; for they deem it unsafe to impede or confuse the retreat by attempting to carry it off. In this they act differently from others; but they act wisely, for independently of the impediment which arises from the obstruction of the road by withdrawing the cannonry, the act of withdrawing marks discomfiture, and more than almost any other thing communicates panic to young troops.

The mode of warfare that was adopted by republican France had much of the desultory and irregular character which belongs to a new people acting by common sense and the reality of things, rather than by precedent and pomp of appearance. A battle, fought in this desultory style, consists of a repetition of attacks connected with each other, but not obviously and openly combined. The French, in executing their view on this subject, advance, attack, and retire, fire at a distance, and necessarily throw away much fire without destructive effect, but in their own idea not without a purpose. The French are constitutionally quick and impetuous as a people; but the French soldier preserves the most perfect *sang froid* in the midst of fire: he may be killed;

he scarcely can be driven from the field by the distant fire of musketry. He is not proof against a charge with the bayonet; nor is the writer competent to say to what extent he is proof against a close fire of musketry at twenty paces. Celerity of movement, with the correct order in which troops move in all forms of evolution, has great advantages in acting against heavy and compact masses of mechanical force. An action fought chiefly by irregular troops, who advance boldly, even rashly, retire, but do not disperse, rally and again advance, is not easily calculated in its issue; and hence the mechanical armies of the great European sovereigns were often embarrassed, in the early part of the war, by the Proteus-like mutability and energy of the republican irregulars; who, if they failed in effecting their purpose by their own effort, fell back upon the reserve, which consisted of tried men, analagous in character to the *triarii* of the Roman armies. The reserve was the trust; and, until it was touched and shaken, there was no alarm in the French army. The soldiers were lavish of life in the defence of their country; and the losses sustained by them, short of defeat, were regarded as accident—the play of a field-day. The French troops are chiefly, as is commonly known, formidable in attack. They are impetuous; but they are not so united and so irresistible in the charge as the English. It has been often tried and proved, that where a French battalion is pitted in the open field against British, it yields to inferior numbers; on broken and irregular grounds, where part is seen and part concealed, it has advantages over the British and over most other soldiers of the present day, through superior activity and greater quickness of perception. The French readily read the countenance of things, and they are prompt in striking the point on which the issue of the action turns.

The above are a few of the points in the character of the French nation and military system of the French republic, which struck the writer forcibly, in the few opportunities which he has had of observing and of ascertaining the manner in which that people acted in the prosecution of their warlike views. A flame of patriotism, general and strong, animated the soldiers of the republic, and cemented their union in difficulty; a quickness of perception and celerity of movement, almost unprecedented in Europe, gave rapidity and effect to execution; novelty in



mode of attack astonished and perplexed, and produced effects which, not being foreseen, could not be expected to be averted. It was thought impossible that French militia should succeed against troops of the highest discipline of any in Europe; and it is perhaps as yet unintelligible to some how they did succeed. Constituted in mind as the French then were, and acting militarily as they then did, it is scarcely possible that they should have had less success than they had. They thought the war of the republic to be a combat of truth against prejudice—of knowledge against ignorance—that is, of nature against art. The discussions which took place prior to the revolution, and the facts which were developed in the revolution itself, brought the mass of the French nation in contact with nature and common sense. They saw without prejudice; and they adopted, in war, what was true and useful, without regard to precedent. The love of country was yet the common object of Frenchmen; it gave a common impulse to all. The position of France itself, its compactness, and sufficiency for almost every purpose of the inhabitant in peace or war, contributed much to the success of the defence. If there was compression at any point on the frontier, there was an elasticity at the centre, which produced a recoil more than sufficient to remove the compression.

France, from an active, elastic, and somewhat tumultuous republic, became a magnificent, a pompous, and regularly-organized empire—military and despotic. It became so through the management of a person who, from a comparatively obscure origin, rose to eminence as a general. During this person's continuance on the imperial throne, France was an object of terror to the rest of Europe. The army, which was the instrument of the emperor's power, and through which he appears to have contemplated the conquest of the world, was favoured, flattered, and cajoled with titles, and honours, and gorgeous trappings. It was perhaps improved in military training and manœuvre during his reign; but it was corrupted at the base, as it was converted from a national army to that of a professed conqueror. The newly-elected emperor became, like the kings and emperors of other countries, the prominent object in the eye of the military. The country, that is, the ideal independence of the country, through which much had been done, and for which much had been suffered, sunk in the shade. Napo-

leon, who was a man of genius—imposing and imperious—not wise and not candid—appears to have had a systematic head. He was active, indefatigable in labour, and, working on principles of science which the early periods of the revolution had brought to light, he organized the empire of France in all its departments on a systematic base, and did so with a skill and precision which prove that, while a man of a wide scope in design, he was also of superior energy in execution. The re-organization and high finishing of the military instrument was one of the first works of the new emperor. The principle on which the improvements were made was discovered, as already observed, during the revolution—a period in the history of nations where the prejudices, which arise in the long-continued exercise of power, removed as it were by charm, allow the mind to look inwardly, and to snatch a view of the real relation of things with one another. The re-organization of the various departments of the state, and, among others, that of the army, was commenced while France was yet republican; it was finished when it was imperial. The emperor, like other sovereigns, desired to have an army, or instrument of military power, at his own disposal, ready and willing to act, by his order, against the nation or for it; and, with this view, he admitted foreigners into the military service of France—even formed corps, tantamount to armies, from the refuse population of the countries he had overrun. This act of the emperor was an insult to France in her integrity, as an independent country. The French army was corrupted; and the defensive force of the kingdom was actually diminished, while the irregularities and atrocities, committed by the foreigners in Napoleon's service, brought reproaches on the French soldiery, which do not belong to the French nation. The French are neither thieves nor robbers as a people; and it was ungenerous in their emperor to contaminate them by mixing them with the outcast population of other countries. When France herself was a scene of horror, from contending interests and conflicting passions, the army, which was on the frontier, evinced sentiments of honour, justice, and humanity, of which no nation in Europe has shewn a brighter example. The character of humanity adheres everywhere to the French people, unless where they are under irritation from passion, or misled by opinions respecting duty: it

was conspicuous among the troops in the most outrageous periods of the republic. The conduct of Robespierre, who was for some time political chief in France, was atrocious: it revolted human nature. That of Napoleon was not praiseworthy; for he considered men as instruments of purpose, and did not appear, more than other great generals, to regard the sacrifice of life in the field of battle, if he thereby gained an object, as a matter of much regret: he was not even scrupulous of individual sacrifice where it was favourable to his interest, or where it gratified his revenge to indulge it. Robespierre was a wretch and a monster: Napoleon was not a hero, or a pattern for imitation; but neither the one nor the other can be allowed to stain the general character of the French nation.

The army of republican France, after it stepped over its own frontier, acted on the maxim of conquerors, namely, to make war support war. The exactions levied in the invaded countries for the accomplishment of this purpose were often heavy, but they were regularly levied. Private plunder was interdicted. It was rarely committed; but, where committed and detected, it was severely punished. Napoleon continued the exaction: he was less careful to interdict the plunder, and less rigorous to punish the offender where there was cause to punish, for he was aware that license to violate and act loosely was a bait which filled his ranks with vagabonds. The French army was correctly organized in all its parts as a military instrument in the time of Napoleon; the materials were good, as taken by conscription from the general mass of the people, not swept up as the refuse population of corrupted towns and cities. The primary education was scientific, and correct in all that relates to the care of the person, or the good conduct of the man—a fact which the author had the opportunity of ascertaining in a manner that he thinks precludes deception. The French armies were organized, as now said, on a correct model; and they were brilliant in their attire in the latter period of Napoleon's reign; but they were debased by foreign mixtures, and they were degraded from national soldiers, to soldiers of an individual man. Napoleon's armies were strong in number and brilliant in appearance; but they were less formidable in the field than the ragged armies of the republic. They had less elasticity, or power of recoil from compression; they were still supe-

rior as soldiers, inferior to the British alone—and that only in close combat.

The above remarks were put together in the year 1816, not long after Louis XVIII. had been placed upon the throne of France, and while he was yet supported on it by the arms of confederated kings. Louis was of the royal blood of France, absorbed in royal and priestly prejudices, infirm in health, of a gross exterior, and ill calculated for the king of a military and enterprizing people. As he was introduced by force and supported by a numerous army, no one can believe that he was the choice of the French nation. A great proportion of the French, tired of war and oppressed by conscriptions, were desirous of peace; and the introduction of Louis, little desirable as he individually was, was favoured by many. Louis bears the character of being a religious man, or rather perhaps of being scrupulously exact in performing his duties at the altar. This does not necessarily imply the true worship of the Deity; but it passes current as such with many. The French had been republican, and had attained, during the reign of the republic, a view of what belongs to man as man—even a view of the relations of man with his Creator as the universal parent of mankind. From republican, they became imperial. They were absorbed in the military glory of their conquering emperor; but they were not enslaved except by the fascination of his character. They still retained the republican sentiment; hence a French soldier was still a national citizen. When Napoleon was dethroned, Louis was put in his place, bound to act under the conditions of a charter. But, though bound to administer the charter, if oath can bind, he contrived to set it aside, so that at the present time this official instrument is little more than a name. The prejudices of blood and priestcraft aided powerfully, or rather worked powerfully under his name, to annul the charter, and to extinguish the liberty and independence of the people. The national representation is now the next thing to a fiction; the legislative deliberations are factionary and prejudiced; the public voice is shackled; and the free exercise of mind, even in pursuits of philosophy and truth, is under restraint. Arts may flourish; science will decay, for the mind is shackled; so that the French nation has little chance of ever being again great and generous. The murder of Ney and the banishment of Carnot shew distinctly that genius, patriotism, honour, and independent

virtue, are not plants to prosper in the soil of Bourbon France. Louis, conscious of treacherous designs and fearful of punishment, fills the country with spies, destroys the pleasures of social intercourse; and, by introducing mercenary troops as the first trust and dependence of the crown, insults the nation, arraigns its loyalty, and degrades its military character. The French army is actually humbled and debased. It would not have been credited, had any one said eight years ago, that a hundred thousand French soldiers could have been induced to act in Spain as French soldiers have now acted, that is, to have destroyed the civil and religious liberties of a people who never offended them—who were in fact desirous of living in peace, and freedom, as they had themselves desired. There was not a ray of false glory in the enterprize; there was iniquity in the design, and disgrace in the execution\*.

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## CHAPTER X.

### MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE NETHERLANDS.

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A DISTRICT on the West coast of the German continent, known by the name of Netherlands, some part of it the richest and best cultivated country in Europe, revolted from the sovereign in the course of the sixteenth century. The history of the revolt is especially interesting, inasmuch as it supplies the means of tracing the progress of the emancipation of the human mind, through a variety of struggles and conflicts of a desperate kind. After long and severely-contested wars, the richest part of the district succumbed. The poorer continued to resist; and, resisting successfully, it established its independence, became sovereign, and lived nominally, if not really, as a free state for some length of time. The energy of the district North of the Scheldt, consisting of seven provinces which united themselves into a certain form of federal republic, is striking in the history of nations. The firmness and perseverance of the people, chiefly fishermen and farmers,

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\* The Author refers to the restoration of Ferdinand by the French under the duke d'Angoulême, in 1820.

scarcely have a parallel in the history of modern times. A prince of the house of Orange offered himself as military chief at the commencement of the insurrectionary movement. He was an estimable man, patriotic, and at the same time sagacious—a politician as well as a soldier. The light of reason, or, as some will have it, the spirit of insurrection, now began to dawn on the human race in Western Europe; consequently, the revolted, who claimed the freedom which belongs to man, had many well-wishers, and even some active and efficient friends among their neighbours. England gave her aid, partly through the sympathy and adventurous spirit of the people, which courts danger as connected with liberty or gain of money, and partly through the jealous and vindictive spirit of the Queen, who disliked the King of Spain. The assistances which were given on this occasion were useful; but the great work was effected by the Dutch themselves. The industry of the maritime provinces north of the Scheldt was almost unparalleled. The enemy was opposed with arms. A country, gained from the inroads of the sea, was cultivated so as to become a garden; and a constitution of law for the confederated states was laid on a rational base of liberty. The Dutch fishermen were bold and fortunate in their sea enterprizes; and, while their boldness was conspicuous, good sense and discretion were apparent in all their resolves. They accumulated wealth in the midst of their wars; for, if they were adventurous as rovers, they were wise as store-keepers and merchants. They became strong in their own strength, claimed independence, and finally obtained it from the most arbitrary and bigotted monarch of the time.

The history of the Seven Provinces is singular in the history of mankind. It furnishes a striking example of the power of the stimulus of necessity in bringing out exertion. The Dutch were not irritable and passionate. They had intrinsically a strong fund of power, and they were not soon exhausted by action; but their movements were sluggish, torpid, mechanical, and liable to stagnate, unless under the excitement of strong stimulation. When adequately excited, the act was energetic, and the endurance was such as was not expected. The Dutch became powerful; their success against the sovereign of the Netherlands, who was then king of Spain and the greatest monarch in Europe, may be considered as a problem not easily solved, according to the common rules of calculation among politicians and soldiers. The Dutch were a simple people, chiefly fishermen and



farmers. The soldiers of the king of Spain were numerous; and they were the most experienced and best disciplined soldiers in Europe at the time. The commanders, particularly the duke of Alva and the duke of Parma, were decidedly the most perfect captains of the age. The latter was a man of consummate military skill; the former was skilful as a soldier, severe, cruel and bigotted as a man—terror attached to his name. Constancy in purpose baffled his arts; and necessity elicited acts of heroism from a people in whom heroism was not thought to reside.

The Seven Provinces became an independent republic under a stadtholder; and, as industry in trade had supplied the means which conduced materially to the attainment of independence, trade was continued for the acquisition of wealth which the degenerated considered as their palladium. The defence of the country was trusted to the arms of soldiers hired for money, and it fell. The tactic and economical arrangements of the mercenary Dutch troops were systematic and regular; their value was small when dangers pressed. They made no proper defence of the country in the year 1792. It was indeed scarcely to be expected that they should; for they had little or no interest in doing it beyond a pay which might be earned anywhere; and which, as such, does not pledge to strong resistance in a doubtful case. The history of the Dutch affords a striking example and useful lesson to statesmen. It proved distinctly that the defence of a country is only to be committed to the hand of the native inhabitant. The insurrectionary Dutch, the native of swamps and bogs and barren lands, reared under churlish skies and inured to boisterous seas, pursued his course steadily through multiplied difficulties, and established the independence of his country against the efforts of the most powerful monarch of the time. The reformed and mercantile Dutch, who, by industry, had converted marshes into gardens, and hovels into elegant houses, lost independence, almost without an effort to maintain it. In the first case, there was pride of mind and attachment to the place of birth; in the second, there was attachment to gold, and comparative indifference to other things. The Dutch purchased men to defend their country with the same spirit as they purchased a bale of goods: the purchased men despised their purchasers as mean and pusillanimous shopkeepers. The country was lost, and it was lost by trusting its defence to means which cannot be trusted.

## CHAPTER XI.

MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SWISS.

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THE Swiss who inhabit the Alps, which are considered as the tower and citadel of Europe, long supported a character of moral and military eminence corresponding, in some degree, with the elevation of the position which they occupied. Love of liberty and independence, national courage and heroism, purity of morals and fervor of religion, with amiable and interesting domestic manners, have distinguished the Swiss among the other inhabitants of Europe for some centuries past. The Swiss, when in bondage, rescued their country from a formidable and harsh tyrant by promptitude and prowess; and they defended it with success against powerful enemies at subsequent times. The local advantages of Switzerland for defence are great; such as may be supposed to enable the united Swiss to resist in open war almost any amount of invading force that can be brought against them. This strikes the observer in travelling through the country; and from this it may be presumed, on fair grounds of reasoning, that the application of open force would not have given the French the possession of this strong hold on a late occasion had open force only been employed. The strength of the Swiss confederacy consisted in union. The basis of the union was here undermined by art; and the politics of the different cantons were put in counteraction to each other before the attempt of invasion was made. The foe, subtle and insidious as a foe, practised on the credulity of the unsuspecting, corrupted those who were corruptible, and succeeded in dividing the nation against itself. France acquired Switzerland through manoeuvre. She even did more than gain possession of the ground; she effected something like political disorganization in the confederacy, so as to attain the means of cutting up the roots of that patriotic feeling, that devout, though superstitious religion, and that estimable moral virtue which appeared to have its abode among the mountains of the Alps for many ages past.

The national character of the Swiss is military. It was hospitable, generous, and sincere, in the days of Switzerland's

prosperity. The Swiss nation has been eminent at all times for military virtues; and Swiss soldiers have been esteemed on all occasions as men of trust. They enter into the service of foreign powers for pay; but they do not abandon the national character; they are always Swiss—not common mercenaries, ready to cut the throat of any one for a sum of money. The Swiss are a professed military people: they possess a correct and rigid mechanical discipline, which is cemented and rendered strong by acting on national honour. Though serving in foreign countries for pay, and, as such, called mercenary, the Swiss uniformly preserve their character, namely, bravery, courage, and fidelity. With these qualities, added to a most correct knowledge of tactic and evolution, the Swiss are justly regarded as the most perfect specimen of military force in Europe.

The military character of the Swiss was eminent; the moral character was amiable. It is probable that some part of this preeminence arose from the impression of localities; some part of it from institution, or moral training. The scenery, by which the native of Switzerland is daily surrounded, tends to elevate the mind, to exalt the courage, and to confirm its constancy under trial. The intercourse among the inhabitants who occupy valleys between lofty mountains may be reasonably supposed to be intimate. The ideas, as restrained from wandering to distant and undefined objects by the circumstances of locality, are condensed and concentrated upon a point. The affections are mutually rivetted, so to speak, throughout the circumscribed circle; hence love and friendship fix their abode in these sequestered vales. The physical cause, as constantly applied to the object, contributes to form the moral act by its continual impression, even to confirm it in strength and constancy by exercise on one subject; it thus becomes in some degree an act of nature. The limbs of the Swiss are active and elastic; the chest is ordinarily full and expanded; the wind is good, and respiration little disturbed by exertion in ascending a mountain. There is thus bodily force in the Swiss soldier joined with activity and intelligence of things similar to those which occur in war. The localities of Switzerland are calculated to engender and to confirm sentiments of independence; and sentiments of independence, however engendered, tend to excite and to maintain the individual in the practice of virtue. But the Swiss are not what they have

been. The simplicity of manner has changed ; and, in the change, it has sustained deterioration. This is conspicuous within the last thirty years, particularly in the rich and popular cantons, where pleasures, generally regarded as vices, are pursued with as much eagerness as in any part of Europe : the poorer cantons seem still to be filled with a virtuous, devout, and sincere people, ignorant and superstitious to excess, but amiable in their ignorance and their superstitions.

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## CHAPTER XII.

### MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE SWEDES.

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THE Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes, bold and adventurous in character like other Teutonic nations, sent out strong predatory expeditions in former times. They invaded defenceless countries, and established themselves in power on many of the coasts that were contiguous to them. The migratory warriors were literally robbers by force of arms ; but robbery then, as war at present, was not a stain on the human character : it, on the contrary, ennobled, or gave preeminence to individuals over their fellows. The Swedes appear among the boldest of adventurers on the theatre of predatory war in early times ; but they were then only robbers : they subsequently attained renown on the fairest field of human fame. The efforts of Gustavus Vasa were noble ; and the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus raised the Swedish nation to eminence. The motive of Adolphus's undertaking, not perhaps unmixed with love of military glory and ambition of conquest, was ostensibly generous and noble : the execution was creditable to the talent of a general, particularly of a tactician. The wars between contending powers on the continent were chiefly carried on at that time by cavaliers : the battle was a crash of harnessed horses and mail-covered horsemen. The limited pecuniary means of the Swedish king did not perhaps admit of a pompous display of cavalier force. He had notwithstanding a sufficiency of horse according to a just scale of utility ; but he modelled the infantry after a new form of tactic and

discipline, not unlike that of the present time, and on them rested the main trust in battle. The Swedish infantry, prior to the time of Gustavus Adolphus, was strictly speaking militia. They were trained in the new tactic, and disciplined by German and English, or Scotch adventurers; who, as they had chosen war for their trade, may be supposed to have attained a mechanical dexterity in the use of arms beyond what is to be expected in common peasants. As the ostensible cause of Gustavus' war was the vindication of human liberty, that is, freedom of conscience in matter of religion, it was common to all the race. The hitherto degraded people, invited on this occasion to participation in war, were in a manner invited to participation in human rights; and as such, they became proud and interested in the issue of the contest. Their powers were tried and proved in combat; their value was seen and appreciated; they became, from this time, the chief trust in battle; and, if they know themselves, they will ever remain so.

The feats of generals who commit slaughter on their fellow-creatures without bounds, and without remorse, stand high in the records of history. Gustavus Adolphus was eminent; but he did not attain eminence from a cause so detestable. He protected those who were oppressed and suffered for conscience sake. He drew the sword in vindication of the independence of the human mind; and as he was, in this instance, the protector, he may be regarded in all the acts of his life as the hero of the human race. The majority of those who flocked to his standard, whether foreign or native, were not ordinary soldiers serving for pay and the chance of spoil. They were animated by the common spirit of liberty, and felt themselves to be important in contending for a cause that is common to man. Courage was here of the highest kind. It was stimulated by a generous motive applied to a noble purpose, and it produced an exalted effect throughout. The Swedish nation, and their sovereign Gustavus Adolphus, rendered themselves dear to mankind by their generosity. Their valour in the field was a theme of wonder; their private virtues commanded the esteem of the good.

The Swede, frugal by habit and simple in manner of living, is capable of self-denial in the midst of luxuries. Hardy in frame and firm in courage, he endures fatigues without repining. He possesses a fair share of physical force, and an animated power of

impression at the point of attack. He is brave as any man, devoted to his duty almost beyond example, mindful of his God in the full tide of success, even in the conflict of battle, and true to his country in the midst of disaster. The Swede was sometimes, indeed often rashly, compromised by the ardour of the heroic Charles; but he was always a Swede, and, in so far as human power and human courage can be supposed to go, he was invincible. The military glory of Sweden was brilliant; but its duration was not long. It has now waned; but the Swedes themselves are still respectable. They furnish an example, rare in history, of a nation losing power and retaining moral character. The phenomenon is not common; and if it be allowable to form conjecture concerning the cause of it, it may be presumed that, as Sweden's power arose from a contingent superiority of military talent, the power has declined in the revolution of things, without impairing the constitutional virtues of the subject; hence it is not precluded from chances of reappearance, inasmuch as the Swede has not, like most others, lost the physical fund of expansion in the exhausting operations of the luxury which usually accompanies the possession of riches.

The Swedish nation may be said to be constitutionally free. It possesses the privilege of deposing and electing a sovereign, or chief of the state; and, if it be not an irrelevant remark, it may be said to have been fortunate, on a recent occasion, in the use which it made of that privilege. The person elected Crown Prince had been a *man* before he became a prince; and there are grounds to believe that he will continue to be a *man* now that he is seated on a throne. He is not of the race of kings; but he appears to have a genuine legitimacy from nature, namely, a sound judgment and a benevolent heart,—more beneficial to mankind, therefore fitter to rule, than a fool or a tyrant who derives his origin from the loins of the imperial Cæsars.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.

THE Austrian army is the most numerous; and, since the time of the Emperor Joseph, the best appointed of any of the armies which appear on the German continent. The materials of which it is composed, besides stray vagabonds of foreign countries, are drawn from Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia; and, in so far as respects physical properties, they are good. The Austrians are generally of a higher stature and possess more muscular force than the French. They are less alert, and do not, upon the whole, possess qualities for active war equal to the people of that nation.

As the Austrian soldier enlists only for a given term of years, he retains the power of disposing of himself at the expiration of the term; consequently he may be supposed to retain the feeling that he is still a man, or that there is a time before him when he may again assume the name of citizen. But, with the reserve of retiring from service at a given time, and thus reassuming citizenship, he seems to forget that he is other than a living machine to be moulded into any form for the purposes of war that the tactician chooses. The Austrian manual, tactic, and evolution, are performed with a mechanical correctness of the greatest precision. The system of interior economy is singularly exact according to external appearance; it is not always so well adjusted according to the intimate nature of things. The Austrian army appears to be constructed on the idea that the materials of it are of one brute animation. They are arranged in their places by external resemblance, or quantity of animal matter, and they are moved into action by external force. The action is regular and calculable, where the external force is strong and the powers of resistance weak; it stagnates, if the impelling power be little impressive; and it recoils, if the obstacles to forward progress be numerous and well placed. The forward act in war is here moved by a cause *a tergo* threatening punishment, or it is solicited forward by hopes of plunder as a private advantage. These causes are stimulant; but they are adventitious, and only

relatively stimulant. They remit in force, or they are withdrawn on some occasions; but, even where they are present and exist in force, they do not act equally on all, for all are not equally susceptible, consequently the effect produced is not uniform and consistent. If the movement of an army be directed by the impulse of fluctuating causes, it cannot be expected to be other than capricious and uncertain; and hence it is that the Austrian army, though perfectly organized according to external appearance, fails not unfrequently in the day of battle, in defect of that species of union which arises from the operation of an internal principle.

The natives of Austria are attached to the house of Hapsburg as strongly perhaps as most subjects are attached to princes. The feeling stimulates to good, even to heroic conduct. This was manifested in the late war, where the Arch-duke Charles of Austria commanded the Austrian army. It may be a question with some whether or not the Arch-duke's military genius be of a superior cast. It is certain that no change was made by him in tactic which could be supposed to lead to the success which he frequently obtained. He was a prince of Austria; and as a prince, his presence seemed to operate on the army by a kind of electric influence. As the materials were the same, there was no ostensible cause for the success of the Arch-duke and the discomfiture of others, unless from the spirit of animation communicated to the mind of the soldiery by the presence of a person, who was beloved, even idolized, as a national hero. The army was animated and energetic when under the command of Charles; it was inert as the Aulic Council, when under the command of others—a mere automaton mechanically correct in its proceedings, but without that elasticity and buoyancy in its movements which darts to its point from something within itself.

The Austrian army stands high in the estimation of military men. Estimated by exterior appearance, namely, physical form, correct mechanical arrangement in the ranks by size and figure, precision and order in movement, it has perhaps no superior in the present time: it notwithstanding appears to the writer to be an army only of the second order. The Austrian organization and economy, the French intelligence and activity, the English courage and execution, combined in a military body, might be regarded as an instrument of military excellence.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

FREDERICK the Second, king of Prussia, is regarded as the most skilful master in the art of war which the last century, or which, according to some, any age of the world has produced. He raised his nation to military eminence by his achievements; and this he is supposed to have done by inventing, or improving a system of tactic, which, while it astonished by apparent novelty, fortunately for him excited the desire to imitate, rather than the endeavour to counteract by other invention. The person who imitates becomes a scholar in the school of a master; and, inasmuch as he is a scholar, he is inferior in his own estimation, and only half prepared for defence, as not thoroughly acquainted with the principle on which he commits himself to act.

The king of Prussia did not possess better materials for the formation of an army than other generals of his time. He arranged them differently; and, in so doing, he appears to have taken, though not strictly speaking a new, at least a somewhat different, view from his predecessors in regard to the manner through which effect in war is produced. Frederick enrolled himself at an early age in the ranks of philosophers. He was self-sufficient, and perhaps imperious as a royal philosopher; but he does not appear to have penetrated deep into the interior of the science. Philosophy, which is knowledge of man's self and of the intimate nature of things, brings proof to every reflecting mind that reciprocity of action and reaction, constituting order and harmony of movement throughout the whole extent of the universe, is God's ordination for the government of man in all his relations. The assumption of power by individuals is, therefore, to be considered as an usurpation, and, as such, a proceeding in direct opposition to the law of the Deity. It subverts constitutional order; and it begets tyranny, which is a political act destructive of human happiness. Frederick ranks distinctly in the class of tyrants; that is, of men who usurp the empire of the Deity by arrogating power to themselves. Whatever might be his pretensions to philosophy, his history proves practically that he was a man who did

not know the true basis of human action. He worked on man only through his passions; he in fact regarded the race as machines of organized animal matter to be moved into action, or restrained from acting, by the force of material or visible things. As he thus appears to have considered man as an automaton, or mass of animated matter, he was led to despise him, and to mock the idea of his mental independence. He employed force as an engine of government, civil or military; and in this manner he laboured to extinguish independence of mind, which is all that gives value to man as a rational being.

The discomfiture of hostile force, whether by the impression of fear which urges it to withdraw from the combat, or by the destruction of life, which destroys its power of resistance, is the purpose of a battle. A provision of force calculated to destroy, and an estimate of powers calculated to intimidate, are consequently the chief objects of study with a military commander. These are major engines, and they are both comprehended in the Prussian system of war. The authority of the commander is supported by fear of punishment. Fear *a tergo* gives impulse to the forward movement of the mass. But, as the impulse is external, and the machine on which it acts complicated in its nature, and not all of one temper, the movement is often uncertain, irregular, and capricious. If the forward act be urged by the impulse of fear *a tergo*, as fear has no measure or self-command, there can be no calculation of the issue of the act; and thus it is that, notwithstanding the machine-like correctness of the explosions of the Prussian firelock, the destroying effect upon the enemy, even in Frederick's time, was sometimes almost nothing; for it was made without other aim than order and correctness in time. Frederick, it may be presumed, had a purpose in what he did; and, on that purpose, he appears to have instituted regular platoon firing, with a view to amuse or intimidate, rather than to destroy: destruction was the result of actual charge made under protection of a close firing; firing was a mask.

The Prussian system of tactic and evolution is one of great correctness, and generally held to be one of great value. It professes to teach the art of concentrating the power of fire, and of directing it, when so concentrated, with order and precision upon given points of the enemy's line. The direction of the force in the manner alluded to is a reality in the great art of war; and,

as Frederick employed it skilfully, his success in the combat may be supposed to be in a great measure owing to the use which he made of it, that is, the superiority which he possessed in the conducting of marches and the developement of force on vulnerable points. Promptitude in applying force, and skill in fixing the point of application, mark the genius of a general. Frederick endeavoured to render generalship a science under the guidance of systematic rule. In this he made some progress; which may be reckoned a main cause of the issue of his battles. But, besides science, there were other causes in the history of Frederick's wars which favoured the success of his arms. Some of them were factitious rather than real; and, as such, they disappear when they are known and estimated by the lights of unprejudiced reason. The king of Prussia was impressed strongly with an idea of the servile nature of the human race; and as he knew, from observation, that armies are oftener intimidated by appearances to leave the field of battle, than actually driven from it by the touch of force, he profited by his knowledge, and brought forward an instrument of deception, namely, a line of soldiers of huge size and imposing aspect, to aid his purpose. The appearance of the heavy mass operated on the ignorant; hence success resulted from appearance by imposing upon fears, not in reality by the touch of force; for, had the question been tried and decided by the firelock, it is evident that the chances are against the bulky mass.

The imposition of fear by the demonstration of a bulky mass made a part in the Prussian system of war. The mode of tactic and evolution which was new modelled, or changed from what was practised at the time, presented itself as a novelty; and, as such, it was deemed a product of genius embarrassing to the opponent as not thoroughly understood. The manner of directing an accumulated weight of fire upon given points of the enemy's line directly or obliquely, the exactness of arrangement, the correspondence of combined movements, the precision of effect, in so far as respects order and time, are all improvements which belong to the Prussian tactic. The authority of command, and the fear of punishment from a dreaded authority, ensured the due performance of the mechanical act of drilling. The continuance of drilling for a length of time gave a facility and aptness in execution; hence arose advantages in action over a less practised enemy. Besides the battalion soldier who fought the actual

battle, the officer was often a man of merit, at least for execution. The whole of the officers, to whom superior command was given, conceived the principle of the new system perfectly, and performed the assigned duties with fidelity and correctness. The success of the Prussian arms was great. It astonished those who were accustomed to calculate effect by mere quantity of matter; and, as may be inferred from what has been said, it arose from causes, some of which are real and will always have effect, some factitious or accidental, and not to be deemed foundations on which to calculate events.

It is generally known that an impression of fear was the principle assumed by the king of Prussia in driving the Prussian recruit into military form: it predominated even in the advance to battle. The impression of fear on the human mind degrades the dignity of man's nature, and extinguishes all that is noble in his character; and, if there be faith in history, or even in the testimony of our senses, we cannot refuse to assent to the position that, though the impression of fear *a tergo* may prevent recoil from dangers in front, it cannot, in its nature, produce a forward act which deserves the name of courage. This is a fact of common observation, and it may be considered as a principle in the original constitution and frame of man; hence it is inferred, that if the conduct of the Prussian troops was good, (and it was such as may be called heroic in many instances) the explanation of the fact must be sought for in some other cause than the impression of fear on the organism of a reluctant animal. The ostensible cause of success is not in this case the real or sole cause. The king of Prussia had formed a system of tactic which was considered as new. It struck at first sight as a novelty; and, acting by the law of fashion, it excited the desire of imitation, rather than the effort of counteraction by means calculated to render its effect void. The king understood the extent of the operation of the principle upon which his system was founded, as well as the amount of the effect which it was capable of producing. He was master of his own views in disposing of his engines; and, as he was sovereign, he was responsible to himself only for what he did. He knew the powers of his soldiers: he had tried them often, and witnessed the extent of their value. Most of them had served long, and acquired such confidence in their skill as arises from long



service. They were expert, at least familiar with the use of arms; and they had learned by experience to form a comparatively just estimate of themselves and of common things. The qualifications of the soldier were in some degree the product of the mechanical tactic and discipline of the Prussian school; they were strengthened and confirmed by experience in actual war, in the midst of storms and battles. These acquirements were valuable in themselves; but they were not the sole or primary causes of success, and not the whole of the causes which gave success to Prussian arms in the seven years' war.

The condition of Prussia was calculated, at the time of her greatest danger, to elicit from the mass of the people, and, among others, from the members of the army, higher sentiments of patriotism, honour, and energy, than can be supposed to arise from a system of military training, the leading principle of action in which consists in fear of punishment in case of failure. Heroic actions do not originate from sensations of fear; yet the acts of the Prussian soldiers were often heroic, individually as well as collectively. The circumstances of the nation and the monarch, as surrounded and threatened to be overwhelmed by an host of enemies, were somewhat peculiar. They may be supposed to have acted on the common sympathies of man's nature, so as to excite sentiments of generosity in all, to unite all hearts in common defence, and to give such energy to action in war as could not be given to it by means that are merely mechanical. The Prussian nation was then simple, as not enervated by the luxuries which follow the possession of wealth; and, as it was recently elevated from an electorate to a royalty, it began to feel the power of the expanding passion which is peculiar to man as he emerges from obscurity. The Prussian peasant may be supposed, in common with agricultural peasants, to have venerated the soil on which he was born and which covered the ashes of his fathers. He was irritated against those who attempted to violate it by force of arms, even ardent in its defence from feelings of resentment. The old soldier, who had fought and been victorious in battle, was proud of the renown which he had gained in long service; the recruit, whether levied by conscription, or trepanned by art, was for the most part carried away in the torrent of events; and, unknown to himself, or almost in spite of himself, he imbibed sympathetically the spirit of war.

He was prevented from leaving his standard on occasional chagrins by the surveillance of persons who were inured to war and stanch in loyalty; and, as thus prevented from desertion on common occasions, his ideas were turned into another channel, and he became important in himself by associating with those who had acquired military renown. He was warmed by example, and his exertions rose superior to the exertions of a man who acts merely by the impulse of fear. The whole of the army, forced or volunteer, foreign or native, was thus roused artificially to exertion through desire of fame; and this desire of fame, acting as an impulse to the machine, gave union and strength to its movements. The king was bold and enterprising, even rash as a general. His pleasure was in battle, his delight in the carnage of the field. He was personally indefatigable, and, as he travelled from combat to combat, generally from victory to victory by forced marches, he gave the soldier little time to turn his thoughts to the difficulties and perils of his situation. The faculties were absorbed in the idea of military fame. The king had the address to keep the idea always before the eye, and to hold out specious expectations of another victory and a day of rest. The presence of a sovereign with an army in the field, especially of a sovereign who shares fatigues and dangers, rarely fails of assuring the attachment of the soldiery. Frederick was present in the hardest service, displayed no royal pomp, and shunned no danger; consequently he was a prominent object in the soldier's eye. He often conversed with the veteran; and, as he knew how to be familiar without compromising the respect which is due to a king and a commander, the royal *bon mot* circulated through the ranks as a talisman which served good purposes in difficult times. Frederick had studied the art of war scientifically—had attained knowledge of its principle, and was unquestionably skilful; but there is reason to think that the opinion which the world held of his skill was higher than true history warrants. He went on with confidence, and was opposed in most cases with feebleness and fear. The enemy was in some manner paralysed in the seven years' war by viewing him through a magnifier; he was seen in a clearer light at a subsequent period, namely, 1778, and he ceased to be an object of wonder.

The success of Frederick, king of Prussia, excited the admiration of Europe in the seven years' war. It was deemed a

success belonging only to a man of paramount military genius; and as it is important to know, so it will be right to investigate and ascertain, in so far as we can, the hinge on which that success might be thought to turn. The author cannot pretend to do it in a satisfactory manner; but he thinks he is able to discover some of the causes with which the success was materially connected. A change in mode of tactic and manœuvre, by presenting an appearance of novelty, threw the enemy into embarrassment, as not prepared to oppose, or as conscious of inferiority according to the mode in which he ought to oppose. The principle of attacking positions, instead of sustaining attacks in defensible ones, was conspicuous in Frederick's system. It was powerful, inasmuch as it gave extra courage to those who attacked, and at the same time diminishing the courage and powers of exertion of those who resisted. Celerity of movement, and precision in developing lines or columns on given points of the enemy's position, was a striking feature in Frederick's campaigns. These, with promptitude and decision in attack supported by the presence of the king, may be considered as the great cause of what happened. They are ostensible and valid causes which proceeded from the king himself. There are others which arose without him, or rather in spite of him. These were excited by the dangers which threatened Prussia as a country, and Frederick as an oppressed sovereign. There is a germ of generosity in the human breast as uncorrupted by the intercourse of the world; and this generosity of the simple soldier appears, on this occasion, to have been the solid bulwark of the Prussian empire. Frederick's ostensible principle for the formation and management of armies consisted, as already observed, in fear *a tergo* urging to forward movement. It is not possible that fear should move an individual or an army to an act of heroism; the heroic act was notwithstanding moved, and it is evident that it was here moved by the inherent spirit of the man, in contradiction to the dominant principle of the prince. Frederick undervalued mankind generally, and regarded his followers—officers or soldiers—as mere instruments, valuable only as they were useful to purposes. He did not, he said, reckon more than three or four generals in his army: the others were machines, competent to execute, not to design. Frederick was a man without a heart—it may be safely said, without a moral principle.

The base, mean, and wicked expedients, by which he attempted to fill the ranks of his army, excite a detestation of his character, which his military glory never can efface; and the indifference which he is said to have shewn for his troops, when their services became less necessary to his preservation, proves him to have been in reality a despicable man. He was not superior in anything except in what relates to war; and, as success in war is relative to the circumstances and condition of the enemy, those circumstances and that condition must be known, and estimated correctly, before an opinion can be safely formed of the real merit of the conqueror. The principal opponent of Frederick was slow and cautious in his proceedings, and moreover a scholar in Frederick's military school. The enemy's general, as shackled by the orders of council, and not at liberty to follow the impulses of his own genius, was not animated by the spirit of enterprize as Frederick himself was. Frederick was responsible only to himself: he was rapid, and bold even to rashness; and to that rashness, which astonished and paralysed, he apparently owed much of his success.

Frederick effected a change, and presumptively an improvement, in the art of war. His general system of tactic, namely, movement and developement of movement, was scientific. He improved the organization of hussar force, and applied it with skill in combat; he did not appear to understand the use and management of light troops. His success in the seven years' war was great; the causes of it were adventitious—the product of contingent circumstances, rather than the evolution of principles that were altogether new. He was foiled in the year 1778 by the Emperor Joseph; and his embarrassments were so great as to prove to posterity that his genius was not paramount to that of all others, or his military instrument a *chef d'œuvre* of human genius. The fact of its insufficiency has been proved to demonstration in later times. The tactic, and all forms of Frederick's discipline, were adhered to and practised assiduously by Frederick's successor. The Prussian army was considered by many as irresistible in the field; yet, when the case was tried, William, the Prussian king, candidly acknowledged that his best battalions could not stand before the loosely organized soldiers of the French republic. The soldiers of republican France were irregular, comparatively with the soldiers of Prussia: they were

intelligent, active, and brave. They were as much before the Prussian battalions in celerity of movement and promptitude in action, as the Prussians had been before the Austrians in the seven years' war; and this celerity more than compensated other defects. The Prussian army, after its repulse from the frontier of France, appeared to be crest-fallen and humbled. In the course of the war 1803, the reigning king of Prussia, bribed at one time, bullied at another, threatened and insulted beyond enduring, took the field against Napoleon—in despair. He was defeated, and the machine of the great Frederick was unhinged and broken to pieces by a single action. When the punishment of ambition and folly overtook Napoleon in Russia, a part of the Prussian troops, which acted with him as auxiliary, revolted from his standard. His power was broken; and the Prussian peasantry, rising enthusiastically in mass for the vindication of what was called the liberty of the country, rapidly assumed a military form of organization, and entered courageously into the field of war. This new army had spirit, at least a desire of revenge for supposed or real ill treatment. A part of it, headed by the veteran and heroic Blücher, pressed eagerly to the frontier of France on Napoleon's return from Elba. It may be said to have been taken unawares on the frontier. It sustained a severe action at Ligny on the 16th of June. Defeated, but not dispersed, it rallied at Wavre, and advanced to Waterloo on the 18th, to the aid of the duke of Wellington. It can scarcely be said to have fought on that field; but its appearance, at a lucky juncture, must be admitted by every one to have determined the enemy to give up the combat. The French retreated, and the retreat soon became route. The fugitives were pursued by the Prussians, who, according to report, were insatiate of blood. The Prussians are not merciful to a vanquished enemy at any time; here they were barbarous and cruel, as judged by the rules of modern warfare.

Prussia was humbled and degraded by Napoleon. She is now restored to her place, or rather exalted to the place of one of the primary military powers in Europe, by the favour of Great Britain and Russia. She holds herself high; for her territory is extended by the partition of the country of defenceless neighbours. Her armies are, or may be, doubled by the overflowings of her population; but it is not probable that she will ever again be a respectable and commanding nation. The despotic meanness of the

king suppresses every expansion of mind. The promise of a free or representative government has been forfeited by him; and it may be presumed, on fair grounds of reasoning, that whatever happen to him, whether he rise high or fall low, his fate will not excite interest with honest and honourable men. He crouched to the power of Napoleon while fortune smiled on his steps; he deserted him on his first reverse; and he has not been grateful, not even just, to the peasantry who raised him from the dust\*.

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## CHAPTER XV.

### MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN NATION.

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THE Russian nation, long barbarous and obscure, rose to eminence in the course of the last century. Their military character now stands high in common opinion, higher perhaps than it deserves to stand, if things be estimated by a true rule. The Russian peasant, like other barbarians, possesses physical properties suitable for the business of war; and Russian arms may be successful in the field from the physical property of the soldier, independently of his proficiency in military tactic and discipline. The Tatars, Cossacks, Persians, and Turks, who have until lately, with the exception of Charles XII. of Sweden, been the principal opponents of Russian arms, do not furnish a field for an estimate of military merit according to the military ideas of modern Europe. The Turk is the enemy over whom Russian successes are most vaunted, at least best known to Europeans; and the Turk of recent times is miserably degenerated from what he has been. The spirit of conquest was the spirit of the Turk when he lived in camps. The spirit of conquest was lost in Constantinople, and with it was lost the celebrated discipline of the Janissaries, who are now armed men with little else than force, courage, and insolence.

The materials of the Russian army are drawn from an immense

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\* Frederic William died in 1840.



tract of country—from nations differing in language, manners, and customs, from each other. The mass consists of persons who are in the semi-barbarous stage of society; and as they are collected from an extensive field, they are unlike to each other in external appearance and internal character: they are put together according to size and figure, not according to internal character and national sympathies. The recruit undergoes severe trial in his moulding. He suffers, but he does not complain; for born in slavery, he permits his person to be moulded into any form which his physical capacity is capable of sustaining; or succumbing when he can no longer sustain, he sinks to eternal rest among a multitude of companions.

The present tactic of the Russian army is laid on a similar base with that of the king of Prussia. The principle which influences the movement is the same; and the surveillance of execution is not less severe and rigorous. The attempt is made to expel every feeling which belongs to a human being, except the dread of military authority, from the mind of the recruit; and, as obedience to military authority is the object expected from military training, the obedience is assured in the present case, in so far as it can be, through actual punishment, or the fear of its infliction. Fear is the paramount motive which urges to action; and fear produces only an unwilling act\*. There are incitements to action which

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\* The Author once had the perusal of some MS. letters of the celebrated Marshal Keith, who was many years in the Russian army, and who afterwards served with the king of Prussia in the seven years' war. The marshal fought against the king's troops at Sheriffmuir, and his party being defeated, he was obliged to abandon his country. He went to Russia, entered into the Russian service, and attained high reputation as a soldier and man of talent; but his talent brought him enemies, and he went to join the king of Prussia. He was killed in battle, and died like a hero without a groan. The marshal was one of the best soldiers of the time, and he stood fair among the philosophers or free-thinking spirits of the age. His letters are written to particular friends, and contain much

information respecting the politics and eminent characters of the time. They are written with a bold pen; they speak the sentiments of a soldier of science; but as they bear strong marks of prejudice against the occupier of the British throne, the language is not always decorous. An extract made from one of the papers, relative to the composition of the Russian army in the time of Peter the Great, is here subjoined.

"The command of a whole army is held by a field-marshal, with a lieutenant-general and a major-general under him. In case of death or absence of the field-marshal, the general of ordnance takes the command, the lieutenant-general and major-general continuing as before. The artillery regiment consists of matrosses, bombardiers, gunners, miners, and

arise from ideas of honour and desire of glory, which inflame nations with sentiments of valour to enthusiasm; but these cannot be supposed to have place in an army formed under the rule of the Russian military institution. It is not unwarrantable to say that

and woodsmen. It amounts to 2400 effective. The Russian army was divided into bodies of nine regiments, called divisions, commanded by a general, a lieutenant-general, a major-general, and a brigadier-general.

"A regiment consists of two battalions, commanded by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and two majors. A battalion contains four companies; the company 150 private men, a captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, two sergeants, a sub-ensign, a captain-at-arms, a quartermaster, a clerk, a surgeon, who acts as barber, two drummers, a timber-man, five denizens, or officers' servants, who do not appear in the ranks, 14 cartmen or waggoners, in all 185, the battalion 732. Each company has a separate set of colours. The generals have no regiment, and field-officers have no company. The paymaster or commissary pays the company, arranges the business of clothing, and pays the recruiting-money.

"The army in general is recruited by the governors of the different provinces, from draughts of peasantry—not vagabonds: the spare youth of large towns, not employed in trade or manufacture, also contribute. The name of regiments was first taken from provinces or districts, towns or cities. Some were also called after the names of individuals. Grenadier companies go by the name of the commandant-general of the division. Regiments are numbered from one onwards, so are the companies. The original mode of charging for battle was in four lines; the two first kneel, the third stoops, the fourth is erect. This was the general mode; it changes with circumstances.

"The emperor's own division consisted of four regiments, each of which had a company of grenadiers extra of other regiments. The first regiment was the Preobrazhensky, of four battalions; the second, Samoenofsky of three; the third,

Ingeomanlandsky, of three also; the fourth, Astrachansky, of two—thirteen battalions of fine men, including four companies of grenadiers. Each regiment of the royal division had an additional captain-lieutenant. Besides two companies of bombardiers, gunners, and miners, there is an additional officer to each battalion of the artillery, termed engineer.

"Two hundred thousand foot made up the Czar Peter's infantry, the cavalry consisted of one hundred thousand, besides Cossacks and Kalmucks, who bring from one to two hundred thousand into the field. The uniform of the Russian infantry is green with scarlet facings and waistcoat, white breeches, high cocked hats, and white cockades; that of the cavalry, blue faced with scarlet, hats and cockades, leather breeches, and boots; that of the artillery, scarlet turned up with blue. The Tatars and Kalmucks wear a variety of dresses, according to their various *costumes*."

Such was the composition of the Russian army in the time of Peter the Great. It appears from Marshal Keith's MSS. that the base of this system of military arrangement had been laid by general Drummond, who with General Dalzell served in the Muscovite army about the middle of the 17th century. Memoirs on the subject were submitted, by the Empress Elizabeth, to Marshal Keith for perusal, and it appeared to him that Peter had built upon the foundation of these memoirs. The Russian army was augmented and modelled by Lascy and Keith. Keith manifested on all occasions an unwillingness to change the plan of Peter's arrangements. Lascy and Keith were perfectly of accord in their general views, and for the most part coincided in their details. Keith was partial to Peter's arrangements; but he acknowledges that the king of Prussia had made the military system still more complete: his tactic was almost his own.

Russian training looks no higher than to form a machine of human materials possessing locomotive power, and calculated to perform offices according to a mechanical rule, under the stimulation of fear of punishment for non-performance. The movement advances against obstacles, or is prevented from recoiling from obstacles, by an external cause of force urging it forward. Hence, as this cause of external force moves, regulates, and restrains, it is possible to understand how an army may remain at its post, and work its musket mechanically as long as its physical capability endures. An army constituted on this base, and acting on this motive, can only be supposed to act in a given tract, and to produce effect through a given channel. It is an automaton; and, if perfect according to its rule, it is without motive of its own, consequently, it is motionless, except by the word of command. If it be less sensible of fear from the sabre or bayonet of the enemy who is in front, than from the halbert of the sergeant who is in the rear, it remains at its post, and suffers itself to be cut to pieces as an act of obedience; for, having no idea of independence, or estimate of the human condition from self-knowledge, it makes no effort to extricate itself from danger by an act of its own. Such may be supposed to be the character of an army formed according to the principle of the king of Prussia, and the practice of Russia. It has no action of its own, and no motive to act, except through impressions of fear urging it forward; it consequently moves reluctantly, or it remains stationary, as not forcibly stimulated to advance.

The highest aim of Russian discipline is directed to render man individually a mechanical instrument, and an army a mass of individuals trained to pour out a torrent of destroying fire from the musket; it is therefore evident that the value or destroying power of the musket can only consist in the correctness with which the point is directed to the object, by a person who looks with his own eye, and judges with his own judgment. The Russian army is put together mechanically, by the appearance rather than by the intrinsic qualities of the parts. It strikes the eye impressively as a machine of power; for, as the parts are correctly adjusted in their places by their outward figures, the ranks have the semblance of firmness and solidity, order and uniformity, as if they had been dressed by the line

and plummet. The whole thus put together, and trained to move by cadenced step, gives the impression of irresistibility to whatever point it tends. The Russian soldier, expert and dextrous in the manual, rolls fire from right to left, and from left to right, with a rapidity not to be exceeded, and so exactly measured in time, as if it proceeded from a machine worked by a mechanical spring. The exhibition is imposing on the parade, or at the review; but the appearance is deceptive, and the effect is often nugatory on the field of battle. The tactician, in training the Russian soldier to the exercise of the firelock, seems to regard rapidity of explosion and precision in time, as points of more importance than the direction of the bullet which strikes and disables the enemy. This is fairly inferred from observation; and here it may be remarked, that if rapidity and closeness of firing be the object of training, while the direction of the bullet which destroys the enemy is little regarded, the object is mistaken. The fire is thrown away without purpose, except in so far as regular and close firing may be supposed, by acting on the ear, to intimidate one part, and to give confidence to another part of the contending host.

The Russian discipline, though the most mechanical, the most rigid, and the most systematic of any in Europe, has not yet attained that degree of perfection in execution which produces uniform and well-directed exertion on all occasions, or which assures subordination in all the circumstances of actual war. The Russian soldier, who may be regarded as a part in a machine of fire, not unfrequently expends his ammunition without an adequate object. He moves forward, in ordinary circumstances, under the impulse of propelling fear, stimulated or stunned by his own tremendous explosion; but he does not always move in a steady progressive course. The impulse is, or may be obscured; and, in spite of the protecting fire of the machine itself, fear invades, and the artificial fabric, guarded by tactical care as it may be said, rushes headlong to disorganization and ruin. The illustrations are numerous. Instances are not even rare where Russian troops, after expending ammunition without object, have given themselves up to be slaughtered, or taken prisoner, without resistance; or where, throwing off the restraints of discipline, they have run into the wildest insubordination, namely, drunkenness and plunder, even in the midst

of battle. It is thus that, in spite of the influence of causes which operate compulsively on man, the nature of man revolts occasionally from constraint, and reclaims the independence of its untamed condition.

The Russian army has attained a high name among military nations. It has been praised for courage, and it has been praised for discipline. But, if causes be traced to their source, the whole of the fame that has been given to it will not perhaps be judged to be the fruit of formal military training. The Russian soldier, though the slave of military authority, and reduced apparently to an automaton performing a routine of duty, still retains a quality of native barbarism, namely, covetousness of the spoils of the enemy. The Turkish empire has been the most conspicuous scene of Russian glory; and, as the Turkish territory presents many things which the Russian soldier covets, the hopes of booty give animation to the forward act, and exalt the Russian courage through a cause which does not belong to military virtue. Besides the incentive of plunder, and it is strong among the barbarous as well as the civilized, the Russian soldier, in spite of every rigour of training calculated to obscure or obliterate the thinking faculty, still retains something of the innate propensities which belong to the human character. His ideas are originally few and simple; and, as little distracted by the various presentations of pleasure which attach civilized men to life for the sake of multiplied sensual gratification, the Russian soldier proceeds in the execution of his duty steadily and resolutely, whether to mount the breach by command, or to be cut to pieces at a post from which he has not been relieved by accredited authority. This has been exemplified in numerous instances; but this, notwithstanding the power of tactic, discipline and fear *a tergo*, has been unequal in others to carry him to the point of attack, until he was put under the banners of religion by the address of the commander. In this manner, daunted by the appearance of opposing force, he has sometimes recoiled, and only been induced to advance under the protection of a crucifix carried by a priest. The history of Suwarrow presents numerous instances of the effect of similar impulse, when the means of common coercion had failed. Suwarrow, considered by many as a buffoon, was in reality a man of genius. His buffooneries were strange, but they were not unmeaning. When he put the dif-

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ferent members of his own body to rest by the word of command, he seemed to know that he inculcated a lesson of implicit obedience to the Russian soldiery. Implicit obedience was the great aim of Suwarrow's labour; but common means were sometimes insufficient for assuring it. His original genius then found a remedy. He knew the Russian character; and when the Russian army was restive, so as not to be moved by the common sources of the tactician, he succeeded in animating it, by infusing enthusiasm or fanaticism, through means which lie beyond the mere tactician's comprehension. The credulous were impressed with an opinion that Suwarrow had his days of inspiration; and in this belief, after being exhausted with toil and discomfited by the accidents of war, they started up in new strength to acts of daring at the electrifying sound of his wizard voice.

The Russian army, as it presents itself to the eye of the common observer, seems to be almost perfect in the mechanical arrangements of its parts. The celerity with which the manual is performed, the exact correspondence in time, and the correctness of movement in evolution, cannot perhaps be exceeded. A Russian battalion throws out a greater quantity of fire in a given time than any other European battalion of equal numbers. It scatters it without aim or direction, but the explosions so correctly correspond in time as if the triggers of the firelocks were drawn by one and the same finger. The lines, when arranged in order of battle, are solid and apparently firm as walls of iron. The columns seem to be impenetrable masses; the movements are rapid; and, while the nature of the ground on which the action lies admits of union and rapid movement, the Russian army may be thought to be irresistible. It moves rapidly; but, as it consists of many parts, the unity and consistency of the movement depend upon a combination of causes which cannot be always commanded, consequently it is liable to be deranged by the contingencies of a military field. When deranged by contingencies it is not soon put right; for as it has no rallying power within itself, every part must be put right as it were by force. Hence it may be supposed, that if a skilful enemy, who studies things in their true relations, refuse close action, with a view to produce change in the mechanical disposition of the parts, and to entice the machine to expend its ammunition without adequate object, the discomfiture of a Russian army is half assured. When Russians begin to fire, they



would appear to fire without interval and without aim, until they sweep the field by showers of bullets, obtain possession of it by the intimidation of noise, or until they expend their ammunition, exhaust their power, and become comparatively harmless. The Russian soldier is not allowed the exercise of his intellectual discretion. He is supposed to act by order, and by order only; consequently, if he have no order to advance to a given point, or to retire upon a given position, he stands still, according to the letter of his discipline, to be slaughtered on the spot; for his life is devoted to obedience.

The Russian army, the military tactic of which is as perfect perhaps as mechanical tactic can be made, is moreover eminent for the order of its economy. The clothing of the soldier is substantial and good of its kind; fashioned so as to be convenient and useful, not cut fantastically to please the eye of a dress-making commander. The soldier is at ease while clothed in uniform; he is not fettered when he sleeps accoutred. The shoes, among other things, are excellent—the soles thick, the quarter deep, the leather impenetrable to wet by impregnation with tallow. The cloak, with which every soldier is furnished, is of strong, thick cloth. It serves as a covering at night, and as a defence against cold or wet, when on duty by night or day. The economical arrangements of the Russian army are laid on a good foundation; and, in order that they be not disturbed by common contingencies, every regiment has a certain number of workmen allotted to itself for the execution of its own regimental business. Besides professed regimental workmen, every soldier in the ranks knows to mend his own clothes, to sew a plain seam, or to repair any accident that happens to his shoes. Hence the shoes and clothes of the Russian soldier, though patched and mended, are never ragged and torn; and it is moreover true, though it may seem incredible to those who have only seen the British army in its helplessness, that the whole of the Russian army is so instructed in what relates to its own concerns, as to be capable of clothing itself from head to foot in the space of three or four days.

The Russian army, which is so exact in tactic and economical arrangement, has also acquired fame on account of its exertions and its courage. This seems to be the opinion of the time; but it does not appear, on close examination, to be a true one: the physical qualities of the Russian do not stand high in a scale of

comparison. The power of the native Russian, at least the balance of power as judged by bulk, is ordinarily in the upper section of the body. The face is broad, the features coarse; the trunk heavy, and long relatively to height; the thighs and legs short, without grace in the outline, round, fleshy, and without the indent of muscular action. The Russian soldiers move in the military step at all times. The Russian step is short, the repetition quick; but, as action is scarcely ever brought to exertion, it is capable of being long continued with little comparative fatigue. The real Russian has, as now said, no pretension to grace and beauty of figure. The skin is coarse and harsh; and, though it be more frequently washed than the skin of any other soldier in Europe, it notwithstanding often appears, as viewed superficially, to be dirty, dry, and withered. The Russian soldier wears the hair long and plaited; his combs are bad, or rarely used; and he is not unfrequently overrun with vermin. He has, as already observed, a weighty carcass and considerable brute force; but he is not distinguished for activity and personal exertion; and, unless in the exercise of the firelock, or other exercise of war to which he has been long and rigorously drilled, he is awkward and helpless compared with other peasantry in Europe.

As the Russian soldier is not preeminent over the common soldiery of Europe in physical properties, neither does he seem to go beyond them in moral qualities. He is good natured; grateful for kindnesses rendered to him; obedient to superiors, either from direct fear, or from long habit of reverence to lords and masters. He is not simply good natured; he is cheerful in temper, and not dull in perception, but the limits of his ideas are circumscribed. He loves money in common with other men, perhaps as eagerly as most men; and it may be assumed with reason that love of money, or the hope of obtaining the spoils of the enemy, is the main incentive which, exclusive of the command of the autocrat, sends him to the field of war. The desire of acquiring operates on the mass, and becomes a paramount object of action; but the mind is simple, and, as uncorrupted by varied artifice, it is more easily moved to acts of heroism and extraordinary sacrifice than the mind of the mere mercenary soldier: Suwarrow, as already said, knew better than any other of the Russian generals how to bring it out.

The Russian peasant lives on homely and coarse fare in his

native land—brown bread and cucumber are his chief support. When admitted into the ranks of the army, he obtains a ration of meat twice and sometimes three times a week. This is military allowance; and, though the soldier be thus more highly fed than the peasant, he is still coarsely fed as compared with the soldiers of most other countries. The Russian stomach is capable of receiving a large allowance of food at one time, and one large meal is sufficient for the purposes of one day. The bread is black, and so hard withal that good teeth only can make impression on it. The *grutz*, an essential part of the ration, is not the most delicious of grains to an English palate; but it is savoury to the Russian, as well as the black bread: while these are in abundance, no complaint is made on the score of eating. *Kuas*, a sour liquor obtained by fermentation from grain, is the usual drink of the Russian. It is not unpleasant to the taste: it is cooling and refreshing—not intoxicating, and not inferior in good qualities to vinegar and water: it is considered to be useful as preventive of scurvy.

In estimating the military properties of the Russian people, there are grounds to believe that the farinaceous foods on which they live, and the *kuas* or sour beverage which they principally drink, contribute, in no small degree, to keep the Russian habit at a low point of excitement under military exercise or exertion. The Russian is not of an irritable constitution physically, consequently his powers are not soon exhausted. He sustains labour for a comparatively long time; but he is little capable of extraordinary effort; he even requires the impulse of strong causes to raise effort to what may be called energy. As native of a cold country, and as such supposed to be familiar with cold, he might be reasonably expected to be little susceptible of its effects; but such is not the case in fact. A Russian shrinks from a degree of cold that makes little impression on an Englishman; he is even frost-bitten by exposure to cold where ordinary men scarcely suffer. The fact is not what would have been expected; but the writer believes it to be correct as a general fact. It was exemplified in the division of the Russian troops who served the campaign of 1799 in Holland, and who were afterwards cantoned in the islands of Jersey and Guernsey in part of the year 1800. The Russian, it must be admitted, was there a humbled man; but making allowance for diminished self-importance, he did not appear to be radically a hardy and elastic animal, such as are the Highlanders of Scotland. The manner of living and the quality

of the diet, which is chiefly farinaceous, may in some measure account for the easy susceptibility of cold. The dwelling of the Russian peasant and the barracks of the soldiery are uniformly kept at a high temperature, not so much by heat of fire as by exclusion of external air and concentration of animal heat, by individuals crowding together at unventilated corners. When obliged to go abroad in cold weather, the Russian does not brave the weather; he envelopes himself in fur, in sheep-skin, or in a cloak, and thus guards himself from its impression by an extra quantity of external covering. Russians of all descriptions go to the bath once a week or oftener, wherever a bath can be procured; and thus from bathing, from warm clothing, and warm apartments, the skin is sensible, the fibre relaxed, and animal action by no means energetic. The Russian, as may be collected from what is now said, is not of an elastic and hardy physical constitution. If he be less sensible to danger than many, whether from constitutional torpor, or from the tyrannic discipline which places the constant fear of the master above the chance fear of the enemy, he cannot fairly be admitted to have a balance of advantages over the other population of Europe for the purposes of war; and if he be capable of perseverance in a given routine of duty for a comparatively long time, he is not intelligent of common things, inasmuch as he is prevented from the exercise of his own mind by the rigour of his military masters.

It will appear demonstrable to the reflecting mind, in viewing the fields of military history, that military force arranged on a mere mechanical basis is only a feeble instrument in war. Unless its action be animated, and pointed to its object by a quick-sighted and imperious commander, or by a person who, practising illusion on credulity, engrosses the whole of the faculties so as to turn them to what account he pleases, the movement of the mechanism is uncertain: it stands still at slight obstacles; it retrogrades at strong ones. The illusion of a name has often succeeded in bringing troops to the point of contact where common military skill and science had failed. The Russian general Suwarrow may be considered as an example of it in modern times. Suwarrow achieved extraordinary things on various occasions; and much of what he did, as claiming the title of extraordinary, arose from the opinion which the simple and credulous Russian entertained of his supernatural endowments as a general. Generals of equal courage, and perhaps of equal skill in tactic

and the routine of warlike manœuvre, were discomfited with a command of troops not less perfectly organized than those with which Suwarrow fought and conquered. This was to a certain extent exemplified in Holland in the year 1799\*.

The Emperor Paul was drawn off from his alliance with great Britain by the address and management of the French consulate; and Russia continued at peace, and apparently in friendly intercourse with France, for some time after Paul's dethronement. The first consul, Buonaparte, became the Emperor Napoleon; and, being an emperor, he appears to have thought that he had a right to make war in the manner of an emperor. He contemplated the conquest of Europe, and perhaps of more than Europe. He

\* A detachment of the Russian army was joined in that year with a British force for the re-establishment of the stadtholder. The number of the detachment amounted to about seventeen thousand men apparently well selected for service—indeed, in so far as the eye can judge, an army of *élite*. The sharpshooters seemed to have been well drilled to their duty. The Kalmuck and Cossack were not numerous, but they were choice troops of the kind. The infantry were healthy and physically strong—so imposing in aspect that, if an estimate were to be made by appearance, that is, closeness and compactness of force, they might have been thought to be capable of walking over the enemy, or over any troops in Europe, as over a stubble-field. The Russians were sent into action soon after they landed. They moved on with a rapidity which astonished; and, as they advanced, they threw out a fire that was tremendous by its noise, but otherwise harmless: it was chiefly expended on the sand hills. Having met with little opposition, they penetrated to Bergen, entered the town, found liquor, and drank to excess: they were soon intoxicated, ungovernable, mutinous, or dead drunk. The enemy, who had wisely given way to the torrent, halted and watched, returned in force, and, enveloping the town, made the Russians prisoners. Whether the Russians were led into the snare by design, or fell into it by accident, is not distinctly known; but this at least is

known, that it is a snare which is always before them, and always available for their destruction by an intelligent enemy. The Russian was so humbled by the disaster at Bergen, that, in all the subsequent affairs in Holland, he seemed to be an unwilling actor. In advancing to the field, the soldiers dropped off occasionally from the advancing lines; even officers assumed the retrograde. One general literally ran away; another, wounded, as it were by the first fire, retired. It is common and allowable that wounded persons retire from action; but the person in question was wounded in such a manner that it was scarcely possible to suppose he had been wounded by the ball of an enemy's musket. The general who ran away was cashiered by the Emperor Paul in a passion; but the manner in which he was treated by his brother officers after his disgrace, affords a striking example of the trivial light in which military cowardice is regarded in Russia. Instead of being shunned and despised, the person alluded to walked at large as if nothing had happened to him; he was even regaled by his brother officers, prior to his departure for Russia, with a fete of honour as if he had returned from a victory. It is not meant to insinuate, in stating this fact, that the Russian officers are generally deficient in courage: it is clear that they have not the same feeling respecting it that officers have in the west of Europe.



overthrew the minor powers—even Austria and Prussia submitted to his law. He, finally, came in contact with Russia; and, by intrigue and address in politics, he gained the ascendancy over the Emperor Alexander. The emperor made a disadvantageous peace; but the Russian troops appear to have fought with courage and perseverance in the greater part of the war that preceded the peace of Tilsit. Their military firmness was such that Napoleon was not able, with all his arts of colouring, to announce a victory in every bulletin which was issued from the field of battle. From the time that peace was made at Tilsit, Alexander seems to have been in some degree subservient to the views of Napoleon. Nothing short of absolute subjection was sufficient to satisfy Napoleon's ambition and arrogance; and, though Alexander be not perhaps one of the most courageous of warrior kings, he himself and his nation were so insulted, that it was at last determined to resist. Napoleon had attained a height from which he had no distinct vision of what was below; and in this state of elevation, which obscures the sight and clouds the mind, he invaded Russia with a numerous and well-appointed army, in hopes of compelling her sovereign to unconditional submission. It cannot, in the just estimate of things, be considered as sound policy to put the safety of an invaded country to the chance of a single battle; and the Russians, who it would appear were aware of this truth, do not seem to have fought to desperation. They opposed the invaders at several points: they gave way when severely pressed. Napoleon's ambition had deprived him of common sense as well as military judgment. He advanced precipitately and improvidently, and lost, by causes which he himself did not foresee, but which were foreseen by men of common understanding, the largest, and perhaps the finest, army that ever was brought together in Europe. The army was destroyed; the emperor escaped as a fugitive. Russia was cleared; but the character of the Russian army was not exalted by the doing of it. The peasantry, like other barbarians, were patriotic. Resentment against the invaders of their country was strong; and to the resentment of the peasantry, cold and hunger and other causes, the destruction of the French army is justly ascribed, not to the prowess of the organized military force and the skill of the Emperor Alexander.



## CHAPTER XVI.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

THE British army had not attained to that degree of perfection in tactic in the year 1804, when the first edition of this work was given to the public, to which it has since attained. But though not then correct in internal organization, it was superior in show and brilliancy of appearance to any army in Europe. The dazzling colour of the uniform, the variety of the facings, the contrasts of the different parts of the dress, the profusion of ornament, namely, feathers, frisures, powdered locks, ponderous queues, and polished accoutrements, were singularly contrived to strike the admiring multitude. A military review was at this time a brilliant exhibition—a gorgeous display of millinery taste and military error. The size, figure, and complexion of the men, presented a dazzling *coup d'œil* to the common observer—not a satisfactory one to the eye of a real soldier, for it was at variance with utility.

The idea of beauty is relative to purpose. Brilliant dress and rosy cheeks have no value in war; they are not in fact compatible with war; consequently they detract from, rather than add to, military value, as estimated by the reason of the thing. A sun-burnt complexion, a hardy and weather-beaten countenance, an eye of fire—stern and rivetted as it were to a forward point—constitute the beauty of a soldier. To a few only of the British regiments of the line does this character apply. The British soldiery, levied in haste for urgent service, and sent to remote countries on detached duties, does not receive that form of training prior to leaving home which gives to the mass a uniform military deportment. Differences in air, manner, and economy, are observable in almost every corps of the line. These differences arise apparently from the differing views of regimental chiefs; who, as employed on detached services, often take the liberty to change the dress, and modify the tactic and economy, to a particular fancy; hence the impression of consolidated effect, as arising from education in one school, where every military object is viewed through one medium, does not strike strongly in a general survey of the British army.

It is an object of importance in its own nature, and it is of urgent necessity in the circumstances of the times, to analyze the materials of the army; that is, to investigate the qualities of individuals, and to suggest the means of adjusting their arrangement in a given order, so that the fabric formed from the combination be solid at its foundations and united in its movements, in so far as is possible, by physical as well as intellectual correspondences. If the British empire is to be defended by a regular army, it is evident that the defence will not be of reliance, unless the troops be of the best quality. The narrow limits of Great Britain does not allow the British government to calculate on a balance of numbers; and even if numbers were at command, quality is indispensable to security, consequently the means of attaining pre-eminence in quality, not the simple means of filling the muster-roll, ought to be considered as the principal object of the statesman's study. Pre-eminence cannot be attained without an intimate knowledge of the qualities of the elementary materials; that is, without knowledge of the physical powers of action and re-action in one and all, and without knowledge of the internal principle which moves and maintains general movement in efficiency under every variety of condition that occurs in service. The subject requires a minute and scientific consideration. The author regrets that he is not able to give to it that elucidation which its importance requires; he hopes he may be able to do something in aiding others to pursue it, and to apprehend the principle of it more correctly than they now do.

The British army is composed of three different people, or nations, namely, English, Scotch, and Irish. They all possess courage. Courage stands first in the list of military qualities; but there are shades of difference in the manner of displaying it, either as arising from difference of blood, difference of climate and locality, difference of national institution, or difference in habits of life, which act on the national character, and which require notice in this place.

*English.*

THE English, who stand the first in the British army, may be divided into two classes, namely, labourers or peasants, townsmen or artizans. The pastoral occupation scarcely has existence

in England at the present time, consequently pastoral life so rarely furnishes materials for the army, that the pastoral condition need not be taken into account in considering the character of military recruits. Distinctions of the people of a country into classes by original blood are not easily made anywhere: they are particularly difficult in England, for England has been often invaded, often overrun and conquered; and as it is now the gathering place of adventurers, and the asylum of the destitute, the people who dwell in it may be regarded as a mixture of all the nations of Europe. This gathering has been going on for the last two thousand years, is still going on, and may be supposed, by its constant operation, to have modified the national character to something different from that of other people. The English peasant is a bold and confident peasant. He is open and blunt, apparently sincere, sometimes generous, often rude, boisterous, and overbearing, rarely gracious or courteous to strangers, particularly to those who have nothing to bestow. He generally assumes an air of independence, is indifferent to equals, even to superiors, except where he expects favour or bounty; he is then as obsequious as his neighbours of the north. He sells his service, public or private, and deems his service equal to his reward. He is little disposed to form personal attachment from pure love. He is often arrogant when he possesses money, abject when he is without it; for he seems to consider money as the sovereign of men and things. He is proud of his nation and contemptuous of others; he is rude, but not cruel or vindictive, and he rarely ill treats an enemy after the chance of war, or any other chance, has brought him within his power.

The English recruit, compared with the Scotch and Irish, presents himself at the time of enlistment with a balance of advantages. He is well made, has a powerful arm, and a full habit, as if he had been well fed and not overworked. The chest is prominent and expanded; the muscles of the shoulders and arms are thick and brawny; the trunk of the body is proportionally ponderous, and the balance of power is conspicuously in the upper extremities. The English is strong; but, as a labourer, he is an economist of his strength. He does not endure toil, or bear hardship and privation with the same temper and cheerfulness as the peasants of many other countries; and, as he is little accustomed to travel on foot, and little practised

in walking, he is scarcely equal to the other parts of the army in marching, particularly in marching over broken and irregular grounds. He is not, as now said, patient of toil and hardy in constitution; consequently he is not capable of resisting the impressions of the numerous causes of disease to which soldiers are exposed in the service of the field. When well clothed, well fed, and well lodged, no man performs his duty more steadily and more efficiently than the Englishman; but, as everything is new in war to persons who are born and bred in a country abounding with plenty, or in a manufacturing town, the hot-bed of luxury and dissipation, he is not always contented, not even subordinate to authority, when severely pressed by privations and hardships.

The English peasant and the English artizan are the same people; but different occupations bring out powers and capacities in different degrees of perfection. The artizan is of less physical force than the labourer, usually of inferior size, of a less florid complexion, a less comely and pleasing aspect, more alert in movement, more dexterous in manual operation, and as such more easily trained to military evolution. He is rarely in the full vigour of health at the time he enters the army; for, as the most part of artizan occupations are sedentary, health and vigour do not consist with their condition. Changes in situation and changes in circumstances often act favourably on the health of persons of a languid and feeble frame of body; hence the health of the artizan ordinarily experiences improvement by the adoption of a military life. The labouring peasant is vigorous and healthy at the outset, and has a superiority over the artizan in acts of exertion. The artizan is apt as a mechanical scholar; and has, in his turn, an advantage over the peasant in the facility of acquiring those forms of cadenced movement which are connected with the mechanism of tactic. These are differences; but whatever be the shades of difference among English recruits, steady courage, actual force, and promptitude in applying force to the proper point of attack, belong to all. These properties are military properties; and it cannot be denied that the part of the army, which is recruited in England, stands on fair ground in this respect with its other parts—on advantageous ground with the military materials of most nations.

Whether it be that the British nation has an innate propen-

sity for war, or that the extent and complication of its political concerns draws it into war involuntarily, the fact is notorious, that it scarcely ever is without war in one part of the world or other, or, in the language of Rome, scarcely ever shuts the temple of Janus. But, notwithstanding the national propensity to war, or the casual necessities which command it, the English cannot be said to possess the character which is genuinely denominated military. National pursuits are artificial and subject to changes. The English are nationally speculative, and adventurous at all games of chance. Two passions do not reign with equal force in the same subject at the same time; consequently the spirit of the war of honour, as it is called, does not run high among people who are adventurers for gain of money through speculations in trade and manufacture. The name of military service does not bring distinction in England as it does in many parts of Europe; and, as the profession of arms is not here held in the first estimation, the better class of the peasantry do not leave the plough or the shuttle for the sword; consequently the recruits of infantry regiments are not on a level with the mass of the nation. They are often drawn from the refuse of manufacturing towns; for instance, from destitute workmen, who enrol themselves in the army through necessity or want of bread, not in love of arms. Manufacturers are often dissipated and effeminate, inferior in good qualities to the common standard of the country; the military character of the British nation is not therefore fairly judged as estimated by the qualities of recruits who may be drawn from the refuse of its population. The British army has only an annual existence; and it has usually been the British policy to reduce it to a low standard in point of numbers at the close of war. When so reduced, the ranks, when occasions demand augmentation, can only be expected to be filled by the bribery of high bounties; for the dominant principle of acting for and by money adheres to the nation in all its operations, that is, the nation is manufacturing and commercial by constitutional habit, military contingently for profit, not for glory. A proportion of the people, influenced by the desire of gain, enticed by the tinsel of dress, or driven by the necessity of want, arrange themselves at the commencement of war under military standards. The ranks are thus filled with men; they are not filled with soldiers, for we do not admit



those to be soldiers who have no higher motive to induce them to assume the soldier's garb than a pecuniary bribe, an instigation of vanity, or a necessity arising from want of bread; and, as the mass of English recruits consists of such, its military character is not what it might be, that is, not on a level with the bulk of the nation. What is here said was correct within the memory of the writer; it is now somewhat different. The ranks of the militia are filled by conscription from the whole of the people; and drafts have been latterly made from the militia to the line under the name of volunteer, in reality, under the bribe of a high bounty; consequently the expedient of volunteering from the militia, which is an indirect conscription, has filled the ranks of the army with good subjects comparatively, both physically and morally, and thus put the British military force nearly on a level in point of worth with the common inhabitants of the country.

The English peasant manifests no predilection for military life; nor does the profession of arms appear, until lately, to have been much sought after by those of the higher class. But, though neither gentleman nor peasant manifest that military ardour which marks a military passion, it must still be allowed that the English officer and the English soldier uniformly maintain a national character in the conflicts of war. They display a cool and deliberate courage in battle, decision in difficulty and exertion in danger, equalled by few and surpassed by none. This is true in itself; but it may be added at the same time, that the spirit of enthusiasm, which stimulates to the enterprize of hazardous acts, is not, as things now stand, a prominent feature of the English army. A spirit of enterprize and a desire of adventure are conspicuous in the navy; consequently it may be concluded that the fund of enterprize exists in the physical constitution of both—dormant in one from want of culture, or want of reward. The sailor has direct spoil in his eye in all his enterprizes; and he acts as if no impediment should stand in the way of attaining it. The soldier has nothing to expect in a battle except a broken leg; and though not coward, he ordinarily keeps within the line of his prescribed duty. He is not impetuous to the same extent as the soldiers of some countries; but he is courageous and determined as any, and he has this farther advantage, that he ordinarily retains command of himself, so that if he do not succeed in his purpose he



retires from it, defeated, not routed. He performs his duties in ordinary circumstances with correctness ; but he performs them as duties which are not to exceed a certain limit ; there is in fact something like discretion—a bargain with himself in all his acts. He is capable of attachment, not susceptible of enthusiastic devotion abstracted from solid reasons. He looks to a general cause, and expects to find a reason for his attachment connected with something that applies to himself. He thus, even as a soldier, retains the base of the national character, namely, a spirit of independence, that is, a power to dispose of himself according to his own way of thinking—and necessarily connected with his real or supposed advantage.

Military enthusiasm does not, as already observed, rise high in the English army. The expression of ardour beyond literal duty is ridiculed rather than encouraged by superiors ; and, if not encouraged by approbation, or stimulated by reward, it is not likely to exist ; for few objects come under the eye of the peasant in early life which have a tendency to inspire romantic sentiments of chivalry. The labourer performs his labour on a given condition, and after a regular routine. He works for hire, and has little interest in the work which he performs, abstractedly from the amount of the hire which it brings. The mode of agriculture at the present time furnishes few opportunities for groups of young persons meeting together in field occupations. Where that occurred (and it often occurred in times past), games and pastimes calculated to bring forth bodily exertion were practised with ardour, with a view to attain superiority ; and, thus practised, they tended to excite the general desire of distinction, even to lead the mind, unintentionally as it were, to look to achievements in war as the final goal of a course of rivalry in feats of strength and activity. As this has now no place, the phantom of military glory has no artificial food ; and, if the love of gain, or casual necessity, did not operate on the peasant class, it is reasonable to believe that English volunteers for military service would actually be few in number. The military character did not until lately stand high in estimation with the peasantry. The return of a soldier to his native home, though covered with what are called honourable wounds gained in glorious battles, did not make an impression on vulgar opinion, so as to incite the youth of the neighbourhood to volunteer military service. It was thus little

to be expected that the English peasant should be of a direct military caste; it is notwithstanding true that he possesses qualities which give him advantages in war, and which contribute materially to beget coolness, self-command, and resolution in action, which the peasant of few nations possesses in an equal degree. An Englishman is accustomed from early youth to enter the lists of combat without what may be called personal enmity. He contends until he is overpowered; he gives in when he discovers his inferiority—and he does so without that sensation of shame and confusion which is manifested by his northern neighbour under similar discomfiture. This practice in trial of strength, without passion or enmity, is almost peculiar to the people of England; and to this, perhaps, may be ascribed that good sense and self-command which gives up a contest in the more serious conflicts of war, without feeling or manifesting such vexation and despair as create confusion and lead to total route. The English soldier has thus a cool and determined courage, either natural, or artificially acquired by habit; and, possessing this quality, he possesses a valuable property for the practice of common warfare. In point of intelligence, he is inferior to many; and, though powerful in actual force, he is not, as already said, hardy in bodily constitution. He is accustomed to full living at his home; and, as he expects a certain condition of things to be present in war as well as in peace; he does not submit to privation without murmur; nor does he endure toil, even when inevitable as a part of his duty, with cheerfulness. These are defects; but, with these defects, he is a valuable soldier: he is honest and manly in sentiment, cool in action, and firm in courage. On these qualities dependence may be placed; and though they are not all the qualities which a soldier ought to possess, they are of great value to generals who conduct extensive military operations.

*Scotch.*

THE Lowland Scot is inferior, at least less attractive by the comeliness and apparent power of his person as viewed superficially, than the neighbouring English. He is ordinarily of a lower stature, less full of flesh, and of a less brawny or muscular arm. The trunk of the body is less ponderous; the legs and thighs are more sinewy and elastic. The address or manner of

the Scot is uncouth ; the countenance is demure, and harsh. The *ensemble* of the figure is not attractive by its grace ; it is military as possessing activity and elasticity. The shades of difference between the two people, arising in a great measure from manner of living and manner of occupation, wear out fast in the South of Scotland ; the traces of national distinction are however still to be seen. The English peasant has, as already observed, a proportionally great weight of body, an expanded chest, an apparently great power of arm. The Scot has sinewy limbs, and a frame of comparative great elasticity ; the balance of power lies in the inferior extremities ; he is thus presumptively better calculated to endure toil, and to bear the privations that are incident to war, than his southern neighbour. As the exterior appearances of the people who dwell on the opposite sides of the Tweed are not precisely the same, so neither is the mental character. The English is open and blunt in manner, and somewhat boastful ; the Scot is close, shrewd, and intelligent. The English meets his enemy coolly and deliberately, and preserves an unruffled temper even in the combat. He now is, and has been at all times, capable of mechanical discipline ; and, as proof of a calm temper, he has at all times excelled in the use of missile force. But, while capable of discipline and cool in temper, he is little enterprising comparatively, and has little of the daring and irregular impetuosity in actual conflict which characterizes the Scot, and occasionally confounds the antagonist. The impetuosity of the Scot is proverbial. It leads him far, and on some occasions into difficulty and danger ; but it also leads him now and then to the achievement of things beyond calculation.

The people of England and of the South of Scotland may be regarded as people of one origin. The coasts and level lands of Great Britain were overrun, and occupied by different conquerors at different times. The whole of the coast admitted into its bosom hordes of freebooters ; who, landing as military adventurers under one pretext or other, usurped the sovereignty of the soil, extirpated and expelled the actual possessors, or converted them to bondsmen or vassal dependents. The invaders were freebooters and men of the sword. Those of them who fixed their abode in England appear to have assumed habits of industry at an earlier period than those who settled in Scotland, probably led to do so by the comparatively higher culture of the south part of the island,

as more under the dominion and domestic management of the Romans at former times. The lands in Scotland were held by feudal tenure until lately; and it may be remarked, that where feudalism prevails, agricultural improvements do not obtain a scientific and systematic attention. The lands north of the Tweed, within the memory of persons still living, were not cultivated generally with any other view than that of producing subsistence in bread for the season; and, as there was little produce from the lands beyond what was necessary for annual consumption, there was little foreign trade: the domestic manufactures were coarse, and chiefly for purposes of necessity. A field, badly manured and clumsily worked, produced an inferior grain which was made into bread; the cattle and sheep, which covered the hills and valleys, furnished milk for food and wool for clothing. Society was in the pastoral stage, a stage considered as barbarous by many; in reality, a stage of wisdom, if things be resolved to their reasons.

The exercise of the mental faculty on subjects of military enterprize, occupies a period in the history of almost every people in their emergence from barbarism. Such exercise arose among the Scotch as among others; and various causes concurred to expand its sphere, prolong its duration, and give to it an extraordinary degree of interest. The Scotch, south of the Forth, even when there was truce between the kings of England and Scotland, were rarely at peace with their neighbours. If open war was suspended, the war of depredation went on. Until the accession of James VI.—even until the union of the two kingdoms, and later than the union—the recollection that Scotland had been invaded by the English with a view to subjugation, kept a feeling of resentment in the breast of the Scotch peasantry, which cherished and supported a martial spirit throughout the whole extent of the southern district. The resentment against England and Englishmen was strong—in a manner innate: it was fostered by popular ballads and the histories of Sir William Wallace and Robert the Bruce. The history of Sir William Wallace was, until these last forty or fifty years, the military catechism of the Scottish youth—the torch which lighted Scottish courage, love of country and desire of war; in fact, the manual of honour and independence. The tale of Wallace is uncouthly told, and told moreover without a ray of genius; it notwithstanding

makes impression by the nature of the matter. The Scottish boy, in times that are but recently passed, devoured the details of the combats of Wallace with what may be called ravenous appetite. He rose lofty within himself at the recital of Wallace's prowess, almost believed himself to be his companion, or shed tears of regret that he was not—that he had not lived to fight by his side, even to die with him or for him. The impression of liberty and independence, which arose from this source of recollection, served to foster a martial spirit among the people, and to give to the peasant character an air of heroism rarely to be met with except on the theatre of Wallace's achievements. This time is past; the face of the country is changed; and, with it, the manners of the people are changed. Wallace's name is not yet forgotten—his spirit has fled from the theatre of his exploits.

The warlike spirit cherished in Scotland by the recital of the warlike achievements of Wallace, and the history of the border freebooters, was supported by the social condition which obtained throughout the country. A form of the feudal tenure of lands obtained in Scotland from time immemorial to a late period. Whatever may be the evils and inconveniences of feudalism, its operation on society is warlike. If the tenure be liberal in its conditions, and well conducted in its application to practice, it serves to produce and cherish a general love of country; inasmuch as it gives a limited inheritance of the soil to those who are capable of military service. Man naturally respects that which he receives from his fathers, and cherishes that which he hopes to transmit to his children. The degree of attachment to paternal inheritance is not measured by absolute value. The attachment is usually strong where the quantum is small; it is weak where the quantity is great and widely extended. The peasant is grateful for the protection even of his miserable hut; the meagre grain of his unfertile field is received as a bounty from the God of Nature. The heart is warm with gratitude, and, thus warm, the individual is patriot—even to devotion. On the contrary, the lordly master of the superb mansion and wide domain, who believes that all his possessions are the work of his own hands, has no patriotism beyond the value of his own property. As he raised a mansion by his own power, so he conceives that he adorns it by the dignity of his own presence. He has self gratification; he acknowledges no gratitude. He may draw his sword in de-



fence of his country as well as the peasant; but he draws it from a different motive and with a different feeling. With the lord, it is the defence of property, valued and estimated as property; with the peasant, it is the defence of an abode dear by its familiarity, and venerated as an asylum from the storms and tempests of the sky. The one is ready to compromise the independence of his nation for the secure possession of his acres and his mansions; the other is ready to shed his blood in defence of the soil which gives him bread, and which gives cover to the bones of his fathers: the peasant has pride of feeling as a member of the nation, the lord has pride or arrogance as a feeling for individual self only.

There are causes and conditions contingent to the life of man, which operate so efficiently on the animal fabric as materially to modify its constitutional forms of action; and among others, the causes here alluded to, acting in some manner mechanically on organism, may be thought to have had a share in rendering the Scottish peasant a patriot on principle. The possession of land appears at one time to have been a species of permanent inheritance to the peasant. The rents, which were chiefly paid in kind or by service, were a tax on the mere product of labour; and, as such, they exempted the tenant from ravenous pursuits of money to satisfy the desires of craving landlords. The trade of farming, where lands are rented with a view to monopolize products and accumulate money, was not known in Scotland to any extent until very recent times—the provision of subsistence in bread was the main object of the husbandman's care. The science of agriculture was then little understood; and, as agricultural labours were only necessary, in this state of rudeness, at particular periods of the year, the mass of the people were frequently without employment; hence, as the hand had no occupation, the mind, which is seldom totally inactive, assumed the first expanding act of the human faculties, and struck into the field of warlike adventure, rather than into the field of mechanical labour connected with arts of peace. It is thus perhaps that, as the accidental condition of the tenure of lands contributed to foster a love of country, the state of society and the accidental circumstances of locality, independently of formal institution, served to encourage the martial propensity which was once so conspicuous among the peasantry of the South of Scotland.



In early times, when man was simple and what is called barbarous, the heart was sensible to friendship, and grateful for kindness. The affections of the peasant were strong to all that was connected with the place of his birth. They expanded from the centre in circles, extended wider and wider, and ultimately embraced the whole circle of the empire. Community of labour, which appears to have prevailed among the peasantry in Scotland in times not long past, spread good-will and kindness among the various members of the circumscribed circle. The people were then clustered in small townships, and union was intimate as the union of those who are allied by blood. The right of pasturage for sheep and cattle was in many cases a common right. Much of the business connected with common pasturage was transacted in common, and the transacting of it occasioned intercourse, or intimacy, among the different members of these clustered habitations. But, besides the daily intercourse alluded to, there were particular seasons of the year when mutual aids in labour were general and extensive. Among these, the provision of fuel was one of the most important. Peat or turf is the ordinary fuel of large tracts of country in Scotland. The operation of digging, &c., is laborious; but, instead of being considered as a labour to be shunned, it was generally anticipated as a pleasure to be enjoyed, inasmuch as it was a day of good cheer and regalement to all. The heart was light and satisfied, as making provision against the cold of winter. It was sensible to the Deity, as expectant of benefit. Besides community of labour in the preparation of peat, hay- and corn-harvest brought the people frequently and intimately together in their fields; and certain days of *corvée* labour to the land proprietor, instead of being regarded as irksome toil, were often regarded as days of festivity. The Scotch father was at this time sober and chaste, intelligent, religious, and watchful over the conduct of his sons. The sons were modest; but they were enterprising. They ordinarily contended in manly exercises, namely, in running, leaping, wrestling, and other similar sports, where superiority gives distinction in the peasant circle, and where distinction stimulates to farther adventure—often to try the fortune in war. Such customs were once common in the South of Scotland; and such practices may be supposed to have excited and supported a military spirit among the people. Challenges for curling on the ice, ball-playing, &c., took place on many occa-

sions between contiguous parishes. They were contentions of emulation, similar, in a humble sphere, to the tournaments of knights and nobles, and they produced similar effects.

A propensity for war and military achievement was engendered, and fostered by the intercourse which took place among the people, in consequence of the tenure under which they held their lands. It was, moreover, supported by a custom, which then very generally prevailed, of assembling in the winter evenings, in one of the larger houses in the village, for the purpose of hearing tales of other times. The Scottish peasant is inquisitive, even greedy of information, on the general affairs of mankind. This he often is, though he may not be acquainted with letters, or ever have moved from his humble village. There was ordinarily one or more chroniclers in a township acquainted, by oral tradition, with all the encounters and petty feuds of the freebooters and lawless barons of the border; and to these chroniclers of border war, old soldiers travelling through the country, begging bread, or flying the *ennui* of a fixed abode, often added the more recent achievements of systematic warriors in foreign climes; thus giving a picture of things, long or recently past, so impressively drawn as to inflame the military mind of the listening youth to enthusiasm. A beggar is necessarily a degraded person; an old soldier, within the last half-century, was an exception in Scotland. He was generally received with kindness at one of the best farm-houses in the place. Young men and children gathered round him, solicited him to talk; and, as he talked, they listened earnestly to his tale of battles, and his adventures in foreign parts. The Scotch were at this time kind and charitable. They were poor; and, in common with the inhabitants of poor, at least of pastoral countries, they were hospitable. It is now otherwise. The Scotch have put on the commercial character. They are manufacturers of goods, or speculators in farming; and, like the inhabitants of countries where arts prevail, and where the desire of gain engrosses all the faculties of the soul, hospitality, or that grace of charity which gives to the indigent without offering insult, or testifying contempt, is rarely to be found.

But, as an attachment to the soil may appear to have risen from the nature of the tenure of lands, and the simplicity of peasant society, the Scotch were patriot, and they were more-

over military. They had a propensity to war from the operation of a variety of natural causes which act on the human mind; and, while they had this propensity through nature, the moral training and the impressions of religion, engrafted on the habit, at an early period of life, by discipline, ensured a correct and principled execution of duty on all important occasions of trial. The Scotch are Calvinists in religious belief; and Calvinists believe that everything which happens in life is preordained by Providence to happen; consequently, that individual life is as secure in the rage of battle as in the shades of peace. Such opinion influenced the conduct of the Lowland Scot, fortified his mind in the dangers of war; and hence the Scotch, who are enterprising and ardent as a quality of national character, were at this time courageous from education, and steady in their purpose, through the impression of their religious creed. The Scotch, before the introduction of that system of scientific agriculture which now prevails in Great Britain, were pastoral, and they were, comparatively, idle. They were not skilled in agricultural science, in manufacture and speculating commerce, but they were not without talent. The mind was strong within itself; and the moral sentiment was chaste and pure, from the time of Knox's reformation, that they were permitted to read the Bible. This energy of mind and chastity of moral sentiment, for which the Scottish peasant is eminently conspicuous among the peasantry of other countries, were principally to be ascribed to the exertions of the parish-ministers—a body of men than whom no religious teachers since the days of the apostles have manifested more of the christian disposition, or laboured more faithfully to preserve purity in morals, and good conduct among men. The Scotch clergy not only preached the doctrine of Jesus Christ, which is a doctrine of truth and piety, but they practised it in purity, and took pains to explain its truth and benefits to their flocks—not only from the pulpit, but more directly at the peasant's home in his domestic circle.

The Scotch, as now said, are Calvinist in religion; and, as the religion of Calvin inculcates the belief that any means which man may employ to obviate the dangers of battle are of no avail, the soldier, as believing in the certainty of predestination, may be supposed to be in some degree exempted from the impressions of fear. The idea of exemption is something; but it is

not all that confirms the courage of a Scotchman. A sentiment of duty, engrafted in the constitution of the mind by public and domestic education, existed in Scotland at a period not long past. It acted; and it may be said to have bound the Scotch soldier to his post by something like a principle of honour. The system of education which produced this effect was a national education, conducted under the eye of the clergy as national guardians of religion and morals. The basis of it was laid on the fundamental doctrine of the New Testament; which, with the exception of a Calvinistical catechism, was the only book of instruction known in the schools at the period alluded to. The education was, as already said, conducted under the eye of the parish-minister, and it was not, under this tuition, permitted to divert from its object, which is an object of piety and good moral conduct. The period allotted to instruction was short; but as the precept "Do unto others as you would that others do unto you," was constantly in the pupil's eye, the impression, as made at an early age, and supported systematically in the subsequent proceedings of life by almost every cause that met the eye, was well fixed. When the pupil was removed from school, his conduct was submitted to the surveillance of a small and jealous community in a sequestered valley—in a circle where a bad or disgraceful act could not be concealed, and where there were fortunately few causes to lead to its commission. A person educated on the base of the Christian doctrine is supposed to be just to others, and to respect himself. He neither encroaches on the weak and timid, nor yields to the arrogant and overbearing. The Scotch peasant had something of this character from the time he became a presbyterian; but it was not perfect. The prejudices of feudal times still existed. Their force was diminished by the doctrines of Calvin; but the lord, or laird, was still a great man, who claimed, and often obtained homage from the peasant beyond the reason of the thing.

The cottage of the Scotch peasant was humble—a hut comparatively with the peasant dwelling of the present time. But, though humble, it was interesting, for the inmates were virtuous. Simple as children of nature, the affections were genuine and warm, not obliterated through intercourse with the world. If any one served as a soldier in a foreign climate, (and there was strong predilection among the Scotch for military service,)

he still retained a recollection of home, and exulted when he returned home to receive the welcome of his friends, ashamed to return, or to receive welcome, if there was a spot upon his honour. Virtue was esteemed on its own account; and was esteemed more than riches. The introduction of farming as a trade, of manufacture and commerce as a gaming adventure, has turned all the energies of the mind to the means of acquiring money, and the acquisition of money has here, as in other places, brought luxury; which, absorbing the mental faculties in pursuits of pleasure and gratifications of animal sense, has extinguished force of mind, and reduced man, through a long *détour* of wandering, to a state of imbecility, even to ignorance of himself and his own condition.

The face of sublunary things is constantly under change; and the change which has taken place in Scotland within these last sixty or seventy years is such as has rarely been anywhere witnessed in so short a space of time. The fields, which were then bare, bleak, and barren, are now rich, gay, and smiling as gardens. The peasantry, who were homely and uncouth in appearance as clothed in coarse home-manufacture, are now gaily and gaudily dressed, well instructed in book-learning, and polished in manner above the peasantry of most countries: the exterior is gilded, the interior is going to decay. The Scotch peasant is not now ashamed to contract debts which he can scarcely ever expect to pay. Bankruptcy was an indelible disgrace at one time; it is now regarded as no more than the bad fortune of a gamester. The moral character is changed. It was sincere and true in past times, and perhaps rude; it is now refined and polished; but with refinement, it has assumed the garb of duplicity, and sacrificed the principle of peasant honour to commercial splendour. The progress of the deteriorating operation is visible in the mass of the Scottish peasantry. They still possess valuable qualities in civil and military life; but they have not the same ardent mind and hardy body as they had at the early periods of the last century, nor even the same purity of character in their social intercourse as marked the days of emergence from the bondage of the Romish church. The love of riches has absorbed the faculties of the soul; the love of military service, except as a mercenary pursuit, is faint. Luxury of living, by pampering the body, has weakened the elastic powers



of life, and thus augmented the constitutional susceptibility to disease. With this change in dress and manner, the form of national intercourse is also changed. Townships are broken up; community of labour is gone into disuse; and ballads recording the feats of the border thieves, who were often chivalrous men, no longer live in the memory of the people. Love and martial achievements were the subject of the border-song; and, as the song often recorded a romantic and chaste love, though the love of a robber, a similar sentiment was infused into the breast of the peasant by a species of contagion. The recitation of popular songs filled up the idle hours of the pastoral Scotch, and attachment between the sexes not unfrequently followed as a consequence of the recitation. This was common, and the cause of it is not of difficult comprehension. It is in sequestered valleys and in country villages that the passion of romantic love fixes its abode. Where the passion is strong, and where it is opposed by difficulties, it often hurries its votary to the field of war, and urges him, under an impression of his mistress's perfections, to undertake bold and adventurous enterprizes with a view to obtain her favour. The history alluded to belongs to what may be called pastoral life. It is past in Scotland; but it is not long past. It marked, when it did exist, the age of chivalry among the plebeian class. The passion of love, while pure and genuine, stimulates to military enterprize; the ideal presence of the beloved object gives energy to the lover's acts, and thus places his name with the heroes of past ages.

The Scotch, while in the pastoral or semi-barbarous stage of society, that is, before they became skilful farmers, ingenious manufacturers, and speculating merchants, were regarded, and justly regarded, as persons possessing a character well suited to the business of war. The impression of the warlike sentiment was then strong; and military service was considered as conferring an honorary distinction. The circle of society was narrow; friendships were intimate, and union in combat was cemented by individual intimacy, as well as by a general principle of duty. The sentiment of honour, which was planted at an early age by institution or casual circumstance, grew with years, and often attained the force of passion. If to these was added an impression of religion sanctifying the act of duty, death in its most formidable form lost its terrors. The Scotch were in this manner



warlike in character; but their warlike character, though eminent, was not without alloy. They were eager in enterprize for the sake of glory; they were impetuous in action, impassioned, and apt to commit themselves by too great ardour. Transported into rage by passion, they were forward to join in close combat; and, as they advanced with a desire of vengeance, a change of circumstances, as it changed or disguised the object of their resentment, occasioned pause and disappointment: disappointment occasioned hesitation, sometimes panic, and probably rout. The character of impetuosity is innate among the Scotch. It always adheres to them, and it seems not unfrequently to have committed them to the chastisement of their southern neighbours. The Scotch were generally superior in recounters where every part of the force was brought into direct contact; they were inferior in great affairs, where foresight and temper were indispensable to the execution of complicated purposes. The impetuous character is still found in the Scotch soldier; for, as he did not in former times, so he does not now, with all the advantages of Prussian discipline, retire from battle with a confession of inferiority. He commits errors, or forgets himself on some occasions; but if so, he often, by the magic of a word which touches a secret spring of action, nobly repairs it: he sometimes does so with an energy which does not come within common military calculation.

The Scotch, from a variety of concurring causes, appear to possess a greater predilection for war than their neighbours of the south; and though not superior in bodily strength, they bear the hardships of military life with more temper and cheerfulness. Military adventure is more congenial with their dispositions; fatigues and self-denials are less foreign from their habits. When Scotland was more of a pastoral than agricultural country, the peasant was familiarized with wind and rain in his daily occupation. If wet with rain, he suffered little injury in his health, for the circumstance, as not novel to him, had little effect upon his habit. He considered it to be no hardship to sleep in the open air—in a furrow or ravine, without any other covering than that of a sheep-herd's plaid. He was thus accustomed, from early youth, to things that are similar to those of war in the field. His fare, at his native home, was not so delicate, rarely so abundant, as that of a soldier in the service of a campaign. He felt no hardship, and he complained not of any. He

did not suffer sickness from the effects of cold and hunger in the same proportion as those who had been delicately fed, and carefully nursed in their infant years. He was upon the whole a valuable subject for a soldier; he is so still, and, if well understood, he is one of the first quality among the warrior nations of Europe.

The English and the lowland Scotch are radically the same people. They had at one time a different modification of law and government, and, as might be expected, they manifested a modified difference of character. They are now under one general government; and as they assimilate in domestic manners in consequence of frequent intercourse, they also approximate in military qualities as a result of similar military training. The HIGHLANDERS are distinct. They cherish the pride of not having submitted to the Roman arms which subjugated Great Britain; and, amid the invasions and revolutions which have repeatedly mixed the inhabitants, and new modelled the government of the low country, the mountaineers pretend (not perhaps with perfect correctness) to aboriginal independence. They have preserved what they consider to be their ancient tongue, their ancient customs and manners. It is difficult to say positively whether the present Highlanders of Scotland be a pure Celtic race, or a mixed race of Celts and Scandinavian Goths. But though the fact cannot be positively ascertained, it is more than probable, from marks of the existence of two castes of people in each clan, that the present Highlanders are actually a mixed people, the Celtic stock predominating in number, the Scandinavian in power. The Gothic invader, when he gained the sovereignty of the soil by arms, maintained it by management. The incorporation of the conquered with the conqueror under one common name, appears to have been the main engine of his operation. It is not clear whether or not the invader established his own language in the Highlands, or adopted that which existed, for the present Gaelic has only a remote resemblance with the Welch, which may be supposed to be the Celtic of ancient Gaul and Great Britain. But be that as it may, it is pretty clear that these invaders brought with them, and planted in the Highlands, the lofty tone of the migratory warlike tribes, their freebooting spirit, their chivalrous character, and the custom of land-tenure common to Eastern adventurers.

In early times, even until lately, the tenure of lands in the Highlands of Scotland was a feudal tenure: the life of the people pastoral, and the character warlike. The population of the Highlands, dispersed in glens or sequestered valleys, classed in districts by tribes or clans pretending to the same origin and warmed by the same blood, maintained a correspondence and intimate connexion with one another through all the ramifications of the clan. The bond, or supposed bond of union by blood, operated strongly at one time; and, as every separate clan considered itself independent, subject to a chief or sovereign of its own, but to no other sovereign, collisions took place among them occasionally, and strife arose between neighbouring clans or neighbouring chiefs, in a similar manner as wars arise between great kingdoms and powerful kings. The Scotch Highlanders were thus often in feuds; for, as an insult offered, or an injury sustained by any individual of the clan, was felt and resented as an insult offered, or an injury sustained, by the whole of the cognominated clan, the occasions of dispute were numerous, and the affrays were often bloody.

The remains of Celtic or rather Gaelic song, which may be considered as a record of Gaelic history, serve to shew that, as manners were not refined beyond the pastoral, or semi-barbarous stage of society, the chief occupation was hunting the deer, &c.—the chief glory of the nation a successful military expedition. To obtain a name in war was the first object of the Gael; an object, if credit be due to the song, sought in the defence of friends, rather than in the aggression of foes. There was a spirit of heroism in the times; and the warlike fame of the Highlander, whether aboriginal Celt or transplanted Goth, was high in this age of chivalry. Fingal was renowned; and whoever Fingal may have been, or in whatever age he may have lived, it would be captious to maintain that he had not a real existence. Ossian was a poet with a warrior's mind and a hero's spirit. He was original as a poet; his pictures are drawn from life. The pieces which go under his name bear internal evidence of antiquity, and undeniable evidence of a poetical genius of the first order. The date cannot be fixed; but, from the whole of the circumstances connected with the story, it is more reasonably referred to the inroads of the migratory warlike tribes who inundated Europe at an early period of the Christian era, than to the invasion of Roman armies. As the

date is unknown, and the objects not so precisely defined that they can be distinctly traced, the songs of Ossian have been considered by some as a fabrication of recent times : there has been controversy on the subject—and it has not been altogether liberally conducted. The opinion of genuineness has been maintained with marks of prejudiced zeal—not investigated with the humility of candour. It has been impugned by ignorance, chiefly by the authority of a book-learned man, who had no knowledge of the subject, and little knowledge of human nature in its simple state. It is no proof that the poems ascribed to Ossian are the work of Mr. Macpherson, because they were not committed to writing until recent times. The history of Arab literature, and what is known of Arab manners, is sufficiently illustrative of the possibility of what the advocates of the genuineness of the poems assume. The finest of Arab poetry was composed by men who could neither write nor read. The fact, that the published poems might have been better translated in some points than they actually are translated, is an argument of weight in favour of the opinion of high antiquity, while the fact, that the translator has not always hit the precise meaning of the Gaelic, may be deemed conclusive of the assumption ; for it can scarcely be supposed that the translator would mistake himself. The proof or disproof of the genuineness of Ossian's poems does not belong to this place ; but the question is interesting generally, and, as it bears directly on the military character of the Highlanders, it is here adverted to. The picture of life there drawn is primitive ; the characters of the actors are simple and warlike ; the sentiments are generous and noble, and they are not merely ideal. Characters not unlike those which embellish the poems alluded to, occurred occasionally in the last century among native Highlanders. They were considered, and will continue to be considered by the children of luxury, as characters of romance ; they are notwithstanding real, and resemblances are not altogether unknown to the writer.

The clans who possessed the north and western parts of the Highlands of Scotland do not appear to have owed unconditional submission to the Scottish crown. The different chiefs possessed a species of independence in their several districts ; and, until lately, they had jurisdiction in life and death over their vassals. The interests of neighbouring clans frequently clashed with one another ; and, as the chiefs had pride and jealousy to excess,

they went to war with other chiefs as lord or sovereign, without permission of the king of the low country. As they possessed a species of sovereignty in their domain, they maintained an appearance of state and dignity, such as is assumed by sovereigns in other parts of the world. They seem to have resembled Arab chiefs in history and character; but they were less simple. The exterior of the people was rude; the mind had a tone of high elevation. The chief displayed more or less of sovereign pomp in his castle, and frequently not less of despotism than the czar of Muscovy. The Highlander of all classes is noted for hospitality, generosity, and friendship, where he is a friend. The submission of the common Highlander to the chief of the clan was perfect in past times; but it was not the servility of a slave in fear of the whip; it was the attachment of a son to a father, accompanied with reverence for authority from preeminence of station. The clan was supposed to be of one blood; and, as such, it was held together by one bond. All the members of the clan owed submission to the chief; but to no power, in their own idea, superior to the chief. The meanest subject of the clan considered the cause of the chief as the cause of himself, and his own cause as that of the chief; they were thus one. The idea of this reciprocal action and reaction was fostered with pride; and, under this idea, the warlike onset of Highlanders, as stimulated by resentment and cemented by sympathy from blood, was impetuous as a torrent from the mountain, not to be resisted by common means of defence. Besides the connexion and union from common blood, the tones of the bagpipe, a musical instrument in some manner peculiar to the Highlanders of Scotland, were singularly powerful in rousing and in supporting courage in the conflict of battle. The tones of the bagpipe penetrate to the inmost fibres of the frame, and rivet, so to speak, the whole action of the soul of a Highlander to one point; hence a charge to battle, sounded *in pibroch*, absorbs all the distracting cares and selfish sensibilities denominated fears, inflames the courage to enthusiasm, and renders a common man a hero.

The Highlanders of Scotland, who are differently dressed, differently armed, and speak a different language from the inhabitants of the low country, have some striking peculiarities in their character. Their origin is obscure; and their early history is only known in their own traditionary songs. The form of dress, and



the distinction of colours in the dress of the different clans, indicate something beyond savage life, something of arrangement which marks the reflecting and analyzing mind. The arms, armour, and mode of warlike attack, are peculiar. The arms and armour are well contrived for execution or defence, the mode of applying them impressive—almost irresistible. The language of the Highlanders and of the Irish has the same base; the Welch is only remotely allied with it. The proper elucidation of the subject is beyond the author's attainment; but he thinks it not improbable that the Gaelic or Erse, as now spoken, is a language of invaders, not the Celtic or language of the aboriginal inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland. The supposition is arbitrary; but it is supported by arguments which are not without weight. The inequality in size, the difference in form and configuration among the different members of the same nominal clan, render it more than probable that the west Highlands of Scotland received, at a remote but unascertained period, a body of foreigners, who, rendering themselves lords of the soil by force of arms, absorbed the aboriginal inhabitants into their mass, and, in the course of time, honoured them with their own name, and perhaps their own language. The clan is different in itself. One part is military *par excellence*, carrying in its mien the character of a soldier; the other is not military in appearance; but it is shrewd, intelligent of things which fall under its eye, and penetrated by a second sight as it were, into the interior of men and things; it is thus adroit in espionage or deception, particularly such as is practised in partizan war. Some of the Highlanders are tall and erect, of great muscular power, of a dignified and majestic air—the *élite* as it were of the Gothic race; others are of comparative low stature, compact and firmly knit in their joints, hardy in bodily frame, but without grace or elegance in manner and movement. The countenance of the higher class of Highlanders is for the most part strongly marked as a warlike countenance: the face is broad, the cheek-bones high, the visage manly—stern rather than comely. The features are often harsh, and the skin is coarse, as much exposed to weather. But though the Highlander, gentleman or gilly, be not so smooth, plump, and polished, as his southern neighbour, the *ensemble* of the figure commands attention and indicates character. He is the Adonis of the military field, not of the royal drawing-room. The



limbs of the Highlander are strong and sinewy, the frame hardy, and of great physical power in proportion to size. He endures cold, hunger, and fatigue, with patience; in other words, he has an elasticity or pride of mind which does not feel hardship, or which refuses to complain of it. The air of the gentleman is ordinarily majestic; the air and gait of the gilly has no artificial grace. He walks with a bended knee, and not gracefully; but his movement has energy, and, between walking and trotting and an interchange of pace, he performs long journeys with facility, particularly on broken and irregular grounds, such as he has been accustomed to traverse in his native country.

The Highlander possesses courage in a preeminent degree; and, with courage, he possesses other qualities which are valuable in war. These qualities may be supposed to be the product of circumstances, namely, local situation, state of society, and national institutions, which ingraft peculiarities on the habit by long custom. The Highlanders, divided into clans, collected into glens or valleys, and clustered on the banks of streams and rivulets in huts or cottages, are intimately united with one another by circumstances of locality as well as community of blood. The friendships are warm, even ardent—the enmities and resentments are strong. Objects are little varied in the circumscribed scene where they dwell; but those which do present make deep impression by frequent repetition. As often repeated, they ingraft a habit on the constitution, which has to a certain extent the power of a law of Nature; and hence the Highlanders of Scotland, born and reared under the circumstances stated, marshalled for action by clans according to ancient usage, led into action by chiefs who possess confidence from an opinion of knowledge, and love from the influence of blood, may be calculated upon as returning victorious, or dying in the grasp of the enemy. Scotch Highlanders have a courage devoted to honour; but they have an impetuosity which, if not well understood and skilfully directed, is liable to commit them to error. The Scotch fight individually as if the cause were their own—not as if it were the cause of a commander only—and they fight impassioned. Whether training and discipline will be capable of bringing them in time to the apathy of German soldiers, further experience may determine; but Scotch Highlanders are now impetuous, and, if they fail to accomplish their object, they cannot be withdrawn from it like

those who fight a battle by the job. The object of acquisition or conquest strikes the Highlander's eye direct: his eye is fixed upon it, he rushes towards it, seizes it, and proclaims victory with exultation. The cause of action is thus prominent in the Highlander's mind, it determines his course and whets his courage. If the cause be hidden from the view by contingency, or guarded from the grasp by unsurmountable obstacle, the movement stagmates, recoils, and does not often recoil by the rule of tactic. The object being lost, the mind becomes blank, the steps retrograde, and sometimes assume the retrograde of flight. The character of ardour belongs to Highland troops, and, as ardour is liable to compromise their safety, it is the duty of the officer who commands an army or division of Highlanders to study, so as to know and estimate effect, and not, through ignorance, misapply means, or misplace instruments, and thereby concert his own misfortune and the ruin of others. If ardour to close with the enemy be the characteristic of Highlanders, it is evident that Highlanders, as acting with armies, are not troops to be employed in masked manœuvres, demonstrations and encounters with a view to diversion, without a perfect knowledge of the purpose; and, as this is the case, it ought to be a rule perhaps in the general's arrangements never to bring Highlanders under fire in the field, where they are precluded by circumstances from extinguishing it by the bayonet. The Highlander does not sustain a distant fire with coolness, or retire with temper from an enterprize to which his front has been turned. He may be trusted to cover a retreat, difficult and dangerous as it may be, if such duty be assigned to him as a duty of honour and distinction; a retreat, in failure of an enterprize of his own, is likely, under his own management, to degenerate into a rout. But though this be true, it may still be observed that, even under failure from their own error, a note of the *pibroch*, or a word which strikes a spring of national feeling, not unfrequently arrests the retrograde, stimulates to forward movement, and infuses an energy into the arm, which washes out, in the blood of the enemy, the stain of momentary forgetfulness. The Highlander upon the whole is a soldier of the first quality; but, as already said, he requires to see his object fully, and to come into contact with it in all its extent. He then feels the impression of his duty through a channel which he understands, and he acts consistently in consequence of that

impression; that is, in consequence of the impulse of his own internal sentiment, rather than the external impulse of the command of another. It is a fact, and it is often verified in experience, that where the enemy is before the Highlander and nearly in contact with him, the authority of the officer is in a manner null; the duty is notwithstanding done, and well done, by the impulses of natural instinct.

Different nations have different excellences, or different defects, in their warlike character. Some excel in the use of missile weapons; the excellence of the Highlander lies in close combat with the naked point. Close charge was his ancient mode of attack; and he still charges with more impetuosity, or sustains the charge with more firmness; that is, disputes the ground with more obstinacy than almost any other man in Europe, presumptively from impressions ingrafted on organism by national custom. Some nations, who sustain the distant combat with courage, turn with fear from the countenance of an enraged enemy. The Highlander advances towards his antagonist with ardour; and, if circumstances permit him to grasp him, as man grasps with man, his courage is assured.

The Highlanders are social in private life—convivial even to excess. The enterprizes of war are the more common themes in their intercourse; and, as the annals of the clans are full of martial achievement, the conversation rarely languishes. Highlanders are remarkable for a spirit of inquisitiveness; and they have strong memories of historical events. The language of the peasant Highlander is animated and impressive as the language of those who possess the poetic mind; historical relation is in fact a living picture, even of things long past; insomuch that the act of a hundred years would seem only to have past yesterday, and that the narrator had been present in the scene. It may be remarked, that where animal sense is not distracted by the presentation of various and fleeting objects soliciting sensual enjoyment, common impressions make a deep indent, and ideas grow up and acquire strength in correspondence with the character of the indent. The Highlanders, who look upon war and the enterprizes of war with interest, seem to acquire instinctive ideas of the military art. The germ of education is scattered everywhere; and, as the Highlanders have strong conception,

and a great desire to learn, they take lessons from what they accidentally hear and see; and they actually attain, in the course of their lives, to a higher scale in military sagacity than any other people in the kingdom, or perhaps than any other peasant people in Europe.

Besides the social habit and military bias conspicuous among the inhabitants of the Highlands of Scotland, the close union of society which exists in the glens and valleys encourages a close and intimate love between the sexes. Love was a comparatively pure sentiment in the early or pastoral age; it was ardent and romantic, not gross and licentious, as the love of mercenary manufacturers or the roving sons of commerce. The name of warlike glory was the leading passion of the Highland youth: hunting the deer, martial music, love and song, and the pleasures of the *shell*, were the principal occupations of life. The scene of Highland festivity was simple; the enjoyment often went to riot or excess; the manner was rude, the sentiment of the mind was elevated and often refined. The different branches of the clan, as united by blood, paid a submissive devotion to the chief. The chief regarded the remoter branches of the clan as parts of himself; and on this ground, he held the whole together by the bond of affection, not less than by the constraint of authority. The population of the Highlands of Scotland consisted at one time of independent tribes. The ideal interest of the tribes often clashed. Feuds arose; war was the consequence of feud; and the Highlands were thus a scene of blood on many occasions. The Scotch Highlanders are brave individually, and the clan is intimately united with itself; but, as different clans are jealous of each other, it is not easy to assure a joint and cordial co-operation in enterprizes that are of complicated execution. The rebellion of the year 1745, which was the greatest affair the Highlanders ever undertook, and the most important that a people could be supposed to undertake, appears to have been defeated by the jealousies and insulated views of the chiefs of different tribes. The enterprize was hazardous in itself. It was exposed to numerous causes of counteraction; and it was not shielded by that prominent force of character in the leader which sinks individual interests in a general object. The Prince had many amiable traits of character as a gentleman; but he was neither a general

nor a hero in the field, and he was particularly deficient in that impenetrability of mind which is indispensable to the chief of a desperate undertaking.

The Highlanders were considered, in relation to their southern neighbours, as freebooters given to spoil and plunder; and the charge had some appearance of truth at one period of their history. The Lowlanders were held by them in the light of hostile people; and it was not comprehended in the creed of the Highlanders, more than in the creed of other people in Europe at the time, to abstain from the property of those whom they regarded as their enemies, or only as equivocal friends. They levied contributions on the Lowlands on some occasions, and they committed outrages on others; but, though they did this in cases that were not always justifiable, even according to the constitution of civil society at the time, their conduct in the year 1745 proves distinctly that they are neither a ferocious nor a cruel people. No troops ever, perhaps, traversed a country which might be deemed hostile, leaving so few traces of outrage behind them as were left by the Highlanders in the year 1745. They are better known at the present time than they were then, and they are known to be eminent for honesty and fidelity where confidence is given to them. They possess exalted notions of honour, warm friendships, and much national pride. Their ideas are comparatively few, but their conceptions are strong and correct; and certain classes of them have a sagacity and penetration in things connected with war, which exceeds the common measure of sagacity among most other nations. The sentiment of the Highlander is radical—a principle in the constitution of his nature. He may be said to have a patriarchal education, and he is attached to kingly power with a blind devotion. He is repugnant from republicanism; in short, he is a soldier who looks to a chief, not a philosopher who considers the sons of man as equal in condition to one another.



*Irish.*

THE nations who at present inhabit the continent and islands in the European seas, seem to consist of different castes of original people, variously mixed and amalgamated with one another in the course of many ages. The difference of original blood is distinctly marked in Ireland; for notwithstanding the intermixture which has arisen from invasion, conquest, and colonization, two classes of Irish are distinguishable from each other by the form of the body, and, more or less, by the features of the mind. The aboriginal stock abounds in the South and West. In physical form, mental character, and ordinary costume of dress, it very much resembles the class which constitutes the base of the population of Spain. This portion of the Irish people is rather under than above the middle standard of height of European peasantry, except the peasantry of France, Portugal, and Wales. The head is small in proportion to the rest of the body; it is well and gracefully formed, such as might be supposed by craniologists to indicate intelligence. The eye is rarely full; it is blue, or rather grey—quick in its motions, unsteady and difficultly fixed to its object. The hair is usually black: the features are somewhat sharp: the complexion is swarthy; the skin coarse; the neck thick; the chest full and expanded; the shoulders broad comparatively; the trunk compact; the thigh thick and fleshy, the leg not finely turned, &c. The expression of countenance is peculiar. It is not open and blunt as the countenance of an Englishman, nor steady and sedate as that of a Scotchman: it is the countenance of an humourist, indicating archness, or ridicule at human life, but not easily read. It is difficult to trace this aboriginal peasant through his varied moral course; but the course, though difficult to be traced as disguised by eccentric acts, is notwithstanding consistent: the Irish peasant has ordinarily his own view, and he pursues it through many windings.

Another part of the population of Ireland differ in external form, and perhaps somewhat in internal character, from what is here stated. It appears to have been sovereign at the time of the invasion of the English; and it may be supposed to have been itself invaded. The origin and history of it is involved in doubt and uncertainty. It has evidently a corporeal resemblance and a common language with the tribes who established themselves in the sovereignty of the isles and west Highlands of



Scotland at a period, not very remote perhaps, but not distinctly known. It is generally tall and strong, powerful in desultory action—not remarkable for endurance of toil. The thighs are fleshy, the legs thick at the ankle. The figure is cast in a large mould; but it is not of the finest proportions. The descendants of English conquerors and Scotch manufacturers are numerous in Ireland. They retain the properties of their original; and, in so far as respects bodily or mental capabilities, they do not seem to have degenerated by transportation to the new soil.

The Irish, whether aboriginal, early, or recent conquerors and colonists, are, upon the whole, good materials for the composition of armies: if they be well understood and skilfully put together, they are among the best in Europe. They are not inferior in exertion, at least in desultory exertion, to either English or Scotch—and they rarely fail in courage. In running, wrestling, and leaping; in short, in the whole round of athletic exercises, they claim superiority over their fellow-subjects; they are given to such sports of pastime as excite the activity of the limbs, and augment their power. These exercises are preparatory to the condition which fits men for war; and, as the Irish spend much of their time in exercises of this kind, they may be fairly supposed to attain a balance of advantages over either English or Scotch—decidedly over the manufacturers and artizans of either nation.

The Irish peasant lives on the coarsest fare at his native home; hence being fed plainly and poorly in early youth, he rarely complains of hardships where there is little choice of viands. He is ordinarily loosely and badly clothed, and otherwise much exposed to weather in his native bogs; it may therefore be presumed that he will not suffer much from similar exposure in the service of the campaign—and it is so in fact. Ireland is a damp and drizzling climate; and, as might be expected, the Irish peasant lives with impunity in an atmosphere which would be injurious to the native of a dry soil. In a word, the Irish soldier, as accustomed to homely fare and rude accommodation from his infancy, rarely complains of the hardships which disgust the sons of luxury; and he rarely suffers from the causes which afflict the health of those who have been delicately fed and tenderly nursed in the early part of life. From these causes the Irishman possesses a large share of constitutional advantages for the practice of war.

A considerable portion of the materials of the British army is drawn from Ireland. The bodily powers of the Irish soldier stand

high on a scale of comparison with others. But though high, they are less available and less calculable than those of the well-trained English; less firm, and less durable, than those of the ordinary Scot, particularly the Highlander. The act of the Irish is energetic, but it is not steady; and, as an act of impulse, it is not possible to calculate the effect with precision. The inhabitants of Ireland, as observed above, appear to be of two original castes, exclusive of the descendants of the comparatively recent English conquerors and Scotch colonists. The Irish speak a peculiar language, whether the language of the aboriginal, or the language imported by tribes of freebooters who invaded Ireland, conquered, and usurped the sovereignty of the soil at a comparatively recent date, is not easily ascertained. But though the origin be doubtful, the language exists, and being from the same root, indeed the same language as that of the West Highlands of Scotland, the presumption is strong, that those who held the sovereignty of Ireland, prior to the English invasion, were of the same race as those who at that time held the sovereignty of the West Highlands. Whether the warlike and domestic character was then the same in both is matter of conjecture only—it is now visibly different. The native Irish, particularly those who are properly considered as aboriginal, are moved to enterprize by sudden impulses. Their perception is acute; but where there is not a strong object to which the act tends, and by which it is regulated, the conduct is uncertain, and apparently capricious. To this the Highlander of Scotland, who is firm and determined in all his undertakings, presents a contrast. The fact is often verified in history; and, as the fact is undeniable, the cause of it may probably be thus explained. Clanship existed, and operated strongly on morals and manners in the Highlands of Scotland prior to the year 1745; and as the name, or reputation of a clan, was the polar-star by which the conduct of the meanest member of the clan was directed prior to that time, the acts of the Highlander were uniform and consistent, as compared with the acts of most other people. The sovereignty of Irish chiefs was annihilated by the English conquest; and if ever the Irish had the same attachment to family name and family character as the Highlanders of Scotland, it was lost when they became the vassals of the king of England—they then ceased to be a nation. The aboriginals of Ireland possess an organism highly sensitive to moral causes, which acts well and consistently

when touched by a commanding cause; but the act is of little dependence, unless where it moves under the touch of a strong impression. The native of Ireland, particularly the primitive class, has an acute sense and ready susceptibility of impression; and hence it is that the Irish recruit learns military exercises and military manœuvres more aptly than either English or Scotch. He learns sooner, but he also sooner forgets; or rather, he requires to be always at the school.

The apparent inconsistency of character in the native Irish embarrasses those who attempt to analyze conduct, and to account for human action on a basis of reasoning. The Irishman possesses, as already said, an acute sense of feeling, and he appears, for the most part, to act unreflectingly in obedience to that feeling. The nature of the cause which impels to action changes through a multitude of contingences, and the aspect of the act changes in correspondence with change in the nature of the impulse. This is apparently the case with the mass of the Irish. They appear to be capricious; they notwithstanding, under a mask of levity and thoughtlessness, conceal on some occasions a purpose of deep design, and pursue it through many disguises—a fact which has affixed upon the race an imputation of systematic deception. The imputation is not perhaps altogether unfounded; but, if founded, it is not difficult to see in what manner it has been produced. It is a law of human nature, that if the straight course be obstructed, a devious course arises, as a consequence of the obstruction. This secondary necessity, as it may be called, models the form of the Irish character.

It is somewhat curious, and may perhaps be deemed a problem in the history of the human mind, that the Irish peasant, apparently unthinking and acting in ordinary circumstances by immediate impulse upon sense, should, notwithstanding his apparent instability, pursue plans of deep design through a long series of difficulties; or that a people, so lightly affected, and acting so capriciously in the common affairs of life as the Irish seem to do, should have persevered in pursuing emancipation through a series of years, and against a barrier of obstacles contrived by a people instructed in all the arts of politicians, and supported in the enforcement of them by an army of soldiers.

The Irish peasant is, or believes himself to be, oppressed by the hand of power. He has some resemblance to the Spaniard

in concealing his resentment. He does not blot it out; and, in this concealment, he discovers much address, and in his acts much of boyish mischief. He conceives himself to be injured, and, possessing susceptible organism, he is now and then moved to revolt. The spirit of resentment and tendency to revolt is sometimes higher, sometimes lower. It has been lulled for a time; it has never been at rest; and it cannot be expected to be at rest, or entirely eradicated, until a revolution be effected in the manners of the people by the introduction of new habits, the accomplishment of which will be a difficult task, implying a deeper knowledge of human nature than falls within the sphere of common statesmen. The art of working moral reformation is not easy in itself; and, when attempted, it is too often counteracted by the very engines which are employed to carry it into effect. It is the example, not the injunctive precept of those who are in high official stations, that operates on the moral character of nations; and, as man is an animal of imitation who endeavours to imitate what is higher than himself, it would be extravagant to expect that he should be frugal, chaste, and just in principle, while his master is prodigal, profligate, and usurping. It is customary with men in power, and those who are ranked in what are called the higher classes of society, to declaim at the vices and bad habits of the vulgar people, without being aware perhaps that in doing so they censure themselves. The conduct of government is a moral mirror to the nation; and, if the history of mankind be examined without prejudice, the mass of the people will be found to be imitators of its acts, whether in virtue or in vice. The vices may be disguised; but the radical principle obtains throughout, and influences the general act.

As soldiers the Irish are brave; but they are uncertain. When intoxicated with liquor—and it is not a rare occurrence—they are riotous, insubordinate, and often in a manner mutinous; but, with all the disadvantages and drawbacks which attach to their condition, they possess a sense of honour and a frank generosity of character which occasionally produces brilliant acts, and sometimes very noble ones\*.

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\* In this posthumous reprint of Dr. Jackson's work some passages, which were left uncorrected at the time of the Author's death, have been omitted on

account of the political and religious changes in the condition of Ireland, which have subsequently taken place.

*Recapitulation.*

THE British army is composed of three nations, namely, English, Scotch, and Irish. The leading features in the character of each have been cursorily stated in the preceding pages, if not in an impressive and discriminating manner, at least in an impartial one—in so far as the writer's knowledge goes. Of the different parts of the British military force, the English is the most attractive, as estimated by beauty of appearance, not the most striking as estimated by utility in the eye of a soldier. It is equal, if not superior, in physical power to either of the others; it is inferior in that species of hardiness which endures the fatigues that are incident to war. As the English peasant is more fully fed, more carefully nursed, and more cautiously guarded against the influences of the weather in the early part of life than the Scotch and Irish, so he is more susceptible of the impression of the causes of disease which arise from the contingences of military service, consequently more sickly on a hard campaign. The English is generally open and manly in character; and, for the most part, sincere and true in his professions. He performs military duty as something bargained for, and he performs it faithfully; but he does not perform it with enthusiasm. He continues, even as a soldier, to act under the impression of that independence, or care of self, which characterizes the nation; that is, he gives service to a certain extent under a specified condition, but not beyond that extent; nor does he give it without something like earnest or security for his reward. He is not suspicious of fraud being practised on him in regard to his pay and allowances; but he does not, in case of privations, consider causes and reasons with discrimination; so as to be satisfied when the accidents which occur in the field, or elsewhere, preclude a regular supply of provisions, and other minor conveniences which are considered as conditions of the service. He is then clamorous, almost mutinous, and too ready to leave his colours. These are defects in the military character of the Englishman; but, with these defects, he may be considered as a good material for the construction of an army, the best perhaps in Europe, in so far as regards the operations of systematic war. He is capable of correct mechanical discipline, steady in action, cool in temper, and generous to the conquered—he rarely sheds the blood of those who throw down their arms.



The *Scot* is shrewd and intelligent, tenacious of his rights, and suspicious that he may not be fairly dealt with in his pecuniary concerns: he is seldom troublesome with complaints relative to the hardships of a hard campaign. He is hardy in physical constitution, eager of enterprize, impetuous in action, more distinguished for close charge with the bayonet than for regular and distant combat with fire-arms; and, as he fights under an excitement nearly allied with passion, he is not altogether so merciful to an enemy in the act of rout, as the soldiers of the English nation. He is true to his oath, rarely deserts his colours; and, at the point of attack, may be considered as the first soldier in Europe. The Scot advances to the enemy with a firm step and a determined eye. When his position is forced by superior power, and the ranks broke by accident, he maintains the combat, and fights with firmness and courage as if he were in close battalion. He bears fire with patience in the siege: he does not bear it with patience in the open field. He is restrained with difficulty from advancing; he is thus liable to commit himself to discomfiture by too great ardour. He is a man of trust for enterprizes in the night, if he have proper information of the design: he is throughout a man of trust, with this reserve, that he is eager, some may think too eager, to close with the enemy, and thus not the best material for a common tactician.

The *Irish* nation furnishes the other part of the British army: its conduct in war is a riddle. The Irish soldier has the appearance of being indifferent to danger, careless, and without thought of himself. Confusion, like the confusion of a row, seems to be his delight; he often seems a playful humourist in the face of an enemy, anticipating, as it were, with pleasure the effect of the snares of the military decoy that he conceives to be in preparation for him. He is brave; but his bravery cannot be calculated with certainty. It seems to depend on impulse of circumstances, rather than on a fixed and determined sentiment of the mind; consequently examples of heroism and panic are strangely mixed. The Irish soldier requires that the point of attack be distinctly in his eye; and, in order that his good conduct be calculable, it is required that he be directly under the eye of a rigorous commanding officer; consequently he is not of dependence in night-expeditions and night-attacks, nor is he of that description of force to which the act of covering a retreat would be safely committed. The case is here stated



as it ordinarily is; but it must not be concealed, at the same time, that the Irish are capable of discipline, susceptible of the impulse of honour, and as such of dependence, as well as the other parts of the army.

The materials of the British army, collected from three different nations, are classed in corps as chance or circumstances of necessity direct, rather than by nation, or by a rule of systematic arrangement according to constitutional qualities in the parts. Whether such a form of composition be calculated to produce the highest possible military excellence of which man is capable, better judges than the writer must decide: there are grounds to believe that it might. The probability of the supposition derives proof and illustration from the example of corps, that are purely national, being generally more distinguished for good conduct than corps that are filled promiscuously with materials of a character nationally repulsive to each other. The question is of some importance to be studied and known; but it cannot be properly discussed in this place. The army that is purely national retains a love for its nation, and continues to regard that love as the paramount object of assuming arms. It has the nation in its eye rather than the commander; and, on that account, it is obnoxious to sovereigns, inasmuch as it is a check upon the course to despotism. There are recent proofs in Europe that a national army is patriot—and proofs also that despots dread it. It remains to be remarked of the British army as now formed, that though it may be reckoned superior to most, if not to every one of the European armies of the present time, in the actual conflict of battle, it is inferior in discipline and steady conduct to most of them under discomfiture, or in reverse of fortune. The instances in proof are numerous: two very remarkable ones occurred in Spain during the late peninsular war, that is, the retreat upon Corunna, and the retreat from Burgos. The army was in a manner disorganized in both of them; and the hardships to which it was exposed do not appear to have been such as ought to have disorganized an army the base of whose discipline was well laid. The fact is recent and precise; and it shews that something is yet wanting in the British military system to form an army of dependence, where circumstances compel it to assume the retrograde, or turn its face from the enemy.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTH AMERICA.

IN estimating the military character of the different nations who have attained a name in the records of history, the people of North America, who revolted against the parent state, and finally established their independence, whether by chance or bravery, claim notice in this place. The North Americans were colonial, and dependent on Great Britain in the year 1775 ; they are now free and sovereign ; and not only free and sovereign, but rich and powerful. As they attained independence through war, they will probably be held, by posterity, to have achieved it by military prowess : on this head there is doubt ; at least, the author believes that if the American success be closely considered, it will be found to have been owing to bad management on the part of the mother-country, rather than to great exertion on the part of the colony. This opinion is contrary to common opinion ; it will therefore be proper to state the grounds on which it is thought to rest.

It is presumed that the means employed by the parent state to check the revolt of the American provinces were sufficient in quantity to have effected the purpose, even more than sufficient, had they been applied under the direction of a principle of military science, and rigorously enforced in execution. Great Britain might have made a desert of the inhabited sea-coast by the force which she commanded. It would not, it is presumed, have been necessary to do so ; for it is not probable that many among the Americans would have left their homes for houseless liberty in the woods. They were not brought to the alternative. The measures adopted for bringing them to obedience were half measures, neither possessing consistent rigour, nor consistent kindness. Some part of the American people, chiefly those of the Northern provinces, had an independent spirit, and something like attachment to the soil that had given bread to their persecuted fathers ; the majority, particularly those whose ancestors, if not banished from Great Britain for evil deeds, had been

adventurers in pursuit of fortune, had little attachment to the country unconnected with its productiveness; hence it is reasonable to believe that it was more in irritation from violence committed on property by arbitrary taxation, from hopes of getting rid of British debts, or from a factious spirit among themselves, than from a real desire of independent liberty, that the revolt became general, and that the revolted remained united. The Americans talk boastingly when danger is distant; they are not in general bold and resolute when the hand of power grasps closely. If this be so, and we believe it to be a fact, it is not improbable that they would have yielded to fear, had the impression of fear been applied skilfully and with rigour. That was not done. The threatenings were numerous, but they were vain words; the severities inflicted were few and partial: they irritated, but they did not intimidate or disable. The offers of kindness were profuse, but they were not applied judiciously. They savoured of the coaxing which acts on the simplicity of children; not of the generosity which gains the heart by the sincerity of kindness: they were, in fact, bribes to gain a purpose. The purpose was seen, for the Americans are sufficiently shrewd, and the coaxing did no good; on the contrary, it did harm. Protection was offered; submission followed the offer of protection. The views of the protectors changed; or, safety having been offered without a previous calculation of means to maintain it, the protectors left their positions, and abandoned the local population to the mercy of the enemy. This was particularly the case in the southern provinces; where, by a series of treatment indicating weakness or want of consideration, the desire, which many of the Americans professed to be again connected with Great Britain, was finally extinguished: the Americans observed sarcastically, that British generals did more for them than their own.

North America had not, as a colony depending on Great Britain, a regular army at the time of the revolt. The different provinces had provincial militia, more or less numerous; and most of the individuals of the provinces were well acquainted with the use of the firelock. Many of them were expert beyond example with the rifle; but few, if any of them, understood tactic and manœuvre; nor could they be expected to learn it, for American ideas were abhorrent from the restraints of military discipline. But, though the people of America were not disciplined;

and could not be subjected to that form of discipline which gives success in systematic war as practised in Europe, they were almost universally excellent marksmen; and, with this acquirement, they were prepared for that desultory and irregular mode of warfare which is best suited to the defence of such a country as America then was. There were no restrictions in America against killing game; and as the pursuit of game is pastime, or amusement, in most countries, the American peasantry spent their idle hours in shooting birds, or hunting deer, &c. They became acquainted through these means with the nature of ground; and they were thus initiated to a certain extent in partizan war. The Americans were novices in mechanical tactic and field-evolutions when they first took to arms; and, as unpractised in the field, and not constitutionally of the most daring courage, they had little confidence in themselves; none indeed, unless when they were placed under cover in a secure position: they were then the most expert of marksmen. They did not, with all the pains they bestowed upon the subject, acquire equal celerity in firing, and equal precision in firing in time, as the trained battalions of Europe; but they fired with better direction than any of them, and were of course their superiors in the work of destruction. Though not daring in close combat, they were not without courage. It was a courage of circumstance, the direct combat: front to front, was supported with resolution, the retrograde was precipitate when the flanks were turned, when the design of turning them was discovered, or when a front attack was threatened by the bayonet. This seemed to the writer to be the leading feature of the American military character during the revolutionary war; and, as it is in some measure a feature of circumstance, it is reasonable to believe that it resulted from habits engendered by mode of life. The value of the American people as soldiers consists in skill in the use of fire-arms. That skill, it is presumed, arises from the practice of firing at birds and wild beasts in the rivers, ponds, and woods, of an extensive continent. Accustomed to circumvent, and to shoot from behind cover, the Americans were themselves afraid of being circumvented; and, impressed perhaps with the idea of circumvention, they moved off precipitately at the appearance of suspicious manœuvres being practised against them: they had not, as a soldier ought to have, a face for flank and rear. The prey which the Ameri-

cans were accustomed to pursue being a timid prey—to be entrapped rather than combatted by force, courage to face the enemy boldly was not acquired by the exercise of hunting: it was rather perhaps diminished by the habit of caution engendered by the practice of circumvention.

If the military merit of the American people, as it appeared during the revolutionary war, be estimated fairly, it does not stand high even in partizan war. The Americans were soldiers from necessity—not from genius or inclination. They did not proceed to the combat with a mind inflamed with ideas of national glory. They had little of military enterprize in the constitution originally; and they made little scientific progress in the military art during the continuance of the contest. They advanced boldly to action in several instances; they maintained no combat obstinately. The cover of a bank, a tree, or a fence, was necessary to give them confidence to look at their antagonist. They exercised the firelock with effect while they were under cover; they retired when the enemy approached near, that is, they split and squandered, according to the cant phrase, to rally at an assigned point in the rear.

The Americans, who were colonists under the protection of Great Britain, revolted and declared war without a regular organized military force to support their pretensions, with few persons capable of putting troops into common military form, and with no one within the union who had experience in conducting an army in the field. Some persons on British half-pay, who had settled in America at the termination of the war 1756, joined the standard of revolt, and obtained rank and command in the new army. Of these, Gates, Lee, and Montgomery, were the most distinguished. Montgomery was considered as a brave and gallant man, with something of the hero in his character. He fell at an early period of the war in the attack on Quebec. Lee was a man of some learning, wit, and humour; and, in so far as opinion can be formed from reports of his conduct in the year 1756, he was not without military talent. He was ambitious of power, capricious in temper, and disposed to despise the people in whose cause he had engaged to fight. Gates was an amiable man; but he was a man of common abilities only. He commanded the troops to which General Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga. He obtained reputation in consequence; subsequently



defeated at Camden by Lord Cornwallis, he lost it, and remained afterwards in retirement.

General Washington was a native American, born in the province of Virginia, of which he was at one time the surveyor-general. He was commander of a corps of militia, and was employed occasionally in the service that was allotted to militia in the war 1756. He was present with General Braddock in his unfortunate expedition, and evinced military talent on that occasion; at least, he gave proofs of good sense and discernment, to which his general did not, to his own misfortune and the misfortune of others, sufficiently attend. His reputation stood high with his countrymen on that account; and, in consequence of his general respectability, and the opinion which was entertained of his military knowledge, he was appointed to the chief command of the army of the revolted provinces. He appears to have been a prudent and sagacious man, patient in labour and patriotic in spirit. The wisdom which he displayed in keeping the Americans together under the difficulties by which they were frequently pressed, was more conspicuous than the force of his military genius in the field. He did much, as much perhaps with the means that were in his hands, as any man could have done; more, it is believed, than many would have done. He was more than a common man; and, without being biassed in favour of Americans, we are warranted to say that General Washington, with the exception of a blemish which seemed at that time to attach to Americans, namely, that man is not bound to his word, &c., beyond what is useful, or expedient in a political view, would have passed into the page of history for a most respectable, even for a great man. The capitulation which he signed at Great Meadows in the year 1755, in which there was a charge of assassination laid against him, appears to the writer to tarnish his character as a man and a soldier; and the attempt to violate the capitulation of York-town, by threatening to hang Captain Asgil, a person under the guarantee of that capitulation, and who had committed no crime, diminishes the respect with which an unbiassed individual is otherwise disposed to regard him. If it be argued, that he threatened only with a view to enforce redress from the British commander-in-chief for an irregularity which had been committed at New York, he was most unfortunate in fixing on the subject of a capitulation



for whose safety his own honour and the honour of his nation was pledged.

Green, another of the American generals, who became conspicuous in the southern provinces towards the close of the war, was also a native of the country. He was a man of good character in private life, and he was peculiar in his military history. General Green cannot be said to have ever decidedly gained a field of battle; the event of every action which he fought was notwithstanding a victory to him. He advanced confidently to the field in most cases; he did not act confidently in the conflict in any, whether owing to his own timidity under fire, or to the timidity of the troops which he commanded, the writer does not venture to pronounce. He retired in some instances where victory was actually in his hands; but, though he retired thus inconsiderately, or as it were in ignorance of the real state of things, he rallied rapidly in most, and again advanced with a good countenance. He was repulsed, or rather left the field abruptly, at Guildford Court-house; at Camden; at Ninety-six; and at the Eutaws. He could not claim a victory at any of them: he reaped the fruits of victory from all of them.

General Arnold, another of the American generals, was a native of America, and a man of genius in the true sense of the word. He had more military talent than perhaps any one who appeared on the military theatre in the revolutionary war on either side. He went over to the British for a sum of money; and his treachery tarnished his character in such a manner that his value was obscured, or lost. He was sent to Virginia by the British general with a small force. He did something; and the preparations which he had made for doing more, shewed clearly what he was capable of doing, if his genius had been left to its own scope. He was a man at all points—his power was within himself. By his coolness and decision he rendered the British good service in the war 1793 in their disaster at Guadaloupe, where he happened to be by accident on a trading speculation; for General Arnold was everything, and capable of almost everything—as huckster, horse-dealer, or general, he was original.

The people of North America revolted from the mother-country, and established their independence after a contest of seven years' duration. As free and independent, they assumed the character of a new people; and as a new people, looking

at the human race with the eye of philosophy, or common sense, they discovered that it has one common origin, and is destined to move on one common base. They considered men as fellows, without other eminence than what is derived from talent, and without other authority than what is given for executing the duties of official stations. The Americans, when emancipated from the chains of the mother-country, considered it to be the first step in their proceeding to digest a system of law for their government as a free and independent people. The author does not pretend to maintain that the law or constitution which they formed is perfect in all things; but he thinks he may say it adheres more closely to the constitution of man's nature than any other constitution now in operation in Europe; it must therefore be supposed to be deserving of man's attention. The American constitution has a somewhat similar basis with what is called the British constitution, in so far as respects the liberty of the subject and the general forms of legislation. The principle is professed republicanism, but not universal republicanism; for the possession of property is the condition which admits the individual to be a part in the state. This is not a true condition, for the good man may be without property, and the rich man without virtue; but, as the mass of the American people have property, the corruptive tendency of the principle has not as yet been injurious to any extent. The chief of the executive is in authority only for a given term of years, and he has no absurd privileges during the term of his authority.

The Americans are speculative, active and enterprising as speculators after gain, rather than patient and industrious as simple labourers. Some of the agriculturists are moderate, frugal, and contented with the product of the labour of their own hands; the majority are enterprising, eager in the pursuit of gain, and, though professing to be free, not scrupulous to make gain by the labour of slaves. Slavery existed in colonial America. It was not done away generally when America became independent; consequently, American liberty, like liberty in other parts of the civilized world, is only a combination among those who have power to apply the persons of those who are destitute, weak, and indolent, to their purposes. The agricultural, fishing, and hunting occupation of the Americans, was primary; the commercial, as it necessarily must be, was secondary. The American hunters,

fishers, and explorers of new regions with a view to traffic, were numerous and adventurous. If not scientific navigators, the Americans are bold and skilful seamen. Possessed of good natural sense, they observe closely what comes under the eye, and, as unprejudiced by forms of education, they make just remark on what they observe. The peasant is inquisitive; and, as not fettered by the fashions of a court, he looks at things as a man of common sense, and forms conclusions from his own judgment. The American was dependent as a colonist, consequently inferior in his own and others' estimation. He became independent and sovereign by a contest in arms; and as independent, he assumed a place among sovereign nations. He formed a constitutional system of law according to his own view of right or expediency; and under that system, faulty as the execution may be, particularly in the looseness or chicanery of law-courts, he made more progress towards improvement in a shorter time than perhaps any other nation in the records of human history. The writer had the opportunity of seeing the Americans in the revolutionary war. He saw them in the year 1798, and also in the year 1815. In so far as he could judge from what he saw, the Americans had improved greatly both in manners and morals since they became an independent nation. The peasantry contiguous to the sea-coast, from Charlestown to New York, are the best informed peasantry that any inhabited part of the globe perhaps contains. The native American does not often exhibit an example of the first-rate genius and fine taste. The people have little of the courtier manner; but they are not rude in the true sense of the word. They pursue science, collect information; and they are, for the most part, well informed of what is useful in common life. They have applied the discoveries of science to the useful arts on a grand scale, and with more success than any other known people. They are, as new people, near to the root of common sense, and have thus a good chance of acting wisely. The construction of steam-vessels, and of ships of war, placed the Americans on an envious eminence. Their ships of war are products of common sense, rather than imitations of European naval architecture. The person who built the Franklin (74) had never seen a war-ship of higher rate than frigate; and there was nothing in the British navy of that period to be compared with the Franklin, whether we regard the formidableness of the battery

or the connexion and harmony of the parts combined in the structure.

The people of North America were adventurous in mercantile or other speculation as colonist, they are restless and bold as sovereign and independent. They open new grounds for agricultural pursuits often at a venture; and they extend their trade by sea in all directions. They were industrious, and they became rich; and, as a consequence of riches, they became arrogant. The population of America multiplied at an astonishing rate after the establishment of independence; and the population, thus increased, became self-important and overbearing. Confident in their power from number, they went to war with Great Britain in the year 1813 on slight provocation. They made their attack on the province of Canada; and the lakes were the scene of serious conflicts. The superiority on the lakes, and also on the ocean, was claimed by the Americans; and it was established to an extent that was not foreseen or expected. It arose evidently from the mode in which the ships were constructed, that is, from the greater concentration of fire, the superior weight of metal, and perhaps from superior skill in gunnery—not from the superior courage or seamanship of the sailor. The combats were only encounters of single ships. The Americans did not appear to be equal in courage to the British at close quarters; but they obtained notwithstanding a balance of advantages. This is true, and must be admitted; but it is not probable that there would have been cause to admit it, had the combat been between large fleets at open sea, or had the engagements been yard-arm and yard-arm between individual ships.

The American navy may in fact be considered as a model of perfection produced by common sense, rather than European dock-yard science. The army is not entitled to the same praise. It does not seem to have made much progress since the termination of the revolutionary war; nor does it seem probable that it ever will make much. The people of North America are deficient in two qualities that are essential to the formation of military force, namely, the subordination which submits patiently to such forms of moulding and discipline as renders the human race a machine, obedient to the will of a general to whatever point it may be directed, or to whatever purpose it may be applied; or, secondly, the ardent love of country, which,

rising to enthusiasm, produces acts of individual heroism beyond the calculations of tacticians, and superior to the acts of mere mechanism. The Americans claim liberty and independence as the abstract right of man—and do not submit to the first; they have no attachment to the country analogous to the attachment of aboriginal people—and are little susceptible of the second.

The Americans made an attack upon the province of Canada in the year 1813; and, from the preponderating force which they might have been supposed to be capable of bringing to bear upon it, they might have been expected to carry it without difficulty. They failed, from want of skill, want of courage, or want of union and cordiality. The first expeditions were badly conducted—committed to destruction by mismanagement, or something worse. The sick-list of a force of 2500 men amounted to 1800. The form of the sickness was gangrenous; such as, in the opinion of the chief medical officer, was occasioned by damaged grain, and other damaged provisions. The expedition, paralysed by this extraordinary sickness, came to nothing; and this extraordinary sickness was occasioned, according to report, by the villany of commissaries or contractors, who sold the sound provisions to the enemy, and fed the troops with damaged grain and putrid beef. This was said to be the cause of the failure; but, independently of this, the general was not a man fit to command an army. A general of more ability was appointed to his place; and, under the impulse which the new general gave to the American spirit, the Canadian army fought with a determination and vigour at Chippawa and Fort Erie that would have done credit to the best troops in Europe. The exertion was a forced one, produced by a general of spirit and resolution; but it was relatively a successful one. The defence of the capital, when attacked by a detachment of the British army in the year 1814, was feeble and ill-concerted. The design and purpose of that attack do no credit to the British government; but the attack shews, among other things, that the Americans are not in themselves a patriotic and hard-fighting people. A motive of strong force is necessary to induce them to do their duty like men—this was seen at New Orleans. The British fleet and army made its appearance in the Mississippi; and, as the armament was formidable and apparently well-



conducted, the inhabitants, according to report, were ready to compound for the safety of their property. The general who commanded at New Orleans was a man of promptitude and decision—not inferior in energy of execution to any general of his time. He was imperious and peremptory, and gave the people to understand, that, though he had not force adequate to the defence of the post without their assistance, he had force to burn it in spite of them—and that he would do it. They knew him to be a man who did not threaten vainly; and, as they found that they could not save their cotton-bags without fighting, they made a virtue of necessity, formed them into bulwarks, and, under cover of their merchandize, repulsed the British with the greatest slaughter, in the shortest time, that stands on record in any scene that occurred in the late war. The determination to resist, with a comparatively weak force, was an act of resolution belonging to the general. The troops, at least the militia, had no part of the merit of it; and no merit in the action, except that under cover of the cotton-bags, and under the eye of a severe and intrepid commander, they used their fire-arms with unparalleled effect. They abandoned an island in the river without adequate resistance—a proof that they do not fight to desperation where they have option to fly. The threatening eye of the general superintended their conduct at the lines, not at the island, and the result was such as has been stated.

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#### CONCLUSION.

THE preceding sketch of the military character of nations, imperfect as it is, offers some important truths on the subject of war and warlike arrangement. The human race, as is obvious to common observation, has one general constitution. It is differently modified in bodily form, and manifests more or less difference in the character and degree of mental capacity; but it is still one in its foundations, from the savage in the wood to the monarch on the throne. Its natural propensities are similar. Its passions, which are propensities in excess, are so modified on many occasions as to give a new face, by coverings of art, to masses of the human creation: this is particu-



larly conspicuous in those who dedicate themselves to military pursuit.

Action and reaction in reciprocity is the visible cause which indicates the life, and maintains the health of the sublunary system. The balance of action among the individuals of the human race, called justice; or, more explicitly, the act of doing unto others as you would that others do unto you, is the base of human morals. Man, it is to be borne in mind, is introduced into the world, the greatest as well as the meanest, in a state of absolute helplessness. He has appetites and desires; he covets and acquires, that is, appropriates. He cannot acquire and appropriate, at least he rarely does acquire and appropriate, without encroaching on the sphere of his fellow-man; and he does not encroach on the sphere of his fellow-man without violating a fundamental law of the Creator of the universe. Man, as repeatedly observed, has an innate desire to extend his sphere and aggrandize his condition. He has, at the same time, an injunction in the structure of his frame not to overstep a limited boundary. This is so constitutionally; but it is also to be observed, that the desire which solicits to exceed is often stronger than the injunction given to restrain. Where the desire to exceed prevails, the barrier of right is broken, the subsequent course is precipitous and irregular, and the termination is any thing but happy. If power be acquired through usurpation on the rights of others, an artificial centre of action arises in the power usurped. The usurpation, as extraneous to the constitution, is deaf to reason, and blind to truth. It worships its own greatness, becomes tyrant over the law of the constitution, and endeavours to maintain power and to exercise tyranny by every means of fraud and force that occurs to vitiated appetites. It is thus that, where the usurper attains a given degree of elevation through art or accident, he rarely fails to prepare an artificial instrument, by means of which he multiplies aggressions, and maintains with violence the stations which he had iniquitously usurped. He thus becomes a robber, under the protection of organized military force.

The Romans, who made extensive conquests, and who maintained their conquests longer than any other people in the records of European history, understood the art of military organization, and the application of military force for assuring con-

quest, better than any others with whom we are acquainted. The form of military training and discipline instituted by this people, and to which the effect alluded to may be considered as due, communicated an interest to the individual who practised it, inasmuch as the utility of every part of the discipline was obviously and directly within his comprehension, at the same time that it was impressive on his senses, as an exercise conducing to his safety. The exercises of the present time have not a similar electrizing effect. The manual or firelock exercise is executed with mechanical precision and correct correspondence as to the time of joint explosion; but, as the utility of precision and correspondence in time is not perceived by the individual himself, there is necessarily little interest in the execution. The execution is compulsory, and it is performed mechanically. The soldier is no more than a hinge in a compound instrument; and, as he is not well informed of the principle on which the instrument acts, he can scarcely be supposed to exercise his judgment in modifying the act which he is ordered to perform. If the attainment of superiority in the actual conflict of battle be the object of military training, the temper and energy of individuals ought, in the just reason of things, to be estimated so as to be known correctly to the full extent of their value. The exact order of external uniformity, according to which separate parts are arranged in the military fabric in the present time, is only a secondary object in the true meaning of things. Correspondence in power, not uniformity in the *coup d'œil*, is the base of true military organization. As it is in the temper of the parts, not in the uniformity of the *coup d'œil* that the value of the military instrument consists, it is, or ought to be, the main object of the tactician, as frequently said, to arrange the parts in the ranks according to power and temper, rather than according to size and external resemblance. But it happens here, as it happens in many other things, that the ingenuity, or rather the presumption, of man counteracts his own design. Ignorant, or regardless of internal relations, he acts on the information of the eye, and thus gives a garb of order and dressing to the materials of the fabric which, as not resting on the true base, detracts from union, vigour, and consistency in the execution of function. Hence it is that military education becomes vain, the effect comparatively void, or the reverse

of good. Unless order be engrafted on the properties of the material with such care and discernment, that no part of the constitutional power and native spirit be marred or shackled by the artificial arrangement, the instinctive sagacity of the barbarian prevails over the science of the refined tactician. The fact is illustrated by the military history of semi-barbarous nations; who, though inferior in military arrangement, in the exterior forms of discipline, and greatly inferior in arms and military apparatus, not unfrequently defeat the armies of scientific, polished, and refined masters in the art of war. The examples are numerous in the history of mankind; and even in recent times, the untaught peasantry of the poorer cantons of Switzerland, and of some part of Tyrol, gave more trouble to the troops of France than the regular armies of the great monarchs, which were exact in their movements as a machine of mechanical construction. Great Britain herself can speak to the fact. She sustained greater injury to her military reputation by the people of the town and district of Buenos Ayres and New Orleans, than from all the regular armies she encountered in the field during the late war.

The energy of spirit which leads to military enterprize is a quality of the early stage of society. It vanishes from nations in proportion as they become polished and refined; at least, it is not supported in a progressive course, unless by scientific study and a judicious application of such causes as, acting on human organism, maintain the machine in a state of activity to a forward point prominent in the view of all. The exercises with the firelock, or common drillings of the European infantry, are not of a nature to interest the simple soldier. The purpose of them, as connected with utility, is not fully comprehended by him. He goes to the field as an automaton, to act and to be acted upon by mechanical powers, ignorant of the principle on which he acts, and the purpose for which he is constrained to act. The mind is not interested by routine forms of duty; and, as it is important to success that the mind should be interested, it is useful, or may be supposed to be useful, to endeavour to give a new cast, consequently a new force of impression, to military exercises and military forms of evolution, without changing the principles of such practices as are laid on a basis of truth. New modes of military exercise interest the individual by their novelty; they even not unfrequently communicate an animating energy to the arm of

the actor, which goes beyond the limits of ordinary calculation: they seldom fail to intimidate the enemy as striking him by surprise. If this be so, it belongs to military genius to change the appearances of things, with a view to animate one part and to intimidate another. But, while this is done, especial care is to be taken that the fundamental principles of military tactic be not rashly violated. The *Shrapnel* shell, as a means of extending the range of missile force, is an invention of science; and it may be considered as an important one in modifying the character of a military action. The *Congreve* rocket may surprise the inexperienced: it is a child's plaything in the field, rather than an instrument in war: it may be employed with advantage in sieges. The Polish lance, with which hussars have lately been armed, has had advantage on some occasions as an arm of offence; but it is chiefly to novelty that the unexpected effect is to be ascribed. The broad-sword and target of the Scotch Highlander is perhaps inferior, in a correct estimate of the power of weapons, to the firelock and bayonet; it was notwithstanding formidable, and made a striking impression on British troops in the year 1745. The British soldier was armed in the year 1745 with the firelock and bayonet. He was a trained soldier, and moreover a soldier not unacquainted with the practice of war. The Highlander was rude, and unskilled in military tactic. If he carried a carbine into the field, he did not much rely on it. His chief trust was in the broad-sword. It was his national arm, and it was to him a talisman which gave confidence, even an idea of invincibility. With this arm and armour he discomfited the experienced troops of Great Britain, presumptively through surprise at the unknown mode of attack. The Highlanders who fought on the continent of Europe, and in America in the war 1756, seemed to have acted on the French by a similar form of impression, as they had acted on the British at Prestonpans and Falkirk. Even so late as the American revolutionary war, the Highlanders, probably from the impression which the peculiarity of dress &c., made upon the peasant militia, were more dreaded than other British soldiers. It is sufficiently proved in history that rude and semi-barbarous nations, ill armed and with little of what is called discipline, often discomfit the systematic armies of scientific tacticians and accomplished generals. If they do so, they must be supposed to do it by the instinctive im-

pulses of simple nature. The fact is incontestably proved in history; and, as true, we may adduce in explanation of it, that wherever art usurps dominion, so as to control, and constrain the physical powers of nature to move in artificial channels, the fabric produced by such system of force is weak in itself and easily overturned, whatever may be the speciousness of its outside. The refinements of polished life, which are different modes of desire and appetite assuming superiority, undermine the stability of society. The path of nature is narrow, simple, and direct—the paths of what is called civilization are specious, numerous, and devious; but, as deviations from the direct course of nature, they are errors which lead ultimately to destruction. In all improvements therefore in the processes of human life, military as well as others, the fundamental law of the constitution of things is to be cautiously guarded from violation; for, if the principle of the improvement do not rest on nature and truth, the superstructure, with all its ornaments of art and beauty, will go to decay as a building the timbers of which are consumed by dry rot.

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## PART III.

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### OUTLINE OF TACTIC, OR RUDIMENT OF MILITARY TRAINING.

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THE history of mankind presents little to the eye of the philosopher, except a picture of ambitious and inordinate passions, leading to acts of robbery and massacre vulgarly dignified with the name of war. An innate propensity to transgress the bounds of justice, that is, a desire to extend power and usurp dominion over his fellows, characterises man from other animals. The desire of obtaining something necessary, or supposed to be necessary for human enjoyment, constitutes the ostensible motive of human activity. Without desire life would stagnate, without the influence of a spirit of justice to control its movements, activity would become injurious to others, and ultimately destructive to itself. Encroachment on the sphere of others is unjust, inasmuch as it is the transgression of the law of Deity, which assigns a limit to the acts of every created thing. The transgression of the limit, as it relates to man with man, is effected by superior force—simple brute force in one case, force combined with fraud, and organized by intelligence, in another. The first is the rude violence of the savage; the latter is the product of civilization.

The art of war, considered as the means of acquiring power, or of preserving power already acquired, stands at the head of human sciences. It is the science of princes; and, where the object of it is legitimate, that is, national protection and defence against unjust aggression, it is a generous and a noble one. It is in all cases a deep one; for it comprehends, within its circle, the supposition of an intimate knowledge of the physical and moral powers of man. As the art is an art of high privilege, the practice of it is reserved for sovereigns and their satellites; and to attempt to discuss the principles of it would be deemed presumption in a man who moves in the humble station of the Author; he therefore abstains from touching it, unless where common sense is permitted to speak.

The proper organization of an army or military instrument



requires a correct knowledge of the constituent material, both in its physical and moral relations ; and, as this knowledge is important and not easily attained, it implies a necessity of studying the subject scientifically in its principles. The leader of an army conducts a series of active and skilfully combined operations for the purpose of attaining a military object, that is, an advantage over the enemy. As the operation implies a contest between opposing powers, and as the contest exhibits a trial of skill, the effect indicates the pre-eminence of one over the other, so as to fix a distinction of relative value. The act of the general, considered as commander, is supposed to be prompt, but not at random. He does not ponder on the field of battle ; but seizes, as it were intuitively, the fit time and place for acting with the promptitude which belongs to genius. Promptitude in the field is what may be called military knowledge. It cannot be learned from books ; but it may be matured and systematized by observation and reflection ; while the preparation of the instrument through which the purpose is effected, is evidently the work of the philosopher who studies and knows human nature in its minuter relations. It is from the perfection of the military instrument in its tactical movement that results in war are calculated. Hence an army, correctly organized and animated by social sympathies, often conquers with little aid from the general ; a general of genius and ability sometimes fails, in spite of his military skill, by the mere defect of his instrument. If this be so, it is evident that the organization of military materials on a basis of science cannot be otherwise considered than as an object of essential importance, to those who pursue war as a trade, or who cultivate it as science for the protection of themselves and their country against external violence.

An army, which is a military instrument formed with a view to execute a design of general purpose, is, or may be, constituted according to two different views ; namely, according to the quantity and external form of the animal mass ; or according to the power and temper of the individual parts, as tried and proved by experiment to be suitable, or corresponding with each other. The first is the common mode. Symmetry, or uniformity of *coup d'œil*, is the chief object in the tactician's eye. The appearance imposes, but it is not of dependence. The second (and it is that which is here recommended) does not disregard external symmetry and

superficial appearance; but it does not build exclusively upon them. The parts may either correspond, or differ in size and figure from each other; but it is indispensable that they correspond in effective power, and that they be similar in temper and internal character. If the parts of which the military instrument consists be adjusted in the manner proposed, it is evident that the act will be one throughout, and that the parts will move in unison when they are brought to action, even when they are incited to the utmost extent of exertion. Hence if the united act, arising from a corresponding and joint action of parts, be the object which is sought for in war, the mode of arrangement suggested in this place is the useful one: the other is delusive, contrived for the pleasure of the eye, or for imposing on an enemy who is timid, as without true knowledge of things.

Animal power is not calculable according to the visible form of the animal mass. It neither resides exclusively in the volume of the muscle, nor in the height of stature. This is an ascertained fact; and it is fair to infer from it that if the materials of armies be classed by appearances, without regard to the measure of powers as proved in trial, they cannot do otherwise than act differently under forced exertions. The act is necessarily unequal, excessive in some parts, defective in others; or made in succession where it ought to be of one impulse; hence the effort is feeble, and the end is imperfect or void. It is evident that where the power of the parts of which the military instrument is made up, is unequal in constitutional properties, the expression of the power can only be uniform under a limited and constrained act, that is, only maintained in regular form by vigorous superintendence, implying coercion of some and stimulation of others; consequently it cannot be maintained where strong causes stimulate to full exertion.

The defects of military arrangement, as made according to superficial appearance, are obvious; and the inconveniences thence resulting are of material importance. They would, it is presumed be diminished, (if not precluded), if persons destined for military service were selected with care, and placed in a military school at an early period of life; so that, the steps and paces being regularly trained to a rule of cadence, order would be so ingrafted in all the ostensible acts, that military habit and custom would become, in some degree, a law of nature. Under a system

of primary education of the kind suggested, the several parts of the military machine might be expected to correspond in action with each other, in so far as the measure of the natural power admits of correspondence; and it may be presumed that an army, so trained and disciplined from early years, while possessing uniformity of appearance externally, would acquire mechanical correspondence in its movements internally; inasmuch as, inured through habits of exercise to a given routine of daily action, its external act would be uniform, and, as acting by the impulse of one object, one sentiment only would be excited, and union would be cemented by association. To produce united action of bodily powers and sympathy of mental affections, is the legitimate object of the tactician. It constitutes military education; and it is important to success in war. But, nevertheless, the accomplishment of it is difficult to be effected in countries such as Great Britain, where the military force is composed of persons who have grown up to manhood without military instruction, even of persons who, before they are admitted into the military ranks, have acquired habits of acting diametrically opposite to what is, or ought to be the habits of soldiers. Where this is the case, and where an army is put together according to uniformity of external appearance rather than measure of actual power, a jarring and discordant movement must of necessity be the result. The discordance arises from failure of power in some, and from disposition in others to recur to early habits, wherever the superintending and controlling influence is weakened or removed. In a mass of men fortuitously collected, and presented to one object, upon which it is a duty for every one to act, it is reasonable to suppose that some exceed when not restrained, that others fail when not impelled; the movement of parts is thus discordant, and the general effect, it may reasonably be supposed, will be abortive, void, or feeble where it ought to be strong. If there be any truth in what is here said, (and it is plain sense which a child may comprehend), the most rational mode of military arrangement is that which selects subjects for different purposes, according to radical powers and fitnesses, and which so classes them by companies, or divisions, that they act in the way which most corresponds with their natural exertions; and further, that they be so adjusted in the ranks, that the institutions of the future discipline evolve the

energies of all to the greatest possible extent. If this rule be observed in arranging the fabric, the exerted act will accord throughout the whole, inasmuch as the parts are put together according to the correspondence of their physical powers, and prepared to be animated in all their extent by one impulse. An army, organized according to this principle, exhibits a machine the external symmetry of which may not please the eye, but the act of which, as united by inherent power, will be united and impressive in battle. The parts joined by estimate of physical power, the tempers balanced by constitutional sympathies, constitute an instrument, which, when it moves, moves correctly, and when it acts, acts in union against impediments of whatever nature they may be.

As the military fabric may be constructed differently, that is, according to the size and figure of the parts, or according to their actual power and activity, so the tactic may be adjusted according to two modes of order, namely, open or close. In open order, the movements are free, but connected in a series and united with each other relatively—the individual action is energetic, and, to a certain degree, independent. In close order, the parts are connected mechanically with each other for mutual support; but, as they are not necessarily and not ordinarily of the same precise power and temper, some are constrained, others are exerted unduly, for the sake of maintaining superficial uniformity. In one, the individual retains the command of his bodily powers and mental energies; and, though under the direction of a military officer, he has his own perception of the object, and some latitude of discretion in the accomplishment of the purpose which it is intended he should effect. In the other, the individual, reduced to the state of an automaton, is a mere part in complicated machinery. He has no perception of object, and no sensibility to impression, except through the impulse of the commander's voice. The joint act may be regular, and as such praiseworthy; it scarcely can be animated, heroic, and great. The American revolutionary war furnished examples of what is here meant. The British troops, particularly the British light infantry, exhibited an example of the first. The spirit of the man was above the mechanical perfection of the soldier. The countenance was open, bold, and intelligent, the figure erect and important, the air martial and determined. The auxiliary Hessians furnished an

example of the second. The Hessians were auxiliary mercenaries ; and as such they were brought forward under disadvantages as compared with the British. The Hessians are among the best of German troops ; and they generally did all that could be expected to be done by a hired and merely mechanical soldier. They were comparatively perfect in their tactic, and they were regular and mechanical in their movements. They were slow—and they frequently lost opportunities of assuring their object by mere slowness. Where they adhered to the close order of their customary tactic, they were exposed to the destructive fire of the enemy ; and in firing by platoon they expended their ammunition without destroying the enemy. Whether from difference of tactic, or from quality of subject individually, the writer does not pretend to determine, but it is certainly true, that the Americans were less intimidated by the solid lines and close fire of the Hessians, than by the impetuous irregularity and rapid movement of the British light infantry ; and it is further true, that those corps which exceeded others in native impetuosity, but which were deficient in parade discipline, particularly the Scotch Highlanders, were the most feared of any. It is innate individual energies of mind and body, classed according to the correspondence of condition, which constitute the perfection of an army. If there be defect in either, the machine is imperfect, and its operations cannot be calculated with confidence. Both are necessary ; but if both cannot be attained, energy is the least dispensable of the two : the proofs are numerous in history.

The writer is aware that it will be deemed presumptuous, in a person who is not of the military profession, to speak decidedly respecting the best form of military tactic, or the best mode of animating an army after it has been formed. Opinions differ, and modes change according to caprices of fashion ; but the basis here assumed will in all cases, it is believed, prove to be a true basis. The open order is evidently the order for movement, evolution, and the use of fire arms ; the close order, the order for the direct charge and impulse of force—bayonet or pike. This is obvious to any one who considers things in their reasons ; but, however obvious to reason the truth of the fact may be, it is doubtful in how far it has been understood and applied in practice according to principle. A volume of fire poured out from a solid line may be considered as the act of a mere machine. The



machine has no distinct idea with respect to direction, consequently its act is an act at random—uncertain, and comparatively harmless. Fire, as proceeding from ranks in open order, it is reasonable to believe, will be effective, for it is independent, and will not be given by a skilful soldier except under a calculable chance of striking. If military arrangements, and the use of military weapons, be analyzed and resolved to first principles, the author can hardly persuade himself, from the imperfect view which he has of war, that the principle has been well conceived, or that the practice has been in any degree guided by a just consideration of the reasons of things. To a person who is not initiated into military mysteries, there appears something like contradiction in the case. The tactician labours for the sole purpose of reducing man to an automaton. In an automaton the act of mind does not exist. The physical organism is accustomed to execute implicitly another's will—by signal, and without impression from the original object. It is admitted that obedience to the commander is indispensable to success in war; but it is contended, at the same time, that it is obedience to an impression of national duty that properly constitutes obedience. The impression passes through the commander as through an electric conductor; it does not originate from him as from a source. If this be so, we must suppose that the first quality of a national general consists, not in presenting himself, as himself, but in presenting himself as a mirror to concentrate impressions, to reflect them on every the minutest part within the military circle; and thus to give one impulse and one animation to the whole of the military engine. The acts of an army so animated may be supposed to be consistent and energetic, for they flow from the genuine source. This is illustrated by the history of barbarous nations, or self-taught peasantry, who combat, and even sometimes triumph, over the refinements of the technical art, and the contrivances of the mechanical generals of the common school. The bond of union is strong where it proceeds from one source, and acts on similar materials; it is weak and easily dissolved, where it has no motive except that produced by fear of external force.

If union of power be the object which principally influences the tactician in constructing the military instrument, it is obvious to common sense, that the first step in the proceeding ought to be



directed to the means of obtaining a correct knowledge of the active powers of the individuals who compose the instrument; not only by examining and measuring the height of stature, but by trying and estimating the power of exertion in all the ways in which powers can be employed in the practice of war. The force and activity of troops, as properly applied, decide the fate of battle; and for this reason, the degree of force and activity which exists in every individual of which an army is composed, ought to be known correctly at the time of enlistment, so that an estimate may be made of the extent to which the constitutional properties are capable of being improved by training and discipline. As this is the first object to be ascertained by persons who are appointed to select and approve recruits for military service, so it is of the first importance that it be well understood.

The formation of armies, at least the formation of regiments which are parts of armies, depends much upon the skill and diligence of adjutants. If this be so, the office of regimental adjutant is a most important one; and, as such, it ought to be filled by a man who is well versed in the science which belongs to it. The adjutant cannot clearly comprehend the principles and effects of movement without some knowledge of mathematics; and, as he ought not only to comprehend, but to explain to others the purpose and design of the manœuvres and movements that are prescribed in the elementary book of tactics, it is necessary that he possess a distinct and clear elocution. Besides mathematical knowledge and clear elocution, he ought to possess some knowledge of animal structure and of the laws of animal economy, in the view that he may be enabled to form judgment respecting the extent of the physical powers of individuals, and be thereby qualified to place every one in the part of the military fabric in which he ought to be placed. The adjutant may attain knowledge of his duty to a certain extent through formal education. The quality by which he reads the character of mind—a quality essential for persons who form and discipline troops—is the gift of nature; and as extraordinary gifts of nature are rare, persons who are qualified to be useful adjutants do not often present themselves to those who have the power of appointing them. The office is a most important one; and, if its importance were duly estimated, it would only be bestowed upon those who possess real merit, that is, science of tactic and the capacity of imparting

their science to others. Next to the commanding officer, the adjutant is the most responsible military officer in a regiment. He is supposed to instruct the junior class of officers in the form and spirit of their duties; and, as he has to explain to them the purpose and design of manœuvres and movements, it is obvious that he requires a higher rank than that of subaltern, in order that he may possess authority; and it is further fit that he be of a mature age, so that he may have the chance of possessing discretion. If the duty of adjutant, as here defined, were assigned to a person holding the rank of second major, and if it were bestowed only upon persons who are distinguished for knowledge of military tactic and acquaintance with the principles of military economy, it is probable that an impulse would be thereby given to many to cultivate science, as a channel through which they might attain a respectable station in the army, without other patronage than that which the simple merit of ability gives to them.

The first part of military preparation consists in improving the power of movement and action in the individuals who compose the army; and as the perfection of that power is important to success in war, it is essential that the principle through which it may be improved be thoroughly understood. The individual is here considered as a part in a compound instrument; and, in order that the parts correspond in action, and thus act to advantage, it is necessary, not only that they be placed upon a just balance with one another in the primary arrangement, but that they be tried and adjusted relatively in the instrument according to temper and fitness of constitutional power. The military figure is erect; and, when erect and well poised, it has dignity in its appearance and readiness in the application of its power. The military positions are, or ought to be, attitudes of perfection according to mechanical rule, so that there be a facility in centering and combining exertions for a military purpose. As this is a plain fact, it is important that the young soldier be well set up, according to the military phrase; in common language, placed upon his haunches in such manner that all the joints and joinings of the different parts bear equally and fairly upon each other. The form of training, or setting up here suggested, is not intended as a mere matter of moulding for the sake of pleasing the eye; it is of positive use; and, in order that the use and end of it may be attained with facility, it is recommended

that the young soldier be ordered to stand for one hour every day in contact with a perpendicular wall; and that, during this exhibition of posture, the joints of the body, and particularly the joinings at the haunches, be tried and moved in all manner of ways, the positions for stability found out, and the parts most employed in military action perseveringly practised in movement, so that a mode may be instituted which, in course of time, will grow into a habit strong as a law of nature\*.

\* To the haunches, as to the common centre of motion of the human figure, are ultimately referred all the movements performed in military tactic. As just poise is important to the correct execution of action whatever it may be, it is necessary that poise or balance be studied, understood, and tried in all positions. It is clear that bodily action cannot possess compass, power and ease, unless the movement be made justly and correctly upon the haunches, as on a central pivot. If the movement have not compass, power, and ease, force and endurance will not be found in the military act. The human figure is erect, when man attains a certain point of growth, and assumes locomotion: it is maintained erect, or it is moved from its erect posture, by the action of the muscular flesh. The nearer the figure to perpendicular, that is, the more equally the various pieces of which the vertebral column consists bear upon each other, the more easily will the balances be preserved under movement. The erect position is maintained by the action of muscles, which, as they act in succession, relieve each other, and, in consequence of such relief, the action though often repeated, is sustained with comparatively little fatigue. The spine possesses the power of a rotary motion in its own structure, even an obscure motion at its joinings with the haunches. The shorter muscular fibres preserve the balance in parts of obscure motion; the longer ones effect locomotive or manual movements. In either case, if action be extended beyond its limits, or if it be continued for a length of time without remission, fatigue, ensues and the contemplated act

fails. The first case occurs under exerted labour; the latter, under constrained positions. When the body is justly poised, erect and duly balanced upon the haunches, locomotion is performed with ease; exercise is supported with little effort comparatively, and the subject is, to a certain extent, prepared for military service. The efficiency of the military machine, the author is disposed to believe, best comports with the following bearing of individual parts; that is, the heels on the same line, near to each other, but not joined, the toes pointed very little outward, the foot firmly planted, the knees straight, but not constrainedly so, the spine nearly erect, the belly compressed, the chest advanced—opened and expanded, the shoulders drawn back, the arms hanging at ease, the neck nearly erect, the countenance determined, as if bent on a purpose,—the eye fixed exclusively to a forward point. When the young soldier is brought into this position, the muscles, as thrown into a form of balanced action, give firmness to the fabric, an air of importance to the figure, and an internal sensation of consequence arising from the impression of acquired superiority. When the spine is erect, the stature is exalted, and a corresponding sensation of elevation is imparted to the mind. When the belly is compressed, the loins girt and firm, the body is comparatively strong. When the chest is advanced and expanded, the lungs act with freedom, and the body is refreshed by an extra accession of air. The heart then dilates with ease, and the whole frame is animated with life. The stern and determined aspect of countenance,

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It is one of the labours of the tactician to make the soldier different in appearance as well as in reality from the common man; but he is not to make him so by giving him a perpendi-

and the forward direction of the eye, which impresses the individual that the only path of the soldier is forward, belong to and constitute the military character.

In regard to the husbanding of animal power, it is reasonable to suppose that marching should be made with the least possible expenditure of material; and with this view, it seems to be enjoined by tacticians that the soldier slide over the ground with the least possible exertion. The truth, or reasonableness of the position, as a general principle, is not disputed; but it must be observed at the same time that there are circumstances, connected with difference of modes, which ought to be maturely and deliberately weighed before the elementary rule be considered as finally established. The step, which is animated and firmly planted, imparts a sensation of conscious importance to the mind of the person who plants it; and it is presumed that the sensation which accompanies this species of exertion gives a support to the endurance of toil more than equal to the sum of the power saved by sliding over the ground in a creeping manner. A soldier is proud and important in himself as he plants his steps with firmness and impression; and however desirable it may be to husband power in all military movements, and to form habits of steadiness as applicable to military action, it is also necessary to increase the impression of force, and to bear in mind that, when the movement is unnatural, even as restrained, irksomeness and early fatigue follow, and effect fails. Successions of action and rest, or alternate changes of positions, are indispensable to the endurance of activity; and hence it is plain, that a knowledge of the structure and active powers of the human frame deserves a minute consideration with tacticians, as a knowledge of great consequence to the right adjustment of positions, and the

right direction of the movements of soldiers in the course of their training. If the foundation of the drill be not laid upon principles of science, the tactic produces weakness instead of strength. The principle of modern tactic, that is, the tactic of Frederick the Second, king of Prussia, goes, if rightly comprehended by the writer, to extinguish, at least to obscure, individual exertion of mind and individual exertion of body, for the sake of producing exterior uniformity.

The Spartan system of military institution differs from that of Frederick. It is more honourable to man's nature according to a true estimate of things; and it is infinitely more just. The Spartan institution studied to improve the powers of both body and mind, and to unite all the parts in action by the impression of a common object identified with the individual's existence and honour. The Spartan had mind and sentiment; but he was not for that reason refractory and headstrong. No Prussian soldier ever shewed a devotion to the most imperious command of his king, equal to the devotion which every Spartan shewed to the honour and interests of his nation. The motive of action was common to the Spartan army; the mode was even apprehended by the common soldier; the impression of duty conceived by the chief was transmitted to the soldier, condensed and animated by the genius of the leader, who considered himself only as the representative of the country. The author of the Spartan institution was a philosopher, who studied and knew man in his intimate nature. He knew him to be susceptible of the sentiment of honour, and he held it to be his duty to unfold his powers, and to place him at a point of eminence where he received the force of it. The Prussian tactician was a pedant and a despot. He knew man only as a slave, and he only used him as an instrument to be acted on by fear. There is suf-

cular and stiff figure, or a rude and ungracious manner. On the contrary, it is important to entice him gradually to fall into, and to move in those attitudes of grace and ease which comprehend force, or the power of continuing action for a comparatively long time with little fatigue; and hence those exercises which conduce to this purpose deserve a minute and attentive consideration in a system of military training.

*And first.* It is not unlikely that the proposition, which suggests dancing to be made a primary part of a soldier's education, will be treated with ridicule: it will be so treated by those only who view things superficially. The instructions of the dancing master are calculated to give grace and ease to the movements of the human figure, and as such to increase the power of enduring action for a comparatively long time. But, while the art of the dancing master is employed to discover such positions and attitudes of body as best concur with the easy performance of a given act; so the act itself expands and perfects the capacity of parts for the execution of general movement. In the act of dancing all the joints and joinings of the body are moved or solicited into movement. The easy and graceful attitudes of the figure are discovered and exercised as a source of pleasure; the minutest fibres vibrate; and where parts move and vibrate, their active powers expand, and, if not over exerted, they increase and improve under expansion. Hence the act of dancing is useful to the formation of a soldier, inasmuch as it improves the power of movement, increases the extent of the sphere of activity, and begets a power of enduring toil by an effect that is merely mechanical.

But, if the act of dancing improve the powers of the subject mechanically in the manner stated, it also acts by an internal operation on the principle which animates to exertion. It engages the mind by a charm peculiar to itself; and it thus beguiles the young soldier into the opinion that he is instructed in dancing for his own sake, his pleasure, or the accomplishment of his manners. To dance well is deemed an accomplishment. It adorns the man as a member of polished society; and, on that

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ficient evidence before the world to convince those, who are not obstinately prepossessed against conviction, that

Frederick's principle has not a true base; Frederick is notwithstanding the idol of the military of the present time.



account, the art is generally cultivated by the young, and the practice of it is sometimes pursued with ardour, even with delight, by those of more advanced years. The act of dancing is useful to the military on general grounds; but its usefulness may be extended by studying and properly applying modes to purposes, so as to bring out the energies of the powers, and train the subject to habits of rapid transition through the circle of exerted movements, rather than to the feminine, slow, and languishing attitudes, which have only ease and grace for their recommendation. The practice of dancing serves to extend the compass of muscular action. It enables the individual to measure with precision the quantity of force requisite for the accomplishment of a given end; and, inasmuch as it teaches the different members of an assembly to unite by cadence in joint action, it may justly be considered as an useful part of primary education in a system of military training. It is a common observation, that persons who dance well ordinarily walk gracefully; and it may be added, that soldiers who dance well usually perform long marches with comparatively little fatigue. If we refer to history for the proof of this assertion, the proofs are numerous and decisive; but it is needless to go further than to the experience of the present day, and what is consistent with common observation. The Highlanders of Scotland are more addicted to dancing than any other portion of the inhabitants of Great Britain, and they are known to be the part of the British army which scarcely ever fails on the march. The French are equally addicted to dancing with the Highlanders of Scotland, and the French surpass every other military people on the continent in expeditious movement. The English are susceptible of a more firm and steady tactic than the French; they fight with equal energy and more resolution in the field, but they do not execute combined movements with the same promptitude and facility. It is not pretended that the Highlanders of Scotland or the people of France derive the quality of marching and moving rapidly in cadence, solely from their habitual practice in dancing, but it is reasonable to believe that the practice of dancing contributes materially to give them this preeminence.

The act of dancing moves and exercises every part of the body, but acts more particularly on the powers of locomotion. The exercise of fencing, while it calls forth exerted action in every



part, excites and strengthens more immediately the power of the arm. Fencing is a direct military exercise which sharpens the faculties for the practice of war. It confirms the courage by accustoming the eye to look steadily on the semblance of a naked weapon; and it gives confidence, to a master in the science, in the consciousness of skill. The attitudes which belong to the positions of offence or defence, give just poise and balance to the body, exercise and improve the power of the loins, and tend to open and expand the chest. The practice of fencing increases the power of the arm and improves the facility of motion at the wrist; and, while it extends and improves action generally, it furnishes the individual with the means of judging of the measure and extent of his own power. If two hours were spent in fencing daily for six months, the principles of the science would be understood by a recruit of common capacity; and, by occasional practice afterwards, the intelligent soldier would acquire confidence in his skill, and thereby enhance the importance of his character. Fencing sharpens the eyesight, increases active power in general, tries the temper, and teaches decision in seizing occasions for acting offensively with effect, or defensively with coolness and resolution. A knowledge to fence with foils, even to exercise the sabre and broad sword, is deemed a necessary accomplishment for all military men of the higher class. It is useful to the common soldier on account of his duty; it ought therefore to be included among the essentials in his military education, for the sake of its utility.

But, though a knowledge of fencing be useful, simple and solitarily, to the individual, the military utility, which is an utility connected with tactic, lies in combining acts of offence or defence in bodies of men, so as to make an impression with joint and united force as the impression of a whole, or to resist in union as a solid mass. This is different from individual dexterity. An example of what is here meant presents itself in the history of the wars of the Romans with one another. We have reason to believe that the individual Roman gladiator would have cut the individual Roman soldier to pieces. There is evidence, in the authentic history of Tacitus, that a battalion of gladiators was inferior to a battalion of ordinary soldiers, inasmuch as they were inferior in the combinations of power which form union and give one impulse to a general act. It is believed, and not without

grounds, that a single Asiatic horseman is an overmatch for a single European; yet it is not questioned that one squadron of European dragoons may be led with confidence to charge two squadrons of the best horsemen in Asia—apparently from the relative differences of acting independently, or forming union by common impression and for a common purpose. In the same manner, French officers are generally better swordsmen than officers in the English army; even the French soldiers are more expert in the use of the sabre, and more practised in exercises with the bayonet, than the soldiers of Great Britain; yet British troops, independently of physical power and the confidence connected with it, unite more readily to form impressive charges, or to repel formidable attacks with a firmness and resolution superior to the common soldiers of France. The Highlanders of Scotland, as feudal and warlike tribes, were familiar with the use of arms generally and individually, prior to the year 1745. One man was more or less expert than another, but they all possessed the power of combining readily in danger as by common sympathy, and of resisting in union to the last. The quality still adheres to them. The Highlanders made, and still continue to make, the best charges of offence, and present the closest union in the resistance of attack of any troops in Europe; and if this be so, the fact strongly points out the propriety of not only improving individual powers and individual exertions, but of studying the art of combining the powers so improved to the production of one general effect.

Dancing and fencing are considered as elementary parts of the education of young soldiers. Instruction in locomotion, so that the common gait of the clown be converted into the measured step of the soldier, is a direct and essential part in military training. The trouble in attaining this part of discipline is abridged by practising the above exercises, for the limbs are thereby rendered pliant and capable of executing movement with facility. It is tactic which gives an army advantage over a multitude of men; and hence the military step, which is the base of tactic, ought to be fixed precisely, and practised rigidly, without change or deviation in the different stages of service. A soldier is supposed to move only in the military step; but, as the duties of soldiers demand movements of different velocities, the effect wanted is better attained through a more frequent repetition of

the step, than by a change in the base of the measure. Union in action is the point on which depends the success of war; the chances left open to disunion ought therefore to be as few as possible. For this reason, common sense says that the military step ought to be confined to two forms, namely, a pace without constraint or exertion—about three miles per hour; an exerted pace, which, by a more frequent repetition of the step in a given time without change in the base of the measure, reaches a higher rate of velocity—probably four miles per hour. Few persons, as encumbered with arms and accoutrements, are capable of continuing long without fatigue at the exerted rate of marching, consequently it is only to be resorted to on urgent occasions, or to be employed as an interchange with the common step for the purpose of relief.

The capacity of marching\* is one of the most essential qualities of a soldier; but, in order that it be attained in the requisite degree of perfection, it is necessary that the individual be trained to it by frequent and diligent practice. Three hours

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\* The length of the military pace differs, according to real or assumed causes, in different European services. In the British line, the measure of the common step, in the direct march, is thirty inches. A pace of thirty inches is a full step for a man of the height of five feet eight inches, well proportioned in all his limbs, and walking without incumbrance. If this be so in fact, thirty inches must be considered as an extended step for those of lower stature, even for those of the taller stature who carry firelock, accoutrements, and knapsack. If the step be extended beyond the easy compass of the constitutional power, early fatigue is the consequence. If the body be loaded with extra weight, every extended step implies an extra exertion, and extra exertion occasions exhaustion and fatigue. This is a fact within most men's observation, and every man's comprehension; and hence it is obvious, in order that the act of marching be sustained with as little fatigue as possible, that the body be supported on a perpendicular bearing when under movement, not thrown off its balance by an exerted extension of the step,

particularly if it be loaded with extra weight. From this it is inferred, that where expedition is required, it is better to quicken the time than to extend the base of the measure. The subject is important, and deserves the consideration of military judges; in the mean time, it is suggested that a space of twenty-seven inches is a sufficient length of step for soldiers of the battalion, who are supposed to move in close and compact order, and to preserve a correct line in movement. This can scarcely be done, even on the smooth surface of a parade, where the measure of the step occasions an extension approaching to exertion. Light infantry have a latitude in this respect which cannot be granted to battalion or grenadiers; for it is necessary in all cases that a battalion soldier, whose value lies in the steadiness of his hand, and a grenadier, whose virtue lies in the power of his arm and in the compact order of his ranks, be brought to the point of attack with all possible fitness of condition; and fitness, it is evident, does not consist with previous exertion.

allotted every day for practice in various forms of marching, that is, common pace, exerted pace, running easily or trotting, running with exertion or speed, marching or running on level ground, on broken or irregular ground, stony, rocky and hilly, leaping ditches and hedges, and clearing all such impediments or obstructions as can be supposed to occur in the field of battle, might be supposed, in no very long course of time, to bring a person of common activity and comprehension to a considerable degree of perfection. By practising the exercises here prescribed, the compass of power in the limbs would be extended, endurance strengthened, and important knowledge obtained of individual fitness for particular purposes of war.

The discipline of training for the march is supposed to be conducted under the eye of an intelligent person, who has studied animal structure, who has acquired knowledge of its laws by observation, and who is familiar with military service from experience in actual war. It is presumed that the exercises of dancing, fencing, running, marching, &c., varied in mode and repeated for a given number of hours daily, will be sufficient to improve the powers of action in the course of six months nearly as far as they are capable of being improved; furnishing the individual with the means of estimating his own force, of judging of his own capacity of endurance; and further, of giving information, to the superintendent of the training, respecting the nature of the materials which are to be placed in the military fabric, so that they be organized according to a rule of effective power, and thus allotted to the services which best correspond with their capacities.

The method of military training recommended in this place is calculated to extend and improve the powers of the body individually; but, in order that the execution of purposes be assured in all conditions, and under all circumstances of service, it is expedient, even necessary, that foundations of economy and management, such as preserve the powers of the individual in a state fit for action, be laid at an early period, and maintained by rigorous discipline throughout; so that the military system, organized on a true basis, may move with facility and correctness in all kinds and stages of service. One soldier is only a part in the military instrument as relative to its great office: every soldier is an independent part in himself as relative to

his own functions. He must therefore, in order to be qualified to maintain his place in the artificial fabric, be instructed systematically to act separately and independently for himself in matters of personal care. The instruction on this head relates, in a more especial manner, to three objects; namely, 1. Cooking, or dressing of provisions; 2. Cleaning, mending, and repairing clothing; and 3. Guarding the health against the injurious contingences incident to military life.

1st. It cannot be expected that soldiers should be furnished with a regular apparatus of cooking utensils in the field. It is therefore a necessary part of primary education that the young soldier be instructed in the best manner of adapting his means to his necessities; and, among others, it is necessary that he be taught the best and easiest method of dressing the raw provision which constitutes his ration, so as to obtain from it a savoury and wholesome nourishment. Broths, soups, and stews, are easily prepared, and they imply the least waste of materials; consequently they are preferable, and the young soldiers ought to be carefully instructed in the best mode of preparing them. The acquisition of this knowledge is not difficult, but still it must be learned: it is not well understood in the British army.

The art of military cooking is not intricate, nor is the practice of it irksome, or degrading from the dignity of a soldier's character. The heroes of ancient Greece prepared their own dinner after they had fought the battle of the day; and it is perhaps in the recollection of many who have served in the war of the present time, that few things are done with more pleasure and alacrity than putting fuel to the camp-kettle after a long march. Where no more than five or six persons mess together, the dressing of the provisions is a common concern which gives a secret lesson of economy to every one, and at the same time engenders affection, similar to the affection which obtains among families. The union which arises from such association is useful; but it is not sufficiently encouraged in the present times, for the benefits of it are not sufficiently understood. The practice which now obtains of dressing provisions in a common kitchen, and above all, the hurried and disorderly manner in which the meal is served in large and crowded messing rooms, has cut up the roots of social intercourse at table; an intercourse which constitutes a great part of a soldier's happiness in camps and detached quarters.

2nd. Besides instruction on the subject of cooking, the young soldier ought to be taught in what manner he can best repair the damages which happen to his clothing and other equipment. Soldiers are not supposed to be tailors and shoemakers; but every soldier is supposed to repair, in a becoming manner, the ordinary damages which happen to his wearing apparel. This is soon and easily learned; and the execution of it, when learned, does not interfere with military duties. In order that an army be efficient by its own means, the soldier ought to be taught to depend upon himself for every personal concern. He ought, for instance, to wash his own linen, to repair the slighter damages which happen to his clothing or his shoes, to shave himself, and dress his own hair; in short, to do for himself everything that a man can do: a regimental barber is an evil.

3rd. It is fit that a soldier be familiarised with the occurrences which are common in actual war, so that nothing be new to him in real service. He ought, for instance, to be accustomed to sleep in his cloak or blanket, dressed and accoutred; to be prepared to march to a distant station at any hour of the night; to be exposed occasionally to wind and rain, heat and cold, so that the impression of such contingency be not novel, and as such not injurious to the health when it unavoidably occurs; and further, it is proper that he be trained and instructed in the best mode of passing rivers by fording or swimming, and without exposing his ammunition to damage. When wet, cold, hungry, and fatigued, he ought also to be taught, and made to understand, the means by which he can best secure his person from injury; in short, he ought to be put in possession of the best remedies for every contingency which may or can happen in military service; and, with this view, he ought to be carefully prepared, by a course of training, to meet with indifference everything which belongs to the military field.

When the rudiments of the discipline instituted for the improvement of the mechanical power of the limbs, and the basis of economy and management necessary for the preservation of the health of the body, have been duly practised for the space of six months, the young soldier may be supposed to enter upon the more immediate business of his profession, namely, practical exercise in the use of arms. The causes and motives which render the soldier ardent in the pursuit of his profession ought to be



carefully estimated by his teacher; and, when estimated and known, they ought to be kept in active movement until habits be formed and confirmed by use. A love of arms induces a young man to become a soldier on some occasions, and often induces him to prosecute his profession with ardour. But, in order that love of arms be placed on good foundations, it is necessary that the principle on which the arm is constructed, and the effect which it produces when skilfully used, be fully explained to him, and proved to demonstration by experiment. It is thus proper that he be taught to know in what manner he can best try and judge the temper of his sword, the correctness of the barrel of his musket, and the mechanism of his lock. There is something in attachment to arms which engages the mind and precludes ennui; and where there is no unusual attachment, the care which is required to keep arms in order furnishes employment; and as such is useful. The attention to the condition of arms here alluded to will be irksome at first to many; but, continued for a time, it forms habit, and habit begets attachment, which finally produces pleasure. A soldier values his arms as his property; and a knowledge of their power and trustworthiness gives him confidence as a soldier, when he is opposed to the enemy. Confidence results from the skill which commands effect; but skill can only be acquired by knowledge of principle and daily practice in application. Every man is awkward, and most men are diffident, in the use of fire-arms at the commencement of their military career; many are more than diffident. The young soldier often draws the trigger of a loaded musket with symptoms of fear, similar to that of a man who puts a match to the train of a loaded mine. The case is new to him; for the customary mode of training in field-days and firing blank cartridge gives no knowledge of the firelock as armed for war. It is then an instrument of death, and the inexperienced recruit is not always without apprehension that the explosion may recoil upon himself.

The young soldier, in proceeding to learn the use of the firelock as an instrument employed in war, is supposed to be previously instructed in certain forms of manual exercise, whether for show or utility. The real object of the soldier's study is the discomfiture of the enemy. The accomplishment of the object appears to consist, in common opinion, in the superior rapidity of loading and firing in regularly measured time. This at least is the

point at which the drill chiefly labours; the just direction of the fire which effects destruction scarcely appears in the calculation. This is common practice, and it is palpably an error. The justness of aim is the main and ultimate object of instruction; and as it is the object which a rational system of military instruction might be supposed to inculcate, it is matter of surprise that it is so little cultivated. As the just direction of fire is of essential importance in war, it is fit that the principle according to which fire-arms act be well understood by the regimental instructor, and that the effect of the act be well and familiarly explained to the young soldier. The firelock is an instrument of missile force. It is obvious that the force which is missile ought to be directed with aim, otherwise it will strike only by accident. It is evident that a person cannot take aim with any correctness unless he be free, independent and clear of all surrounding incumbrances; and, for this reason, there can be little dependence on the effect of fire that is given by platoons or volleys, and by word of command. Such explosions may intimidate by their noise: it is mere chance if they destroy by their impression. If there be a general maxim in war, it consists in opening the ranks for the use of missile force, and in closing them for charge with the bayonet. If the destruction of the enemy be the object of a battle, the arrangements of modern tactic and the drillings of the soldier counteract the purpose. History furnishes proof that the battle is rarely gained by the scientific use of the musket: noise intimidates; platoon-firing strikes only at random; the charge with the bayonet decides the question.

Besides what is now said with regard to firing independently and with aim, or firing by word of command and general level, military men will decide whether or not a line three deep can be so disposed as to fire with safety to each other, and with impression on the enemy. It is probable that the front rank may suffer from the rear rank in the hurry and confusion of action; or that the rear rank, avoiding the heads of those in front, may discharge its bullets in the air. This is a question which the experienced soldier, who is a man of observation, only can determine; but other men may be permitted to judge of the principle according to which the aim in firing is to be directed. The ray of vision expands from a centre to a circumference. It inclines upwards in its expansion, and those objects which stand above

the level of the eye, are the objects which are most readily and most distinctly seen. As this is a principle in the theory of vision, we thence comprehend how the fire of a line of musketry does more execution as pointed from low to high ground, than where it is pointed from the height to the level; also, how the fire of the rank which kneels is generally more destructive to the enemy than that of the rank which stands upright; and, reasoning by a similar principle, it is plain in what manner greater destruction is to be expected from the firelock as brought up to the eye, in the manner that a sportsman covers a bird, than if brought down mechanically to a general level from the position of *recover*. It is probable that the presentation of a line of firelocks, directed rapidly and mechanically by platoons from *recover* to *present*, operates by appearance, and, acting upon a timid enemy, hastens his retreat. But be that as it may, there is reason to think that destruction from the effect of fire will be proportionally less in this case than in the other. The subject does not appear to be much noticed by military men; but it deserves to be attended to, if the object in war be the destruction of the enemy by the just direction of the bullet, rather than his intimidation by noise and demonstrations of the regular and mechanical movement of the firelock in platoon-firing.

The degree of perfection attainable by individuals in the art of firing has great latitude. Some remain inferior to others in spite of all their endeavours to excel. Few fire well without instruction, and without practice. The knowledge how to direct fire upon given points is a most essential part of the mechanical soldier's study; consequently the office of giving instruction on that head commands especial attention. As the knowledge of it is important to success, it will not be denied that the duty of instruction ought to be committed to persons who are sufficiently master of science to explain the principle upon which perfection depends, who are capable of pointing out the right way of attaining it, and who are themselves capable of shewing, by example, the perfection to which the attainment may be carried. The young soldier judiciously treated, and with the example of instruction judiciously directed, becomes enamoured of his arms, and ultimately of his profession. He perceives that he acquires knowledge; and, in proportion as he acquires knowledge, he becomes confident in himself. He is thus rendered courageous by

art, for courage of a certain description is the product of the practice alluded to.

It is almost superfluous to repeat, that attainment of skill in the use of arms is an important object in war; and, as such, an object to be prosecuted scientifically and steadily. With this view, it is suggested that during the period of military training, and after six months of previous education, three days in the week be set apart for the practice of firing ball-cartridge, and that seven ball-cartridges be allowed to each man for the consumption of the day. This implies some expense of money; but as the knowledge of firing with ball is the only part of training which forms a soldier expressly for his ostensible purpose, it is to be hoped that the higher powers of the state will consider the subject with its reasons, and institute such a system of military education in all its branches as may attain the end for which an army finds a place among national establishments. It is not pretended to penetrate the reasons which influence the scanty supply of leaden bullets; but it is evident that it is not economical in the true sense of the word. In actions which are fought under common circumstances, one ball does not strike out of one hundred, or even a greater number; and as it is known that one in three at least will strike within the volume of a man's body, at the distance of one hundred or one hundred and twenty paces, if directed by a hand of the requisite skill, it follows, that one man who is master of this part of his duty is equal to thirty or more who are equally perfect in tactic and manœuvre, but who have not practised and learned the art of directing fire upon distant points with care and precision. If this be true, and it is capable of proof, the mode of training suggested in this place is demonstratively economical; for, judging by effect, it may be said to multiply the army throughout by thirty or a higher number. The advantage of skill over inexperience is here striking, and it is presumed that, if twenty-one ball-cartridges be fired under good instruction every week, for the space of six months, the proposed perfection will be attained by all such as have a good sight, a steady hand, and a firm courage.

Besides the qualities of arms considered as arms, the acquaintance which the soldier individually has with them is of

importance in assuring that precision in effect which constitutes superiority. In this manner, while the barrel of the musket is straight, and proved to be true as well as strong, the lock ought to be perfect in all its parts, and easy in its movements; for it is obvious to common sense that undue force applied to the trigger disturbs the level, and thus affects the direction of the ball. But, in addition to the actual perfection of the arms, it is useful that the soldier be familiar with his musket, and correctly acquainted with its properties. By long possession he becomes enamoured and fond of it, as a part of himself. He learns, by practice, the precise charge of powder which gives the just effect; for, though two firelocks may be of the same apparent calibre, there is something in temper not susceptible of measure or estimate by calculation, which considerably modifies results. Hence there is nicety in determining the true measure of the charge according to the temper of the piece, as well as according to distance and other circumstances of the object to be struck, that can only be ascertained by correct and actual experiment; experiment ought therefore to be applied to the case.

The execution of fire-arms varies according to the nature of the ground and the presentation of objects at nearly equal distances. The first trials with fire-arms are supposed to be made on level ground, and the first judgment on the effect is formed from such trial. This we infer from the mode of drilling that is commonly adopted; but such drilling furnishes only an imperfect illustration of the fact. Military actions do not always, do not even ordinarily, take place on level grounds; it is therefore proper that the soldier, in order to be properly instructed, be exercised in firing at objects on ground of varied form and aspect, such as those on which military combats may or do occur. It is necessary, for instance, that he ascertain the distance on the level plain at which he can promise with certainty to strike the object at which he aims, that he ascertain the same effect as directed from a height to a level, or across a ravine or hollow way to another height. If he view all the forms and presentations of the object with a just eye, measure the distances and bearings correctly, and estimate the effect by knowledge previously gained by experience, as he is confident of his power and master of his act, he does not expend his ammunition unskilfully, or squander at random the means on which his own life and the success of the military enterprise depends.



The subject of directing fire rightly is important; and it may be added, in illustration of its importance, that eighty or a hundred thousand ball-cartridges are often fired in the course of a military action without killing or wounding more than five hundred men. In such case, (and such cases are not rare,) it is evident that there is an expense of ammunition without an effect commensurate to the expenditure. If the non-effect arise from distance or position, the military officer in command commits an error. If the distance be just distance for action, if the enemy be duly exposed, and if the troops be carried into the field in a proper manner, and the effect be such as is stated, it is evident that the soldier wants skill, or that he wants discipline and courage necessary for the direction of the skill which he possesses. Want of skill is always accompanied with hurry and confusion; and a soldier who wants skill, that is, who is not confident of producing a given effect by a discharge of his musket, has no calculation. He knows that he is in possession of an instrument of destruction. He is ignorant of its true value: he loads and fires in haste and confusion, in hopes of hiding himself under the cover of its smoke, or of drowning his fears under its noise. But as he has no skill, and, from want of skill, no precise object in view, the mind is blank, and the act is in a manner void. In this case, the remedy against panic consists principally in the noise and order of the explosions—and that is precarious. On the contrary, the skilful soldier is confident of an effect resulting from his skill. He is master of himself on all occasions, and according to his position, and his bearings, he is almost certain of diminishing the number of the foe by every ball discharged; thus every discharge adds to security, both in his own idea and in reality. If this subject be considered as it ought to be, the principal object of study in the training of troops will be bestowed on cultivating the art of firing with just direction, rather than for attaining rapid explosion and exact correspondence in time by platoon or battalion. If it appear that eighty or one hundred thousand balls kill or wound no more than five hundred of the enemy, and if it be demonstrable that fifteen hundred would have the same effect if the soldier were brought into action properly, and if he correctly knew the power of his musket, it is obvious to common sense that every soldier ought to be scientifically instructed in an art which brings with it advantages of so great value. The degree of perfection here stated is presumed to



be attainable, and it is economical in every point of view that pains be taken to attain it. It supersedes the necessity of number, as it gives the same result from skill as from a great multitude.

The soldier learns, by experience, that his greatest security and his best defence in battle lies in the use of his arms, employed with energy and directed by skill. Consciousness in the possession of skill is the best support of courage; for it brings conviction that the proper application of it rapidly diminishes the number of the foe. No defence, except what results from the skilful exercise of the musket, can be depended on by the battalion soldier in the open field. The attempts which are sometimes made, and which were very common at one period of the American war, to avoid the effect of fire by what is termed ducking, do not appear, when correctly considered, to be of any use on the head of safety, and they are pernicious by example, inasmuch as they indicate and propagate fears. It is an essential part of military education to teach the soldier to look upon danger with indifference while in the execution of his duty. The impression is important; but it only can be made properly where there is a belief that the condition is equal in advantages of position to that of the enemy, and that the skill in the use of arms is superior. In the confidence of such opinion the soldier attains courage artificially, for, calculating chances, instinctively as it were, he finds them in his favour.

Confidence arising from skill in the use of fire-arms gives courage in the combat of the open field; but, as the success of military actions does not rest wholly upon the use of fire-arms, the effect of other means employed in battle is also to be estimated and ascertained, whether for offence, or for the defence of particular positions. The destruction produced by fire-arms results from the skill of the individual soldier, and the fitness of the position chosen by the general for its application. The effect produced by bayonets and sharp weapons, though not independent of advantages from individual skill and military genius to direct application, depends principally upon courage and union of physical power. The individual quality for attack consists in boldness and impetuosity; the technical quality in uniting force by art so as to amalgamate many into one. The individual quality in defence consists in physical firmness and courage; the technical quality in uniting and cementing force

by position. If this be so, it is proper that the soldier be trained carefully, and instructed scientifically in those exercises and forms of combination which are most formidable in attack, or most secure in defence; and hence individuals ought to be furnished with opportunities of estimating and knowing the force and value of each other before they are put together for conflict in battle.

The subject of training, in so far as it is here considered, relates only to infantry acting against infantry. In war, as now practised, the field of battle presents formidable ranges of artillery and numerous columns of cavalry of threatening appearance. These, as new, astonish and alarm, and thereby produce consequences different from what may be expected from their real value. In the presumption that astonishment and dismay will result from the appearance of batteries of artillery and columns of threatening cavalry, it becomes a part of the tactician's office to place before the eye of young troops the best attainable view of what actually occurs, or may occur in war, without risking an experiment which implies a positive danger. The effect of artillery is chiefly destructive where it sweeps the level surface of the plain, or where it is directed through a hollow way. In broken and irregular grounds, the noise occasions panic among the inexperienced, the actual destruction is comparatively small. The fact is demonstrable; and it is fit that it be demonstrated by experiment, so that the individual may possess knowledge on the subject, and not in ignorance of things be astonished in the day of trial. For this reason it is recommended that example should be given of the effect produced, or that may be produced, by artillery on grounds of different forms; and it would be further useful if instruction were given respecting the best and most expeditious manner of carrying batteries, or of obtaining possession of field-pieces which bear upon the lines or columns of an advancing army. Experiments of this kind cannot shew the exact truth, but they serve to throw some light upon the subject. They may be so managed as to accustom troops to move upon given points, with correctness and precision, under a semblance of hostile opposition.

Besides the noise and destruction occasioned by artillery, the threatenings of cavalry and the havoc which horses commit among broken lines, deserve to be justly estimated, known, and

carefully guarded against. It is a well ascertained fact, that squadrons of cavalry, even of the best quality, have not force or courage to penetrate a hedge of bayonets well planted and well supported by the human figure. It has notwithstanding happened that corps, of what were esteemed good infantry, have been attacked, broken, and defeated by inferior numbers of dragoons; and this has even happened in the Author's experience as a looker on, under circumstances where, according to the rules of war and good sense, dragoons ought not to have been capable of making impression. Such disasters happen not unfrequently; they proceed from ignorance oftener than from cowardice; it is therefore proper and necessary that infantry soldiers be made acquainted with the extent of their own power, when united by tactic and sustained by courage; and this can only be done by demonstrative example.

Three days in the week are supposed to be set apart for firing of ball-cartridge and practice in the use of arms; the other three are allotted to laying the foundations of instructions on the head of complex movements, whether openly in the face of the enemy, or remotely, as it were, and under concealment. Complex movement is important in itself, as constituting a principal cause of the success of military operations in the field. But, in order that the instruction be comprehended clearly, without which it cannot be executed justly, it is necessary that the principle be explained, and the practice demonstrated, to the young soldier in all its forms by a patient and intelligent master. If the principle upon which military operations depend be clearly comprehended, the execution will be learned easily; and if care be taken to demonstrate utility, the exercise will be practised with alacrity and good will. In such case, the physical power is inured to a habit, and the mental conception, expanding and becoming interested in the corporeal act, gives, inasmuch as it comprehends the purpose for which the act is to be undertaken, a comparatively sure effect.

If the principle upon which military movements are made be explained in a simple and intelligible manner to the recruit, it is presumed that, with the principle in view, the execution of evolution will be comparatively soon attained. It must however be always borne in mind that execution cannot be precise, unless it be effected on a consistent basis, that is, unless the

moving parts be arranged in the fabric according to exertions of power, as estimated and known by trial to correspond with each other. If this suggestion be attended to, the several parts of the regiment or corps, as they move according to a measured and known step, and correspond in power according to position relatively, unite in one exertion by a natural and instinctive act. In such case, effect will be primarily correct, so as not to require a retrograde or shuffling of the feet to give uniformity of appearance to the order of the line.

A young man, prepared in the primary school for six months, practised in complex movements and firing of ball-cartridge for six more, may be regarded as a person instructed in the first rudiments of his profession, consequently fit to be incorporated into a regiment, and classed in that regiment according to his respective quality or condition. A regiment may be considered as an army in miniature, complete in the formation and composition of its effective parts. As an army, it is necessarily formed to meet the ordinary presentations of an enemy with its own means; and, in this manner, it is supposed to be formed of four classes, as calculated to meet the more prominent objects in a military action, that is, riflemen, as marksmen; light infantry, allotted to desultory movements; battalion, or ordinary line, destined principally for the exercise of the firelock; and grenadiers, of superior force and courage, reserved for close combat with the bayonet.

It is reasonable to suppose, as has been already observed, that more or less of fitness for the different purposes of the service results from the manner of life of the individual prior to enlistment. What is supposed is generally verified by experience; but, besides the supposed qualification from previous habit, the quality of the individual himself must be individually examined and appreciated prior to incorporation, so that the station allotted to him be that which best corresponds with his qualities, physical or moral. It is left to those who are professedly of the military class to fix the strength of regiments or corps, and to determine the proportion of the orders of which the corps consists. It might be deemed presumptuous in the writer to offer a suggestion on the subject; but, as military actions usually consist of different parts, and as the nature of the action varies according to the scene on which it is fought, it is obvious that the number and the qualities

of the classes ought to be well considered, so that they be suitably adapted to the circumstances of the service.

Rifle, or marksmen, form the first part of a regiment. They are useful on various occasions, especially in sieges and for the attack and defence of advanced posts or picquets. They act with advantage on rocky and broken grounds, in woods and covered places. They are, or they may be, employed to feel the pulse of the enemy, to cover those who reconnoitre positions, to harass and annoy, and occasionally to impede, the progress of lines or columns in their advance to the scene of action. The instruction which qualifies the soldier for this part of duty consists in knowing the power and proper management of the rifle. The proper use of the rifle requires skill; and besides skill, the application of it requires such form of cover as gives reasonable security from the impression of causes which agitate the frame and render the hand unsteady. But, besides position or cover in approaching an enemy, the rifleman requires to possess, in his own person, a quick and discerning eye, address to conceal himself, whether in advancing or retiring; and, together with address, the capacity of judging correctly of designs from appearances; hence, while active he ought to be intelligent, and he ought also to be prompt to decide in difficulty.

The light infantry, or second part of the regiment, is prepared for closer combat, and a more honourable part in action than the rifleman. It occasionally meets the enemy with main force, though in a desultory and irregular manner. The properties of this class of soldiers, besides good wind and long endurance of exerted movement, connected with a light body and long fork, are correct and ready knowledge of the aspects of ground and position, a mind of enterprise, a bold and daring courage—ardour in pursuit of glory. The instruction which qualifies for the proper exercise of the duty consists in expertness of executing movement and evolution, in firing correctly at objects under various forms of presentation. The tactic of the light troops appears to be irregular; but it has its own rules of order. The light infantry advances rapidly, and sometimes retreats precipitately. It occupies positions, and maintains them for a given time and given purpose. In short, the duty of meeting all the irregular presentations of the enemy, of arresting his progress, and of thereby allowing the battalion to approach to the just point of attack



without the necessity of accelerating its pace, devolves on this species of force; in other words, it covers the battalion from the impression of causes which occasion emotion, disturb the steadiness of the hand, and consequently diminish the certainty of the effect from fire—the arm in which the battalion's power consists.

The battalion, which is the main body of the army, and the power which is calculated to act principally by fire-arms, is supposed to be composed of persons who possess correct mechanical power of the hand, acquired in the occupations of individual manual labour. Hence the mass of artisans, as mechanical in mind and body, is presumptively the fittest to furnish materials for this part of the military instrument.

Besides riflemen, light infantry, and battalion or fusiliers, there is a description of force called grenadier, which is the reserve, or last resource of an army. Persons who have given proof of resolute mind and powerful body are the only persons to be admitted into this class. The qualification consists in the possession of bodily power, and the indelible impression of a grenadier motto: "*Victory, or a grave in the field of battle.*"—the grenadier ought to be a soldier of service, not a lad who measures six feet.

The elementary parts of the army having acquired the rudiments of military education separately and independently, and having been selected, classed, and trained for the performance of military duties scientifically and systematically as here described, the institution of a system of exercise and movement, similar to that which is practised in actual war, is the next and last part in a system of mechanical training. It is the part which, while it preserves all that has been done, digests the experience and acquirement into system, and brings it into form for practical use. It is proper that a regiment (which is an army in miniature) be exercised frequently and perseveringly in all forms of evolution which occur in military action. Such exercises are useful; and as they are always practicable, so they ought to be often practised. But further, where circumstances permit the meeting of different regiments, so as to form something like an army, it is especially necessary that a course of practice in compound movement be instituted on an extensive scale, with a view to extend the sphere and to perfect the effect of the military training. Regiments



ought, for instance, to be tried and practised in marching at the different military paces on different kinds of ground, for the purpose of estimating capacities and ascertaining the extent of powers. When this has been done, and the powers are correctly known, the military officer, who, as informed of precise distance, and of the nature of the roads and the qualities of the ground on which he is to act, cannot be supposed to err in calculating the time at which the several parts, moving on different lines in a combined operation, will reach their destination; as well as to form precise opinion of the power which they may yet retain for acting, when the destination is attained. In conducting this plan of exercise and discipline, whether with one or many regiments, the troops ought to be thrown into all possible forms, and instructed in all modes of warfare that occur in attack or in defence. They ought, for instance, to be accustomed to march at different paces, to change the pace at given times, to exhibit every mode of exertion which is called forth in war, and to combine all the powers correctly for a joint and just effect. Practice forms habit; and hence it is that, when the parts of an army have been put together according to natural correspondence in power, and accustomed to move in cadence on all occasions of their life, the estimate of effect, as proceeding from the operation of an instrument that is justly balanced in all its parts, may be expected to be correct and uniform throughout. But, in order that the exercises and evolutions be well managed and well applied in execution, it would be useful that the soldier himself were convinced of the purpose for which they are instituted. Such conviction is important; and it might be impressed on the mind of the individual without much trouble, by exhibiting example demonstrative of effect. The proper management of demonstrative example requires discernment in the instructor; but, properly managed, it facilitates labour, and spares the necessity of employing measures which, without such demonstrative example, will still be defective. If the various causes which influence the conduct of man were rightly understood, and applied with discernment to subjects under military training, it would not be impossible, perhaps not difficult, to render soldiers so perfect by education, as to perform all the military operations of which their physical powers are capable with perfect mechanical correctness, and with effects subject to correct calculation. Such

perfection may be attained ; but it cannot be attained so as to be calculated upon, without practice on every variety of ground where military actions can be supposed to take place.

The requisite time for training the recruit to the practice of combined movement, as connected with practical warfare, cannot be supposed to be less than six months. Habit cannot be formed without time ; and unless habit be formed, and firmly established, we cannot depend on the soldier as acting correctly under the various forms in which the enemy's force presents itself. The practice of evolution and movement, as before stated, may be, and ought to be, performed regimentally ; but, besides regimental practice, it will be further proper that great bodies of troops be brought together on proper ground, at stated times, for the sake of an extensive exercise of the duties which are necessary in the field, and in order to furnish opportunities of shewing examples of the various modes of attack and defence which are practised by contending armies. It is such demonstration only as represents all the realities of a combat, except actual slaughter, that furnishes this instruction. It places before the eye of the soldier an example of something similar to that which he must expect to see in the field ; whence, in consequence of experience, he is less apt to be startled at noise and threatening aspects than he otherwise would be. The effects are different in actual war, and in demonstrations illustrative of war ; but the superficial appearances are similar ; and surprise, as an effect of novelty, is diminished by such exhibitions. In order that the exhibition leave a useful lesson with the young soldier, it must be often repeated, varied in form, according to circumstances of ground, and conducted without any other correspondence between the opposing military officers, than the injunction to attack or defend certain positions in the field, such as, when secured, command advantages, or assure victory. The practice alluded to accustoms the soldier to look at things in their different aspects, and to distinguish truth from its appearance. It teaches him also to estimate the importance of the purpose to be accomplished, and it moreover tends to improve his own ability in carrying it into execution. It serves, farther, to sharpen the genius of the officer ; for, as the operations are supposed to be carried on without concert between parties, the mind is exercised in finding remedies for contingencies, and in

finding them promptly. Hence a certain degree of proficiency in the art of war, at least a perfect correctness in the execution of all the parts of tactic and strategy, may be supposed to result from the mode of training and exercise now suggested.

The military demonstrations, or mock-engagements, now alluded to, are not without their use in the manner in which they are usually conducted; but they will be more instructive if they more nearly resemble the reality. The effect of fire-arms produces a given destruction in the field of battle; and hence, in imitation of reality, a proportion of the parts are supposed to disappear from the ranks in the mock engagements, as from the supposed havoc of the enemy's fire. The ranks being thinned by the apparent operation of an ordinary cause of destruction, a necessity is incurred, and an opportunity offered, of reorganising, upon a corresponding basis of order. To reorganize the shattered ranks in the face of fire, and under a continually accumulating destruction, is the most important and the most difficult operation which occurs in war. To effect it properly commands the highest admiration: it marks the highest degree of promptitude and self-possession. It may be useful for the military officer to study, and to endeavour to ascertain, the principle upon which the reorganization of shattered ranks depends. The cause is obscure; and it is left to the military officer to turn it in his own mind. The reorganization of broken lines under fire constitutes the highest effort of discipline, and gives the most convincing proof of military excellence; so, if the fire of the mock-engagement do not apparently derange the ranks of the battalions, with the view of affording an opportunity of reorganizing for the sake of instruction, the effect is incomplete. Such engagement does not in fact exhibit a correct representation of war, and it does not of course rank in the first degree of usefulness. It is an exhibition to amuse—not an example to instruct.

If the ground over which an army is destined to march in its route to the field of battle be correctly known, the general who commands, and who is supposed to be duly acquainted with the relative powers of the troops in marching, is not likely to err in calculating the time of the rendezvous of the different columns at their proper stations; and, further, if the nature of the ground upon which the combat takes place be rightly

understood, the effect of fire-arms on grounds of different declivities and at different distances being previously calculated and known, together with the capabilities of the different divisions, for seizing advantageous positions, and for maintaining them with obstinacy when seized, the calculation on the issue of the combat will seldom be erroneous. An army, on this supposition, is understood to be so organized as to be capable of acting upon a fixed principle. By ascertaining the effect of fire-arms at different distances, and in different modes of direction, and by practising evolution and movement, so as to form the habit of bringing means to bear with precision, and with all their force, on given points, the issue of a battle becomes a matter of correct calculation; for it follows a rule of science. Such science belongs to the military officer, and the correct application of it is supposed to constitute his principal study. An army may be sufficiently powerful in itself to effect a specified purpose; but if the power be not applied to the proper point, it fails entirely, or it succeeds partially, and by chance, where success ought to have been complete and certain, as the result of systematic arrangement. Hence, in order to obtain full effect from just application, it is necessary that conditions and circumstances be carefully considered; that the character of the different classes of troops be justly estimated, placed in their proper stations, and applied with precision in the respective lines of their duty. Riflemen compose the first class of troops. Their mode of fighting is desultory and loose; they cover operations, harass and annoy, rather than fight a battle. Light infantry is likewise ranked among the troops of demonstration. It seizes positions by rapidity of movement, maintains them by obstinacy and firmness of courage; and, in doing this, it covers or masks the execution of important general movements. Its services are preparatory of the great conflict, for it guards the line from annoyance until it arrive at its appointed station, in all its fitness. This is necessary to be done; for it must be always borne in mind, that if the object in view be impression from the fire of musketry, as the fire must not be permitted to commence till the distance be point blank, so the force intended to operate by means of fire must not be permitted to quicken its pace in advancing to its station. It is a physical fact, of which any man may try the truth, that when the body is heated, the

current of blood accelerated by running, or other exertion, the heart beats high, the lungs pant for breath, and the power of the arm is weakened; consequently the act of the hand is wavering and unsteady, and the direction of the fire is false. From this simple fact arises an important lesson for military commanders, namely, that whenever the main action depends upon the fire of musketry, the line or column of troops destined for execution ought to be led to its position at the slow pace of movement; and to this may be added, that wherever troops are directed to advance in charge with the bayonet, or other weapon of close attack, the force should be husbanded, the movement accelerated only in degree, sufficient to give impulse, not to exhaust power.

The officer directs the application of means to the proper point of attack; the soldier makes impression by dexterity in managing his arms. Dexterity is acquired by careful and long practice. The consciousness of superior dexterity gives courage and confidence in action; namely, the courage and confidence which result from practice in actual war. The veteran soldiers of Alexander, denominated the silver shields, appear to have attained the highest degree of perfection, arising from this source of experience, which any soldiers ever attained. They were fierce and confident from superior skill; and, as such, they ruled the fate of battles. The successes of the Roman armies were highly distinguished; and those successes were produced in a great measure by the perfection which the soldiers attained in the use of arms. The military institution imperiously commanded daily practice in all forms of exercise; and the habit thereby acquired produced a correctness and union of action in the day of battle, which could have been no other way produced. Force was thus concentrated to be applied with impression on given points of attack, or to resist as one body in defence. The Buccaneers of America were irregulars and freebooters. They perhaps will not be allowed to rank in the military class; but, if such privilege be granted them, they may be adduced as an example of superior success from superior knowledge in the use of fire-arms. The Buccaneer wasted no ammunition. He was master of himself, and confident in courage from superiority of skill. In all military associations, ancient or modern, mechanical or irregular, Prussian or Buccaneer, it is experience

that imprints character, and imparts courage from conscious superiority in the art of applying power on given points, at a given time. Such courage is cool and tempered; that of inexperienced troops is impetuous, blind, headlong, and liable to mistake and failure. But, while inexperienced troops fail on many occasions, they also sometimes achieve things by impulse which veterans would not attempt. Veterans act by knowledge, and act in rule; the inexperienced astonish by their boldness—and they sometimes succeed, through ardour, contrary to the rules of military calculation.

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## PART IV.

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### INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF MILITARY ACTION.

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SOME suggestions have been offered, in the preceding pages, concerning the mode of organizing recruits, with a view to form a military instrument of just mechanical connexion in all its parts. It is plain to common sense that the instrument must be formed by a true estimate of physical power individually, and that the act of it, when formed, must be maintained scientifically by impulse of motive sufficient in force to excite movement, and at the same time so qualified in character as to cement union firmly and equally in all. Human action acknowledges two general motives as its source, namely, love or desire, fear or aversion. These primary motives, modified by the contingencies of human life, diverge into numerous channels, and produce much diversity of action among the mass of human beings. Hence an army, which consists of a number of separate and independent individuals, differing in figure and form from each other, not according in temper, and susceptible of impression in various modes and degrees, can only move harmoniously, and act consistently, by the stimulation of a principle of paramount force; such as absorbs in itself, and directs all the active powers and faculties of its several constituent parts to a given point. The proper direction and management of this paramount principle of human action, that is, desire of one thing, and aversion from another, is a difficult part of the military officer's duty. To direct it aright requires an intimate knowledge of human structure and human character in all its shades and bearings; and as this is a deep study and toilsome employment, it is little prosecuted by the great.

## SECTION I.

THE causes which influence the character of military nations are various. Some operate in early life through contingencies which produce habit; some operate through civil institutions or professed military education, which, acting on a basis of reason, generate a consistent system of conduct of more or less perfection and effect. The contingent causes which affect the military character flow from the following sources: 1st, National character as connected with pursuits of life, or state of social intercourse among the different members of the nation. 2ndly, Character of the rival power on which the army or military body acts, namely, high or low in military reputation. 3rdly, Selection and arrangement of the individual parts into corps or regiments, according to physical power and moral sympathies, or by size and figure only, as masses of brute matter. 4thly, Form and character of tactic and discipline as original or borrowed, that is, as national, or imported from foreigners; and lastly, mode and character of service, as calculated to condense and cement, or to divide and dissipate military energies.

1st. The semi-barbarous stage of society, where strength and vigour of mind predominate over the refinement of animal sense, is the epoch in human history most fertile of military genius and warlike qualities. The fact is indisputable, so evident to observation, that it is not necessary to adduce any proof of it. But, though proof be unnecessary, it will not be deemed impertinent to give an outline of the progress and changes of warlike character, as manifested at different times among the inhabitants of Great Britain, since they were first brought under the notice of the historian. The subject is curious and interesting; and, if the author's powers were equal to the proper elucidation of it, it could not fail to be attractive and instructive to others as well as to military readers. The English nation, either as principal or auxiliary, is oftener engaged in war than any other nation in Europe; and if the almost continual wars between England and France for the last thousand years, the wars and conquests in Ireland, the wars with Scotland prior to the union, the civil wars within the kingdom—whether factionary, between different

branches of the royal house, or revolutionary, between kings and people—the wars of conquest and colonization, trade and free-booting in the East and West Indies, in North and South America, and even in Africa, be taken into the account, the English, if not regularly organised as a military power, is decidedly the first among fighting nations that stand in the records of history. The nation is ambitious of power, covetous of territory and spoil, and is charged with covertly grasping the dominion of the world through a monopoly of trade and commerce.

It does not belong to this place to enter into discussions which do not bear directly on causes of military pre-eminence; but, as a leading trait of character ingrafts itself on the habits and acts of every individual of a nation, it is obvious to remark that the British are, at present, more distinguished for a speculative and complicated character of adventure, whether in agriculture, manufacture, traffic, stock-jobbing, or military enterprise, than any other people in Europe. The nation which is ambitious as a nation, has an insatiable desire of gain of money. Acquisition of money, directly or remotely, is the pursuit of all its members—the engine of activity to all, even to those of the highest station. The composition of society is different in England from what it is in most other European countries. In the greater part of the continent there is only lord and vassal, or other servile instrument of luxury and pleasure. In England, the spirit of manufacture, trade, and barter of all saleable commodities, marks the national character; and as that spirit requires a certain power of self-disposal for its developement, the English, who possess that power, rush to every adventure which promises advantage. The mass of the nation is manufacturer and mercantile, working for gain of money direct; in former times there was a class of persons, known by the name of *yeomen*, who were in some degree free and independent of servile pursuit. They were bold and manly in spirit, the bulwark of the country in times of danger, not the mercenary tools of an overflowing treasury. They are not yet extinct; but they are reduced to comparatively small numbers. These *yeomen* were, it may be presumed, descendants of Saxons and Danes. They lost the sovereignty of the soil at the Norman invasion; but they appear to have retained a national mind, and a sentiment of liberty beyond the common vassals

of the kings, lords, or barons of the continent. Whether the sentiment of liberty belonged peculiarly to the Anglo-Saxon race; or, whether it arose, and acquired a constitutional form under the compact through which the settlements of the Saxons were formed in England, the yeomen and seafaring part of the community, who were presumptively of a Saxon or Danish origin, may be regarded as the only part of the nation which, until the revolution of the 17th century, had any idea of constitutional freedom founded on natural right.

The cause of the establishment of constitutional freedom among the English is a subject of important research. The proper investigation of it is beyond the writer's ability. He abstains from entering into it deeply; but he thinks he may venture to say, that the associations formed by adventurers, such as our Saxon ancestors undoubtedly were, whether with a view to predatory inroad, or permanent settlement, may be considered as associations in which all the parts were functionary, efficient, and obedient to a primary law of the compact; consequently every part had a defined sphere and a limited portion of liberty. As a body of adventurers may be supposed to act under a law of order, constitutional restraint applies to all, that is, the right of arbitrary oppression is conceded to no one. It may thus be supposed that if associated adventurers invade foreign territory, and usurp the sovereignty of the soil, they plant a species of freedom in the country which they conquer, and incorporate rather than enslave the aboriginal inhabitants. Kings invade, conquer thrones; and, having obtained the sovereignty of the soil, engraft slavery on the mass of the people, whom they estimate as the spoil of the strong arm. The Saxon adventurers and the Norman conqueror furnish examples of what is alleged. William, a feudal and despotic prince, followed by a swarm of feudal vassals, landed on the English shores with a view to obtain possession of the crown, and thereby to command the allegiance of the people. He succeeded in his attempt by the issue of a single battle; and having succeeded, he extinguished for a time the exercise of constitutional freedom in England. The Norman officers became feudal lords; the inferior soldiery feudal vassals. The Saxon population, which consisted of different migrations inhabiting different districts of country, loosely connected with the central government, and appa-

rently little interested in the fate of kings, submitted to the Norman invader with little resistance. The country was overrun. It was occupied, and treated as a conquered country; but still, in spite of the harsh spirit of Norman despotism, a portion of the Saxon race retained something of their constitutional independence; others regained it at after periods by purchase or other contingency. The class of Englishmen styled yeomen, presumptively of Saxon origin, were conspicuous among the English people for a blunt and manly character. Agriculture was their occupation, hunting their pastime; their sports and amusements were rural, active, and warlike. If they owed submission to a feudal lord, they were not abject slaves. The seafaring people, in whom it may be supposed there was a large mixture of Danish blood, were rude and boisterous as the element on which they lived; they were bold and hardy. The freebooting spirit of their ancestors long adhered to them; consequently they were ready for every enterprise of adventure connected with gain of money, or liberty of acting freely. From such population the crusades to the Holy Land, the auxiliary wars in France and Flanders, against the tyranny of sovereign kings, had, it may be presumed, many volunteers. The buccaneering expeditions to the western hemisphere were numerous at one period of the English history; and, though they were not, strictly speaking, conducted after the mode of authorised warfare among civilized nations, they strongly mark the character of the English people. They exhibited specimens of heroic enterprise, generosity and cupidity, firmness and dissipation, that do not often present themselves in the history of mankind. There is reason to believe that the English soldier and the English adventurer of the chivalrous times were of a higher class than the agricultural peasant, who, in England as in other countries in Europe, was a simple serf until the middle of the seventeenth century; when, electrified, as it were, by the equalizing impulse of Christian truth, he ceased to be a slave—and became a man. The dormant energies of the human mind were then called into activity through all ranks of people; and the spirit of individual independence which characterized the epoch of the commonwealth, though persecuted and oppressed at the restoration of the monarchy, was not entirely extinguished by strong exertions of despotism. The fund remained: it was brought out,



and established in a chastened and constitutional form in the year 1688.

The wars of King William, prince of Orange, were not of great lustre in the field; but they were interesting through the apparent generosity of the motive which produced and supported them: those of his successor were brilliant beyond example. The duke of Marlborough was superior as a genius in war; and the English were then soldiers worthy of their general. The military field was comparatively narrow under the earl of Peterborough; but there was something of the generous and heroic in it which attracts attention and interests the mind. When the wars of Queen Anne terminated, the spirit of Marlborough and Peterborough being withdrawn from the army, the military course, instead of advancing, appeared to retrograde. The allurements of gain from manufacture and trade supplanted the ideas of national glory from conquest; and as from that, or other cause, the ranks of the English army were chiefly filled by the outcasts of the English population, the English army was little distinguished in the field until the latter years of the war 1756. Whether this proceeded from inferior materials, inferior commanders, or want of national interest as respects the motive of war, others may determine—the fact is not equivocal.

The Scotch, particularly the Lowland Scotch, made part of the English army from the accession of James the First, more directly and effectively from the time of the union; they had their share of glory in the wars of Queen Anne. The Scotch were at this time considerably behind the English in what is termed civilization; that is, their fare was homely and their clothing coarse, their figure uncouth, and their external condition of little variety. But, though homely and uncouth in appearance, the Scot possessed eminent qualities for the military field. From the time of the reformation, at least from the time of the establishment of parochial schools, the Scotch had the advantage of a national education. This, as laid on the base of the Christian code, opened a view to the true condition of man as an individual, and produced a sentiment, in the lowest orders of the people, of the first value in regulating moral conduct, and in stimulating to exertion where the cause was deemed reasonable and just.



The Scotch Highlanders, different in origin, language, and manners from the people of the Lowlands, were, prior to the year 1745, nearly independent tribes, who lived in a state of warlike and heroic barbarism. The chiefs were feudal lords with civil jurisdiction; the people were vassals, presumptively of the same blood with the lords. The jurisdiction of the chief was annulled after the year 1745; and the Highlander, from that epoch, became intimately incorporated with the British nation. The prominent feature of the Highland clans is warlike; and, as the chiefs were restrained from factious and domestic broils with each other, the people entered freely into the ranks of the British army in the war 1756, and carried off a large share of the renown of the successful campaigns, particularly in Canada. The Highland corps mustered strong in the American revolutionary war. The issue of the contest was not such as could be called glorious to the British arms; but the fighting character of the English soldier was not tarnished, and that of the Highlander as more known, was better appreciated and more highly valued.

The Irish nation furnishes other, and, very numerous materials for the British army. Ireland was attacked by England when it had no united government to defend it; and, in defect of organized means of defence, it submitted to an enterprising and politic invader. The English became lords of the soil by force of arms. The native Irish were reduced to vassalage; and were long kept in a state of depression, worse than ordinary vassalage. The feudal vassal of England, and particularly of Scotland, was often of the same race and of the same blood with the feudal lord; mutual connexion and sympathy thus existed between them. The feudal lord was a conqueror in Ireland, and he was regarded with aversion as an usurper. The English nation obtained liberty, through revolution in church and state, in the seventeenth century. The Scot obtained a scope and freedom of thinking through changes effected in the form of religion, and particularly through the establishment of parish-schools, where the basis of instruction was laid on the Christian code, that is, on the sacred truth, that the lowest of human beings is a man, and that the highest is not more. The Irish, notwithstanding the unsteadiness which apparently characterises their conduct, are under the influence of a priesthood

in matters of religion. The native Irish have had no reformation or revolution similar to the political revolution among the English, or the religious reformation among the Scotch; and they have not thus been as yet furnished with the opportunity of rising to their just place in the scale of national military importance. No one who knows the Irish will venture to say that their physical military properties are inferior to those of the other members of the United Kingdom; and, with acknowledged military properties, the proofs are numerous that they possess mental sensibility, which is, or may be, made the base of moral virtues. Nature has planted the fund of excellence in the Irish organism; but the operation of the commendable act is suppressed or obscured through defect in the spring which moves the mechanism.

If the history of men and nations be carefully observed and scientifically analyzed, one outline of proceeding may be traced in all. In the period of youth, or emergence from barbarism, the mind is strong and the military acts are energetic. This is illustrated in the history of Great Britain. The era of the commonwealth may be considered as England's national youth; the wars in the reign of Queen Anne afford a brilliant example of her manhood. The war of 1756, which brought the Scotch Highlanders from predatory and factious warfare in their sequestered valleys, to systematic war in the open theatre of the world, may be considered as the youth, or military emergence of the Highlanders. Their youth was vigorous, and they still remain in their manhood, notwithstanding the counteraction of the strong deteriorating causes to which they have been lately exposed. After the termination of the wars of Queen Anne, pursuits of manufacture, trade, commerce, and agriculture, as a direct speculation for gain of money, engrossed the activity of the population of England. Similar pursuits extended to the southern division of Scotland after the termination of the war of 1756. The improvement, as it must be termed in compliance with custom, progressed northward; and the poorer classes of Highlanders were disturbed in the possession of their sequestered valleys by this rage for improvement. The Highland chiefs were now under no danger of hostility from one another; and, relieved from apprehension on that head, they seem to have

found out that they would profit more by the fleeces of flocks of sheep, than by the devotion and prowess of military vassals. The vassal Highlanders were thus unhoused to make room for sheep. They were forced, by necessity, to migrate to uncultivated America in search of a home, or to seek a precarious subsistence in the trading towns of the south by drudgery and servile toil. Born and bred among the mountains, where the spirit of war and heroism was ingrafted on the frame, the Highlander, not relishing, or not possessing capacity for mechanic arts, became the lowest of labourers in luxurious cities, or, entering into the army, proved himself to be among the best and bravest of soldiers.

The people of England prior to the termination of the war in the reign of Queen Anne, and the people of Scotland prior to the termination of the war 1756, appear to have been in that stage of society which, as emerging from mental torpor, produces soldiers of the first character. From these periods downwards, the tide of activity has moved in another channel. Instead of the phantom of military glory, which at different epochs urged the English and the Scotch to the field of combat, the allurements of wealth, and the attempts to acquire it by speculation and adventure, have engrossed all the desires and absorbed into itself all the energies of the man. A nation, as a whole, moves under the influence of one general and dominant passion. The operation of money, where money is the master-engine of the state, fills the ranks of the army with rapidity; and it often fills them with materials which act with energy in wars of aggression, where the hopes of spoil are before the eye and stimulate to exertion. The history of mankind proves to conviction, that armies composed of mercenary materials are of small reliance in defence. It is patriotism which defends a country; and there are volumes of evidence before the public in proof of the fact, that wealth and patriotism do not dwell together. The labour of the mechanic may be purchased for money—the spirit of the patriot is beyond the touch of gold. It may even be added, that, wherever a nation adopts the practice of filling the ranks of its army by purchase, whether at a foreign market, or at the market of its own population, the foundations of its national decay are laid; and it may be predicted, without the spirit of prophecy, that, sooner or later, the national edifice will be a ruin.

2nd. That the rise and fall of the military character of nations is influenced by the warlike character of the opponent, is a well-founded position; so obvious indeed that it does not require to be illustrated by much detail of history. The Romans were stimulated to exertion in the infancy of the republic by the formidable power of the expelled Tarquin. When the attempts of Tarquin failed, they were urged, or thought themselves urged, to proceed in the pursuits of military science by the preponderating force of the neighbouring states, which were jealous of their aspiring spirit. After the conquest of Italy, and the termination of the second Punic war, the Romans had not, strictly speaking, a rival to contend with. The people with whom they came into hostile contact were factious republics, tyrannic despots with mercenary armies, or hordes of rude barbarians, brave, but deficient in the complicated science of war, consequently not possessing that property of rival character which excites the military genius, and supports the military name. The Romans studied tactic, or exercised themselves in the practice of arms, after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Italy; but as it was for the purpose of extending dominion, not for resisting aggression, that this was done, the impulse was uncertain, and the moral bond weak, inasmuch as it was converted from the defence of the native soil to the acquisition of the soil of others. The proceeding moves on the same base in all countries, and among all conditions of men, as it did among the Romans. The movement is an important one; but the progress of it is only noticed cursorily in this place, and that chiefly as it relates to the empire of Great Britain.

The French and English are rivals; and, as rivals, they quarrel and fight. They shake hands, draw breath for a longer or shorter time, quarrel, and fight again. The military glory of the French stood high towards the close of the seventeenth century. The ambition of the monarch who then occupied the throne was great; so great as to aspire to the hope of subjugating the world to his will. The English were jealous; and, as they are at no time averse from a trial of strength, they soon came into hostile contact with their rival. The English government was then new; at least, it had been renovated—and it was in vigour. The republican spirit of the people was strong; and,

as the sentiment which urged to war was generous, the pretensions of the French monarch, which were revolting to the republican spirit, were opposed with resolution and courage. The high military character of the French acted as a stimulus to English patriotism, and roused the national energies to a high point of exertion. From the termination of the successful war of Queen Anne, which defeated the views of French ambition, until the latter periods of the war in 1756, the military spirit of the English was low—comparatively dormant. That of its rival advanced, as raised from depression to eminence by some scattered rays of genius among the military chiefs.

But though the military spirit of England was faint during this period, it was not extinguished. The material of enterprize existed; and it was stimulated to exertion by the arrogance of France. Success followed exertion, and glory followed success; insomuch that the war in 1756 closed with an increase of military reputation, and a positive balance of advantages on the English side. That species of stimulus which acts on the spirit of troops, as a consequence of the military reputation of the opponent, could not be supposed to exist in the war with the American provinces. The Americans had attained no name in arms, and had as yet no pretensions to military science; consequently all the military glory which could attach to success in the American revolutionary war, was no more than the glory of repressing the revolt of unskilful peasants.

The nations which combined against the French in the year 1792 were in a somewhat similar predicament with the English at the commencement of the American war of 1775. The most of them stood high in military reputation, and all of them were perfectly drilled to military tactic. They calculated success on the presumption of their skill, and were not strongly stimulated to exert it by the military glory of their rival; for the French were then regarded as a revolted multitude ignorant of warlike science. They were deserted by the class which deems itself born to the privilege of commanding armies; and they were thus considered to be an easy prey to the disciplined troops of the allied sovereigns. The case was put to trial, and failed. The trial brought proof that the energy of spirit which belongs to freedom is of more value than the science of the tactic which



moves under the impression of fear ; and it proved, moreover, that the wisdom of an assembly of plebeians often defeats the wisdom of a council of kings. Genius and good sense are gifts of nature, and they are dispensed as freely to the cottage as to the palace. This is a fact ; the enunciation of it will be deemed rude ; but the truth of it is strongly exemplified in the revolutionary war with France. Exclusive of the devoted patriotism which animated every Frenchman in that important contest, the light of genius beamed on many ; and it beamed with so much splendour on some, that tactic and discipline made more progress on a scientific and reasoned base in the first years of the republic, than it had done at any period of history from the early days of Rome. The military system which gave success to the arms of republican France, seems, in so far as the question can be judged by a non-professional man, to be founded on an intimate knowledge of the real nature of things, physical and moral. It had much resemblance to the system of the Roman republic—modified to circumstances, not servilely copied. It possessed its own spirit, and it acted always with the spirit of an original. Its success was unparalleled. At the close of the war in 1801, which was the last days of the republic, the military reputation of the French nation stood on a high eminence. Republican France was formidable in war, from union of object and energy of sentiment in the executive, not less than from form and manner of tactic. Imperial France was formidable ; but it was formidable from causes of less stability, namely, perfection in mechanical tactic and military evolution, arrogant assumptions and political impositions of a chief, who intimidated with so much art that his opponents were half conquered before the battle was joined. All the sovereigns on the continent submitted to Napoleon ; and they would have remained in submission to a late period, had not the position of England and the courage of the people opposed a barrier to his progress. England alone resisted Napoleon in his insolence ; and her courage grew strong under resistance. The eminence of the rival excited her military exertion ; and the eminence of that rival has actually added to her military reputation ; for it may be said, without offending truth, that the rival spirit of the soldier, rather than the military skill of the general, sustained the combat on the field of Waterloo. Great Britain gained no



reputation from the first American war: she did not gain, nor could she be expected to gain, any from the second. The enemy did not present himself as a military rival: success would have been no triumph; and defeat will pass into the page of history as a disgrace.

3rd. It is assumed, as a primary position in human history, that man is everywhere the same animal. It is obvious that one man differs from another in external appearance; and it is moreover true that the shades of difference are so various and extensive, that there are perhaps no two individuals under the sun who correspond exactly in the measure of bodily power in all its modes of application, or in the qualities of mental capacity in all the varieties of exhibition. Impetuosity and ardour, patience and self-command, are extremes of temper. Extremes are defects; for, as a soldier may be too impetuous, so he may be too patient of injury. Qualities are peculiar to individuals; and as an army is an instrument consisting of many individuals, possessing peculiar tempers and different capacities of action, it is obviously the primary business of the tactician to ascertain the kind and degree of the power or capacity of each, so that he may be capable of arranging them in their respective stations in such a manner that the fabric be not only uniform in its appearance, but that it be so put together by its sympathies, that all separate parts unite harmoniously and correspond correctly in action for the execution of one purpose.

The physical properties of the human race, which operate effectually in war, indicate themselves to the observing eye; they are tried and ascertained by experiment to be true or false. The principle through which troops are joined together, so as to produce a common and consistent act in application to an object, is not easily estimated. The quality in the tactician, who measures and applies things to purpose with correctness, resides in an intuitive knowledge of human nature, which belongs to some as a peculiar gift. It is not learned from written books; but, if not learned from written books, it is matured by study in the book of nature. It is to be remarked, and borne in mind, that materials of similar nature unite harmoniously with each other, augment weight, and thereby augment power, without changing quality; that materials of a heterogeneous kind rush together when brought into contact,

lose their radical distinction of character, and produce a mean between extremes. If this law of nature be rightly understood, and applied to animated matter, particularly to the selection of human materials for the composition of armies, it follows, (if it be desired to form an army of the first excellence,) that, instead of mixing people of different nations promiscuously in one corps, as chance or exterior semblance directs, the purpose will be better attained by classing them in their places according to nation, county, or district of country. The human species possesses certain resemblances in physical constitution according to nation, more striking ones according to country; the resemblance increases, and the union becomes progressively intimate, in proportion as the sphere of the circle diminishes. In this manner, while an army which consists of the subjects of one nation only presents a more uniform and a more consistent external appearance than an army that is composed of various nations, so the movement of the parts may be supposed to have more of natural correspondence in the time of exerted action, than the movement of those that are thrown together promiscuously from various quarters of the globe. If advantages attach to national arrangement, as deriving from correspondence in physical power, they are still more conspicuous as connected with the morals which flow from union of sympathies contracted by habits which are formed in early life.

As it is the ostensible object of the tactician to compose a structure capable of acting with all its parts in union for the accomplishment of a given purpose, so it is obvious that the materials which possess the nearest correspondence with each other in their radical properties, are preferably to be classed together for the formation of the fabric in question. It is evident, that men who are arranged in armies by nation, and in regiments by county or districts of country, have a physical connexion with each other from correspondence of power arising from the climate which they inhabit, or produced by the customs which prevail in the country where they dwell. The correspondence alluded to is a mechanical correspondence of physical powers produced by chance. It is loose in its connexions; but it is not without weight in its effect. But besides physical correspondence, there is often a more intimate connexion among the inhabitants

of particular territories, arising from a sentiment ingrafted on the mind through certain forms of education, or through habits tacitly formed by the domestic occupations which principally prevail in particular districts of a given county. Men are bound to each other by a national tie—by the tie of county, by the tie of township, and more intimately by that of a still smaller circle. The fact is obvious to the most superficial observer; and as the effect may be, and often is, of powerful operation in war, the forming of armies, or divisions of armies by nation, and regiments by county or district of country, obviously presents itself as the most eligible mode of organizing military force, if it be intended that military force be more than the instrument of a sovereign for purposes of arbitrary rule.

If military materials be thrown together promiscuously, that is, arranged by no other rule except that of size or quantity of matter, as it is admitted that the individual parts possess different propensities and different powers of action, it is plain that the instrument composed of these different and independent parts has a tendency to act differently; the separate parts being constrained to act on one object by stimulation or coercion only. In order to maintain the union contemplated by the tactician as the object of his training, one requires to be urged, another requires to be restrained, consequently the management is difficult; for, as the actual powers of exertion do not always correspond with the physical appearances, they are not always equally influenced to exert themselves by the impulse of the same internal motive. A military instrument, composed of heterogeneous parts as here stated, cannot well be supposed to attain the highest point of excellence. Military excellence consists, as often said, in every part of the instrument acting with full force, from one principle and for one purpose; and hence it is evident, that in a mixed fabric, composed of parts of unequal power and different temper, disunion must be the consequence; or if disunion be not a consequence, the combined act must necessarily be shackled, and, as such, inferior; the strong being restrained from exertion for the sake of preserving union with the weak.

The imperfection now stated necessarily attaches to regiments composed of different nations mixed promiscuously. It even attaches, in some degree, to regiments which are formed indis-

criminally from the population of all the districts or counties of an extensive kingdom. This assumption, anticipated by reasoning, is confirmed by experience in the military history of semi-barbarous tribes, which are often observed, without the aid of tactic as taught in modern schools, to stick together in danger, and to achieve acts of heroism, beyond the comprehension of those who have no knowledge of man but as a part of a mechanical instrument of war. The fact has numerous proofs in the history of nations; but it has not a more decisive one than that which occurred in the late 71st regiment in the revolutionary war of America. In the summer of the year 1779, a party of the 71st regiment, consisting of fifty-six men and five officers was detached from a redoubt, at Stone-ferry in South Carolina, for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy, which was supposed to be advancing in force to attack the post. The instruction given to the officer who commanded went no further than to reconnoitre and retire upon the redoubt. The troops were new troops—ardent as Highlanders usually are. They fell in with a strong column of the enemy (upwards of two thousand) within a short distance of the post; and, instead of retiring according to instruction, they thought proper to attack—with an instinctive view, it is supposed, to retard progress, and thereby to give time to those who were in the redoubt to make better preparation for defence. This they did; but they were themselves nearly destroyed. All the officers and non-commissioned officers were killed or wounded, and seven of the privates only remained on their legs at the end of the combat. The commanding officer fell; and, in falling, desired the few, who still resisted, to make the best of their way to the redoubt. They did not obey. The national sympathies were warm: national honour did not permit them to leave their officers in the field; and they actually persisted in covering their fallen comrades until a reinforcement arriving from head-quarters, which was at some distance, induced the enemy to retire. Whether the attack made by this party was right or wrong in a military point of view, does not concern the present question. The conduct in the act was heroic, and the authors of it had no skill in the tactic of military schools. The major part of them had been taken at sea on their passage to America, and had only been recently released from prison: the best part of them, in so

far as regards manual and manœuvre, would have been sent to the awkward squad of a regiment of militia of the present day. The artificial lock-step was not known to them; but heroism of mind and social sympathy locked them together as one man in the hour of danger. They were only peasants of the Scottish mountains—they rank in history with the Spartans who fought at Thermopylæ.

Besides the motives which may thus be supposed to influence the conduct of national armies, and still more strongly that of county regiments in the field of battle, another benefit, and one of material importance, may be expected to arise from adherence to the rule here advocated, namely, the preservation, even the improvement, of the moral character. If we look into the history of nations, and study to comprehend its spirit, we cannot avoid seeing that the moral virtue of the soldier has a greater share in the permanent success of arms than his physical prowess; and further, that no stronger cause for good conduct exists among soldiers, than the hopes that the report of such good conduct will be conveyed to his native home, to be known to the companions of his youth, whom he cherishes in idea as the friends of his old age. The majority of soldiers are emulous to do well, that their parents may be honoured; they are fearful to do wrong, lest their parents should be disgraced. Such motive exists; and it operates so strongly on the Highlanders of Scotland, that the feeling connected with it may be considered as a main cause of the uniform good conduct of Highland soldiers in every service where they have been employed.

In order that the military fabric be rendered as perfect as possible, that is, that the parts be selected and arranged according to the correspondence of physical powers, and that the act be cemented by sympathies which arise from habits of association in domestic life, it is important that the commissioned officers be natives of the kingdom, even natives of the county to which the regiments respectively belong, so as to be known and esteemed at their native homes. If an army or a regiment be constituted according to this rule, and if it be animated by a congenial spirit in its officers, there is reason to conclude that its conduct will be uniformly correct, and praiseworthy at all times. There is no reasonable expectation to believe that this will be the



case, where the constituent parts are thrown together promiscuously ; where the officer, who is supposed to give the impulse to the national act, is a foreigner, or even a stranger, in the county to which the corps belongs. A soldier, of whatever class or condition he may be, attains, through training and discipline, certain habits and qualities that are peculiar to his profession ; he, at the same time, retains peculiarities of his county or district of country implanted in youth, and so confirmed by long-continued habit, that, as military education cannot altogether expel it, it now and then breaks through the covering of art, and endangers the action of the artificial fabric. If the commissioned officer be not familiar with all the circumstances which belong to the soldier who is under his command, he is defective in one essential qualification for his office ; and if he have no previous knowledge of the predominant characteristic of the people of the county to which the corps belongs, he will not soon learn it, or he will not much study to learn it under a temporary attachment to a corps of strangers. This is self-evident ; and it is not irrelevant on this occasion to remark, that the active transfer among officers from regiment to regiment, as it suits convenience or private purposes, is, in all points of view, an injurious practice to the real interests of an army, if the interests of an army be thought to consist in domestic happiness and good moral conduct. The officer is not likely to form attachment to a class of men from whom the strong hope of promotion already separates him in idea ; and the soldier forms only a slender attachment to the officer, who, if he be a man of interest, wealth, or even professional value, is not expected to remain long as his friend and protector. Where men and officers associate long together, an intimacy is often formed between them as between the members of a family ; and it is observed in such case that moral conduct is ordinarily correct, military conduct generally distinguished : if the chief be worthy of command, the whole may be expected to be obedient and worthy of praise. Where the form of association alluded to exists, there is much happiness in military life ; there is little, if any, where competitions for rank and promotion, out of time and out of place, through traffick with money, or influence from high connexion, characterize the service. In such case, no man is satisfied with his condition. From change, desire of change,



and inability to effect it, jealousies and murmurings prevail throughout, and military life is rarely any other than a life of complaint and grievance—internal rot under a gilded outside.

The suggestion of forming armies according to nation, and regiments according to county, that is, of strictly executing a plan which must have been contemplated at the time that particular regiments were named after particular counties, will probably be considered as a visionary suggestion in the present state of the British empire. The plan is not, it must be confessed, of easy execution, inasmuch as the basis on which it must be supposed to rest is undermined by the diffused intercourse which obtains throughout the kingdom; an intercourse which dissipates county feeling, and reduces national sympathies almost to nothing. The foundations of union are shaken by the existing state of intercourse, and the facility of execution is thereby counteracted. This must be admitted; but, with this admission, a base is still left, sufficient to support the fabric, if the case were brought to trial; but, as the idea is repugnant to the modern idea of military organization, there are small expectations that it will soon obtain it. Frederick the Second, king of Prussia, is the model of imitation of most of the European sovereigns on the subject of military formations. Frederick was a conqueror, and his authority is high; but it is not an authority of trust, for it is counter to the law of nature. Frederick, it is not denied, did much with an army of vagabonds, that is, with a mixture of all countries and classes: his successors did nothing, though their instrument possessed all its formal perfection. The revolutionary French were heroic as national soldiers in the first days of the republic. After their ranks were polluted by foreigners, forced or mercenary, their success was less distinguished, notwithstanding the skill and the multitude of impositions practised by their boasted commander to attain it. This is recent, and may be considered as authentic historical fact. If admitted to be valid, it proves that there is something in the intimate connexion which subsists between clans, tribes, inhabitants of county or district of country, and even the pure blood of a nation, stronger than any influence that arises from the mere restraints of mechanical discipline imposed on the mass by the most consummate masters of military tactic. An army that is purely national, or a regi-

ment that is put together by clan or county, may be compared to a wall-rugged and unequal exteriorly, but united interiorly by a bond that is strong as Roman cement—the pieces may be broken, the cement is not dissolved. An army, on the contrary, that is put together by exterior appearance, and without regard to national sympathies, is like an edifice of hewn stone. Its outside pleases the eye; but, as it is without the interior cement of national feeling, its stability is not proof against violence. The first is an arm of reality—its character rests on the strength of the national mind. The last is an army of imposition, an artificial instrument of fine workmanship for the pleasure of the eye, or the amusement of princes in the pastime of shedding human blood.

4th. The system of tactic under which troops are trained for war, is another point for consideration in the estimate of military character; and it is not an unimportant one. Independently of the relative value of different systems of tactic in their scientific merits, the simple circumstance that the mode is national, or that it is borrowed from foreigners, appears to the writer to have more influence on ultimate effect than military men generally imagine. If military history be examined with care, there scarcely occurs an instance of a nation attaining to high military reputation under a borrowed system of tactic. Austria and Russia may be regarded at present as imitators of the tactic of Frederick, the great king of Prussia. The physical properties of the Austrian and Russian armies are good, and the artificial arrangement of the tactic is scrupulously correct; but it will not be maintained by any one, who investigates causes and estimates effect, that either of these powers have attained the first station among military nations. They conquer; but where they do so, they overwhelm by weight and number, or they intimidate by impositions on ignorance. Wherever they are heroic, they forget the borrowed tactic, and revert to the mode of their ancestors.

The Spartans, who stand in the first class of military nations, had their own military institution, tactic, and discipline. The outline was strictly original, or it was so presented to the soldier that it was original in his idea, and, as such, superior. Philip of Macedon, the next great tactician in the military field,

knew the weakness of human nature, and acted on it with advantage. He was a man of genius, scientific as a tactician; and where he did not invent, he arranged and so artfully incorporated the inventions of others, that his system presented itself to the soldier as something new. As new, it gave birth to a sentiment of pride or self-importance in those who filled the Macedonian ranks; and it, at the same time, acted on the opponent by intimidation, as comprehending an effect not known. The Romans, at the earlier period of their history, arranged the order of battle on the same tactical base, and fought with similar arms, as the nations with whom they contended. They established themselves on the banks of the Tiber; and they might have lived in security, after the expulsion of the kings, had not the ambitious spirit of the corporated aristocracy which ruled at Rome, and which, as a form of government, is progressive in its purpose of aggrandizement above any other, prompted the design of subjugating the entire world to its will; an achievement not to be accomplished by a small force, without the invention of means more impressive in the work of destruction than those which then existed. The Roman citizen did not possess more physical courage, and scarcely so much physical strength, as the people who were contiguous to Rome. The government of Rome possessed a deep and condensed ambition, with a military sagacity and decision in difficulty that scarcely has a parallel in history. The ambition of conquest laid the foundation of the design; military sagacity conducted the execution. The Romans, who were observing and sagacious as statesmen and warriors, noted those arrangements in tactic which are most impressive in attack, or which, as best united, are most repulsive in defence—the armour which best protects from injury, and the arms which act most effectively in the destruction of those who oppose. In consequence of knowledge resulting from observation of effect, the common mode of tactic, and the common arms and armour of the time, were changed, for such as, judged by experience and the reason of things, best combine to give activity and solidity; that is, force to impress, and power to resist impression. The Roman tactic, and the Roman arms and armour, invented or adopted, (for the Romans, high as they were, did not disdain to borrow a hint, though they did not servilely copy a practice,)

was so incorporated and united into a whole, that it became national and peculiar. The reasons of things were studied so as to be understood; a practice was not adopted until it was demonstrable that it rested on a base of mathematical science. Exercise in arms was pursued by the recruit with the ardour that belongs to a national exercise; the knowledge to apply arms to the object with effect, gave, when attained, pre-eminence to the soldier. The Roman soldier was formidable mechanically from knowledge in the use of arms abstractedly; he was moreover invincible, in the virtuous days of the republic, in the idea that he was a Roman. The form of tactic was preserved, and it was practised in the Roman army after the spirit which originally animated it had fled, that is, after the Roman soldier ceased to possess that spirit of the Roman citizen, which, urging to combat, united the different parts in action by sympathy of national impulse. The decline and fall of the Roman empire followed the decline of national interest in the individual. The history of it presents an instructive view of social organization, civil and military; and, among other things, it proves to demonstration, if no other record existed in the world, that the mechanical tactic of civilized and enervated states is inferior to what may be termed the instinctive tactic and vigorous impulse of rude and uninstructed barbarians. The proofs in history are numerous and conclusive; but there is not one more apposite and illustrative of the fact, than that which is drawn from the history of the Scotch in the year 1745. The Scotch Highlanders, prior to the year 1745, knew less of arts and sciences than perhaps any people in Europe. They had the instinctive military sagacity of the semibarbarous stage of society, but they had none of the common military science of civilized Europeans. They were badly provided with arms; they notwithstanding defeated the regular and experienced troops of the crown both at Prestonpans and Falkirk; and there are grounds to believe, from the decided experiment that was made upon Barrell's regiment at Culloden, that they would have defeated them a third time, had there been union in council and accord in action. They were placed by necessity or mismanagement under great physical disadvantages. Opinions were divided on the line of conduct to be pursued; and it happened here, as it might be expected to hap-

pen with an army composed of independent tribes, some fought heroically, some lukewarmly, and some did not fight at all. The accomplishment of the object failed from defect of means and military combination; but the experiment furnishes proof that national tactic, even if inferior in its own value, has advantages over that which is artificial and borrowed, and learned by routine, without comprehension of principle. The Scotch Highlanders are brave to a proverb, and they are distinguished for good conduct under every form of tactic and discipline to which they have been trained; but the writer is inclined to believe that they were more confident in themselves, consequently less resistible, as protected by the target and armed with the broad-sword, than they now are, as armed with the firelock and bayonet.

It does not belong to this place to enter into discussion on the comparative merits of the different systems of military tactic which have been adopted by different nations for defence or conquest. It is only meant to impress on the mind of the reader, that national tactic, however defective in systematic science, uniformly carries with it advantages over that which is borrowed from the most perfect masters of the military art. If an independent nation enter itself as a scholar in a foreign school, it openly acknowledges a superior; consequently it does not retain that importance of character which is necessary to give to it, even in its own opinion, the tone of command. It possesses no original spirit; and hence, whatever may be the superiority of Prussian tactic over other forms of tactic in its abstract merits, the nation which copies it servilely is only a copyist, and, as such, of secondary estimation. The act of imitation represses the effort of the original mind. The act which is new and original rarely fails to make impression, and impression is success, or the first step towards success, in war. Acts of mere imitation are, comparatively, weak; and hence it is concluded, that the improvements, or hints of improvement, which are drawn from foreign sources, ought, in order to be useful, to be primarily resolved to their principles, incorporated, but so disguised in their incorporation with what is national, that they not only appear to be, but that they be in reality, essential and integral. If this be not done, the form that is borrowed may be perfect



in appearance—the spirit which animates will not be found in the act.

The invention of gunpowder produced great changes in the practice of war, and influenced, in a material degree, the form of military tactic. Though military actions, prior to the era of this discovery, generally began with the missile, they rarely ended without the shock of actual force from lance, pike, or sabre. At present the combats of the largest armies are often wholly decided by fire-arms; the bravest soldier thus fights under a hazard over which his individual prowess has no control. When fire-arms were first employed in war, they were employed with a view to inflict death upon the enemy, rather than to confound, astonish, and intimidate by noise; consequently their powers were studied, and, being known, they were applied in practice to their real object. The Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles the Twelfth, the soldiers of Cromwell, the soldiers of Marlborough, and, above all, the Buccaneers of the seventeenth century, who were indisputably the best practised soldiers in the annals of history, in so far as respects the just direction of the bullet from the musket, appear to have all acted on this idea. Frederick, king of Prussia, who is generally regarded as an oracle in the theory and practice of war, viewed the subject in a different light. If it actually was the intention of that great commander to destroy the enemy by the fire of the musket, rather than to confound by noise, and to cover movements by smoke, he mistook the case, and miscalculated the effect. The fire of the Prussian battalions was close and concentrated, rapid, and regular in time. It is obvious that the close and concentrated, the rapid and regular fire, is not compatible with aim or just direction; and it is by just direction alone that the destruction of the enemy is effected. This is a remark of common sense, arising from common observation; and it is reasonable to conclude, from the best view which can be attained of the history of Frederick's battles, that musketry-fire was chiefly employed as a decoy; namely, to impose on fears, or cover purposes: the actual success depended on skilful movement, correct order in movement, and united vigour in close attack.

It would be deemed presumption in a person who does



not stand in the military list of the army, to offer opinion on the relative merits of the different systems of tactic which have been practised at different times by military nations; and the writer, wishing to avoid the imputation of presumption, abstains from the question, except in so far as the common faculties of common men may see and comprehend. The Spartan and Macedonian tactic was evidently a tactic of much perfection, both in the mechanical arrangement of the parts, and in the provisions which cement social sympathies; it was consequently distinguished for success. The Macedonian phalanx was strong, in a manner impenetrable, in position; it was not sufficiently active and applicable to the fluctuating conditions of war. The Roman armies were marshalled after a somewhat similar manner with the Spartan, in the early days of the republic; but the Romans, who were a people of great military sagacity, though not of the greatest brilliancy of inventive genius, observed the results in war to be precarious where the combat was joined on irregular ground. Their sagacity led them to change, new model, and invent; and, in prosecution of their idea of improvement, the continued line was changed into a line with intervals, and drawn up in three orders, namely, *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. The arms were changed; that is, from spear and buckler, to sword, shield, and dagger. The changes that were thus made in arms, armour, and arrangement, produced a force, the best protected, the most active in offence, and, at the same time, the most condensed and firm in resistance of any form of force that has perhaps ever been brought together under military array. The Roman principle infers that the first two ranks, the *hastati* and *principes*, retire upon the *triarii*, when pressed or overpowered. Provision is made in the primary arrangement that this may be done without confusion, space being left between the files, and intervals between the divisions, that the coward may leave the field without disordering the ranks, and the good soldier, who only yields temporarily to overwhelming force, may find a place among the *triarii*, to try his strength again, and avenge his honour. If the arrangement be estimated according to the reason of things, it appears to possess great advantages. If the *triarii* be all men of determined courage, firm in their purposes under the threatening aspects of approach-

ing danger, there are grounds to believe that they will, ultimately, turn the tide of battle from their front. The Roman order of tactic provides a new, a firm, and compact line of resistance at different stages in retreat, particularly at the station of the *triarii*; and it scarcely can be expected that the enemy, who may be supposed to advance irregularly in confidence of victory, exhausted by exertion, and probably spent by running, should make impression on troops who possess courage, whose vigour is unimpaired, and who are placed by their commander in a good military position. Men acquire courage in going on; they lose it in giving way. This is a known fact; but it is a fact equally known, that active resistance, arising unexpectedly to the tide of success, acts by surprise, and often strikes panic into those who advance in confidence of victory. In spite of all the drilling of the tactician, human nature is human nature still. Man remains susceptible of impression; and unexpected things seldom fail to surprise and to disconcert. In this manner the advance of the *triarii* from position, rushing furiously at the advancing enemy, who does not perhaps calculate on resistance, rarely fails to be decisive: the proofs in history that it is so are without number. The Roman tactic formed the order of battle in such manner that the last stake rested on the *triarii* as fighting in position; yet, in more common practice, the *triarii* advanced to support the *principes*. The preference of the one mode over the other depends on the character of the troops. If the *triarii* be all veteran of tried courage, insensible to the threatening aspect of an advancing enemy, the object is surer, and the issue more decisive, if they keep their position, or only advance from it with joint impetus, when they are near the point of being touched by the advancing foe. If the courage be doubtful, it is more eligible, as exposing less to risk, to support the *principes* rather than to allow them to retire.

The outline of military tactic is supposed to be laid on a basis of mathematical science; the modes are varied according to the circumstances of the subject and scene. From the time of Gustavus Adolphus to the time of Frederick, the great object of the campaign seemed to consist in trials of skill in strategic movement, with a view to obtain advantages from position.

The success of Frederick's battles and campaigns depended on the just order of tactic. By means of tactic his force moved correctly to its object, and acted with united impulse on vulnerable points. The American revolutionary war opened the view to another modification of military disposition, as applicable to the circumstances of the enemy and the scene of the action. The American peasant was better acquainted with the power of the musket, as an instrument of destruction, than the best disciplined soldier in Europe; and as man usually has courage under the protection of the arm in the use of which he excels, the American supported front-fire, at a reasonable distance, with firmness and resolution. He recoiled at the approach of the bayonet; and, as his courage did not urge him to close attack, the British open order, which was sufficient for the resistance of the American close order, presented a less compact object for the destructive effect of fire-arms, and was therefore adopted on justifiable, even on judicious, grounds. The American value consisted in the fire of the musket; the British in charge with the bayonet; hence activity, impetuosity, with the terror arising from the appearance of bristling points of cold iron, were the chief causes of British success in the American campaigns.

5th. The nature of military service, considered abstractedly in itself, acts with power on the military condition; and as the mode of service may stimulate energies and improve character, so it may undermine good habits, corrupt moral discipline, generate disorder, and accelerate destruction. The Spartans, who must ever be regarded as the first of military nations, do not appear to have benefitted, either as soldiers or citizens, by the practice of foreign war. Devotion to the Spartan institution was strong at Sparta: it was distracted in foreign countries by a variety of contingent incentives to deviation, and it was corrupted, among other causes, by the spoils of the rich. The Athenians differed from the Spartans. They were more susceptible of transient impression, and more varied in character. As soldiers they were courageous in their native soil; they were active and energetic in the soil of the enemy. Their object was acquisition of territory and spoil; but they knew to cover their real object with art, and while they extended their sphere, and consolidated

the extension by policy, they often imposed on credulity, so as to obtain credit for encountering dangers for the sake of doing good to mankind. The virtue of the Spartan lay in constancy and firmness; that of the Athenian in promptitude and energy; hence, as a people constitutionally susceptible and readily adapting itself to circumstances, the Athenian, who improved in foreign war, particularly excelled in expeditionary enterprize. The Roman troops had much resemblance to the Spartan in the early days of the republic. The soldiers were modest, brave, hardy, and frugal, devoted to the honour of the Roman name, proud of the distinction which attached to a Roman citizen, scrupulous in faith, and more afraid of encroaching on the sacredness of an oath than of exposing life to destruction. This was the Roman character in the better days of Rome, and it continued to be the character until the second Punic war. During that war, and particularly after Carthage was humbled and no longer a rival, the Roman moral degenerated, and the military character experienced a change—in the author's opinion, from change in the nature of the military service. The Roman arms were, from this period, principally directed against tyrannic despots, or against barbarian tribes. The troops of the former were mercenary and effeminate: the latter were courageous, but they were rude in manner, comparatively ignorant of arts, and limited in their views of war and general policy. Against such the Romans were for the most part successful; but their success depended more upon the genius and skill of the general than the national spirit and animation of the soldier. Tactical arrangement and dexterity in the management of arms appear to have been carried to great perfection under Marius, Sylla, Cæsar, and some other ambitious chiefs; but the perfection alluded to was an artificial and mechanical perfection, inasmuch as the soldier was the passive instrument of the general; or, if more than passive, he was stimulated to exertion by the inflamed and partial spirit of faction, or by avidity for spoil. Rome degenerated from a virtuous to a factious republic; and, by an easy and common transition, from a factious republic to an imperial despotism and an extreme of human debasement. The extension of the empire, which in those days was considered as vast, occasioned a division of the military force into numerous and distant garrisons; and as garrisons are stationary, and as

the spirit of war cannot remain stationary, it necessarily took the course of retrograde. The Roman soldiers were mercenary, and mostly foreign. They were comparatively idle in the garrisons of subdued provinces. From idle they became dissipated, from dissipated, licentious, and even mutinous: they latterly usurped power, and disposed of the sovereignty according to caprice. The Romans, who, from a band of robbers, rose to be sovereign among nations through the influence of religion, laws, and military virtues, sunk, through corruption and neglect of institutions, to the lowest point of degradation in the scale of human beings. The whole of the events of their long history are clear and explicit lessons to posterity. They are instructive; but living nations rarely take instruction from the history of the dead.

From the fall of the Roman empire, until the discovery of gunpowder and the introduction of fire-arms among the instruments of destruction, there was much slaughter and carnage in hostile encounters, but little military skill, according to the ideas of ancient or modern warriors. The barbarians who inundated Europe and dispossessed the Romans of their sovereignty, divided the soil according to their own views; namely, according to a tenure of feudal service. The great lords and inferior cavaliers were men of courage; and many of them, it may be presumed, possessed military genius. They were often at variance with one another; and when they met in the field of combat, the inferiors were considered as a mass of men—to slay and to be slain. They were in fact often slain as cattle in cold blood; for, if they had not the means of ransoming their lives, they were destroyed as not of value. The picture of the human race was disgusting during this period; not that the principle was different from what it is now, but that the act was covered with a thinner veil of hypocrisy. Man, openly or covertly, is in a constant state of contention with his neighbours for sovereignty and dominion: here he acted without disguise; and, having overrun the land, he transferred the inhabitants as property, like the sheep and cattle of a farm. Such things are contrary to the fundamental law of nature. The God of Nature made individual man a part in a whole, not the slave of a fellow-creature; yet, directly or indirectly, the practice of enslaving continues among freemen and Christians to the present day. The passion of



aggrandizement is stronger than the sentiment of reason and justice ; but, as the people are now more connected with one another, and have more knowledge of their own power than they had in former times, the purpose of aggrandizement requires to be accomplished through management and arts of deception, rather than by open force. It still is accomplished ; and the present time furnishes proof, on a large scale, that power acts on the same base—acts blindly, without generosity and without justice.

The reformation in religion and church-discipline, moved by Luther and Calvin, and supported by sovereign princes as favourable to their temporal interests, gave, by opening a field for the exercise of the human mind, a new impulse to most of the sciences ; and, among others, it acted conspicuously on the spirit and operations of war. The civil war, which for many years deluged France with blood, was connected with differences in religious opinion, and it was supported by the zeal and animation which attach to religious contentions. Many examples of brilliant military talent arose in the course of that long contest ; but the principle of the military art experienced no material change. The passions of the opposing parties were inflamed ; the rencounters were often furious, and the conduct, in so far as relates to courage, was heroic ; but the mode was, upon the whole, the mode of barbarous times. The war, known by the name of the thirty years' war, opened a new view in the military art, or rather it tended to revive a view of that art as practised by the Greeks and Romans. This arose from necessity, or from knowledge acquired through observation in varied experience. Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, was head of the protestant association. He was inferior in cavalry and cavalry equipment to his formidable opponents, who consisted of the high blood of Europe. It is probable that from this necessity he was led to study, and to ascertain the primary properties of man in his simple state ; and, in doing this, he discovered, secondarily, that certain modes of marshalling infantry are capable of rendering them impregnable to cavalry ; in fact, superior to all other forms of military force. The thirty years' war, as of long continuance, was also waged on an extensive theatre, and frequently carried into countries remote from the native country of the combatants. The neces-



sities, which arose in a distant and often difficult scene, sharpened the faculties; and exercise in manœuvre produced mechanical improvement in conflict, independently of the principle which animated all the operations of the protestants in their long protracted campaigns. The soldiers who followed the standard of Gustavus considered the war as their own, that is, a war undertaken to establish civil and religious liberty against bigotry and tyranny, not undertaken through royal ambition, or mercantile cupidity to round a territory, and to transfer the herd of population as an appendage of the conquered soil. Gustavus Adolphus was chief. He stands solitary among princes, inasmuch as he risked his crown and exposed his person in attempting to establish the freedom of the human mind on a basis of reciprocal equality among the members of the human race; in other words, on the basis of the Christian code. In the protestant army every part might be supposed to participate in the object of the war. The parts were adapted to their stations with consideration of circumstances: discipline was correct, and exactness and precision in field-operation followed correct discipline. The army, particularly the Swedish part of it, had no superior, perhaps no equal in moral conduct. It appears also to have been unrivalled in field-movement and knowledge of the power of missile force; properties which long adhered to it, and which produced acts under Charles the Twelfth exceeding credibility. Gustavus was great; Charles was a prodigy; but among generals who, in modern times, have formed troops and carried them to distinction by means of science and service in the field, the French general Turenne holds the highest place. Common men, electrified by his sublime spirit, became heroes. They were rivetted to his fortune in all their toils and difficulties by the singular amiableness and purity of his character: they had no second view. He was himself devoted to his country—a similar devotion ingrafted itself on his followers. The variety and activity of his campaigns sharpened the faculty of perception, and frequent practice in combat gave confidence in the use of arms.

The king of Prussia is ordinarily considered as the great master of military tactic; and it must be confessed that his campaigns were so managed in the seven years' war, as to bring forth a high degree of executive perfection in the field. Few princes have gone to war with less warrantable prettexts than Frederick;

but few have met with so many circumstances to engage the sympathies of troops to exert themselves in his favour. The Prussian military institution tends directly to debase the human mind, even to extinguish the faculty of thinking; but, in spite of all the rigour of that degrading discipline, contingencies arose in the course of service which excited moral sentiment in the soldier, and which sometimes brought out energies that do not belong to the principle of the system on which Frederick acted. The king of Prussia was aggressor originally, and as such, culpable; but the combination that was formed by his powerful neighbours to punish, overwhelm, and even to extinguish him, raised sympathies in his subjects, which covered his acts of injustice with the veil of forgiveness, which even generated affection for his person and attachment to his cause, that could scarcely have been expected. The address with which he contrived to carry his troops from one successful field to another, kept the eye on a forward point; the almost constant practice, in marching and countermarching, inured the soldier to habits which rendered the actual campaign an exercise of little fatigue comparatively, while confidence in the use of arms gave more desire than dread of battle. These circumstances were the cause of temporary success; the effect was nearly worn out before the war was ended.

It is not easy to form a correct opinion respecting the effect of service on the troops which compose the British army, estimated as a whole. The British soldier is constitutionally good; the character is open and manly; the physical power is superior, and the mind is capable of being influenced so as to act energetically on the subject before it; but the character of the service, which is for the most part desultory, precludes systematic perfection in arrangement and scientific practice on the grand scale of strategy. There are grounds to believe that military discipline, and promptitude in movement, had attained to a higher degree of perfection under the command of the duke of Marlborough, than it had done before, or has since done, notwithstanding the high praise that has been recently claimed on that head. The nation was then warlike, and it possessed a republican spirit. The object of the service was a high object—the protection of Europe from the fangs of an ambitious prince. This idea, proclaimed in the wars of Queen Anne, made the soldier

in some degree a party in the case. General liberty was the watchword, and that added to the character of the commander, who possessed the impenetrability which belongs to original genius, captivated the mind and secured devotion in all difficulties. Since that period the causes of most of British wars have been subordinate. Some of the wars have even been reluctant, as against the national will. The mode has often been desultory, or, when prosecuted systematically, it has been so combined with operations of allies, that the British, perplexed, as obscured and shackled in the trammels of artificial tactic, have not always been equal to themselves. The troops of no nation meet the enemy with a better countenance than the English, and the troops of no nation maintain the conflict with more firmness where they engage on equal terms; but no troops are less united and less orderly when circumstances oblige their leaders to turn their back to the enemy. The instances in proof of the assertion are numerous, and some of them are recent. The address of the great commander to officers commanding regiments, in the retreat from Burgos in 1812, must be regarded as a calumny of the British army, or it must be admitted that the British army had not then, and has not yet, perhaps, attained a condition which is entitled to the name of disciplined.

The pursuit of great and systematic, or of partizan and desultory warfare, impresses the mind and forms the character of the soldier differently. In the first, the soldier, and even the inferior officer, ceases to exercise thought or play of mind. He obeys a signal as a part of a machine, and performs all his acts in routine by word of command, without permitting himself to look at the cause, or to judge of the reason of what he does. In the latter, the object, though presented through the commanding officer, makes its own immediate impression on the soldier, excites his act, and animates his effort beyond the measure of the act that belongs to the mere automaton. The first diminishes the man as an individual, inasmuch as it reduces him, from an independent and self-governing being, to a subordinate part in an artificial instrument, limited and coerced in the powers of action by external force. The second exalts and improves the man, inasmuch as it directs attention to objects which elicit the physical and intellectual powers to their utmost extent, thereby allowing every one to be in some degree a principal.

## SECTION II.

BESIDES the conditions now mentioned, as contingently influencing the military character of troops, there are others laid on a basis of science, and applied, under institutions of art, to form the recruit for the direct purposes of war, that deserve notice in this place. The more prominent of these belong to the modes that are taken; 1st, to collect materials and to put them together; 2ndly, to the terms of engagement, namely, limited or unlimited to time or place; 3rdly, amount of reward or salary for daily service; 4thly, the law under which the soldier lives, as preventive of crime, or inflictive of punishment for crimes committed; and 5thly, and lastly, the character of the person who commands—whether stimulative of good, or corruptive of what is good by infectious example.

1st. Military force may be considered under two points of view: 1st, national, intended only for national defence; 2ndly, foreign or mixed, intended for aggression, or exterritorial conquest. It is consistent with the law of the Deity that man defend his sphere from encroachment; it is interdicted by the same law that he encroach on the sphere of others. National armies for defensive war, and for defensive war only, can scarcely be said to have an existence at the present time in any country in Europe. If this idea were in the contemplation of those who recently formed governments for the south parts of Europe, it will not be suffered to attain a corporeal existence. Opposed by the royal fraternity, it is more than doubtful that it ever manifest a practical act. The act contemplated assumes justice, or reciprocity of action and reaction, as the ostensible ground of the proceeding; the act practised, whatever may be pretended to the contrary, assumes the extension of dominion by bargain or force as the paramount object and incentive of political activity. This object is pursued with zeal and ardour; but, as it implies a direct violation of the law of reciprocal action and reaction among men, it ceases to be national, and cannot, strictly speaking, be accomplished by a national instrument. Patriotism, or national feeling, belongs to defence of a common country—not to the aggression of the country of others; consequently the military instrument which is destined for aggression is the instrument of a robber who

dignifies himself with the name of warrior. An army formed of native subjects, and held in union by a feeling of love of country, may be considered as a nation's strength and shield. An army formed of the refuse of nations, and held together by the bribe of money or the lure of spoil, is regarded as the strength of monarchs; it is the death of nations.

Armies are or may be formed on two bases, namely, patriotic or mercenary; and as the bases are opposite to each other—the one calculated to make a nation one and impregnable, the other calculated to make an individual of the nation great and formidable—it is not easy to combine so as to assure defence of the nation and control of the sovereign, to whom the direction of the military force is committed. The greater number of sovereigns, to whom power has been given for national purposes, desire to maintain the power with which they have been conditionally intrusted by force of arms; and, in that view, they fence themselves with armies of foreigners, or corrupted natives, who, becoming slaves of an individual, are alien to the country to which they belong, or in which they live. The introduction of foreigners into a sovereign's guard impeaches the fidelity of native subjects, insults their military value, and betrays a purpose of offence against the nation itself. The act is covered by pretexts; but, covered as it may be, it indicates a desire to rule by the sword: it is, in fact, a distinct step to despotism. The desire of arbitrary rule attaches to all persons perhaps who have attained to sovereign power, in whatever manner they may have attained it; and, in order to assure it, they desire to possess the command of a military force which has little connexion with the nation, but which fixes its regards exclusively on the person who has the power of giving bread and bestowing rank. This feeling is natural to man, even to those who possess, according to compact, no more than a limited power delegated by national representatives for national purposes. It is in the nature of sovereignty, whether hereditary or elective, to place itself before the nation of which it is only the functionary; and it may thus be supposed that it would consider itself to be impeded in its course, if the military force of which it has the disposal were wholly native; for in such case the national sentiment might be supposed to prevail over the sentiment of attachment to the functionary, who is in reality only one of the nation. In order therefore to damp or extinguish national



sentiment and local attachments, it seems to have been the view of the military department, even in Great Britain, to mix English, Scotch and Irish, so as to sink national prejudices, and amalgamate the whole into a common mass, prepared to turn its eye to the military leader—not to the nation to which it belongs. An army so formed is fit only for offensive war; and as almost all the wars of Great Britain are offensive, that is, wars for conquest, or for maintaining conquest, the inconveniences of it are not so distinctly felt as the reason of the thing might seem to imply. The plan now adopted forms an army; but not an army of all the excellence of which the materials are capable; for, though it be not denied that British arms have been successful in the field, it must at the same time be admitted, that the most brilliant acts and greatest victories of the army are found in conditions where the national honour stands on its own ground independently, or rather stands in opposition to the artificial arrangements intended to improve its condition. The examples in proof are numerous.

2nd. Men engage for military service in the present times for a limited term of years, or for the continuance of life. The first may, in some sense of the word, be called national soldiers. They preserve the right of resuming, at a given time, their place among their fellow-citizens, and thus retain some portion of the personal liberty which belongs to man. The second are the soldiers of a sovereign. They forego their national liberty, and, for a bribe of money, place themselves unreservedly at the disposal of an individual, whether to act for or against the nation to which they actually belong. The British people pretend to be the only, or almost the only, people in Europe who have ideas of constitutional liberty, and who know the value of possessing it. If the assumption be admitted, it may at the same time be added that, if they be actually free to dispose of themselves, no people in Europe give up the power of doing so for a bribe of money with so much readiness as the peasant or artisan of the United Kingdom. The peasant of other countries, even the vassal-peasant of Germany, stipulates a term of years for carrying arms; the Briton, even now when there is an option of choice between limited and unlimited service, commonly accedes to the latter condition for a few pounds of extra bounty: he thus places himself for life at the disposal of the military department for purposes of which he is not permitted



to form an opinion. The soldier of limited service may still be allowed to call himself a citizen. The soldier, whose service is unlimited in time and place, is a military servant as long as he is serviceable ; and he has, moreover, no option of choice in the kind of the service which he is to perform.

Military service, limited or unlimited to time or place, bears a different character, and has a different value, according to differing conditions in different states or kingdoms. In states surrounded by other states which are hostile or suspected of hostility, limited service, as serving to fill the country with men instructed in the use of arms, is, in every point of view, a desirable condition as a security against invasion. In this case, every native inhabitant is to be considered as a soldier, and, under the circumstances stated, he is a soldier trained and ready for defensive war at all times. In a country such as Great Britain, the approach to the shores of which will be difficult, if not impracticable, while the navy maintains superiority at sea, and which is, moreover, guarded interiorly by a national and constitutional militia, the scheme of limited service, with a view to fill the country with men who have been trained to the use of arms, is comparatively little necessary as a measure of security ; and if not necessary on that account, the adoption of it is inconvenient on others, particularly on account of service in foreign parts—a service which much encumbers the British military machinery. On this ground, perhaps, a stipulation to the limit of service was not conceded to the British recruit until recent times ; when, from urgent necessities, in want of voluntary materials, the scheme of temporary service was suggested as an expedient to lure the reluctant into the military ranks. It had some effect, but not much ; for, as said before, the British peasant does not calculate or balance the difference of conditions with much care : he generally takes the greatest direct bait. The condition of limited service did not therefore produce so great accession to the strength of the army as was expected ; and, while it failed of the end that was contemplated, it became a cause of introducing a condition into the military ranks which tends to subvert the base of military organization : it thus did harm. Limited service, as already said, has a tendency to augment the defensive strength of the country, and perhaps to improve economical and moral habits among the people : unlimited service, which adds little to

the defence of a country, has a tendency to dissipate national sympathies and corrupt moral character; for, as it separates the soldier from the mass of the people, it alienates him from the interests of his country, and commits him to the will of a military commander as his lord and master for life.

3rd. The quantity of *pay* and the manner of applying it has, as might be expected, a material effect on the moral conduct, and even on the military character, of soldiers. It is evident to common sense, that the pay of the soldier ought to be adequate to the procuring of everything that is calculated to increase bodily power, and to maintain it in efficiency; and, as it is equally well ascertained in experience that more than what is sufficient for the purpose has injurious effects on health and morals, it follows by consequence that superfluity ought to be rigorously proscribed in the military system, if it be intended that its course be duly supported. It may be considered as a primary rule in military organization, that the parts of which the military instrument is composed be put together according to a measure of power and capacity, and that every cause which has a tendency to alter the condition of the parts individually, among which may be reckoned inequalities in the rate of pay of the same class, be carefully avoided as a cause leading to individual counteractions; and, in consequence of counteractions, to the defeat of general purposes. A regiment, which is an army in miniature, consists of parts bearing different denominations, as destined to duties that are somewhat different: it has, for instance, light infantry, grenadiers, and battalion of fuziliers. Equality of condition among the parts which bear one denomination and act on one military object, may be considered as one of the surest bonds of united effect in action. Grenadiers and light infantry, as liable to be differently employed from the subjects of the battalion, may perhaps be allowed some difference of pay without producing a disorganizing effect; but, if there be difference in the amount of the pay of the individuals of the same battalion, whether by length of service, or any other cause which does not imply a difference of duty, there can be no hesitation in saying that the distinction is made in error, inasmuch as a difference of condition is arbitrarily introduced among the parts of a living and moving instrument, the value of which, as an efficient instrument, consists in activity and union of movement through all its extent. The rule alluded to was suggested

by the minister at war, and sanctioned by the legislature some years since, with a view to avoid the inconveniences which might be expected to arise from the operation of the limited service bill, in corps that were stationed in foreign parts. The augmented pay was considered as a bribe in dry money to prolong service. It sometimes succeeded in doing this; but the success was not attained on just grounds, either as respects the nation or the soldier. Military pay is given for service performed—not as a gratuity; and if the service be equally well performed by a soldier of three years' standing as by one of twenty, there is a palpable incongruity in making a difference in the rate of hire. If there be incongruity on this head according to reason, there is inconvenience and actual evil according to experience on another. It is a truth always to be borne in mind, that equality of condition among the parts of an instrument which acts for one purpose, is the true base of military organization; and that, as the distinctions now adverted to are not connected with real value, they are ill judged distinctions, and have a deteriorating effect on the discipline and final efficiency of armies. The pay of the first term of service is supposed to furnish every necessary that the soldier's condition requires: if it does not do so, there is error in the construction of the economical system. The extra pay of the second period gives superfluity; and as superfluity has no place in military arrangement, the extra or superfluous pay is ordinarily applied to purposes which do not improve, but which, on the contrary, have a tendency to deteriorate the individual as a soldier. It may be remarked in this place, that the soldier of the first period of service is seldom intoxicated, for he has not the means of being so; the soldier of the second period may be expected, from the application of his extra pence, to be intoxicated at least once a week; the soldier of the third, twice or oftener. It is not said that this is always the case: it will, it is presumed, be often found to be the case where facts are rigorously investigated. There is sufficient experience in the history of the British soldiery to prove, to the conviction of the most prejudiced, that everything beyond correct measure is injurious, consequently that the additions, which have been made to the daily pay as gratuities for length of service, are additions which have been made injudiciously, inasmuch as they act in direct contradiction to the true principle of military organization. The British soldier is seldom

a man of discretion in what regards himself. He has a propensity naturally, or created artificially by the bounty of the state, to strong drink. Strong drink, beyond a very narrow limit, intoxicates its subject; and as intoxication extinguishes judgment, errors, and not unfrequently offences, arise under intoxication, which, submitted to the decisions of courts-martial, are punished with stripes and disgrace; the nation's bounty thus becomes the soldier's bane. If the interest of the soldier be seen in a proper point of view, no unnecessary superfluity will be given to him for the indulgence of pernicious propensities while he acts as a soldier. But, as he has devoted his life and spent the best of his days in a service considered as just and necessary in the view of the nation, he may be allowed to expect that the nation take measures to secure to him a comfortable retirement, when the stipulated term of service expires, or where he has been prematurely and permanently disabled by wounds or disease from acting as a soldier, or from earning his bread as a labourer. Chelsea College has been erected for the reception of the destitute and disabled military; and, without detracting from the praise which has been given, and which is due to the spirit of benevolence which suggested the measures which have been adopted on this head, the writer is humbly of opinion that things may be so modified as to increase the good intended to be done, without adding to the expense now incurred on account of doing what is done at that establishment. Though the soldier who volunteers unlimited service at an early period of his life, cannot be supposed to have a very strong attachment to his country, his county, or place of birth, yet there are perhaps few to whom the recollection of home does not occur, with more or less force, when the blood of youth cools, and disappointments accumulate. The recollection is accompanied with a desire to revisit the native place, to associate with old friends and acquaintances, provided there be no internal reproach or disgrace attached to character which forbids the expectation of esteem from fellow-citizens. In the supposition that the conduct of the disabled or superannuated soldier is pure and irreproachable, it is presumed that it would be more acceptable to him, instead of being discharged with an annual pension, to be a wanderer in the world, or to be immured in Chelsea College for food and raiment, were he to be received into an

asylum in his native county—not as a pauper, but as a public servant in honourable retirement. There is reason to believe that a cottage, on a common of the native county, would be a more agreeable abode to most Chelsea pensioners than the college, in its best order of arrangement; for it is natural, and we believe it to be true, that a soldier who has been born in a cottage, and who has spent the most of his time in a tent, a hut, or a wigwam, can with difficulty persuade himself that he is at home in a palace.

The execution of the plan proposed does not appear to be difficult in itself; nor does it appear to the writer that it would imply expense beyond what is now voted for Chelsea College and the pension-list. The plan is simply this; namely, that a dépôt be formed in every county in England, Ireland, and Scotland, for the reception of disabled or superannuated soldiers, natives of the respective counties of the united kingdoms; that each person have a separate house, consisting of kitchen and bed-room, or a kitchen and two bed-rooms, according to circumstances; a garden for each, amounting to the sixth part of an acre; and pasture for a milch-cow for every six persons. If it be thought to be too great bounty to make this allowance extra of the pension, let the rent of the house and land be deducted from the amount of the annual payment in money. If this be done, no great expense will be incurred, and the soldier will, it is presumed, still be the gainer, for he will be less dependent than he now is. If the proposition now made should obtain notice, it may be supposed that a good locality will be chosen for the dépôt, that the houses will be constructed in the best form of cottage construction, that the superintendence of the dépôt will be placed under superannuated military officers, and that the whole establishment will be placed under the direction of the governors of Chelsea College.

The execution of the plan proposed would not, as already said, be a work of great difficulty. There are crown or common lands in most of the counties of the United Kingdom, which might be obtained for the purpose, and prepared for culture at small expense. The number of men who have served twenty-one years in foreign parts, and who, as such, are entitled to claim a settlement, would not, it is presumed, be numerous. The number



of those disabled by wounds and impaired health are at present considerable; but of the disabled, few are so totally disabled as to be incapable of cultivating, by their own labour, the land that is allotted to them for their portion, namely, garden and potatoe-field. The employment of cultivating would serve to take off the ennui which attaches to idleness; the exercise would contribute to the preservation of health; and, as the disbanded soldier would then have a home, and something like a national reward in his cottage and garden, he would be regarded by the mass of the people as a person who had deserved well of his country; and, rendered independent as an acknowledgment of his service, he would be esteemed an honourable citizen—not an outcast, supported by gratuitous bounty, as the money-pensioner and the Chelsea pensioner hold themselves to be.

4th. A consideration of the political measures by which the crimes and offences of the military body have a chance of being diminished, a view of the constitution of the code of laws by which their offences are to be tried and judged, and an analysis of the modes and degrees of punishment inflicted on offenders, constitute essential points of investigation in a philosophical view of a military system. The subject is important. The proper exposition of it requires detail—more detail than the writer can give to it; and, as it requires more knowledge of things than he pretends to possess, he touches it lightly, adverting simply to the general basis on which the enquiry may be supposed to be laid.

1st. The people of Great Britain, particularly those of the south part of the kingdom, claim the privilege of disposing of themselves according to their will; and, as self-important from the possession of that privilege, they yield to the propensities of the will, and not unfrequently violate the rules of discipline, in civil as well as military life, in a manner that requires, at least that meets with, severe chastisement. It thus happens that the catalogue of offences is comparatively great among the civil part of the community of England, and particularly conspicuous among the military, as brought into a comparison with that of most European nations. The civil inhabitant, as claiming independence, does not readily submit to regulations of preventive police; and the military, as put in possession of arms before the moral education is sufficiently perfected, runs headlong into error, and incurs



the penalties of the military law, without knowledge or without reflection. The subjects of most of the European states, as vassals of a superior who is absolute in power, and often arbitrary in his ordonnances, grow up under restraint, and abstain from excess through dread of punishment. They have not, when they enter the military ranks, to adopt a new rule of life; their course is, as it might be expected to be, equal, uniform, and steady. The English, born in the opinion that they are their own masters, act much under the influence of their own will; and so acting, they transgress the regulations of military law, carelessly and capriciously, oftener than wilfully and deliberately. The regulations of the army are arbitrary regulations, in so far as respects the common peasant of England; and as the peasant rarely knows them until he has attained to man's estate, his habits are formed, and the restraint imposed on him is only a feeble restraint. He errs in forgetfulness, even sometimes in ignorance, of the law under which he is supposed to live and act. If punished for errors committed in ignorance, it does not appear to the writer that he is punished justly. It is harsh, though it may not strictly speaking be unjust, to punish a soldier for forgetfulness; it is unjust and barbarous to punish him for ignorance. On this ground, the writer ventures to say that officers who take pains to drill recruits in all forms of manual and tactic, but who neglect to instruct, so as to make them understand the meaning and purpose of the articles of war, fail in their duty, and, in the strict sense of the word, become responsible for all the errors and punishments which are incurred by recruits who err in want of the information which they ought to possess. This is reasonable in common men's common sense; and in order to obviate the inconvenience thence arising, it is suggested that officers of companies be directed to instruct the recruit in knowledge of the rules by which he is to square his conduct; and, moreover, that the officer in command know correctly that he thoroughly comprehends them. The measure proposed could not fail of assuring to every soldier such acquaintance with military law as would be sufficient to preserve him from offending in ignorance, and thereby incurring punishment without in reality deserving it. But, useful as it might be that the officers of companies were held responsible for the soldier's acquaintance with the articles of war, with as much rigour as

he is for the condition of his arms and necessities, the acquaintance alluded to, as in some manner attained through compulsion, would only be an acquaintance of secondary effect.

It is admitted that military discipline ought to be rigorous in its execution; but it is important that it have an active principle; that is, that it move to what is good under a sentiment of moral duty, rather than be deterred from what is bad by fear of punishment for delinquency. This, it may be concluded, was the idea of government when chaplains were appointed to regiments, intended, it is presumed, to be present in the field and quarters, as instructors in moral duties, and superintendents of moral conduct. The office of regimental chaplain has been annulled in the British service. It existed when the writer was first acquainted with the army; but it had ceased to be useful before that time. No one will deny that it is better that there be no chaplain, than that there be one of an inferior character. This was probably seen, and, in consequence of the discovery, garrison or brigade chaplains were appointed to bury the dead, preach an occasional sermon, and thus to execute the ostensible, not the most important, duty of a chaplain. The change might perhaps be considered as an improvement at the time; for the chaplaincy of a regiment had degenerated into a sinecure. It was bestowed by the favour of colonels, and the duty was done by substitute, at a small salary, or it was not done at all. If done by substitute, it could scarcely be expected to be well done; for the duty of a chaplain, as an instructor and superintendent of morals, is in itself an original duty—an office of the heart, which cannot be deputed, much less bargained for as a job of common work. A man may be hired to read service over the dead—he cannot be hired to teach virtue to the living. There are few soldiers of the present day who are irrecoverably profligate. Many err; but they err in weakness, or in want of an enlightened director to point to what is right: if they retain sensibility, they are not irreclaimable. This may be assumed as a fact; and if true, there is no room to believe that a chaplain of a devout character, who is at the same time zealous and firm in courage to do his duty under the ridicule and irony of the unthinking, would not fail to influence, by his words and by his example, the moral conduct of the generality of soldiers; and this to such extent that

the military penal code would become nearly a dead letter. The office of regimental chaplain appears to the writer to be in itself a very important one; but it is one of very difficult execution. The military power is everywhere jealous of encroachment; and it is more than surmise that the interference of the chaplain with the moral conduct of the soldier would rarely be approved, or even permitted to pass without censure or reprimand. Every act in the army is supposed to emanate from a military chief; but the order of the military chief cannot bring love and religion from the heart of the chaplain to the humble soldier in the ranks.

2nd. The military law of the army, as framed on a base of arbitrary will, and executed arbitrarily, is totally at variance with the law of England. The English criminal law assumes a base of justice, inasmuch as it implies that the humble as well as the high is to be judged by his peers. Of this privilege the soldier is deprived when he appears as a culprit before a regimental court-martial. He cannot in such case be supposed to have confidence within himself that he is to be fairly judged. The jury and judges, as men of a high class, have not, it may be presumed, the sympathy which belongs to the equal condition; and, as men formed like other men, they are not supposed to be exempt from prepossession and prejudice; consequently their decisions are liable to be biassed, particularly where the question lies between one of their own order and one of the humblest rank. It is desirable, and it does not appear to be unattainable with security to military discipline, that the soldier be tried and judged by a law similar to that by which other subjects of the realm are tried and judged. If he have this privilege, he may be allowed to consider himself as a national soldier, or national functionary—not the servile instrument of an individual who acts according to his own will. According to the letter of military law, the commissioned officer is jury and judge in the soldier's case. The life and honour of a soldier are thus placed at the disposal of what cannot be called other than an arbitrary court; and as the members of the court are bound together by official connexion, they may be supposed, at least they will be thought, to be in combination against the offender, if the charge be laid by one bearing a commission. There can be no confidence, in the present state of human things, that the decisions of a court of

law will be just decisions where the jury and culprit are not of equal condition. On this ground, the soldier may be allowed to think doubtfully of the issue of his trial, where his accuser and his judge are of the same class of people, and of a class moreover which is different from his own, and which is disposed, by its constitution, to act arbitrarily, that is, to dispense favour, or exercise severity, as a biassed judgment may direct. This is a contingency of evil that ought to be guarded against; and, with hopes of obviating the chances of its occurrence, the writer ventures to submit, though with the almost certainty of giving offence, that soldiers should be jury in all cases which concern the soldier; the jury being so constituted that men of years and discretion only be admitted to that office, and men moreover who have never been in a guard-house. The essentials of the law of liberty would be preserved by this means, and the chances of insubordination in the inferior class would at the same time be effectually precluded. As things now are, the military law is made without the consent of the party to which it particularly applies. It is executed without the party having a voice in its proceedings; and, as such, it can only be considered as an edict of power, and sometimes perhaps as an edict issued under prejudice. No valid argument can, it is presumed, be shewn why the common soldier of England should not have a jury of his peers for the proof or refutation of a criminal charge: he would then be a soldier worthy of a free country. The writer is not unaware that the proposition now made will be considered as subversive of the constitution of the army; he is bold to maintain that it is not incompatible with the constitution of a true military force; and he ventures to say, that if it subvert what exists, it promises to substitute in its place what is legitimate in the true sense of the word, and effective of purpose, in so far as regards national defence, in the highest attainable degree. The right of being judged by a jury of peers may be supposed to have a tendency to excite a sentiment of honour in the common man, and to ensure good conduct from principle, rather than from fear. The soldier who has the privilege alluded to, would, it is presumed, be a valuable national soldier; he would not, it is admitted, be so fit as he now is for purposes of conquest in foreign countries, or so ready to devote himself to the will of a commander for purposes he does not comprehend, or which he cannot in his

conscience approve. There are some, it is probable, who will be disposed to maintain, that if the condition now alluded to were granted to the common soldier, the soldier would in almost every instance escape from punishment. The case has not been tried, and no positive opinion can be given on the subject; but the probabilities are strong, from what is known of the human mind, that culprits would be judged severely, and more rigorously punished than they now are. If we seek for a reason, the reason is easily found. If soldiers were constituted jury, the honour of the corps might be supposed to be in the keeping of the soldier, and it is reasonable to suppose that he would study and be proud to keep it. As things are, the officer watches conduct, arraigns offence, and sits in judgment to award punishment. His office is an invidious one; and it has not been assigned to him in knowledge of human nature. It directly counteracts the principle which renders the military instrument a whole, animated with one spirit, and united in action for a common—and constitutional purpose. It might be presumed that a sentiment of independence, essential to true honour, would arise and possess a constitutional place in the mind of every soldier in the case supposed; in the case existing, the sentiment of honour is extinct, or, as planted in an artificial soil, it supports existence only by coercion. The soldier has no liberty to exercise his own mind; and, as no man can be great, or even good, without exercise of mind, it is worthy of the consideration of the wise, to determine how much of that can be permitted to the soldier, without danger to the security of the sovereign authority.

3rd. It is reasonable to believe that the constitution of the British military court-martial, at least of the regimental court-martial, might be changed with advantage to the soldier, and even with benefit to the nation. It is also reasonable to believe that the existing modes of punishment, as they are revolting to man's feelings, and could not, without the evidence of ocular demonstration, have been supposed to have place in the institutions of Great Britain, might be altogether changed for other less disgusting, and not less efficacious, means of securing good conduct. The English pretend to be the only free nation in Europe; but, notwithstanding this pretension, no people in Europe so easily part with their liberty, or so readily submit to corporal chastisement, as the English, particularly as the English military.



No one presumes to strike the person of a man who carries arms in the service of the different military powers of the continent. If any one deserve punishment, the punishment must be made according to rule. In the British service, on the contrary, the soldier was until lately, if not at present, beaten arbitrarily by the officer—a grey-headed man not unfrequently by a beardless boy. This is held to be a reproach to the British service; and it must be confessed that it is not creditable to the British nation. The practice insults the rights of man; and it must be allowed to be particularly grievous and ill-judged among a people who claim freedom as their inheritance. There is something like enigma in the character of the English on this head. The English pretend to be philosophers; but no nation in Europe acts more under prejudice and prepossession, or trusts so implicitly to direct force for effecting purposes, of whatever description they may be, as the English. Force is the ostensible engine in most of the operations of the people of Great Britain. The youth at school is driven to learn his task by force; the soldier is driven by force to acquire a knowledge of the use of arms. Deterred from doing wrong by force, or threatenings of force, he is punished with stripes on the bare back when he appears to forget himself. Courts-martial and punishment of crime were in many British regiments, at no very remote period, almost the order of the day. Punishments were frequent, sometimes severe; and the manner of infliction, while it degraded the subject and revolted the common feelings of man's nature, was not calculated to act on the mind, so as to produce contrition and lead to change of conduct. There is not an instance in a thousand where the cat-o'-nine-tails has made a soldier what he ought to be; there are thousands where it has rendered those who were forgetful and careless, rather than vicious, insensible to honour and abandoned to crime. It is invidious to remark on the institutions of the superior power—and the writer does it with reluctance; but he cannot refrain from saying, that the constitution of the British military law is not laid on a base of science: it is not just, for it does not correspond with the general principle of the common law of the country. The observance of it is difficult, for it implies not only learning something new, but forgetting what has been learned, and, in some instances, grown into habit. But, while the observance is



difficult, the mode adopted for the punishment of transgression is revolting to man's common sense of feeling—more revolting than the modes of punishment adopted in foreign armies, and less effective of purpose than it there appears to be. Whether from the influences of a systematic national police or other cause, the mass of peasantry on the European continent is careful of its conduct. Crimes are comparatively rare, and modes of punishment are comparatively less degrading. A threatening of force, repressive of irregularity, is all the motive to good conduct that operates in the British service; and as the materials of the British army are collected fortuitously from all parts of the three kingdoms, put together promiscuously without regard to the dispositions and habits of the parts, the necessity of the application of force to preserve the exterior of order often becomes indispensable. In times not long past regimental courts-martial were careless proceedings. They have recently attained a certain degree of solemnity by administering an oath to the members; and the sentences of the court are, it may be presumed, more carefully considered than they were prior to that regulation. The court is thus less objectionable than it was; it is not yet perfect as a court of justice. The moral character of the soldier is also improved of late years; it is not yet what it is capable of being made. It may be said with safety that there were regiments in the line, not many years since, where corporal punishments within the annual period exceeded the number of the days of the year; there are regiments at the present time where punishment scarcely ever occurs. The persons who have wrought so great a change on the military body of the nation are valuable men in the true meaning of the word; but they must be contented with the reward which is within themselves. Much might be said on the subject of British military law. It is an important subject; but the writer is not competent to the discussion of it; and enough has been said to shew that it requires revision, that is, revision founded on a basis that admits of measures decisive in their nature, so as to assure subordination to command, and adjusted in their conditions, so as to secure the right of citizen to the individual soldier.

4th. Besides the conditions now mentioned, which are calculated, according to the mode of application, to improve or to

deteriorate the character of the soldier beyond that of the common citizen, the impression which the military reputation of the commander makes upon the mind of his followers, stands prominent among the considerations which influence the conduct of soldiers, not only in the field of war, but in private life. Rank, which is of no intrinsic value in itself, is here conditionally an engine of great power. The presence of the sovereign, or even of one of the royal house with an army in the field, rarely fails to give an extra impulse to the military mind, and to confirm the courage by fixing the eye upon an individual who is considered as the nation's representative. This may be supposed to belong to the rank of kings and princes; but where there is no royal magic in the person of the commander, heroism and unshaken courage in dangers and difficulties, a reserved wisdom which does not expose purposes that ought not to be known, and a firmness of character which does not yield to importunities, of whatever kind they may be, are the points which strike the soldier's mind, and assure his attachment beyond all other causes which act on man. If the general expose his designs prior to forming his order of battle, or, if he change purposes from wavering within himself, the soldier (and soldiers are ordinarily acute to perceive manifestations of weakness) loses confidence, and, whatever may be the eminence of the commander's rank, commits himself to his guidance with reluctance. The military chief, in order to assure the success of his enterprizes, must be supposed to command the confidence of his followers; and he cannot be expected to command it without the possession of a genius which cannot be penetrated or measured by common capacities. Different modes and combinations of quality, through which the general acts on the mind of the soldier, are superficially sketched in this place: the sketch is rude, and upon the whole imperfect; but it may lead to reflection on the subject.

1st. Of the numerous generals who have attained eminence in the list of commanders, some appear to have attained it by means of a pure, original, and intuitive genius; such as gives boldness to design and promptitude to execution beyond the formal rules of art. Charles the Twelfth, of Sweden, appears to stand at the head of this class. Charles was successful by mere force of genius. Others appear to have succeeded by genius mixed with imposture. Alexander, king of Macedonia, is eminent in this

class of commanders. His education was directed by the most scientific philosopher of the age in which he lived; and, as Alexander professed great attachment to his master, he may be supposed to have profited by his instructions, and to have acquired knowledge in science by study. His genius in war was his own: he did not seem to know the extent of it; and he endeavoured to add force to it by imposture, that is, by assuming a descent from Jupiter Ammon. The Roman Sertorius possessed original genius for war and warlike enterprize, and he practised delusion on the credulity of his barbarian followers with a view to augment effect. The Russian Suwarrow possessed military genius to considerable extent; but he did more by imposing on the simple mind of the Russian soldier, than by his skill in tactic and evolution. He commanded devotion, by encouraging the idea that his acts were inspired acts, moving under the guidance of supernatural agency. Where the intuitive genius of war combines with the passion of ambition in the mind of a sovereign, the march in foreign conquest is rapid, and the submission of the native subject is absolute. But where this is so, the rapidity of the course generally precipitates in ruin: instances of extraordinary exaltation are seldom of long duration.

2nd. Besides the condition of capacity now noticed as primary in the character of a military commander, the possession of science, or knowledge of men and fitness of things to each other, has on many occasions raised individuals to eminence as generals, who did not appear to have warlike propensities in their younger years, and who did not assume the aids of fiction and imposture to add to the effect. The character of such is consistent with simplicity and modesty. The power consists in knowledge; and the skill is manifested in placing the object of desire before the eye in such manner that the individual may see by his own powers of perception what he is to do, and, as may be supposed, do it with the energy which belongs to the knowledge which results from his own observation. Generals of this character study the nature and power of the instruments with which they act, as well as the nature and power of the instruments against which their attacks are directed. They know what they do; and they do not compromise themselves by ignorance and rashness. If disaster occur, the general, who acts under this principle, finds a resource in the intimate knowledge which he has of men and

things, in their physical and moral relations. Epaminondas, the Theban, stands at the head of this class among the ancients; Xenophon, the Athenian, as may be collected from the retreat of the Ten Thousand, belongs to it. Count Turenne acted on this principle; his character was amiable, and he was a man within himself at all times. The late General Moreau perhaps belonged to the same class: he was great in actual combat, intimating that he had knowledge of things in their own nature.

3rd. There is a class of military commanders, or great captains, whose character is complicated and various; that is, such as are endowed by nature with rudiments of military talent, and who bring their talent to perfection by art, that is, by observation and severe study in the field of experience. Among these, the Carthaginian general Hannibal holds the first place in the writer's estimate of generals. Hannibal was confessedly a man of original mind, and of great acquirement. His enterprize, in invading Italy in the manner he did, was the boldest that is found in history, and it was conducted, in all cases, by consummate skill and ability. He was devoted to the interests of his country. He was sagacious, and he seems to have been impenetrable in his purposes. It is reasonable to conclude that he was conciliating in manner—not tyrant in disposition; for it may be presumed that tyrant force could not have kept the mixture, of which his army was composed, in good humour through the difficulties to which it was sometimes exposed. The Carthaginian army was conquered at Zama; and Carthage sued for peace; Hannibal cannot be said, in the strict sense of the word, to have been conquered. Scipio, his antagonist, was a captain of original genius. He was perhaps the most scientific of the Roman generals, and the most amiable; he possessed the love of the soldiery through his goodness, no less than through the opinion of his superior skill. Cæsar, the first Roman emperor, was also a great captain, and a man of great powers of mind. He was ambitious of conquest to excess; and, as restrained by no tie of morality from the pursuit of it, he surmounted external impediments by a courage and perseverance that has few examples in history. His soldiers were bound to him by the strength of his character solely. Among moderns who have been eminent as commanders, no one seems to have attained the same elevation, in everything connected with war,

as John duke of Marlborough. He was the bravest of soldiers when he was a young man, and the most successful of generals in mature years. The comprehension of his genius was unparalleled among the generals of the time: his command was absolute, without harshness; his manner of imposing it was without imposture. Marlborough was great in the common meaning of the word—in the field, and in the cabinet. He was modest and humble—religious, without ostentation; and, unlike the generality of successful warriors, he seems to have retained, in his greatest elevation, sensibility to the human species. He did not appear to have delighted in war for the sake of military fame: he accepted the command of armies as a duty to his nation. He was a good man; but the deference which he paid to the will of his royal mistress, contrary to his own judgment, is a blemish in his character of no small importance.

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## PART V.

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### DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY FOR THE FIELD AND QUARTERS.

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WHEN troops are classed in corps by correspondence of moral sympathies, adjusted in the ranks by correspondence of physical power, urged to action by a sentiment of honour, and supported in action by a sense of duty resting on moral obligation, they may be supposed to have attained the highest point of military excellence which human beings are capable of attaining. The structure of the machine is then comparatively perfect; but, in order that it be preserved in a perfect state, under all the contingencies that are incident to war, the principles of management, whether for quarters or for camp, require to be studied and understood, so that that form of practice which produces effect may be correctly adhered to in its minutest details. The just estimate of military economy depends on a knowledge of the constitution of the animal body, consequently the subject may be expected to be explained by those who have studied animal structure scientifically, and who have seen animal powers tried and proved in a variety of situations in the course of military service. The material points to be considered, in the detail of economical adjustment, relate to diet, clothing, and exercise.

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#### SECTION I.—CHAPTER I.

##### D I E T.

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A DIET, wholesome in kind and spare in measure, is essential to the preservation of health among all classes of men; it is of the first importance among the military. The position, which is true in itself, rests on the basis of man's physical constitution as physically dissected; but, true as it may be in principle, and important as it is in its practical consequences, the form of economy



which inculcates the spare measure of diet has the semblance of poverty; and poverty, though the best friend of man, is viewed with abhorrence by almost all the human race, and by the English more than others. Economy, or the exact measure of means to ends, preserves balance, maintains effective action, and ensures prosperity in times and trials of difficulty. Its value is great; but it is not known; and it cannot be seen by those who fix the eye on aggrandizement as the end and object of their being. A full habit is vulgarly supposed to constitute animal power; and as a full measure of diet fills the habit, full living presents itself, by inference, as the direct means of attaining a high portion of bodily strength. This is an English creed, followed rigorously in practice; it is not orthodox according to the law of nature.

It is argued by physiologists and physicians, men who ought to understand the structure of the human fabric, and the laws which maintain its economy, that high living, at least a large allowance of animal food, increases physical force, and supports the powers of exertion beyond other form of diet. The opinion is specious; but it is formed on partial grounds, and it is not radically true. The English consume animal food in a higher proportion than most European nations. The English are powerful men; but there are no grounds to believe, in tracing the cause to its source, that their power arises from the quantity of animal food which they consume. The Spartans were abstemious; they were in fact restricted to a diet which the soldiery of the present day would consider as coarse and stinted; yet the Spartans were conspicuous for physical strength, and they were, morally, the most resolute military that ever appeared on the theatre of war. The Swiss occupied a high station among military nations in the days of their glory; yet the Swiss, while brave in the field, and virtuous in the domestic circle, were homely and frugal in manner of living. The Highlanders of Scotland have some claim to be ranked with the Swiss and Spartans. Their virtues are known in war: their fare was coarse in the days of their heroism, and even now it is homely. Animal food rarely fell to the lot of the Scotch peasant, Highland or Lowland, till within these very few years; yet the Scot was always a good soldier, ardent in courage, and powerful in

the close conflict of battle. The Irish peasant is not diminutive in size, and little, if at all, inferior in physical force to the peasant of England. He is, moreover, spirited and bold as a soldier, and not wanting in energy in the field, where his powers are suitably animated and judiciously directed; yet the food of the Irish peasant consists, at best, of potatoes and buttermilk. The fishermen on the coast of Spain and on the shores of the Mediterranean live frugally. They subsist on the simplest food. They are notwithstanding strong and sinewy, inasmuch that the highest-fed boat's crew in the English navy does not equal a boat's crew of Biscayan fishermen, or of Turkish watermen, either in power or endurance at the oar.

The facts now stated are precise, and of common notoriety. They furnish proof that a high measure of animal food, and, I may even add, a large allowance of strong drink, are not the radical causes which give strength to the human body. The Spartans and Swiss, as already observed, were strong as well as valiant; and even now the Scotch Highlander possesses a firm and elastic muscle, and a high quantity of physical force, relatively to his size. The opinion given on this subject is believed to be correct in the true nature of things. The writer is aware that the *athletæ* of Greece were fed, and that the pugilist of England is, at the present time, fed differently from what is here recommended; and it is not meant to deny that the effective power of the *athletæ* and the pugilist is increased by diet, training, and exercise. This the author is ready to admit; but he is confident to maintain, at the same time, that the *athletæ* of Greece, though powerful and good wrestlers, were not good soldiers; and there are no grounds to believe, from what is daily seen, that the champions of English pugilism are superior, even equal, to the peasant of the country, for that species of courage, and endurance of toil, which constitutes military value. But as it is proved by the history of all military nations, both in ancient and modern times, that the quantity of physical force best adapted to the purposes of war may be derived from a plain and homely diet, of comparatively small measure, so persons of experience, particularly such as have made experiment in their own persons, will not refuse assent to the fact, that endurance of toil, similar to military toil, is better supported

under a diet that is light in kind, and of a rather scanty measure, than under full meals of rich and solid food. If this fact be true, and the history of military service proves it every day, it follows, by necessary consequence, that if it be desirable to render the condition of the military force stable, and the effect of its service calculable, the diet will be measured and administered according to just quantity only; namely, such quantity as is found on trial to produce that species of power which endures toil, and which does not, by accumulating irritability, predispose the habit to explosions of disease.

The kind and quantity of the daily ration of provisions adjudged to be sufficient for the sustenance of the British soldier is fixed by regulation; and it would be deemed presumption to suggest an alteration. But, admitting the ration to be good in kind, and justly measured in quantity, the writer thinks he may venture, without transgressing the limits which he has prescribed to himself in touching on military economy, to direct the attention of chiefs of regiments to a study of the proper mode of preparing it for the soldier's use. It may be said without offence, that if the art of cookery be understood by the English nation, it is not generally practised by the English soldiery.

The cooking utensils of the soldier, as they are to be carried by the soldier himself when he changes quarter or encampment, cannot be supposed to be either numerous or heavy. One camp-kettle for a mess consisting of six persons carried by the members in rotation, or one quart canteen carried by the individual himself, if it be approved (and it is undoubtedly to be preferred) that the mess be cooked individually, a tin pint porringer, an iron spoon, a small knife and fork, a flask or canteen for water, comprise the soldier's table and kitchen equipment for the field. It is sufficient for the purpose, and, if it be so, those who command regiments will, it is presumed, consider it to be a part of their duty to take measures to assure the proper application of it, that is, to assure the preparation of the raw material after a form that occasions little demand for drink, and is, at the same time, easy of digestion. In this view, soup, broth, stew, &c. with a large portion of vegetables, constitute the preferable form of pot-tage for a soldier's dinner. A large proportion of the vegetable

material is desirable for the dinner-mess; for it is observed, that persons who subsist principally on vegetable and farinaceous food, endure toil longer than those who subsist chiefly on the flesh of animals. They have not more, perhaps not so much brute force, but they have more endurance of toil. If so, it is left to military men to judge whether the possession of brute force, or the capacity of enduring toil for a comparatively long time, is the preferable quality in war. In recommending a system of cookery for the use of the military, the reader will not suppose that epicurean refinement enters into the idea of the writer. The culinary art is simple, and soon learned in so far as respects the soldier. The fundamental rule consists in boiling slow, and in roasting quick. The rule is plain, obvious, and well approved; but it does not appear to be commonly known to English soldiers. The pot of the soldier almost always boils with fury: fuel is wasted, and the mess is not so good as it might be by simmering, or a slow process of boiling.

There is not anything of which we have knowledge equal to tea for breakfast. A breakfast of tea with bread and butter, or even bread without butter, enables a person to sustain the fatigues of war with more energy and endurance than a breakfast of beef-steaks and porter; but, as tea cannot be procured at all times, coffee, cocoa, milk, or bouillon, may be substituted in its stead. It is at all times desirable that the soldier breakfast before parade, before the commencement of exercise, or before the commencement of a march. If this be neglected, faintness sometimes ensues, and exertion fails from the mere craving of the stomach. Hence a morsel of bread and cheese put into the soldier's haversack, whenever there is expectation of a long march in the course of the campaign, might be regarded as an useful provision. Besides what relates to breakfast and provision for the march, the writer is of opinion, (and the opinion is formed from mature consideration of the subject) that the evening, at least that portion of the day which remains after the termination of the march when troops are in the field, or after the performance of those exercises and amusements which fill up the measure of the day during peace in quarters or cantonment, is the most suitable time for the dinner, or principal repast. It is important to the interests of military service that soldiers be restricted to two

meals a-day; and further, that care be taken, in laying the basis of primary education, that every one be competent to dress in a suitable manner the raw provisions of which the ration consists. If the principle according to which the application of heat acts on raw provisions for the improvement of their taste and nutritive qualities, be explained to the young soldier and rightly comprehended by him, he will know to vary the mode according to his means, and not complain that his meal is unsavoury, when his ration is good in kind and abundant in quantity; a case which often happens with those who are young and uneducated, and which happens with almost all British soldiers in their first campaigns.

It were perhaps better that every soldier should employ himself in cooking his own provisions, inasmuch as the act serves to multiply the means which give interest to his life. But if this method be not adopted, and if soldiers be divided into messes of a given number of persons, it is proper that the business of cooking follow a *roster* of fatigue among the different members of the company. One of the soldiers, the least smart in appearance, or least expert in military manœuvre, is often doomed to be perpetual cook. The practice is wrong, at least it is improper, in the author's opinion, that any one who is thought worthy to bear arms, should be degraded to the office of perpetual scullion for his comrades. The duty of cooking in rotation, that is, of superintending the boiling of the pot, is not an irksome duty, and it has moreover an useful influence upon morals. It serves to cement society, and to keep the heterogeneous mass of modern armies in something like family connexion.

It is a primary object, in the discipline of troops, to implant a sentiment of honour which stimulates to duty, rather than to impress a sense of fear which forcibly restrains from doing wrong. This is a cardinal point in the system of military instruction; and, keeping this point in view, the writer takes the liberty to suggest, that, if the soldier's mess consist of six persons under the superintendence of serjeants and corporals, who sit as presidents of the mess in rotation, the end proposed will be attained at least to a certain extent. The good conduct of the private would not fail to be assured by the presence of a respectable serjeant at the mess-table; and, as serjeants are,



or ought to be capable, of instructing soldiers in their duties, the military character might be supposed to receive improvement during this social or convivial intercourse. The idea is not foolish ; but the writer is aware that it will be ridiculed, perhaps deprecated as subversive of the tremendous rule of subordination inculcated in modern discipline. A certain degree of familiarity is implied in the act of persons eating together ; and it probably will be pretended that a serjeant cannot maintain authority among the men, if he be a member, or even if he preside at the soldier's mess-table. If serjeants are persons to be viewed only through fear, and revered only through the authority of the cane, such might be the effect ; but this character does not belong to the nature of that officer's duty. A serjeant may retain, and a good serjeant will not fail to retain, authority and respect at the table among young soldiers, on a similar principle and with a similar feeling as a father retains respect at the table of his children. The relation is the same, or similar, where the military fabric is laid on a true base.

The water of the brook is what the Creator of the universe has provided for quenching thirst both in man and beast. As it is the most common, it is the most convenient and most suitable drink for soldiers ; for soldiers ought to be accustomed to eat and drink whatever is common and easily procured. If water be muddy and unpleasant to the eye, the addition of a small quantity of alum causes the mud to subside, and, while it does so, does not deteriorate the quality of the water as drink for man. If it be flat and mawkish, the addition of vinegar, while it makes it pleasant to the taste, improves its virtues as a beverage for persons who are destined to undergo military fatigues. The Romans, who studied the laws of animal economy with care, and who applied them with good effect, in so far as respects the health and efficiency of the soldier, considered vinegar as an indispensable provision for their armies. The British nation, not less humane than the Roman, but less observant of the nature of things as they bear on the health of the military, decreed the provision of a ration of rum for the use of troops on foreign service. The ostensible pretext for the measure was an alleged unwholesomeness of water. If water were always bad in foreign countries, and if there were

no other way of correcting it but by the addition of rum, the measure adopted might have been defended, notwithstanding the expense which it entailed, and the evils which attach to the long-continued use of ardent spirits. The first necessity does not exist. Water is as good in other countries as it is in England; and where water is good, it stands in no need of a corrective. If it be less pure, and if correctives be necessary, it has been stated what these are. Both of them are easily procured: one of them was tried, and its utility sanctioned by the wisest military nation in the records of human history.

A ration of rum was allowed to the British army in foreign parts, under the pretext of a bad quality in water. The allowance was at first given as a bounty for a supposed purpose of utility. It was subsequently claimed as a right, where no cause of usefulness existed. The young soldier received his allowance and consumed it, not that he liked rum, or that he thought it good for his health, but because he considered it to be his own, and because he was prohibited from disposing of it to others. The military character is tenacious of right and property; and, through this spirit of tenaciousness, the young soldier drank the liquor which he disliked, rather than spill it on the ground, or suffer it to remain in the store. The dislike was overcome, a habit was formed, and a fondness even acquired for this at first disgusting liquor, which engrosses the whole desires, and thereby converts the soldier into a drunkard, and a sot of no positive value to the service. The history of the British army, particularly in the West Indies, furnishes too many proofs of the truth of this statement.

The soldier who has been long accustomed to drink his ration of rum, in the idea that it conduces to the preservation of his health, often acquires such an insatiate desire for liquor, that he has no command over himself where the means of gratification are within his reach; consequently he ceases to be a man on whose services calculation can be made. The soldier who is under the influence of liquor is unruly, insubordinate, even mutinous. If intoxicated to excess, he is not capable of meeting an enemy in the field. He may present himself to be killed; for, as he cannot reason, he may not fear; but he is useless as a soldier.

It is an ungracious task, and may perhaps be a dangerous duty, to bring measures under public notice which are sanctioned by the authority of the state, but which cannot be sanctioned by the reason of the philosopher. That attempt is now made; but it is not made offensively. It is an imperious duty of humanity to endeavour to preserve the human race from destruction; and as it is the duty of a military physician to maintain the military in a state of calculable efficiency, the truth is here spoken freely, at all risk of penalty. The measure in question, that is, the allowance of a ration of rum for troops on foreign service, was ordered at random, and sanctioned by the legislature without a valid argument of utility. It was not wise or well founded in its origin; and, in observing its progress and its effect, it does not altogether correspond with the common notions of justice. The British soldier is supplied daily with a ration of rum, and strictly enjoined to mix it with water that it may be less injurious to him. The recruit who enters the army with an aversion to strong drink, receives rum as a portion of his ration, and drinks grog by coercion. He swallows it with disgust when he first joins the corps. His taste is then natural; but it is liable to be vitiated, and it soon becomes so vitiated that, according to a law which obtains in animal nature, the disagreeable thing becomes, through repetition, a gratification of high relish. This applies particularly to rum and tobacco; and, agreeable to this law of animal nature, a fondness for rum, amounting to passion, is gradually acquired by the young soldier. Where the desire is ingrafted by force so as to become a habit, prudence and even fear is feeble as a barrier to prevent indulging it. Liquor is sought for at all risks: intoxication follows gratification; and, under intoxication, the subject loses self-command, forgets the laws of discipline, even commits crimes, while under the influence of liquor, from which, in his sober senses, his nature would recoil. He is punished for the crimes which he then commits; and of the punishments which occur in the army, nineteen out of twenty are connected with this cause\*.

\* The remaining lines of this paragraph are omitted, as the practice of issuing daily rations of spirits to troops on

foreign service has been discontinued, an equivalent in money being granted in compensation.

If it be admitted that a system of economy, namely, the rigid practice of sobriety and temperance, be essential to the prosperity of the army, the practice, it is evident, must begin with the commissioned officers, who are the moving parts of the machine. The officer may lead by example; he cannot drive by authority. If a general of high reputation in war, instead of courting popularity by a sumptuous table and high-flavoured wines, had the resolution to cover a simple board with a plain repast, similar to the soldier's mess, and measured in quantity in proportion to the number of the guests, he would have the merit of being a reformer; and if his example served to eradicate the national propensity to sumptuous living, which is the most prominent defect in the character of the English military, he would be regarded, and justly regarded by posterity, not as a visionary reformer, but as a national benefactor of the first distinction. The plain repast is sufficient for sustenance; and a plain repast gives all the gratification to the palate of an hungry and thirsty man that a soldier ought to permit himself to receive; and, while it does this, it leaves his organs, as not overwhelmed by turtle and claret, free for impressions of military glory and pursuits of military science.

Economy, or a just measure of means to ends, lays the foundation of individual and national prosperity: adherence to it alone ensures the permanence of happiness. Dignity of mind and real military virtue have no connexion with sumptuous living. The conqueror is ordinarily frugal and homely, that is, the bold barbarian emerging from savage life: the conquered is ordinarily rich, luxurious, and what is called refined; that is, the creature of the appetites of corporal sense. The Spartan nation was temperate and frugal. It was august in the assembly of nations, and warlike in the field of battle. The Spartan mess-room presented little furniture that was costly, no service of plate, and few silver or gilded utensils. It presented veteran heroes teaching lessons of warlike virtue to the youth, an equipment of infinitely more value than the inside of a jeweller's shop. The precedent is good, and it is not difficult to be followed. Cleomenes, one of the Spartan kings, found, at his accession to the sovereignty, that, instead of Spartans of the school of Lycurgus, a degenerated race filled the military ranks—men corrupted by the luxu-

ries of Asia, and absorbed in the pleasures of the table. The moral virtue was lost, and even the military virtue was obscured. He meditated reform, and the first step in reform was the re-establishment of the public mess and frugal meal. Cleomenes was plain in manner and frugal in expenditure at the mess; but no sovereign whose record stands in history was more dignified in mind; and no one—not even Louis the Magnificent in all his grandeur—commanded a devotion equal to what was voluntarily given to this simple and meanly-attired Spartan. The English military are perhaps more under the influence of the pleasures of the table than any other military in modern times; but they are not beyond the possibility of reform. It is reported that General Wolfe, who, while a man of superior goodness, was perhaps the most perfect soldier of the age in which he lived, never gave an elegant, and rarely an eatable dinner, to persons of the *haut goût*. The Epicurean was disgusted, the soldier was regaled. General Wolfe's table was said to be an epitome of a Spartan mess-room. No one rose from it without having been furnished with the opportunity of carrying away a military lesson; and few left it without feeling an accession of military importance communicated to the mind by the impressive influence of a hero's spirit. The example was almost solitary. The career of General Wolfe's life was short; his virtues were notwithstanding of such force, that the impression remained long with the 20th regiment, which he formed, and at one time commanded. The example of a frugal mess-table is not, the writer is aware, adapted to our present habits; but man is the child of imitation; and, if frugal regimen were the regimen of high authority and acknowledged military talent, simplicity of living might again become a fashion in the army. The young soldier, instead of exerting his genius in the improvement of a ragout, or the dressing and carving of a duck, might be formed to eat his ration of beef and bread in silence; and, instead of thinking it necessary to be intoxicated with wine, might be led to imbibe the spirit of Wolfe and Cleomenes, and thus become a soldier.

The pleasures of the table, to which the military are generally addicted, and to which they devote much of their time, in want of a professional pursuit, are ideal rather than real. If the day be spent in exercise in times of peace, or in marching and counter-

marching in times of war, the simplest fare—brown bread and boiled beef—are eaten with better relish than turtle and venison, after all the wetting the appetite can receive from the languid recreations of a luxurious city. A soldier eats that he may live and be able to perform his duty. There are many of the human race who pride themselves on the exquisite sense of the palate, which decides on the birth-place of a partridge by the flavour of its flesh. This exquisite sense of taste may be a merit somewhere; it degrades and disgraces a soldier. The soldier's duty implies toil, fatigue, and often hunger; and most soldiers know, by experience, that hunger makes every wholesome food savoury. If this were rightly understood, actual war would rarely present a hardship on the score of eating. If a soldier meet, in the course of his campaign, with wood and water, beef and bread, and a glass of brandy, he has no just cause to complain of hardship. He is not to calculate on two courses, a dessert and variety of wines, in the service of the field; and, as these luxuries cannot be commanded in war, they ought not, if we act wisely, be admitted in peace. Custom forms habit; and privation, though privation of things not essential, generates chagrin. Superfluity and variety provoke the appetite, enlist the soldier under the banners of sensuality; and they undermine the foundation of military virtue, which consists in self-denial.

It is a physical fact, well ascertained and obvious in its reasons, that a course of high living increases animal irritability; and, in so doing, renders the stability of bodily health insecure. A course of luxurious living has a similar operation on the mind; and hence, while bodily exertion is desultory and uncertain in the high-fed soldier, the character of the mind's action is capricious and unsteady; or the mind, wrapped up in itself, is exclusively selfish, or indifferent to causes of national good. The bravery of the luxurious, and of those who are pampered with high feeding, is ordinarily a partial and irregular manifestation of bravery, inasmuch as it proceeds from an impulse of vanity, a desire of spoil, or an incitement of lust. The votary of pleasure possesses only a weak constitutional courage. The habit is unduly irritable, and little capable of enduring fatigue; the temper is constitutionally sensual, and abhorrent from the privations and denials that are common to war. As it is evident, from an attentive



consideration of the laws of animal organism, that the condition of mind and body resulting from a course of high living, and the condition of mind and body necessary for the exertions of military service, are at direct variance with each other, it follows, by fair inference, that the custom of high living, now so common at military messes, ought to be positively interdicted by the nation which desires to be eminent in arms, or which is solicitous to maintain the eminence which it may have previously attained by its boldness and its courage. The luxurious and the high fed are less patient of military fatigues than others. Life has been with them a round of gratifications, and the desire of gratification is so engrafted in the habit, that they are reluctant to encounter hardships, or to submit to privation without enormous bribes. They are dissatisfied and chagrined with homely fare; they despond and sink at the idea of privation; they even fail under circumstances of service where the rude mountaineer feels no want, and complains of no hardship. If this be true—and its truth rests on a fundamental law of animal nature proved in numerous instances of experience to be correct—a rational policy, instead of studying to undermine the military character by allowances for a sumptuous table, might be supposed to direct its attention to the bill of fare of the officers' mess-table, namely, to the institution of simplicity and frugality, and the proscription of foods and drinks which are not calculated to produce firmness of physical power and steadiness of moral action. If there be truth and reason in what is here stated, the condition occasionally stipulated at the admission of young men into certain favourite corps of the army, namely, that a high sum be added annually to the pay, to enable the youth to live like a gentleman, that is, to dine at a table of two courses, and drink wine according to his will, is not a wise one. It places the military character on the brink of destruction; for, if there be anything like correct observation among men, it may be confidently asserted, that, if high living be the life of the gentleman, it is the death of the soldier.

## CHAPTER II.

## DRESS, OR CLOTHING OF TROOPS.

NEXT to the feeding, the clothing of troops is the most important of the economical concerns which belong to armies; and it is one on which the attention of military commanders has been much employed in all ages of the world. The brilliancy of dress strikes the eye agreeably, and entices multitudes to enter the military ranks; consequently military dress is purposely rendered attractive, that it may act as a decoy for those who delight in finery. But besides the gaudiness of dress, which, acting as a decoy, fills the ranks of the army with a multitude of the vain, the mere circumstance of uniformity, acting on the mind of a mass of people, however brought together, begets more or less of union in sentiment; hence the utility of uniform clothing for military force is obvious.

The warlike nations of Europe clothe their military differently in colour and form, according to the taste which predominates with the nation respectively. As the ultimate purpose of covering the body with clothes refers to protection from the inclemencies of weather, and as utility is, or ought to be, the end of human contrivances, it is evident that usefulness and convenience are, or ought to be, the principal objects in view in contriving the habiliment of soldiers. The best fashion is that which best protects the body from the injuries of weather, and which least impedes the movements that are connected with military duties. Every one may judge of this; and the wise will follow its own rule. The nation which imitates another nation, whether in clothing, accoutrement, or tactic, is only copyist; and, as copyist, it has no national importance. Pride of mind is the highest possession of a military people; hence it is evident that a nation, in adopting whatever may be useful in the tactic, accoutrement, or clothing of foreigners, should, in a manner, conceal from itself the source from whence the improvements are drawn. A hint may be borrowed without wounding pride—a system of practice cannot be adopted without confessing inferiority. It is thus that if a people, instead of incorporating and amalgamating

that which is useful in the foreign with its own, professedly and servilely copy the whole of the foreign, such people does not stand, and cannot be supposed to stand, in the first scale of excellence, even in its own estimation: originals only are great in war.

As convenience and usefulness are the first points to be considered in adjusting military dress, and as every person who is acquainted with military service may be supposed to be a judge of what is most suitable for his wants, it consequently is, or it ought to be, preliminary to all proceedings on the subject of dress, that those who have actually served in the field, and who know what is suitable for service, be the persons consulted on this occasion, in the view that what is most useful and most convenient be connected with what is least expensive. Expense is a material consideration in the estimate of all military nations; and among European nations, the Austrian appears to have joined the cheap with the useful more correctly than any other. All that is essentially necessary is provided in just and measured quantity for the Austrian infantry; but the rule obtains only with the infantry. Human ingenuity could scarcely contrive anything more absurd than the equipment of Hussars. The gaudiness of the figure is at direct variance with the usefulness of the man. The power of exertion is encumbered, and the value of the soldier is diminished, for the sake of amusing the eye with the fantastic appearances of a toy-shop. So numerous are the trappings, and so complicated are the parts of the Hussar dress, that, unless an officer sleep in his clothes while in the enemy's country, his quarters may be surprized, and himself put to the sword, before he can button his jacket, or be in a condition to assume his arms. It is open to every military power to adopt improvement, if it comprehend the principle on which the improvement rests: it is incumbent on every one who values the independence and honour of character, not to copy fashions from foreign nations.

The dress of a soldier consists of different parts: a few cursory remarks are offered on the subject. The soldier's coat ought to be fitted with care, easy at the shoulder, so as not, in any degree, to impede the motion of the arms, and wide in the body, so as not to impede, even when closely buttoned, the expansion of the chest. It ought not to reach lower than the middle of the thigh: all beyond is an unnecessary incumbrance of weight.

It ought, moreover, to be furnished with a large and convenient side-pocket, in the manner of a sportsman's jacket.

Breeches and leggins were for a long time the dress of the British soldier; they are less eligible than the trowser and gaiter, or half-boot. The trowser does not impede the motion of the joints in exercise, or occasion the least irksome pressure when the soldier sleeps in his clothes. Almost every person of the present time knows by experience that the pantaloen or trowser is less irksome than breeches. It has no buttons, and it is sooner and more easily adjusted in the dark. This is a matter of some utility; for it is obvious that a soldier ought to be so dressed as to sleep in his clothes without inconvenience, or that the clothes ought to be so fashioned that he may put them on in the dark without embarrassment. The gaiter and sock are preferable to the leggin. The calf of the leg rarely suffers from cold; the feet, ankles, and knees, do. These therefore require to be doubly guarded: and, on this account, flannel-socks, cloth-gaiters, and a knee-cap to the trowser, are particularly recommended for guarding the parts which are least capable of resisting cold, and which most require protection against injury. But while the tendinous parts, namely, the feet, knees, and ankles, are to be kept warm by additional clothing, the fleshy parts, particularly the calves of the legs, which, as full of blood, and thrown into action in locomotion, ought not (as not liable to suffer from cold) to be confined by pressure so as to be impeded in their movements, or heated by covering so as to be solicited to throw out pimples, which, thus produced, often degenerate in sores. To this cause, the sore legs, which so much annoy a certain description of soldiers, may in some degree be ascribed.

The feet are an essential part of the person of the soldier; their condition ought therefore to be particularly attended to by the officer. The casual wetting of the feet is frequently a cause of sickness to those who have been born and bred in towns, and carefully nursed in infancy. In such the feet require to be guarded from chances of accident by means of socks and well-fitted shoes of good manufacture. The flannel sock, or rather the cotton sock with a sole piece of milled flannel, is useful for this purpose; for, while flannel preserves a more equal temperature of heat than linen or cotton, it, at the same time, affords a better protection against the chance of blistering than socks of other

materials. The good condition of the feet is so essential for the performance of military duties, that shoes, boots, or half-boots, ought to be well chosen and well made; that is, made of good materials for the sake of durability, and well fitted to the foot on account of ease and convenience to the wearer. The properties of a soldier's shoe, so formed as to correspond with the natural shape of the foot, consist principally in thick and firm outer soles, with an inner sole which has an obscure sliding motion—the quarter short and high, so that mud or sand do not easily enter, nor the tenacity of a deep clay easily drag it from the foot, the leather well tanned, and prepared, by means of oil and wax, tallow or other composition, to resist the entrance of water.

The military hat ought to be light and well manufactured—the crown deep, for the better defence of the head against the rays of a vertical sun, or against the stroke of an enemy's sabre. A brim, even a broad brim, is convenient on many accounts, and very useful on some, particularly to shade the eyes from glare of light, and to protect the neck from rain.

The uniform of the British army has been altered of late years, and the fashion of several parts of the habiliment has not only been changed, but improved. The shirt, though not a part of the ostensible uniform, is a part of clothing which, as opinions are divided about the nature of the material of which it is to be made, cannot be passed over in this place without particular notice. Woollen stuff was worn next the skin by our unpolished ancestors; refinement substituted linen. The opinions of men fluctuate like the tides of the ocean; and flannel, an improved manufacture of wool, is again advanced in its original station. There are many, even physicians of eminence, who maintain that flannel worn next the skin is preservative of health, both in hot and cold climates; others contend that flannel, independently of its quality of increasing the susceptibility to impression, and consequently of favouring the action of the causes of disease, by receiving contagious matters more readily, and retaining them more closely than linen or cotton, serves to propagate sickness in armies. The truth of the assertion is in some degree supported by what happened to the British army in the early part of the war 1793. The soldiers were then enveloped in flannel, either furnished by their own funds, or provided by the donation of the generous; yet, notwithstanding all this care and foresight, sick-

ness was great, and mortality was unexampled. It cannot be proved, nor would any one, it is presumed, pretend to say, that flannel clothing was the primary cause of sickness on this occasion: it was obviously a contingent one. Flannel readily attracts pollutions; and it does not, on account of its colour, so soon discover their adhesion as bleached linen or cotton. This is an inconvenience; but, with this inconvenience, there are also advantages—and not unimportant ones. Flannel preserves more equally than linen the genial warmth of the parts which it covers. It absorbs more readily the excess of perspirations which occur in hot weather, or under severe exercise; and while it is agreeable to the wearer from this cause, it is conditionally preservative of that equal condition of circulation which is intimately connected with health. This one feels and judges by the feeling: but still, if all the circumstances connected with flannel clothing be considered in their full extent and bearing, the obvious benefits are more than counterbalanced by other contingencies that are not easily avoided. As it preserves an equal heat on the surface, so it preserves the skin soft and preternaturally sensible, exquisitely susceptible of impression, and easily acted on by causes which float in the atmosphere, and which have a tendency, by their action, to disturb the health of the subjects to which they are applied. If this be correct, its benefits are deceptive; and, though it must be admitted that it contributes to the preservation of the health of the valetudinary, it has a tendency to render valetudinary those who are naturally robust; hence it is injurious, rather than beneficial, as a general article of clothing for soldiers. It is, and must be considered in all cases as a fundamental maxim in military education, that the soldier be as far as possible removed from the valetudinary habit, even from the opinion that a valetudinary frame is compatible with his profession. The greater number of soldiers, as improvident and careless of their health, not unfrequently throw aside their artificial defences (particularly the flannel shirt) at the very time they most require it, namely, when they are in a state of rest, bathed in perspiration, and susceptible of impression at every pore.

The preservation of health is an important object to the members of civil society: it is particularly so to the military. There are two views according to which the subject is to be considered: one, to guard against the impressions of noxious causes



by adventitious defences; another, to fortify the constitution, so as to render it capable of resisting noxious impressions by its own internal force. The means which conduce to the first are only under the command of the higher classes of society in civil life; the means of the latter belong to every one, and they are particularly applicable to the condition of the military. The first, or system of artificial care, is preventative of disease by avoiding exposures, or in blunting, by means of art, such influences as are disposed to act noxiously on the human frame. Flannel is preservative on this ground; but it, at the same time, renders the habit preternaturally susceptible to impression, and thereby predisposes to the explosion of disease when a morbid cause contingently strikes. The second, or system of exposure, secures the continuance of health by resistance, that is, by inuring the body to bear a change of impressions without injury: it thus preserves it on a surer foundation than all the contrivances of care that ingenious physicians have suggested. It is a truth, obvious and of daily occurrence, that things which are new or strange to each other run rapidly into contact, and produce new action, or new combination of action with one another. In this manner, it is observed that a person who is guarded carefully from external air, from vicissitudes of heat and cold, from wind and rain, and the whole train of common causes which act on animal life, is easily disturbed by slight incidental impressions; while another of similar original constitution, but who has been exposed for a course of time to the action of these causes, in similar or superior degrees of force, suffers no material injury. This is an ascertained fact: it is the basis on which the training of the military, in so far as regards the preservation of health, ought to be laid.

It is left to physicians, who apply their art to persons in civil life, to suggest the means of guarding, by adventitious aids, the irritable and delicate citizen from the action of the external causes which disturb human health. It belongs to a wise military institution to form the soldier in such manner as to be able to resist noxious impressions by his own internal power. This is an important object; but the attainment of it is difficult; and it is in fact only to be attained by familiarizing the subjects with the various contingencies which occur in the field of service. The means required for conducting the training here alluded to are not expensive, or difficult to be procured; but they are revolting

to the habits of the refined age in which we live. They enjoin privations, immediate pains and unpleasant exposures, in the hopes of obviating remote consequences; and, as such, it is probable that they never will obtain a trial. The doctrine which inculcates the utility of exposing the soldier's body to wind and rain, and to alternations of heat and cold, for the sake of familiarizing the habit to vicissitude, and of thereby obviating the injurious effects of what is new to the habit when applied by accident, is not likely to be well received. It implies an immediate suffering in the prospect of a remote contingent exemption from suffering. The discipline necessary to assure it is at the same time harsh, so harsh indeed that it will be considered by many as barbarous. It is notwithstanding useful, even necessary, if it be considered to be an object worthy of a nation's study and attention to form an army capable of sustaining with impunity the various contingencies which belong to war. It is paradox, but at the same time true, that the excessive care which fosters a condition of body easily susceptible of impression from external causes, is more injurious to the health of an army than habitual exposure to the action of the noxious causes which present themselves in the ordinary course of military life. The assertion is not made at random. Irregular troops, who have the least protection from the inclemencies of weather, are usually the least unhealthy part of armies; and if reference be made to a comparative state of health among British soldiers, previously to their being furnished with flannel-shirts, socks, great-coats, and even blankets, the balance will not be found to stand on the side of the times of extraordinary care. Prejudices are however strong on this head at the present time, so strong that arguments will not gain a hearing; even the voice of experience will not command attention. The suggestion for training a soldier to hardship, in order to make him fit for military duty, is so contrary to the sense of a luxurious people, that it will be deemed the gloomy vision of a barbarian of the dark ages, rather than the induction of accurate observation drawn from a wide field of experience. The voice of reason and experience here, as in other things, is but a feeble voice; and, as there exist but small hopes of carrying into effect a fundamental system of military training, calculated to steel the body of the soldier against the effect of the hardships and contingencies which are common in war, we are compelled to trust

to care. As compelled to trust to care, it belongs to persons, circumstanced as the army physician is, to point out the mode of care which embraces the greatest number of advantages with the smallest number of inconveniences.

As the chief object of attention, in arranging a soldier's equipment, ought to be directed to convenience and usefulness, it follows that clothing, while it defends the body from cold, should be so contrived as not to confine the free motion of the limbs by tightness, or to encumber exertion by clumsiness and superfluous weight. While a person is engaged in active exercise, whether in pursuing an object of duty or amusement, he is little liable to be acted on by causes which, in other circumstances, are injurious to health; hence soldiers, while actively employed, may be, or rather ought to be, lightly clothed; for toil or labour is then easily sustained. When rest commences, susceptibility to impression returns; and with susceptibility to impression, liability to disease. It is therefore safe, and it will be useful, that the soldier be provided with means, to be employed discretionally, for his protection against the injurious action of causes which occasionally present themselves in war, and which act with force when the body is in a state of rest. In order to give the command of these defensive means, the habiliments, as already stated, ought to be large and easy, and so fashioned as to button over the trunk of the body. But, besides the fashion of the coat here recommended, a cloak, or mantle, as better calculated than any other form of clothing to protect the body against impressions from cold when exercise is suspended and rest commences, is an essential part of a soldier's equipment. It has advantages over the blanket and great-coat, inasmuch as it answers the purpose of both. A soldier, in the present times, carries a blanket for the sake of the warmth which it affords in the night; a great-coat is provided for the protection of himself and his arms from rain when on duty. A great-coat is not held to be sufficient protection against cold at night: a blanket is therefore provided for night covering, and hence two things are provided for a purpose which might be answered by one. A cloak made in the form of the Portugal cloak, the cloth close and strong duffle, so as to be both light and warm, and manufactured by incorporating grease or oil with the raw material, so as to be little penetrable to wet, sufficiently long to cover the feet when the knees are bent, and provided with buttons and loops that it may be tucked up in

marching, is to be considered as sufficient defence against the cold of the night in the common circumstances of service. It defends the body from rain when on duty, and it does not encumber with unnecessary weight in travelling. Such are the properties of the military cloak; and, viewed in this light, it is evidently a most useful provision to a soldier's equipment for the field.

The form and fashion of a soldier's equipment is supposed to be such as is stated. The adjustment of the kind and quantity of articles termed necessities, is a matter of importance, and, as such, requires to be well considered. It is demonstrably proved, to the conviction of all persons who have served with armies, that superfluous baggage, that is, baggage beyond the narrowest measure of utility, instead of bringing comfort to the possessor, is a cause of great annoyance and vexation. Provision of the means for a complete change of the smaller parts of dress in the event of being wet with rain, together with a cloak as a covering for the night, is all that a soldier requires for his comfort, and the preservation of his health; and, as such, it is all that he ought to be permitted to possess. British soldiers are often encumbered with a load of necessities; and they are notwithstanding often in want of what is useful. The fact, though paradoxical, is true, and it is easily explained how it should be so. Where persons have not more than one change of raiment, the strong impression of necessity obliges them to prepare for the return of want; and, as the impression is strong, the first occasion of replenishing is generally embraced. Where there is variety and superfluity, the necessity does not present itself forcibly, and hence the dirty clothes are crammed into the knapsack, where they accumulate in quantity, without obliging the individual to recollect that they are not fit for use until they are washed. It thus often happens that a soldier who has four or more shirts in his possession has not one fit for use; while a soldier who possesses no more than two, has generally one in his knapsack ready for the contingent occasion. This fact, and it is not equivocal, proves the utility of placing a cause of necessity constantly before the eye of the soldier; for it is only under the impression of necessity that this thoughtless animal prepares for the contingency which belongs to his condition. The idea of relief from impending necessity brings with it a

sensation of pleasure; and, under this interchange of necessity and relief from necessity, life goes on cheerfully: it is in such interchange that the happiness of the soldier and of most other men consists.

The following is considered to be a full, but not a superfluous equipment for a soldier on service; namely, two shirts—linen, cotton, or flannel; two pairs of socks; two pairs of flannel or cotton drawers; two pairs of shoes; or one pair of shoes and one pair of half-boots; one pair of short gaiters; one foraging cap as night-cap; shoe-brushes of small size, with blacking; one razor and strap; one brush for the hair; one square piece of soap; a sponge for washing the body, and a towel for drying it; a pocket handkerchief; a frock or dressing gown of cotton cloth, to serve as a night-shirt; a cloak of duffle or other suitable material; a knife and fork; a canteen for drink; and, if it be thought proper that every soldier be independent in himself, a small canteen for cooking the mess and carrying the dressed provisions, complete the equipment. If the part of the raiment not in use be put up, in a neat and compact manner, in a case of oil-skin so as to be secured from wet, and disposed in a haversack for easy carriage, the soldier will not be incommoded by bulk, nor incumbered by weight; and, while little loaded, he will, as possessing within himself everything that is actually necessary for use, be independent of the accidents that happen to baggage-waggons.

An army is a whole, supposed to be influenced by one motive, and moved in all its parts by one force to one connected act. As the ultimate end and object is one, the exterior aspect ought to be one also. In correspondence with the principle alluded to, it is customary that troops of one nation be clothed in one uniform manner. The uniformity of appearance conveys an impression of union and strength; it even has a tendency to augment the real effect of force. This obviously implies utility; but it may be added, that if dress be loaded with ornaments and encumbered with trappings, the *coup d'œil* of uniformity is broken, and the general effect of the impression is necessarily weakened. It is the union of power and energy of movement which strike the eye, when the value of the military fabric is estimated: and as man is the chief part of the exhibition, the countenance or figure of the man is in all cases the object



which attracts attention, whether for pleasure or intimidation; consequently artificial decorations, as obscuring the figure, are misplaced and misapplied in military *costume*.

In proportion therefore as the attire of a military body is gaudy and varied, the impression connected with union is divided, and effect, as now said, is weakened. But, independently of this consideration, and it is not an unimportant one, the dress which is loaded with ornaments occupies a large portion of time for adjustment; and, besides the time wasted in an useless purpose, the means employed to clean and decorate, that is, pipe-clay for the clothing, grease and flour for the hair, actually pollute the skin, and obscure the genuine and manly expression of the countenance. Pipe-clay is employed to cover dirt. A soldier until lately, notwithstanding he might be incrustated from head to foot, was said to be clean if his small-clothes and facings were covered with pipe-clay, and the head was said to be dressed if the hair was matted with a paste of grease and flour. A common observer, who looked at the British army a few years back, would be disposed to say that military cleanliness was positive dandriff; and as the pleasure which arises from the sensations of personal cleanliness is one of the greatest of which man's nature is capable, the soldier might then be considered as continually in penance. Where man is perfectly clean in person as freed from all exterior impurity, he may be said to live at every pore, and to be animated in every fibre. On the contrary, where the skin is filled with ochre, or encrusted with pipe-clay, the hair besmeared with grease and matted with flour, pleasure, even comfort, is banished from the feeling. The individual is irritated by artificial encumbrances, and health itself suffers from annoyance. Nothing contributes more to preserve health than personal cleanliness; nothing impairs it sooner than artificial dirt; hence it is inferred, that the military clothing which requires to be encrusted with pipe-clay in order to appear clean, is not a well contrived form of clothing. Pipe-clay does not clean: it only covers the appearances of dirt. Grease and flour, employed to form a matting of the hair, constitute a sacrifice to appearance at the expense of comfort. These are points which relate to health and agreeable feeling; but, putting these aside, the military effect, as relative to appearance, is totally misapprehended. Factitious ornament for the head, which obscures the countenance of the soldier, is at variance with a



true military principle: it weakens impression, by attempting to render comely and alluring that which ought to be prominent, bold, and stern. A steady, and even a stern countenance, is the countenance of a soldier. It acts with more impression, on some occasions, on the ranks of an enemy than the fire of the musket; hence it ought not to be masked by powdered locks and millinery decorations.

It may be thought presumptuous to speak so positively on this subject; but it is difficult to refrain from saying that fancy has led us astray on the subject of military dress. The idea of power in a military body consists in uniformity of parts; and, as uniformity best consists with simplicity, simplicity, by necessary inference, constitutes the fundamental rule to be kept in view in arranging the military habiliment. Health and vigour best consist with personal cleanliness; hence the assuring of personal cleanliness is an object intimately connected with the clothing of troops. Pipe-clay, which is positive dirt as it relates to the human skin, is reasonably supposed to be injurious to health; grease and flour as incorporated with the hair, if not directly noxious to health, engender and feed vermin. The practice is the reverse of cleanliness; and the effect is not even pleasing to the eye. Man is never so attractive as when he is perfectly clean both in his clothes and person. The hair, as washed with soap and water, and dressed with a brush, gives satisfaction to the wearer; the appearance, as cropped short or tied with a ribbon, is more pleasing to the eye and more becoming a soldier, than a *frisure* made up with grease and flour into a fantastic form; and it is less incommodious than a mass of false hair, in form of a general's *baton*, appended to the back in a case of leather. This, if esteemed ornament, is felt by those who carry it to be an incumbrance. Much of what is preposterous in military dress has been done away of late years in the British line; but, as taste is a fluctuating fashion, the absurdities may be again brought back; and, for this reason, they are adverted to in this place. The chief military power will, it is to be hoped, consider reasons, and avoid what is useless or of bad effect.

But while the inconveniences connected with a gaudy and variegated military dress are considerable inconveniences to the individual, the effect, resulting from the obtrusion of artificial trappings and vain ornaments, constitutes a radical and important interruption to military impulse. A sentiment of honour is the

motive which urges a soldier to his duty—it is that which maintains him in his place in the day of trial. It is a simple motive, has only one form of action, and the progress of the act is forward and direct. This sentiment of honour, or pride of mind from consciousness of intrinsic worth, gives firmness to man's character, maintains him in the execution of his duty, and urges him to pursue his purpose even to the destruction of his life. It is a modest sentiment: it acts in silence and without boast. Vanity assumes its place: it does not execute its office. Vanity courts admiration, delights in applause, and calculates value by external appearance. If this be so, it is not a military quality; it is notwithstanding, by an unfortunate misapprehension of things, cherished by the military as the substitute of pride; and, from this misapprehension, ornaments of dress, feathers, lace, embroidery, and gildings of the exterior, are permitted to engross the faculties and fill the military mind with vain conceit. Where the soldier's thoughts are chiefly directed to the imagining of factitious dress for the sake of attractive appearance, he is induced to neglect the essential. This is a condition of man's nature; for the mind of man is capable of acting with energy on one subject only. The factitious and the real are not compatible with each other; and it may be added, that those who expect to make men brave by infusing into them the spirit of vanity and love of ornamental dress, proceed on a mistaken view of the causes which act on the mind of man. A love of dress enamours man of himself, for it makes him vain of appearance. It attaches him to life, for life's sake; for it supplies a material of selfish and solitary gratification; consequently it diminishes the radical fund of courage, and weakens the patriotic love of country. Vanity often leads to acts of enterprize; that is, it entices a man to enter the field of battle with a shew of courage: it is honour, or mental pride only, which secures him from leaving it without disgrace.

The writer has thus stated his opinions concerning the form and fashion of military clothing. The opinions will be considered as presumptuous; they are notwithstanding true, as founded on the reason of things. A few remarks are now to be added on the materials of which military clothing is made; and here the manufacturing character of the nation cannot meet with praise. The object of the manufacturer is gain of money; consequently the fundamental rule of manufacture turns on producing a specious

outside, to captivate the eye of the purchaser, and a perishable interior texture, to insure the necessity of a speedy return to the market. This is not an assumption ; it is comprised in the nature of trade. It does not belong to the present subject to enquire into the cause of deterioration which now obtains in the quality, that is, in the durability of the wearing apparel of the English peasant. It is not pretended to say whether it arises from the deep-laid design of the manufacturer to increase consumption, or that it arises contingently from the employment of machinery and other processes of art which do violence to the nature of the material, crush its constitutional substance, and thus diminish its durability as exposed to friction from wearing. But be the cause what it may, the fact is certain, that English broad-cloth and English leather are less durable and less serviceable at the present time than they were at the middle of the last century. With a great-coat and boots of the manufacture of 1760, a person might travel for half a day in heavy rain without being wet to the skin. With a coat of the manufacture of the present day, he is drenched to the skin by a summer shower, and his feet are wet by the dew which hangs on the grass of a summer's morning. English broad-cloth and English leather, though highly dressed to captivate the eye, are not in reality well manufactured for the benefit of the wearer. They are not durable: the cloth is not warm ; and the material is so put together that it appears to attract rather than to repel moisture.

The common manufacturer exerts his genius to produce a commodity of the flimsiest interior texture with the best exterior surface. The contractor for soldier's clothing exerts himself to go beyond the manufacturer for the common market—and he generally succeeds; for soldier's clothing is inspected and approved by less competent judges than those who purchase for themselves. It thus happens that, from the bad quality of contract clothing and contract shoes, English soldiers are sometimes ill clothed on actual service, and almost always ill shod. The clothing of the troops of foreign nations is ordinarily of a better quality as to substance than that of the English. The shoes are of a better form and of a more durable material; a circumstance which, exclusive of better primary education for war, gives foreign soldiers great advantages over English in protracted campaigns and harassing services, carried on at a distance from the depot of stores.

## CHAPTER III.

## EXERCISE, BODILY AND MENTAL.

It is an obvious fact, that idleness has a deteriorating effect on the military character, consequently it is important that idleness be banished from military life; and for this purpose it is important that all the time of the soldier be occupied in the performance of exercises, such as add directly or collaterally to the efficiency of military power. The exercises which are calculated to form soldiers for the practice of war have been noticed in another place, and the advantages resulting from the practice of them have there been pointed out at some length. The rudiment of instruction is laid in the primary school; but, if it be intended that the effect of the instruction be subject to calculation in the field of action, perseverance in practice is necessary, even after individuals have been incorporated with their respective corps.

Dancing may be ranked among military exercises. It gives pleasure to the individual, and it is practised with pleasure for its own sake. It conduces to the improvement of military address, inasmuch as it conduces to the facility of combining movements in marching, in running, in halting, in changing position readily and in order; hence the habit is important to the military art, inasmuch as it communicates an idea of the manner by which parts separate and join, and, when joined, move in union, so as to become irresistible in attack by united impulse. Fencing is an exercise directly military. It is practised with interest by the soldier, inasmuch as it illustrates different modes of defence, or teaches how to multiply and augment the power of the arm in offence.

The pleasure arising from exercises, of whatever kind they may be, is felt by the soldier as an individual gratification; or the usefulness of it is estimated in his reason, by the pre-eminence which it gives to him in the execution of his military duties. But, as military exercises cannot be supposed to occupy the whole of the time that a soldier is exempted from carrying arms, it is of consequence that the intervals be filled up by amusements

in the open air, that is, ball-playing, cricket, quoits, and such others as while they gratify and please, improve the military powers, try endurance, and furnish the commander with the opportunity of ascertaining with accuracy the extent of the powers of exertion of individuals, of regiments, and collectively of large divisions of military force.

It is intended, in the execution of the system of discipline contemplated in this place, that a considerable portion of the soldier's time be occupied by a round of bodily exercises, such as are connected with the conditions which ordinarily occur in the practice of war. But, as bodily exercises cannot, from the condition of man's physical constitution, be continual, and as there ought not to be a pause of rest in the progress of military improvement, the parts of the discipline ought to be so disposed that, when bodily exercises cease, the exercises of the mind begin. The object is important; but it is little regarded in the present times. Military education rarely has a higher aim than to render the soldier submissive to command, and steady in movement as a part of a machine. If the culture of the mind obtain notice, it is only secondarily that it obtains it, that is, as directed to cherish a desire of dress for the sake of appearance, or to arrange a train of indulgences for the gratification of appetites. In this there is error. If vanity be the impulse to action, dignity of mind is obscured; and if appetite be indulged, the fund of military excellence is undermined. The subject, as now said, is an important one: but the principle by which it is to be directed does not appear to be understood, at least justly estimated, by ordinary tacticians. If viewed according to the reason of things, the genuine military principle, and many of the current practices of the day, are in direct contradiction to each other. It is, or it ought to be, the aim of military institution to render the frame of the soldier little sensible to the impression of the contingencies which arise in the fields of war, in the view that his health be little endangered by their occurrence, which is often unavoidable. This is common sense; it is not common practice. The system of care, ease, and indulgence, which grows into fashion daily, as calculated to increase the number of physical wants, to multiply and extend the reign of appetites and desires, runs counter to the military purpose. It fosters vanity, and cherishes the gratification of sense through all the extent of the fabric, that is, from



the head which orders to the hand which executes. In a fabric so constituted, and overcharged with inflammable materials as the common military instrument is, the movements are irregular, and the effect of the act is often void through irregularity in the movement.

As it is the paramount object of military institution to reduce to order, and bring under command the movements of animal organism as stimulated to action by a variety of causes, so there is no effectual mode of doing it except by implanting a sentiment in the mind, which absorbs into itself, with a domineering force, all the caprices and wanderings of corporeal sense. The foundation of the discipline which effects this purpose is supposed to be laid in the primary school of military education; the routine, practised by the formed soldier, is supposed to improve and confirm the effect of what was begun in early years. A man, or nation, is most attracted by what most nearly concerns itself. The heroic acts of the Black Prince of England form the most brilliant, the most generous, and the most interesting part of the English history. As such, they are best calculated to engender the heroic spirit in Englishmen; and as a spirit of heroism is the only principle which ensures, at least which deserves success in war, a manual of achievements of that illustrious prince could not fail, if skilfully put together, to act usefully on the military spirit of the English soldier. A similar, and not less impressive impulse, might be given to the Lowland Scot by the history of Sir William Wallace. Wallace's history cannot be read without emotion by any one who possesses the sympathies of human nature: it kindles the ardour of a Scotchman into a flame. The Highlander of Scotland is naturally enamoured of war and warlike achievements; and he so abounds with martial fire, that there is generally more occasion to restrain than to urge him to the combat by artificial excitement.

The traits of heroic character, which stand in the records of national history, may be employed with advantage to improve military education. They animate courage to acts of enterprize, and they cement action by a national bond of union, inasmuch as they place national glory on a point of elevation to which all eyes are directed. In this view, the heroic acts of Wallace and the Black Prince of England might be thrown together in such form as to constitute a catechism for the British soldier, calculated



to inflame the mind to military enterprize, and, what is of more value, to guide its course in the paths of military virtue. If the sentiment of heroism, so engendered, were stimulated into action by music, the act becomes animated, united, and irresistible. The songs of Tyrtæus, the language of which is ardent to excess, appear to have strongly affected the soldiers of Sparta; and the hymn of the Marseillois, the tones of which seize the sympathies of the soul, and impel the whole movements of soul and body to one object, may be regarded as a grand instrument in the French revolution. In a word, an army the structure of which is adjusted by correspondence of physical power, the action urged by the electrizing influence of heroic leaders, and cemented by the cadence of national music in a national purpose, will be as a rock in the day of battle—not to be shaken, and as a torrent in its strength—not to be withstood.

The effects of well adjusted forms of exercise tend to perfect the mechanical union of the separate parts of armies. They improve and confirm the energies of the mind, and they contribute to the preservation of bodily health. It has been often observed, both in ancient and modern times, and it was well appreciated by the Romans, that perseverance in exercise in the open air serves to steel the body against the chances of disease, and is, in fact, of more value to the health of an army than an host of physicians. The observation, so well approved by the Romans, is verified in daily experience; but, though true and important in itself, it is not acted on systematically in the armies of modern Europe. The military exercises of the present day call forth no exertions, and excite no movements which try, extend, and confirm the stability of bodily power. They embrace no sudden transitions from cold to heat, and from heat to cold, from rest to action, and from action to rest, familiarizing the individual with vicissitude. The Roman soldier, who sweated daily, and who sweated profusely under toil, possessed comparatively little of that high charged irritability which explodes in disease on slight occasions; for, passing suddenly from cold to heat, and from heat to cold, in the routine of daily exercise, the changes which occurred in actual war were not new to him, and, as not new, produced no injurious effect. With the modern soldier, not inured in this practice by education, the trial cannot be made without danger. The fibre has little comparative elasticity, hence strong external impression

forcing the barrier of order, excites disease, and the military machine is crippled by causes which make no impression on the trained soldier.

But, besides the influence of active exercise, which in a manner steels the body against the impression of the ordinary causes of disease, there are other personal cares and practices which contribute in a high degree to preserve health, even to improve its condition. Among these, personal cleanliness is one of the most striking. The act of making the body clean affords the highest gratification of pleasure to animal sense of which man's nature is capable. It is accompanied with an accession of physical force and vigour; and it is not alloyed by vexation or remorse as a fruit of enjoyment. As the exercise of purifying the person has a tendency to increase physical power and to preserve bodily health, it will necessarily be one of the cares of a well-considered system of military economy to assure to the soldier the means of carrying the purpose into effect in the completest and most perfect manner. For that end, every soldier is supposed to be provided with a sponge and towel as a part of his necessaries; and, when so provided, it is supposed to be a custom, not to be dispensed with on any occasion, that he wash his body from head to foot every day, preferably at noon when the day is at the hottest, or when the animal heat has been preternaturally increased by previous exercise. It is not necessary to be scrupulously exact in the wiping off the moisture; it is even useful that the subject move about and expose his naked body to the open air after bathing. Besides the general ablution here alluded to, the hair ought to be washed frequently with soap and water, or water and pot-ash, brushed and completely cleared of vermin. If, in addition to ablution, the skin were occasionally rubbed with oil, as was done by the Greeks in ancient times, the health would be better protected against the injurious impressions of weather than it is, or can be protected by a shirt of double-milled flannel; and, while guarded on this point, it would also be guarded in a material degree against febrile contagions. Among necessaries, a frock or dressing gown of cotton cloth, to be employed as a night-shirt, cannot be otherwise considered than as an useful addition to the soldier's wardrobe. It is economical, as saving shirts and sheets, and it is salutary, as implying the necessity of exposing the body to the air in the act of dressing and undressing twice a day.

If the practices which are here described be duly executed, the body of the soldier will be perfectly clean, the sensations gratifying, the vigour improved to the utmost point of improvement, health will even be secure comparatively. Where a form of discipline, similar to that now recommended, is regularly enforced, the application of moisture to the skin, in the incidental wettings inseparable from field-service, as not new or unc customary, is little likely to be injurious; and as noxious causes, generated in the body and deposited upon the skin, are washed away by water, or swept away by currents of fresh air, contagious fever has no chance of being engendered in a barrack, or even of existing long in a barrack should it be accidentally introduced. In this manner, attention to personal cleanliness brings with it a numerous train of advantages to the soldier; and, as personal purification is a radical part of the institutions of military economy, the execution of the duty ought, in the just reason of things, to be conducted under the eye of commissioned officers not less punctually than evolution in tactic, or training to the use of arms.

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## SECTION II.

### BARRACKS, CAMPS, AND TRANSPORT SHIPS.

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THE proper accommodation of troops, in the field and in quarters, forms an important part in the economical arrangement of armies. Accommodation is of a twofold nature, namely, houses or barracks for permanent stations, tents or huts for moving armies. The adjustments of the barrack department are complex; and, among other things, they require knowledge of the causes which act on human health. Protection from weather by houses or tents, seems, on the first view of things, to be necessary for the safety of armies; but, useful or necessary as they are thought to be, the protection is often connected with causes more pernicious to health than complete exposure to an inclement sky in an inclement climate. Where many men are collected together and confined within narrow limits, the atmosphere of the confined circle is liable to be corrupted; and, as corrupted air is destructive of health, it is obvious that the fundamental rule, in

adjusting accommodation for troops, consists, or ought to consist, in combining protection from causes without, with security from contamination of causes that are within. With primary knowledge of the things of nature, and practical experience of the operation of the causes which act on the health of the human constitution, the object may be attained without much difficulty. Without such knowledge, the labour of the architect is misapplied, and money is expended for no good purpose. We stumble from error to error on this head as on others, suffer destruction from disease, murmur, and blame the physical constitution of things, when our own ignorance only is in blame.

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## CHAPTER I.

### BARRACKS.

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THE site and construction of barracks must be allowed by every one to be a point of important concern to a military nation. If barracks be injudiciously placed, or badly constructed, health suffers. If health suffer and life be lost from the operation of causes which arise from the bad position or faulty construction of the soldier's dwelling, the military department is responsible to the nation for a sacrifice of human life without necessity. The choice of a proper position for the establishment of military quarters is not obscure or difficult. It is known to the scientific by a view of locality, and to the ignorant by experience; but, unfortunately, men in high office ordinarily disclaim science, and the self-sufficient are not to be made wise by experience. They presume in their arrogance to control the laws of nature, and they are punished for their presumption. The position of barracks is sometimes commanded by circumstances which leave no option of choice to the architect. But, where this necessity does not exist, the barrack ought to be placed on a soil that is dry in itself, or that is capable of being made dry by draining; that is, distant from swampy grounds, or the foul banks of large and slow moving rivers; and, while such is the quality of soil and position, it is important that the building itself be sheltered from piercing winds

by the interposition of rising grounds, that it be shaded by trees which communicate freshness to the air, and that it possess the command of a perennial spring, or stream of running water, as essential to the comfort of the troops. Such position is proper in the best estimate of our reason; it is convenient for business, and it promises well for health.

The means of guarding against the contamination of air, which results from accumulating a number of persons into narrow space, are uniformly to be kept in view in constructing a military barrack. The purity of air depends on ventilation; but the mode of assuring thorough ventilation does not appear to be well understood by the architects of military barracks, not even by the architects of military hospitals. The contrivances of the barrack-architect permit heated air to escape and cold air to enter: but if the air escape, or enter vertically, no effective ventilation is produced in consequence, especially in apartments crowded with men, baggage, and bedsteads. Ventilation, as the term imports, consists in a constant movement of the interior air as connected with the exterior. The movement only deserves the name of ventilation which sweeps every corner of the apartment in a full stream, and carries whatever is offensive to an outlet; an effect only to be assured by windows which reach to the level of the floor in the manner of Venetian windows. If barrack-windows be constructed after the Venetian form, the air will not be easily contaminated, even if the apartment be crowded beyond the regulation. If constructed in the common manner, the apartment will not be ventilated even if it be not half full. It is suggested that barrack-windows descend to the floor: it is not meant that they be wholly of glass. The lower part, to the height of a man's head or higher, ought to be of wood, to be opened for ventilation as a common door; the upper part of glass, to admit light, as a common window. If barrack-windows be formed in this manner, the air of the apartment may be always preserved in purity in dry weather. When the weather is close, damp, or foggy, ventilation is effected by artificial means, that is, by the strong heat of fire. Economy is the essence of military arrangement; and, in order that the smallest quantity of fuel diffuse the greatest quantity of heat throughout the apartment, the fuel ought to be put into a low and open fire-stove, and placed at the centre of the room. If



this be done, heat will be equally diffused; and, the air being moved equally by the rarefying influence of heat, the ventilation will be uniform, and as perfect as it can be made by artificial means.

A barrack-room calculated for twelve or fourteen soldiers, with an apartment separated by a partition for a serjeant, is the size most consistent with the preservation of health, best calculated for enforcing the rules of discipline, and for ensuring good conduct among the men. Where soldiers are thrown together in masses into one common apartment, they naturally collect in groups, often at the corners of the room. The air is contaminated in consequence of the accumulation at the least ventilated places; and irregular acts, as they are then more likely to arise, so they are detected with comparative difficulty. Licentiousness or vice springs up in the multitude merely as multitude; and the restraints of discipline, as weakened and embarrassed by the extent of the circle, produce no beneficial effect. This occurs often; and from this it is comprehensible why a small apartment, as less exposed to such contingency, becomes preferable for the barrack accommodation of soldiers, on account of morals, as well as health.

It is an object of some importance to contrive the furniture of the barrack-apartment so that it do not impede movement in the interior air; for movement of the interior air, vulgarly called ventilation, is essential to the preservation of health. Where the floors of the apartment are of board, bedsteads are superfluous. If the soldier be furnished with a straw paliasse, he sleeps in safety and in luxury on a boarded floor. Every military officer who considers the reason of things, will, it is presumed, study to inure the soldier in peaceful times to customs and practices which correspond as nearly as possible with what occurs in war. The soldier who has been accustomed to sleep on bedsteads and in sheets in commodious barracks, conceives it to be a hardship to lay himself down on a hard board without straw, and dangerous to sleep on the bare turf without a mattress and a pillow. If such be hardship or danger, it must happen in the field; and when it does happen, the first trial gives dissatisfaction, occasions chagrin, and probably subverts health. Bedsteads in barrack-rooms with boarded floors are superfluous as furniture; they are injurious as luxury. A double



tier of bedsteads, such as obtains in some barracks, or a double tier of platform, marks an extreme ignorance of the nature of things. The contrivance contaminates the air by artificial condensation, favours the generation of the cause of contagious fever, and thereby tacitly and indirectly annihilates the army, or renders it ineffective through disease artificially produced. There are multitudes of examples in recent history in proof of the destructive effects of the practice alluded to; but they make little impression on those who rule. It is an invidious remark, but a true one, that there are proceedings in the affairs of men upon which experience is not sufficient to teach wisdom; and this unfortunately is one of them. If no bedsteads existed in barrack-rooms, and if no platforms were permitted to be erected for the purpose of a soldier's repose, perfect ventilation might be easily assured within the soldier's dwelling. If the palliasses which are spread upon the floor at night, were carried into the open air in the morning in dry weather, or piled up in the corner of the room when the weather is wet and foggy, the area of the apartment, being thus freed of incumbrance, nothing would present itself to interrupt ventilation, or to harbour impurities; for whatever is offensive or noxious, as moved into the currents produced by the strong heat of fire, or by the counter-openings of doors and windows, could not be otherwise than conducted to an outlet, and thence finally expelled from the interior of the apartment.

Besides palliasses with straw, sheets and blankets are the ordinary equipment of barrack-apartments. If, instead of sheets or blankets, a soldier were provided with a dressing-gown, or frock of strong cotton cloth, sufficiently long to cover the feet, he would, with the help of his cloak and the warmth of his comrade, sleep as warm as a soldier ought to be accustomed to sleep. When the soldier enters upon service, he has, or ought to have, the same equipment as in quarters. When this is the case, he experiences only a small change of condition; he feels little chagrin, and has little chance of suffering in his health. Nothing is new to him. He is taught to depend on himself for his personal comfort; and, as he moves in the same channel in peace as he may expect to move in war, he knows neither luxury nor want, is neither raised high in hope in the anticipation of indulgences, nor depressed in spirit with the

idea of accumulating hardships. It is this equality of temper which constitutes a soldier; it therefore becomes the duty of military institution to fashion the recruit, through a proper course of training, to attain it in such manner that he may endure, with impunity to his health and without chagrin to his temper, whatever occurs or may occur in the service of the field.

If barrack-apartments be infected with contagions, nitrous fumigations and whitewashing are common means employed to purify them: they are not sufficient if the cause be strongly fixed\*. A coating of hot varnish would, it is presumed, be effectual for this purpose, but it is expensive, and has perhaps never been tried. In prevention of the adhesion of contagions, washing the floors and walls with soap and hot water, or water and potash (provided the walls be polished) twice a week in warm and dry weather, or dry rubbing daily with a hard and heavy brush in cold, damp, and foggy weather, may be considered as sufficient security on this head, where the construction of the house and its equipments are of a proper kind. Washing or rubbing removes the noxious matter which adheres to the walls or floors. Ventilation, by the proper management of a volume of pure air entering at the level of the floor by doors and windows in fine weather, or by the movement produced through rarefaction from the action of the strong heat of fire in damp and foggy weather, prevents the aggregation of noxious emanations from the animal body, or dissipates them when already aggregated and in a state of virulence. Such is the sum of the writer's suggestions on this head. If the outline be filled up with due consideration to circumstances, and if the operations be carefully watched in practice, he ventures to say that fever, the product of bad air, will not arise in the quarter so treated, or if a contagious fever, arising from a remote source, be introduced contingently, it will not long exist. As things are, it is difficult to prevent the cause from being generated. When generated, and when rendered virulent by condensation, it is scarcely to be eradicated without abandoning the barrack for a time, and destroying the parts of the furniture that are most susceptible of contamination.

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\* The more efficient action of fumigation by chlorine has considerably lessened the danger of contagion.

## CHAPTER II.

## ENCAMPMENT.

THE manner of covering troops while employed in the field, is a subject of not less important concern than that of disposing of them in quarters. A necessity occurs in war, on many occasions, which leaves no option of choice in occupying posts of an unhealthy character; but there is unfortunately an authority, derived from example and the sanction of great names, which directs the military officer, when under no military necessity, to fix his encampment on grounds which are unhealthy in themselves, or which are exposed by position to the influence of noxious causes which are carried from a distance. Such advice proceeds from the desire to act on a presumption of knowledge which cannot be ascertained, rather than to act by the experience of facts which man is qualified to observe and verify. It is consonant with the experience of military people in all ages and in all countries, that camp-diseases most abound near the muddy banks of large rivers, near swamps and ponds, and on grounds which have been recently stripped of their woods. The fact is precise; but it has been set aside to make way for an opinion. It was assumed, about half a century since, by a celebrated army physician, that camp-diseases originate from causes of putrefaction, and that putrefaction is connected radically with a stagnant condition of the air. As streams of air usually proceed along rivers with more certainty and force than in other places, and as there is evidently a more certain movement of air, that is, more wind on open grounds than among woods and thickets, this sole consideration, without any regard to experience, influenced opinion, and gave currency to the destructive maxim, that the banks of rivers, open grounds, and exposed heights, are the most eligible situations for the encampment of troops. They are the best ventilated; they must, if the theory be true, be the most healthy. The fact is the reverse. But demonstrative as the fact may be, fashion has more influence than multiplied examples of fact experimentally proved. Encampments are still formed in the vicinity of swamps, or on grounds which are newly cleared of their woods, in obedience to

theory, and contrary to fact. The savage who acts by instinct, or who acts directly from the impressions of experience, has in this instance the advantage over the philosopher; who, reasoning concerning causes which he cannot know, and acting according to the result of his reasonings, errs, and leads others astray by the authority of his name. The savage feels, and, acting by the impression of what he feels, instead of fixing his habitation on the exposed bank of large rivers, unsheltered heights, or grounds newly cleared of their woods, seeks the cover of the forest, even avoids the streams of air which proceed from rivers, from the surface of ponds, or from lands newly opened to the sun. The rule of the savage is a rule of experience, founded in truth, and applicable to the encampment of troops even of civilized Europeans.

It is prudent, as now said, in choosing ground for encampment, to avoid the immediate vicinity of swamps and rivers. The air is there noxious; but, as the influence of the air thence originating does not extend beyond a certain limit, it is a matter of some importance to ascertain to what distance it does extend; because, if circumstances do not permit that the encampment be removed out of its reach, prudence directs that remedies be applied to weaken the force of its pernicious impressions. The remedies consist in the interposition of rising grounds, woods, or such other impediments as serve to break the current in its progress from the noxious source. It is an obvious fact, that the noxious cause, or the exhalation in which it is enveloped, ascends as it traverses the adjacent plain, and that its impression is augmented by the adventitious force with which it strikes upon the subject of its action. It is thus that a position of three hundred paces from the margin of a swamp on a level with the swamp itself, or but moderately elevated, is less unhealthy than one at six hundred on the same line of direction on an exposed height. The cause here strikes fully in its ascent; and as the atmosphere has a more varied temperature, and the succussions of the air are more irregular on the height than on the plain, the impression is more forcible, and the noxious effect more strongly marked. In accord with this principle, it is almost uniformly true, *cæteris paribus*, that diseases are more common, at least more violent, in broken, irregular, and hilly countries, where the temperature is liable to sudden changes, and where

blasts descend with fury from the mountains, than in large and extensive inclined plains under the action of equal and gentle breezes only. From this fact, it becomes an object of the first consideration, in choosing ground for encampment, to guard against the impression of strong winds on their own account, independently of their proceeding from swamps, rivers, and noxious soils.

There is room for improvement in the manner ordinarily employed for covering troops from the inclemency of the weather during a campaign: perhaps the very base of the plan might be changed with advantage. In countries covered with woods, abundantly supplied with straw and other materials applicable to the purposes of forming shelter, it is upon the whole better to raise huts and construct bowers than to carry canvass. Great expense, and considerable inconvenience, on the head of transport, is saved in the first instance by adopting that measure, and, what is of more importance, the service begets an interest to itself in all its stages. The individual is exercised by labour; and as his mind is employed in contriving and executing something for self accommodation, he is furnished with a daily opportunity of renewing the pleasure. The mode of hutting here recommended effectually precludes the evils arising from those contaminations of air in which contagion is generated; an evil which often arises in tents, and is carried about with an army in all its movements in the field.

It stands prominent as a fact in military history, that serious evils frequently arise in armies from the ravages of contagious fever; and as contagion is a contingent evil, it is obvious to common sense that the chances which give rise to its action ought to be precluded with every possible care. It is proved by experience, in armies as in civil life, that injury does not often result from simple wetting with rain, where the person is fairly exposed in the open air, and habitually inured to the contingencies of weather. Irregular troops which act in the advanced line of armies, and which have no other shelter from weather than a hedge or tree, rarely experience sickness, never at least the sickness which proceeds from contagion; hence it is inferred that the shelter of tents is not necessary for the preservation of health. Irregular troops, with contingent shelter only, are comparatively healthy, whilst sickness often rages with



violence in the same scene, among those who have all the protection against the inclemencies of weather which can be furnished by canvass. The fact is verified in experience, and the cause of it is not of difficult explanation. When the earth is damp, the action of heat on its surface occasions the interior moisture to ascend. The heat of the bodies of a given number of men, confined within a tent of a given dimension, raises the temperature within the tent beyond the temperature of the common air. The ascent of moisture is thus encouraged generally, by a change of temperature in the tent, and more particularly by the immediate or near contact of the heated bodies of the men with the surface of the earth. Moisture, as exhaled from the earth, is considered by observers of fact to be a cause which acts injuriously on health. Produced artificially by the accumulation of individuals in close tents, it may reasonably be supposed to produce its usual effects on armies. The balances of health are disturbed by its immediate operation in the first instance; and, under its action, a process arises subsequently in animal economy, which engenders a material that acts upon other animal bodies, and disturbs the rule and economy of health through a long series of subjects. A cause of contagious influence, of fatal effect, is thus generated by accumulating soldiers in close and crowded tents, under the pretext of defending them from the inclemencies of weather; and hence it is that the means which are provided for the preservation of health, are actually causes of the destruction of life.

But though tents, as means of protecting troops against the inclemencies of weather, are more injurious than useful to health, according to the ordinary construction and manner of adjustment, yet, as habits acquired by long custom grow into prejudices which are not easily overcome, it would be time lost to attempt to prove the advantages that might be gained by discontinuing such protection. The argument would not be listened to, for the suggestion savours of barbarous life. In the refined stage of manners and military habits in which we now are, artificial protections are deemed indispensable, and tents must perhaps on that account be always permitted to be an appendage of armies. But if this must be submitted to in compliance with custom, it is the duty of the army-physician to suggest the means of diminishing the mischiefs which arise from the

use of means which are deemed necessary. There are two causes which more evidently act upon the health of troops in the field than any other, namely, moisture exhaled direct from the surface of the earth in undue quantity, and emanations of a peculiar character, arising from diseased action in the animal system, in a mass of men crowded together. These are principal, and they are important. The noxious effects may be obviated, or, rather, the noxious cause will not be generated, under the following arrangement, namely, a carpet of painted canvass for the floor of the tent; a tent with a light roof, as defence against perpendicular rain, or the rays of a vertical sun, and with side-walls of moderate height, to be employed only against driving rains. To the first there can be no objection. It is useful, as preventing the exhalation of moisture from the surface of the earth; it is convenient, as always ready; and it is economical, as less expensive than straw. It may be cleaned every day with little trouble—without any cost—and it requires to be fresh painted only once a year. The other is practicable; but the application of it is connected with trouble. It is a truth, established by incontrovertible experience, that health is most secure, vigour most permanent and most effective, where man is employed daily in exercise, amusement, and pastime in the open air. The contact of the pure air conduces to health; and as that cannot be doubted, a roof, to defend from perpendicular rain, is all that is necessary for a soldier's accommodation in the field. A roof, similar to that of a marquee, is liable to be overturned by strong winds; a tent with close walls is liable to be contaminated. The first is the lesser evil, and even that evil may be easily obviated. If walls three feet in depth be provided for the round tents at present generally used for the accommodation of British soldiers, very little addition will be thereby made to the weight of carriage. The defence against wind and rain will be at command, and the air will not be liable to contamination; for the roof being lofty, and the walls only attached under strong wind, or driving rain, ventilation will not be impeded in its ordinary course. With such protection from weather, wet ground, and contamination of air, a soldier's health may be considered as secure under the continuance of a campaign of ordinary, even of protracted duration.

## CHAPTER III.

## TRANSPORT-SHIPS.

TROOPS, particularly British troops, are often embarked in transport-ships, to be carried to distant stations, either for field-service, or garrison-duty. It is commonly known, that if men be embarked in wholesome ships, themselves in perfect health at the time of embarkation, and without the seeds of disease lurking in their clothes or persons, they rarely suffer sickness, even during long voyages, unless there be palpable defect in economical arrangement. On the other hand, if the vessel be unwholesome in itself, or if the persons embarked carry with them the seeds of disease, the latent germ, called into activity by heat, or other contingency incident to the condition of troops embarked, expands, multiplies, propagates widely, and even, in some instances, acquires a virulence which strikes on the sources of life with the force of a pestilence. The ravages of contagious fever in hospitals and transport-ships are often terrible. They were enormous during some periods of the war in 1793; and, as the case is recent, it may be reasonably supposed that the memory of the losses then sustained is not yet obliterated from the memory of the war department. As the loss was so great on some occasions as in a manner to cripple the service, the minister, it is presumed, will not fail to institute an inquiry into the nature of the causes which occasioned it, in hopes of finding a remedy against the occurrence of similar calamity at future times. Whether such inquiry has actually been instituted, or what progress has been made in it, the writer does not pretend to know; but as the causes are obvious, and as they have fallen under his notice in the course of his official duty, he states with freedom, and in as plain a manner as he can, what they are.

In viewing this subject with attention, several points of material importance present themselves for consideration. 1st. The character of the ship as to wholesomeness, or exemption from infections. 2nd. Allowance of tonnage per man. 3d. Height between decks. 4th. Equipment of bedding, arrangement for sleeping, &c. 5th. Divisions for sick and convalescent. 6th. General means and provision for washing and purifying, &c. &c.

1st. It is important to ascertain, by the clearest possible evidence, the character which a vessel destined for the transport of troops bears for wholesomeness, prior to engagement for service. Some vessels are unhealthy without suspicion of engrafted contagions. This occurs sometimes in new ships; and as it then presumptively depends on some undefinable process in the seasoning of timber, it ceases in a course of time. But though nothing noxious exist in the condition of the timber, or in the condition of the hold, it notwithstanding happens that wherever fever has prevailed in any given vessel with such force as to engraft its cause into the beams or lining, the common means of purification are not sufficient to eradicate it completely. For example, an infected transport, after undergoing a common purification, has often remained healthy for a length of time when employed as a carrier of merchandize; when again converted to a troop-ship, the infection has burst forth with violence, and committed destruction. The fact is not doubtful; and the knowledge of it gives reason to believe that a vessel, which has been once thoroughly contaminated with the matter which produces fever, can scarcely be considered as safe, unless the decks and linings be removed, and all the surfaces which were exposed to the contact of the noxious cause be covered with a coating of hot varnish.

2nd. *Tonnage per man.*—It is commonly known that a rule relative to tonnage is inferred in all embarkations of troops: it is also known that the rule is not positive, or correctly adhered to in the British service. It varies arbitrarily, according to distance and destination of voyage; and it is not clear that the latitude of variation, assumed in such case, is always directed by a correct knowledge of the nature of things. For example, a greater allowance of tonnage is made for troops that are destined for the West Indies, than for those which are destined to navigate European seas. The rule is mistaken. In a voyage to the West Indies, where the fineness of the weather entices the soldier to the deck, where the trade winds ventilate the ship completely, and where the warmth of the climate modifies animal action in a manner that does not easily consist with the generation of febrile infections, the tonnage may be reduced to the smallest scale without apprehension of injury on the score of health. On the contrary, in European seas, particularly in

harbours and roadsteads, in cold, damp, and foggy weather, where the troops embarked are naturally inclined to cluster in groups for the sake of warmth, the air stagnates, and becomes impure; and there being, moreover, few or no objects in such situations calculated to rouse the attention, the action of life becomes languid, and the rise of the process which generates the cause of fever is facilitated. A crowded transport rarely fails to become sickly in such circumstances; and it is often observed that a contagious fever, introduced by accident, or arising spontaneously among the inmates of such vessel, propagates itself widely, and commits destruction to a great extent, in the very harbours and roadsteads of the kingdom. The latter end of autumn and beginning of winter, especially when the weather is close and damp, is the season of the year most favourable for generating and propagating contagious fever; and if troops be then crowded in barracks, or accumulated in the 'tween-decks of transport-ships, where accumulation is little admissible, the virulence of the cause often becomes extreme.

3rd. *Height between decks, and quantity of space for individual accommodation.*—There exists a rule, but it appears to be only loosely adhered to, of allotting a certain tonnage of shipping for the transport of a given number of troops. The largest allowance seems to be made for the longest voyages, and the warmest climates; but this is not uniformly right. The measure of quantity may be allowed to vary according to circumstances; but a fair proportion stands about two tons per man. If the arrangement of the space between decks be a proper one, this allowance may be supposed to be connected with sufficient space to permit every one embarked to move about with freedom. The quantity of the tonnage is the base upon which the calculation is ostensibly made in providing transport for troops; the measure of the space between decks is, in reality, that which requires to be principally considered, for it is that only with which the soldier is concerned. In a transport-ship, intended to be fitted up with a double tier of berths, the height between the decks ought not to be less than seven feet under the beam; and, that the soldier may have it in his power to lie at ease, not less than two feet ought to be allowed for the repose of his body.

4th. *Equipment of bedding, and arrangement for repose.*—Transport-ships are usually furnished with bedding for the voyage,



namely, a flock mattress and blanket. The bedding so furnished is not new in every instance; and, if not new, there is no certainty that it is not contaminated with contagious matter. The instances of the mischiefs which have arisen from infected bedding are numerous and authentic; and the writer has no hesitation in saying, that the desire to save a few dirty blankets and half-worn mattresses, has, on some occasions, destroyed military life to such extent, that the price of it, at the lowest computation, might have equipped the transport with furniture of satin and velvet. But as it is expensive to furnish new bedding for every embarkation of troops, and as mischief has often arisen from using that which is impure, the writer believes that the evil may be evaded by allowing the soldier to sleep on board, as he is supposed to sleep on shore, that is, in his cloak, with the addition of a cotton dressing-gown, as substitute for sheets. If the board be too hard, it may be covered with a blanket; or a moveable cot frame of canvass may be substituted for the platform—and this at no great expense. The whole cost of this equipment will not be equal to that of the mattress, for it will last longer, and the comfort will be great—all indeed that a soldier can desire.

It may be observed in this place, that transport-ships have been sometimes fitted up with hammocks instead of platforms. Where soldiers are accustomed to sea, and able to manage themselves like sailors, the advantages are evident. The space between decks is convertible into a clear area, by the removal of the hammocks to the deck, and, as such, it is capable of ventilation and thorough purification. This is desirable; but it is not always attainable; and where attained, it is moreover observed, that where soldiers are not accustomed to sea, and particularly where there are women and children on board, the 'tween decks of a transport-ship, equipped with hammocks instead of platforms, exhibits a scene of great confusion and distress in stormy weather. There is here a positive and very serious inconvenience—the advantage is only contingent. The moveable platform, whether of board or canvass, is therefore the more eligible mode of accommodating soldiers in their sleeping hours—canvass simply, or board covered with a blanket.

5th. *Division for sick and convalescent.*—Though it is not prudent, where there is option of choice, to carry soldiers on

board of transport-ships with marks of disease upon their persons—such disease at least as has the chance of being communicated to others—yet, as this necessity sometimes occurs in the course of service, and as diseases sometimes arise on board of ship which threaten danger to those who approach near them, the best remedy must be applied to the case that circumstances permit. The remedy consists in allotting a division of the vessel for the reception of the infected, namely, an apartment cut off by a partition from communicating with the berths of the healthy, so that the danger, if not entirely precluded, may be materially diminished. This division ought to be at the bow of the ship, under the forecabin; not as the best part of the ship for the purpose, but as the least obnoxious to others. The division for the sick is supposed to have a communication with the deck by its own hatchway—one side allotted for those who are in a state of convalescence, the other for those who are recently attacked, and yet in danger. The soldier who is in health is not allowed extra bedding on board of transport-ships; the soldier who is sick is, on the contrary, to be furnished with everything which, adding to comfort, promises to promote recovery, namely, a cradle or cot, hair mattress, sheets, blankets, sick dress, and change of linen.

6th. *Provisions for washing, purifying, &c. &c.*—It will be useful, as economical of labour, that transport-ships be furnished with a pump and *hose* at the bow of the vessel for the facility of conveying water to the deck. It will also be useful that they be furnished with fumigating apparatus and necessary materials for fumigation; and it is important that they be supplied with moveable fire-stoves for drying and purifying the air between decks in damp and close weather, or after the decks have been wet by washing. Offal tubs, for the use of the different messes during meals, are indispensable for maintaining order and propriety between decks; and a common pantry, under lock and key, for the reception of such part of the dressed provision as is not consumed at the ordinary meal, cannot well be dispensed with. It is almost unnecessary to mention that there ought to be port-holes in the sides of the ship for each tier of berths, as large and as numerous as is consistent with safety to the vessel. The air-holes, cut in the decks of transport-ships of late years, are inconvenient in various respects in a crowded ship, and they are in

reality of little or no use in so far as respects ventilation, the purpose for which they were projected. They are formed on a wrong principle, in the same manner as air-holes for ventilation in barrack-buildings.

Besides the above there are other minor necessities, useful in preserving a correct economy in transport-ships, which the occasion will best point out. The principal object in equipping vessels destined for carrying troops, consists in assuring circulation and purity of air in the 'tween decks, and in providing every kind of means that conduce to assure personal cleanliness among those who are embarked. The washing of the person is essentially necessary and always safe. Washing of the space between decks is to be permitted in dry weather only, or where the proper apparatus of fire-stoves is at command for drying up the moisture: moisture in a crowded place is demonstrably injurious to health; washing the 'tween decks ought therefore to be interdicted unless where they can be perfectly dried in the absence of the people.

A transport-ship equipped in the manner suggested, and not more crowded than a judicious regulation admits, may be supposed to continue for many months a safe abode for troops that are embarked in perfect health. Experience proves this to be fact; but the fact is sometimes disguised by the difficulty which exists in discerning correctly the conditions connected with perfect health. Disease, or the seeds of disease, lurk not unfrequently in persons, or in clothes, without being indicated by external signs; hence scrutiny, prior to embarkation, not only of the existing, but of the past condition, is necessary for confidence in the measures adopted. Where the latent seeds of disease are introduced into a crowded vessel, they expand suddenly as animated by warmth; and acting with force, they propagate and spread to all within—often destructively. To prevent this occurrence is important: it has scarcely as yet obtained attention.

Troops destined for embarkation may be considered as presented under three conditions:—1st. In a state of perfect health, in so far as respects exemption from actual disease, or suspicion of the cause of disease lurking in the habit. 2nd. In a state of apparent good health, but doubtful as to security, inasmuch as the subjects are drawn from situations where reputed causes of disease exist in force. 3rd. In a state of actual malady—the disease, endemic, epidemic, or contagious fever.

1st. The first class of troops, destined for embarkation, is supposed to be drawn from well-ventilated barracks, or from tents that have stood upon favourable ground in the early part of summer. The preservative precautions necessary to be taken in this case are few and simple. No danger is apprehended from the importation of contagion, for no contagion exists in the quarter or encampment from which the troops are drawn; hence the chief care is directed to the institution of suitable rules of regimen to be observed during the voyage. The diminution of the ordinary ration, where troops are embarked on board of transport-ships, is a judicious regulation. It obtains, it is believed, in all cases. It may be considered upon the whole as preventive of sickness; but if it should not be thought sufficient to prevent repletion under a long-continued state of inaction, a pint of salt-water, or other purgative, may be employed as auxiliary; and it may in fact be usefully employed once a week.

2nd. Much care, and, in many cases, much judgment, is necessary for the effectual execution of the preventive plan of discipline, which applies to the second case. It is supposed that no disease manifests itself at the time of embarkation; but, as it is known by experience, that if the human body be exposed to the influence of causes which arise from particular soils and situations, an impression is made on the habit, and a secret operation, results from the impression, which, taking root, advances by a regular but imperceptible process to a morbid development at a given time. The development may not be, and rarely in fact is, completed before the expiration of seven days, a fortnight, a month, or even a longer period from the time, of application. The endemic cause of fever is of this character. The material does not adhere to inanimate substances, consequently it is not conveyed by the medium of apparel to distant places. It appears to exert its first and chief action on the alimentary canal and its connexions; hence it is obvious that, to prevent its explosion, it should be primarily and principally attacked in the quarter where it chiefly resides. In this view, emetics and purgatives are among the most useful of the medical aids employed in prevention. These, namely, an emetic and purgative soon after embarkation, followed by the judicious use of stomachic bitters, a measured and correct regimen of diet, that is, a ration of provisions diminished in quantity, well cooked and good in



quality, presents itself as a direct remedy to obviate a great deal of the evil which so frequently arises from the promiscuous embarkation of troops in the circumstances alluded to.

3rd. The arrangement of means for the prevention of the diffusion of disease on board of ship requires much consideration, and can only be carried properly into effect under the direction of a discerning medical officer. The circumstances of service sometimes compel military officers to order the embarkation of troops when they are not in health. Danger is to be apprehended from the measure. The extent of the danger ought, when known, to be stated by the medical officer to the officer commanding, and stated in such terms that, if error be committed, it may not be committed in ignorance. Nothing short of imperious necessity can justify the proceeding alluded to; for, without foresight of what is to happen, and great exertion to counteract the ordinary course of things, the introduction of contagious fever into a transport-ship is calculated to produce, and in many cases actually has produced, great destruction of military life. Wherever a fever, possessing the character of contagious, prevails among troops, whether in quarters or in camp, it may be assumed as a truth, that the clothing of such troops is not free from the seeds of disease; consequently, that such clothing cannot be introduced into the 'tween decks of a transport-ship with impunity. If this be so, it follows in the true reason of things, and it is consistent with the strictest rules of economy, that the woollen part of the apparel, the proper purification of which is little to be depended upon, be thrown into the sea. It avails little to bathe, wash, and purify externally, even to exterminate the contagion in its first operation by emetics and purgatives, if the cause be again applied to the skin through polluted garments. The writer is aware that a proposition which recommends the destruction of infected clothing, whether the property of the colonel, the soldier, or the state, will startle those who form the army estimates. Those calculate the cost of dead matter; but, if any among them estimate the value of the living man, and the value of the materials which destroy his health, and strike a balance between the value of an old coat and the life of an effective soldier, he would not, it is presumed, consider the proposition as extravagant. If one must be sacrificed, it is needless to say which is the least expensive. The money value of men who died in hospitals



and transport-ships of late years, from diseases engendered in unwholesome dwellings, and propagated to others by infected clothing, exceeds all calculation. It was a melancholy loss; for it was a loss which might, and which ought to have been avoided. In all cases therefore, where troops are embarked from infected barracks, infected camps, or from infected hospitals, it will be found, in summing up the final account, to be a rule of radical economy to destroy every the minutest article of the woollen clothing that is in their possession: without such precaution the other means adopted for the preservation of health will not be of avail.

Where troops are embarked with all the precautions here stated, their health may be considered as secure during a long voyage, if proper regulations be adopted in the interior management. The chief causes of the sicknesses which occur on board of ship arise from corruption of air in consequence of over crowding, from stagnation of air in consequence of defective means of ventilation, or excessive dampness, from torpor in consequence of defective excitement of animal power, from too great fulness in consequence of over-feeding, or from degenerated nutrition in consequence of errors in the mixture of food. The corruption of air from over-crowding is obviated by adhering to a proper regulation respecting tonnage, and by dividing the complement of troops into three watches, so that one division be always on deck and employed in exercise for amusement, or in exercise that belongs to duty. Ventilation is promoted, and corrupted air is rectified, by nitrous fumigations, by chlorine, by the heat of fire carried in stoves to different parts of the ship, or by the counter-opening of port-holes in fine weather. Damp, or exhaling moisture, is hurtful to the health of those on whom it strikes; hence the introduction of wet clothing between the decks of a transport-ship is to be expressly forbidden, the injunction rigidly enforced. For instance, those who are on guard, if wet with rain or sea-water while on deck, are not to be permitted to go below until they put off their clothing; and, that this may be done without inconvenience, cloaks or great coats for the watch are to be considered as a necessary provision for troops embarked.

The exercises which contribute most to the preservation of health cannot be pursued to extent on board of ship; but such as are practicable ought to be practised with diligence. Of these,

fencing, cudgelling, dancing, and sparring, are the principal. Certain portions of time ought therefore to be allotted to the practice of each; and care ought to be taken that the soldier practice with exertion, so that the circulation of the blood be driven to every part of the exterior, with such force as to occasion a warm and general perspiration throughout. The effect of washing the surface of the body with cold water, particularly with cold salt-water, is then beneficial. It imparts vigour to animal life, and serves, in an eminent degree, to confirm animal health. But, besides the benefits to be derived from the mere practice of bodily exercise, the proceeding may be so directed as to produce an impression on the mind of more importance than even bodily health. National songs, of simple expression and martial character as sung in chorus by the mass, are powerful in this view; and they deserve a place in the routine of discipline ordered to be practised by troops embarked. But useful as these means are, simply in their own nature, the effect is imperfect unless it be consecrated by an hymn to the Deity at the close of the day. The hymn sanctifies; it renders the soldier invincible, inasmuch as it contributes to plant the opinion of his military duty on the base of religion. The ordinary attention and cares of officers have a military purpose in view; they may consequently be considered as proceeding from an interested motive. The discipline which leads a soldier to a nearer view of his Creator, is felt by the soldier as a kindness conferred upon himself; and it is ordinarily acknowledged by him with gratitude as such. The impression of religion is the highest and surest pledge of courage in all cases of difficulty. This is an important truth; and it may be assumed as a fact, that as the soldier who possesses that paramount sensibility to Deity which constitutes religion, cannot be made the servile instrument of an outrageous despot, so a just sovereign may calculate on his duty by the duration of his life.

The evils consequent to a full diet in a state of inaction were known to those who went before us, and they were in some degree averted by a diminution of the ration of provisions where troops were embarked on board of ship. The change of the species of the provisions in the different days of the week, seems also to imply that the subject had been considered with care, and arranged under the guidance of a principle of science. The Dutch, of all European nations, have formed a table of sea-diet with the

greatest judgment: the English under the influence of the national prejudice, that high feeding gives the highest portion of physical power, err the most.

The proper management of troops in transport-ships is an important concern; but the outline of the arrangement is only given in this place. Instances of the advantage of knowledge and attention over ignorance and neglect on this head are numerous. It has happened, and it happens often, that of two men similarly circumstanced in all things, one preserves the troops under his command, through knowledge, care, and attention, in a state of perfect health during a long voyage, another, from want of knowledge, or through indolence, permits disease to arise, to extend itself, and to infect the mass. If such difference in capacity and diligence exist between military men, it ought to be known; and, if known, we must regret that it is not always appreciated. Those who are capable and diligent are those only who ought to be placed in charge of transport-ships. The trust is an important one; but, in ordinary circumstances, it is little regarded as an useful one, for military value belongs, in common opinion, to the art of applying the instrument, not to the art of keeping it in a state fit for application.

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### SECTION III.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE MARCH OF THE TROOPS.

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THE proper care and management of troops in the field is an object of important concern to the success of the campaign. It is important; but the execution is difficult, for it requires minute attention on the part of the officer to maintain all the parts of it in correspondence with each other, and thereby to assure an efficient act at the point of conflict. The march cannot be properly conducted without correct previous arrangement of the parts of which the army is composed, and the parts can only be correctly arranged by those who know private conditions in their minutest relations. It is a part of the duty of the superior officer to obtain correct information concerning the nature of the roads

on which the troops he immediately commands are ordered to march, and also to obtain as distinct knowledge as he can of the nature of the ground on which they are destined to fight. Without knowledge of roads, not merely distance, but the number and nature of impediments which may be expected to arise in the route, there can be no precise calculation of time, or estimate of efficient power, when the march is accomplished, and the point of attack gained. The officer who commands in chief forms his plans, and adjusts the order of his movements, in the idea that all the parts in his instrument are perfect, and capable of effective action. He supposes that they are, it is the duty of subordinate officers to assure the truth of what he supposes. In assuming this as a position, it is indispensable, in order to be certain of effect, that the state of health among the troops be examined rigidly by a medical officer; and further, that the condition of the feet, and all other things connected with the useful power of the soldier, be examined and ascertained to be serviceable by a military officer of the company, prior to the commencement of the route.

The feet of a foot-soldier demand particular attention from the military officer who confides in the correctness of movement for the accomplishment of purposes. As soldiers suffer pain, and fail in their duties from a neglect on this head alone, it is necessary that the officer know, by actual observation, that they are in fit condition, that is, that they are without blisters, the toes without corns, the flesh not pierced by the growth of the nails; and that the shoes, while strong and durable, correspond to the foot by their form or fashion. Besides the inspection of the feet, there are other of the soldier's concerns which require to be examined and properly adjusted before the march commence. British soldiers can rarely be left to their own discretion in matters which require foresight. For this reason, it is the duty of the officer to know, by actual observation, that every man of his immediate company is furnished with what is fitting for his purposes; and, in the first place, that the articles termed necessities, while they do not exceed the proportion which is strictly useful for the wants, be so arranged for carriage as to be of the least possible inconvenience to the person who carries them. If they do not exceed the schedule proposed above, the incumbrance from weight will be inconsiderable; and if they be disposed in a haver-

sack hung over the shoulder like a sportsman's pouch, the cloak hanging diagonally over the other, the balance will be equal, and the individual will not be incommoded by them, either on the march or in action.

Where calculations are made for the attainment of a given purpose, a precise measure of means is indispensable. The study of measure is therefore important. It is, unfortunately, oftener judged by the eye than by correct experiment; hence the equipments of the soldier, termed necessities, are multiplied capriciously, with the view of adding to his comfort. The case is mistaken. There is more value at market in six clean shirts than in one. There is not more personal comfort; and if there be not more comfort, there is inconvenience from the possession of quantity. A knapsack crammed with necessities, so as to load a foot-soldier like a pack-horse, oppresses by its weight, consequently consumes a part of the power which is intended for, and which ought to be, reserved for military exertion. Superfluity of baggage is a common error in the British service; and the usual manner of disposing of it for carriage is not, moreover, well contrived. A full knapsack rolls upon the back like a billet of wood; and shoulder-straps gall the skin, if the whole weight of the pack bear upon the shoulder. To remedy the rolling of the pack, and the galling of the shoulders, the shoulder-straps are joined by a belt across the breast. The remedy is worse than the evil it is intended to remedy; and it is worse for this reason, that few persons are aware of the mischief which it occasions. The pressure of a cross-belt confines the free motion of the chest, and impedes respiration. Whatever impedes free respiration increases the heat of the body beyond the just temperature. It is thus that a person who joins the shoulder-straps of his pack by a belt across the breast is oppressed with heat, and pants for breath, frequently without adverting to the cause which occasions the increase of heat and oppression. On the contrary, where the pack is supported wholly by the shoulder-straps, though the shoulders may be galled, the respiration is free, and the body is less liable to be overheated.

The error now stated, with others which obtain in the equipment of foot-soldiers, deserves the consideration of the tactician. It proceeds from the presumption of judging of fitness by the eye, instead of being guided by the knowledge which



results from experience in trial. The remedy is obvious; but, whether the radical remedy be applied or not, it is the duty of the commissioned officer, when troops are in the field, to know that the necessaries of the soldier, such as they are, be well arranged for the convenience of carriage, and that the soldier himself do not undertake the march without suitable preparation, namely, without repast, whether tea, coffee, or soup; without bread and cheese in his haversack, and vinegar in his canteen, preferable to rum, which used to be the allowed ration of British troops on foreign service.

When a soldier has been prepared in the manner stated, he proceeds on the march, and marches at precisely the same pace in all parts of the column. As soldiers are supposed to be arranged in companies according to powers of exertion, and as there must necessarily be some variety in the effective power of companies, it is obvious to common sense that the least effective companies ought to be placed in front, the movement being there least embarrassed. The rate of the slow pace is three miles per hour—the rate of the exerted pace four. These paces are to be changed at stated intervals only, time and distance being measured exactly by an officer who leads at a justly regulated step. If this be not done with care, a precise effect cannot be expected in combined movement; and hence it happens that by the neglect, or by the transgression of this fundamental rule of order, the military purpose is defeated, or less completely executed than it might be.

Various contingences arise in the course of a march which oblige individuals to leave the ranks. The act of leaving the ranks is unmilitary in appearance; and reprehensible irregularities not unfrequently follow the practice of it. In order therefore to remove all shadow of pretext for the occurrence of such necessity, it will be proper that a general halt be made for five minutes at the end of the first hour, so that every one may, during the interval, adjust those personal concerns which require adjustment. The march of the first hour is supposed to be performed at the slow pace, that of the second at the accelerated. The column halts for fifteen minutes or more at the end of the second hour; and, during the halt, the individuals of the column are supposed to recline, or assume a horizontal position, for it is only in the recumbent posture that the limbs

experience the full benefit of rest. When fifteen minutes have expired, the march is resumed at the slow pace. When the hour is completed, the column halts five minutes for purposes of personal adjustment; and, at a given signal, resumes its course at the accelerated pace. In this manner a journey of fourteen miles is performed in the space of four hours and twenty-five minutes, including the time allowed for halting; and if the march be conducted in the manner proposed, no person, it is presumed, who is fit to be admitted into the military ranks will fail in performing it. A distance of fourteen miles is a common day's march for troops on ordinary service. Circumstances sometimes occur which require that the distance be lengthened, even that it be doubled. The exertion will not, it is believed, bear hard upon well-formed troops, if due care be taken in adjusting the primary arrangement, and due consideration employed in directing the subsequent steps of the march. For example, it is understood that a halt for the space of one hour take place after the performance of the first part of the allotted march, and that the shoes, socks, and trowsers, or breeches and leggins, be then taken off, the feet, legs, and thighs washed, or bathed in cold water, if the nature of the halting-ground supply water in sufficient quantity for that purpose. If water be deficient, the lower extremities may be rubbed with a wet towel, and exposed to the cool air. Such is a simple expedient only; but it restores vigour and capability of exertion equal to some hours of rest. If hunger or faintness be felt by any one, a crust of bread with a morsel of cheese, washed down by tea, or vinegar and water, with which every soldier is understood to be provided, is sufficient to remove it. The march is to be resumed at the expiration of an hour; and, with the observance of the rules prescribed, the distance, it is presumed, will be performed with ease in the calculated time, if care has been taken in the primary arrangement to separate the weak and inefficient parts from the sound and effective.

The arrangement and transport of baggage, as connected with the march of an army, is another of the matters which requires to be adjusted with knowledge and foresight. If a soldier be equipped in the manner suggested, he is independent in himself, as carrying all things on his own person for which he has immediate occasion. But when an army advances in

expectation of meeting the enemy, it is necessary that its baggage and incumbrances be brought together and follow in the rear, properly arranged, so as to move without confusion, and so conducted as to arrive at the place of destination in due time. The baggage of a fighting army consists of tents, &c. undressed provisions of the day, persons who are indisposed by sickness, women, and children. These proceed in the rear, under military escort, the pace calculated so as to correspond, according to a proportional rule, with the movements of the military columns. It is necessary that the column of baggage observe the most exact discipline, and the most exact order on the route, otherwise the expectation of the soldier will be disappointed, perhaps the military plan will be disconcerted by neglecting things essentially necessary, but which do not strike at first sight as being of importance.

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## PART VI.

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### OUTLINE OF A SCHEME OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENT FOR COLONIAL POSSESSIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### GENERAL VIEW OF SERVICE IN TROPICAL CLIMATES.

MILITARY service implies change of place and condition. Change of place and condition implies the occurrence of disease; for disease, according to common observation, arises as the effect of new impression made upon animal organism by the application of new or foreign causes. Change in circumstances, and consequent disease, happens under military service everywhere; it happens more frequently and more remarkably in the foreign than in the native soil. In this manner, the natives of Europe, or of the higher latitudes of North America, suffer sickness under migration to the torrid zone. Sickness, and mortality from sickness, is there proportionally high—considerable among colonists, sometimes enormous among the soldiers who are sent from Europe for the protection of colonies. If this be so, and if life be considered as a possession of value in a national point of view, the loss of life resulting from the military protection that is given to commercial adventurers in foreign climates, and to the prosecution of foreign war for the sake of conquest, is a serious loss in the balance of national accounts. Man is the operative instrument through which the nation as a corporate body attains power and obtains wealth; consequently, if the health and life of man be not husbanded with care, conquest, which is an accumulating operation of the state, stagnates in defect of operative instruments, and the nation becomes bankrupt through its ambition, and its carelessness. If this be so, it is reasonable to suppose that an investigation into the principles which regulate the balances of health among the military, will not be thought superfluous in the view of the wise economist. The case is important; and the

sovereign power will be false to its own interest if it do not apply a remedy, when furnished with proof that a remedy is attainable, and particularly when informed that it is not difficult of attainment.

Auxiliary to the investigation in question, the writer takes the liberty of giving a preliminary view of the subject as drawn from a wide field of experience. Excess of irritability, constitutional or contingent, constitutes a quality of habit which favours the invasion of acute disease. Irritability is augmented by heat; and heat, acting on moisture, produces expansion in the volume of the animal structure. Expansion is a physical effect of heat; and the habit of the native of northern latitudes expands rapidly, in consequence of the action of the increased heat of tropical latitudes. While the expansion from heat does not exceed a given limit, the operation is animating, for it excites the power of animal life. But, while this is evident on one part, it is no less true on another, that if the effect of the force which produces the expanding act be obstructed in its channel by accident, the barrier which limits the movement of action and reaction in its natural routine, is violated, the customary course of things is subverted, and a train of movement commences in a new circle, constituting what in common language is termed disease. Excess of stimulation from heat produces expansion, and produces it suddenly. If the expanded fluid find issue by a common outlet, the health sustains no material injury. If the outlets be obstructed, the customary action of health is subverted, and the effect terminates in one or other of the forms of febrile irritation to which the human constitution is liable. Febrile irritation constitutes diseased action. Diseased action is generally a creative process disposed to terminate in organic destruction, and ultimately in general death. Expansion from heat is obviously a predisposing cause of acute disease; and it is obvious to man's common sense that this cause is comparatively strong in tropical climates. It is fully ascertained by experience, that persons of a full, robust, and athletic habit, of a tense and rigid fibre which does not easily yield to impulses which violate structure, are more liable to fevers, particularly to such fevers as are violent and dangerous, than those of a spare habit, even than those who are valetudinary and of a delicate and lax texture. Febrile irritation is rare where the skin is open and perspirable, where the bowels



are lax, approaching to diarrhoea, where pimples, boils, and eruptions appear on the skin, particularly where they appear on the legs, degenerate into sores and ulcers of different kinds. Evacuation is thus preservative of health; suppression of evacuation is productive of disease; and it is often productive of fever of the most aggravated kind.

As excess of heat and moisture is an ostensible cause of the frequency of acute disease in tropical climates, it is evident that, with a view to prevention, the impressions of such causes should be avoided as far as possible, or that the irritability upon which the cause acts should be lowered artificially, so that a given force of irritation do not produce the subversive effect it would otherwise produce. The balance of the healthy action of the system may thus be preserved by reduction of the heat and moisture of the climate, or by blunting the susceptibility of man to common irritations.

The influence of heat acting on moisture constitutes the obvious physical cause of expansion; the excess of expansion, as forcing the barrier of organic harmony, is the obvious cause of febrile tumult. The cause usually abounds in low grounds, in rich and fertile soils, on the banks of slow moving rivers, near stagnant waters, swamps, and ponds. It usually exists in a higher proportion near the sea-coast than in the interior, inasmuch as the shore is the reservoir of the inland country—the depot of its moisture and its riches. The interior is, for the most part, elevated; and it is cool in proportion to its elevation. The surface is dry; or if not dry in itself, its moisture circulates briskly from declivity of position, and the health of the European is comparatively secure from injury.

The question under consideration is important in itself; and it claims the particular attention of the military officers of the state from its intimate connexion with military health. It is not altogether easy to estimate, so as to form precise opinion on the subject; but some light will be thrown upon it by tracing the gradations of febrile disease according to variations of locality. The rule which influences salubrity in the tropical climate is nearly the same in all the islands in the West Indies; that is, it rests on the same base, though it varies occasionally through circumstances of accident, namely, force of cause, or mode of application. The endemic of the West Indies may be considered

as a fever of periodic movement, modified in character—from intermittent, mild, and regular, to a form so concentrated, and with movements so complicated and obscure, that the type cannot be distinctly traced. The endemic is remitting, or intermitting in the native inhabitant, in persons who are assimilated to climate by long residence, and commonly in all descriptions of persons in wet seasons and on swampy grounds. In strangers, who are natives of northern latitudes, who are young in years, strong and athletic in form, full in habit, rigid in fibre, who are crowded in quarters, or who live in a circumscribed atmosphere, the form is continued, the symptoms concentrated, the course rapid, the fatal termination within the fifth day.

The endemic fever of the West Indies is usually of an aggravated form near the sea-coast, particularly in valleys between mountains, in the vicinity of swamps, foul grounds, the oozy banks of rivers or brooks. It is comparatively mild, and ordinarily assumes a periodic type, namely, remittent or intermittent, at the distance of a few miles interior, especially in mountainous districts, at least behind the first ridge of mountain. Diarrhoea and ulcer of the legs are there common: the latter prevails, and is almost the sole disease in the dry season. On the central ridge of the larger islands febrile disease is rarely seen; slight diarrhoea, boils and eruptions terminating in ulcers on the legs, are almost the only complaints which occur among the military who occupy the higher stations.

Such is the outline of gradation in the endemic fever according to locality. The intensity of the disease preserves a ratio with the heat of the atmosphere and the stagnant moisture of the soil. The form is modified by a multitude of contingent causes, namely, force and direction of winds, protection from, or direct exposure to, sources of noxious exhalation. If this be fact—and it is well ascertained by an experience of many years—it can scarcely be supposed that government will refuse to take advantage of the informations attained through unprejudiced observation; and from these informations make such a disposition in the quarters of the military as to secure health in the best attainable manner. The subject nearly concerns the nation, inasmuch as it affects the health and lives of the soldiers who are purchased with the nation's money. The balance of advantages derivable from the preservation of the health of the military on foreign

stations, is demonstratively great on the bare ground of economy; but great as it may be, there is no authentic evidence before the public that proper steps have been taken to give it effect, notwithstanding the promise, and confident assertion, which the minister for the war department made to the house of commons in the year 1807. The question was broached by a member of the house, and it was then asserted by the minister at war that the matter had been scientifically considered, and that no means would be neglected that gave promise of diminishing the evil. The house was satisfied with the minister's word—and sickness pursued its course.

It may be observed in this place, that prospects of advantage, or convenience in matter of trade and commerce, generally rule arrangements in colonial settlements, at least in sugar-colonies; and as the produce of the soil is a commodity intended to be transported to a foreign market, the facilities of transport, namely, conveniences for export and import, decide the choice of position with the first settler. Corresponding with this view, towns are ordinarily built upon the sea-coast, in bays and creeks, or near the mouths of rivers, for the sake of harbour and other contingent accommodations. The military destined to serve in the colonies is stationed for the ostensible protection of the town or the sea-port, whether the seat of government, or the depot of the marketable commodity; consequently the troops, as stationed in the vicinity for the purposes specified, are frequently condemned to dwell in situations where causes which subvert health, which even rapidly destroy life, abound to excess. This is the fact; and with this condition of the fact fully exposed, it may be thought not to be unworthy of the parental cares of the state to examine the subject with care, for the sake of ascertaining whether or not it be possible to unite defence and protection with such disposition of military force as is consistent with the preservation of health. It is positively true, (proved to demonstration in numerous instances, but proved by accident, not by avowed experiment,) that European troops may be so stationed in the islands of the West Indies, as to retain their health nearly as perfectly as they could be expected to retain it in their native country.

The air of the interior and mountainous parts of the larger of the inter-tropical islands is comparatively cool and pleasant,

and not unfriendly to the European constitution. There are numerous instances where European soldiers have remained for seasons, and there is presumption to believe that they might have remained for a long life, without sustaining injury on the score of health, if they had been permitted to remain at an interior station. No one will pretend to say that such a disposition of the military force as assures the continuance of the soldier's health, is not a desirable object; but it is not always attainable as things are. Where the object is not fully attainable by the means which are within the sphere of military comprehension, it is necessary to bring all available assistances from the resources of the medical art to give aid to the purpose. It is the duty of government, and it will be the pleasure of a paternal one, to meet the evils which cannot be avoided, and to combat them with the skill of science. It has been repeatedly stated that excess of heat and moisture is a prominent cause of febrile disease in tropical countries. It acts by an expansive power, forces the limits of order and harmony in organic structure, forces its way by the skin or bowels, forms depositions in the interior, or, in failure of that, produces general febrile tumult. If the European soldier be exposed to its influence in the course of his duty, it belongs, as now said, to the military officer to counteract its operation; and as a military officer can scarcely be supposed to possess knowledge of the means by which the counteraction is to be effected, it belongs to medical science to instruct him on that head.

The security of health under exposure to strong causes of disease, depends upon the stability of the power of resistance in the individual habit. The power of resistance consists in this case in irritability of a comparatively low scale; in other words, in a slow susceptibility of expansion through stimulation by heat and moisture. The condition so defined is attained, 1st, by diminishing the quantity, and by changing the quality of diet; 2nd, by artificial evacuation, preventive of repletion; and 3rd, by such occupation of mind and body as maintains animal action efficiently in the constituted channels of health, in spite of the impression of the contingent causes that are calculated to subvert it. Abstinence, occasional depletions, and active exercise, are the means.

The case has been tried; and it has proved on many occasions that persons who live abstemiously in tropical climates, who live chiefly on vegetable and farinaceous foods, which furnish a less heating nutriment than the flesh of animals, not only escape sickness, but preserve health, vigour, and activity, unimpaired; while those who live fully and fare sumptuously suffer signal sickness, and die in great numbers. This is frequently exemplified in war. Prisoners, as furnished with a measured ration of diet, chiefly bread and rice, rarely experience sickness; at least, they are in a manner exempted from the sickness which depend on climate. The fact was proved in St. Domingo in the war 1793\*. From this fact, and others similar, we are warranted to conclude that vegetable diet, at least diet with a comparatively large proportion of the vegetable material, is best calculated for the security of health in hot countries. Besides diet on a low scale and chiefly vegetable, sobriety, or temperance in the use of malt and spirituous liquors, is justly reckoned among the number of preservative means. The ration of rum, as already observed, is a pernicious bounty to the British soldier. It is rarely serviceable on the score of health immediately, and it is pernicious in its consequences through the habits which the continued use of spirituous liquors engenders. But, though this bounty has been the cause of incalculable evil to the army, it is not denied that there are occasions where a small glass of pure rum may be useful, even as preservative of health. It invigorates

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\* A detachment of British soldiers was captured at sea on the passage to St. Domingo, in the year 1796, and carried into Cape François. The ration given to them was chiefly rice with salt herrings, and occasionally a small allowance of raw spirit. The prisoners were sometimes employed to load and unload ships. They did not suffer in their health; at least, they did not lose one of their number while they remained in captivity. Their comrades, who were within the British lines, suffered great sickness during this period, and enormous mortality. The prisoners were sent to Cape St. Nicolas' Mole, after six months detention, alert, active, animated, and cheerful. They entered immediately upon the

British ration, and in six months nearly one half of them were numbered with the dead. Illustrative of the principle here contended for, it is mentioned, on the authority of a person of veracity and a party in the case, that between fifty and sixty British officers (prisoners) were allowed to live at Pointe a Petre in Guadeloupe on parole. They had plenty of provisions, meat, drink, and money. In four months thirty-two only remained alive. They had been, prior to that time, confined upwards of twelve months in hulks in the harbour of Pointe a Petre, on a scanty allowance of food, often not exceeding six ounces a man per diem: none of them died during that period.



the functions of the stomach, particularly where the food is vegetable or farinaceous. The fact cannot be denied, and the explanation of it is consistent with just views of animal economy. But if it be granted that a small glass of rum, given as a stimulating liqueur, may be serviceable for the purpose stated, it does not follow that rum mixed with water, vulgarly grog, is useful as a diluting beverage. Water is the true diluent, or quencher of thirst; and it is the most suitable, for it engenders no desire to drink beyond utility. The fabricated liquor engenders a desire for more; and as it entices to drink where there is no real thirst, it confirms the subject in habits which diminish his value, destroy his life; and thus punish, in conformity with the universal law of Nature, the ingenuity, if it be so called, which contrives indulgences for artificial appetites and superfluous cravings.

2nd. Besides measured diet, that is, abstinence in eating and temperance in drinking, there are other means which, diminishing the volume of the fluids, may be considered as preventive of the explosions of disease. These are subtractive, namely, blood-letting and purging. It is proper to be remarked in this place, that there are times of repletion, or what may be termed periods of irritability, occurring at intervals, apparently connected with the phases of the moon, new or full, and more or less connected with a disposition to febrile explosion through a cause we do not comprehend, but which appears to be connected with fulness or irritability; hence it is obvious that purgatives, namely, calomel and jalap, or calomel followed by a solution of purging salts, administered on the third day preceeding the full or new moon, bid fair to prevent accessions of fever through the effect of depletion, or by directing the accumulated irritability to an outlet. The day on which the purgative is exhibited is necessarily a day of abstinence; and there is sufficient evidence in the writer's experience, if not in that of others, to prove, that if the practice suggested be justly suited to the case, the rage of sickness will be thereby moderated in sickly times, particularly among Europeans recently arrived in tropical latitudes. The practice is useful: the management of it must be left to persons of the medical profession; the reason of it may be apprehended by military men of common understanding.

3rd. It is a common observation, that occupation of mind and body, implying exertion to an extent sufficient to act

with impression upon animal structure, acts preventively of sickness in all countries, and particularly among Europeans in tropical latitudes. The opinion is heterodox. It is notwithstanding true; and the truth of it receives illustration from the history of planters, particularly the younger planters who spend the greatest part of the day under the rays of a scorching sun, superintending the field-labour of slaves. The young planter may be said to work hard; and he is comparatively healthy. Soldiers who remain in barracks, who pass the hours in indolence and ease, or in drunkenness and revelry, suffer severely, and die in great numbers. If it be permitted to draw an inference from the fact as it relates to the planter, occupation and exercise under the noon-day sun, instead of being hurtful, are salutary to the human constitution. The fact contended for is distinct and clear. The explanation of it may be referred to a double cause, that is, to the reduction of fulness and irritability in consequence of perspiration, or to constrained action, analogous to the action of health, that is, such as gives a condition to the habit which renders it little susceptible of contingent morbid impressions. Planters are healthy under active and daily employment; soldiers are healthy and vigorous under active military service. If the military service be of such a character as to embrace daily exertions of activity for six days, or for six months, the troops rarely experience sickness during the period of exertion. The cessation of labour, or the return to rest, is almost uniformly followed by the explosion of disease. The sickness which occurs in this case is usually ascribed to preceding toils. In this there is error; and, as it is an error of consequence to the interests of military service, the foundations of it ought to be examined, so that the case be thoroughly understood.

It was said before, that if active service continue for six days, or if it continue for six months, general sickness rarely makes its appearance until the service terminate and the troops resume a state of rest. It then soon begins, particularly where to rest is added full living. This fact is frequently exemplified in experience; but, with this fact in view, it is important to remark, that sickness rarely appears among those who, though they have undergone the toils of the campaign, do not remit their activity when the campaign is over. If this be true, rest, not labour,

is the cause of sickness. As the fact stated occurs frequently, the explanation of it may be comprehended by those who permit themselves to think and reason. The animal body fills rapidly in a state of rest where it is fully fed; and if there be no evacuation by a natural or artificial outlet, the habit, as surcharged with irritable materials, is liable to be disturbed in its movements by slight and contingent causes of irritation, that is, health is liable to be perverted by the impulse of causes which would not otherwise be felt. This is often exemplified under the embarkation of troops in transport-ships in hot weather, particularly where the troops have been recently imported into tropical latitudes. The fact was strikingly exemplified in the late war in St. Domingo on several occasions\*. It was there observed that soldiers, who

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\* It will here be proper to state some distinct examples of the fact. Two companies of the 69th regiment of foot, which had been at Cape Nicolas' Mole for about three months without experiencing any material sickness, were embarked in a transport-ship to be sent to St. Marque, towards the end of May. The weather was hot and calm, and the passage was tedious, that is, from four to five days. When the 69th arrived at its destination, upwards of thirty men, out of ninety, were on the sick-list: the disease was of an aggravated kind, and the mortality was great in proportion to the number of the sick. The York Hussars, a corps of five hundred, and, in so far as appearance goes, a corps of *élite*, landed at Cape Nicolas' Mole about the end of May, in a state of the highest health. It made an excursion into the interior, and assisted at the capture of Bombardopolis. It remained a fortnight or three weeks at or near Bombardopolis, and about the end of June it was sent to St. Marque, as its allotted station. The corps had no sick at the time of embarkation. By the end of the third day near one half was indisposed, and by the end of the first week one hundred was numbered with the dead. The weather was calm, and excessively hot; the transports were crowded, and the disease was mortal almost beyond example. Detachments

were sent at other times from Cape Nicolas' Mole to other stations in the island. They rarely made the passage without experiencing great sickness and great proportional mortality. This applied chiefly to troops recently arrived from Europe, that is, such as had been landed and had spent some time on shore in camp or barracks. The occurrence gave a suspicion that there was contagious pestilence in the transports. Experiment was made to ascertain the fact; and it was clearly proved that no personal contagion existed in the case, the result being similar whether the ships had carried troops or not on former occasions. The circumstances now stated were more striking at St. Domingo in the year 1796 than on any other occasion within the writer's observation; but they were not peculiar to that season and climate. It was observed on other occasions, that where troops were embarked from camp or quarters in high health and vigour, the sick-list suddenly increased, and the malady moreover usually assumed a more concentrated character than it had among those who lived on shore. On the other hand, where sickly and exhausted subjects were embarked on board of ship in tropical climates, the state of health manifested more or less improvement in almost all cases.

had lived in the open air, and who had the liberty of moving about in open air while in quarters, sickened in one, two, or three days after embarkation, as if they had been struck with a breath of pestilence,—one third, even in some instances one half, of the number embarked fell down in less than a week. There was here no suspicion of febrile contagion, and there existed no assignable cause of disease, except the rest and ennui which are inseparable from confinement in a transport-ship, combined with a condition of atmosphere heated artificially by accumulation, and, to a certain extent, deprived of its vivifying principle by the breath of many persons crowded into small space. This extraordinary sickness occurred only in the hot months of the year, and in those persons who had been for some time on shore: the mortality in some instances was dreadful—the fatal course rapid beyond example. The fact is correctly stated; and it is here stated, in order that something may be learned from it for guidance on future occasions. Proper foresight as connected with knowledge of causes would, there is reason to think, have obviated the effect, if not entirely, at least to a certain extent. A low and measured diet, artificial evacuation by bleeding or purging, exercise to excite perspiration, with a mind occupied and engaged ardently in an interesting pursuit, would, it is conceived, have been effectual in prevention.

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## CHAPTER II.

### DETAIL OF A SCHEME OF COLONIAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENT.

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THE laws which influence the health of the military in tropical countries are common to latitude; they are modified occasionally by circumstances of locality. If the law which influences health be common, the principle by which the military defence is to be directed is common also. The islands of the West Indies are mountainous—for the most part clothed with woods, and intersected by bold and deep ravines. To penetrate the interior without opposition is difficult—with opposition from an intelligent enemy impossible. The coasts are indented with bays, and the

facilities for landing troops are great. If the landing be effected, (and it can scarcely fail of being effected, if the measures be well laid and the execution well conducted,) the communication of troops, as dispersed in posts at the different accessible points on the coast, is liable to be interrupted or cut off; consequently the defences of the island may be expected to fall in detail. This is a reasonable supposition, and even a fact proved in experience. But if, instead of intrusting the defence of an island to detached posts at accessible points on the sea-coast, or to a work of regular fortification covering the capital, which is usually the aim of an enemy as the seat of government and a depot of marketable property, magazines were placed in citadels on well chosen sites in the interior, and a certain number of troops disposed at well chosen posts, which command the roads or passes which lead to the citadel, the troops, as supposed to be energetic, active, and organized according to a sound principle for the practice of war, and so stationed as to secure communication with one another for joint operation, it is fair to infer that a portion of defensive force would gain the points threatened with attack before a landing could be effected, at least before the means of maintaining it could be secured by works of art. The debarkation of a hostile force, which is conveyed through the seas in many ships, cannot be made by surprise without error, negligence, or treachery on the part of those who are appointed to observe. If the enemy's force be discovered at a distance, the attempt to land will probably be defeated. But if it be not seen, and if the landing be made good, the conquest is still remote: the difficulties and embarrassments in fact only begin. It is not denied that an enemy who temporarily commands the seas may land on almost any of the islands in question, and so far prevail as to destroy towns, to ravage and burn plantations; but to make and assure a conquest, under the circumstances stated, is a herculean labour, requiring greater talent and perseverance than falls to the lot of ordinary commanders. The difficulties are numerous and formidable; and it is not a random assertion to say, that one thousand soldiers, inured to climate, masters in the desultory mode of warfare, disposed advantageously in positions for defence, and assisted by the ravages which disease commits upon strangers, will actually effect, in the course of six months, the destruction of five thousand of the best drilled troops of



Europe, who have European habits, and act according to the principles of European warfare. If this be so, and it will not be disputed by those who are acquainted with the scene of action, it may be inferred that the greater number of the islands in the West Indies are impregnable, if they be defended according to the principle here suggested. If defended by forts erected at the accessible points of the sea-coast, or by regular works constructed for the protection of the capital, there are few of them that offer a prospect of long resistance.

The islands in the West Indies are exposed to invasion from foreign enemies. Doubts may arise concerning the propriety, or the practicability, of trusting the chief defence against foreign invasion to a military force stationed among the mountains of the interior; no doubt can arise concerning the propriety and advantage of placing the force in the fastnesses and passes of the mountains, as security against domestic insurrection. Revolt among negroes is not likely to occur in towns where white men are numerous and watchful. If it occur on sugar-estates in the plain, it may be speedily crushed by a force descending from the mountains. If it originate among the mountains, it must always be formidable; and it will only fail to be successful through the small number or insufficient skill of the revolted.

The alteration in the general plan and principle of disposing the military force in the West Indies here suggested, is not fanciful. It may be adopted with advantage, both on the head of health and military effect. The efficiency of health is obviously of great importance for assuring the success of military undertakings. But, though the possession of health be evidently important to success in war, the subject, as already said, has scarcely yet obtained a scientific consideration with the members of the cabinet. Sickness has been great of late years, and mortality has been sometimes enormous; yet the public does not know that any plan of science has been projected by the state for diminishing the calamity. We all know that no measures have been attempted to be carried into effect which look to that object with a reasonable prospect of success. The features of the country, as they indicate effect on health, are rarely regarded in the manner of disposing of troops; even military features do not always command the choice of military stations. Convenience,

ease, and the facilities of accommodation for trade, which is the polar star of British policy, condemn soldiers to the scourge of disease, sometimes without apparent necessity.

The sea-coast of the islands in the West Indies, particularly near bays and creeks where the shores are foul and muddy, and the air moist, is unfriendly to the health of Europeans. Such, however, is usually the station of military force. The swamp, or vicinity of the swamp, is not eligible. It ought therefore to be avoided. But if the necessities of service require that it be occupied, every care ought to be taken in the construction of quarters so that the influence of the noxious cause, to which the situation is naturally exposed, be as much as possible diminished. The following are the principal points of consideration that bear on that head.

1st. That the position be protected by the interposition of woods or rising grounds from the force of winds which blow over swamps, or which, descending from the mountains through gullies and ravines, strike the body with a forcible and injurious impression. If no interposition of this kind exist naturally within the limit that is destined for the erection of the barrack, it is important that it be planted artificially. A high wall, or a line of spreading trees, placed at the noxious quarter, furnishes an obvious defence against the progress of the enemy in question; but it is scarcely, if ever, resorted to. On the contrary, it is customary to cut down the woods for some distance around the site of houses, habitations, barracks, or towns in the West Indies, under the idea of thereby assuring a free circulation of air. The idea is founded in error. Nothing is more grateful than the shade of trees in scorching climates; nothing more refreshes and more effectually purifies the air than the breathings of green foliage; and nothing more completely absorbs the noxious qualities of the soil than the material which is applied to the nutriment of trees and plants. Hence, as the shade of trees is both grateful and healthful in itself, barracks for troops, in order to possess the advantages of a cool shade and protection from noxious and piercing winds, require to be sheltered by an avenue, or double row of wide-spreading trees, judiciously placed at the exposed points.

2nd. That the mode of constructing barracks, for the convenience and health of troops, be scientifically considered in all

countries is plain to every man's apprehension; it is of main importance that the principle be understood and acted upon in the West Indies. Barracks, in order to be habitable in that country, ought to be raised from the ground on brick pillars, to the height of three feet or more, so as to be thoroughly ventilated underneath. It is advisable that the West India barrack consist of one story only, and that the roof, while lofty, be double; that is, that there be an interior lining of canvass or board, at a sufficient distance from the outer roof to leave an interval for ventilation, and thereby to lessen the influence of the vertical sun in the interior of the dwelling. Besides a double roof, every barrack building ought to be constructed with piazzas or balconies in front and rear, ten or twelve feet in width, furnished with jalousies, painted green, as most grateful to the eye, and so well joined as to exclude strong currents of wind and driving rains. A barrack-room for twelve men, with an apartment at the extremity of the rear balcony for a non-commissioned officer, is the most eligible size for the comfort and benefit of the troops. But, if it be preferred to lodge twenty-four men under the same roof, an apartment ought to be left at each extremity of the balcony for a non-commissioned officer, as a provision necessary for maintaining discipline and order among the troops within.

The hammock is perhaps the most convenient of the contrivances for the soldier's repose that has yet been adopted by economists. It may be furnished, if not at less, at least at an expense not exceeding that of a platform or guard-bed. If it be made into net-work, in the manner of the Indian hammock, the soldier, when furnished with the raw material, might be instructed with very little trouble to prepare it for himself; and, as the accommodation thus provided arises from the labour of his own hands, he may be supposed to have pleasure in keeping it in a proper state of repair, exclusive of the formal order which compels him to do so. If the net-hammock be not easily procured, strong cotton cloth is the best substitute: it is preferable to sacking on account of lightness, and even comfort.

The accommodation and arrangements here projected are suited to the condition of troops assembled in considerable numbers at strong and central stations. Where small parties are dispersed among the interior mountains, huts calculated to contain seven persons, namely, six soldiers and corporal, or six soldiers

and a serjeant, are capable of furnishing more domestic comfort than the larger barrack; and, on that account, they constitute the preferable mode of accommodation for all forms of detachment. A lofty hut, the floors raised on pillars so as to be ventilated underneath, or erected over a floor of well made terrace, and covered with a thick roof of thatch, piazzas in front and rear wattled with branches of the cocoa-nut-tree for the purpose of intercepting the glare of the sun's rays, may be considered as a comparatively pleasant dwelling in a hot country: it is in all respects a safe one on the score of health, as raised on pillars, or as erected over a terrace floor.

The selection of stations in the West Indies, and the mode of quartering troops, imply questions of important consideration for the chiefs of the war department. Loss of military life from disease has been great at all times in the colonies; in the late wars it was prodigious. If the subject be viewed correctly and without prepossession, the loss sustained on these occasions, enormous as it was, will be found to have been principally owing to mistake; that is, to inattention to truths furnished by experience for the choice of healthy positions.

The writer is aware that exigencies of military service sometimes command the sacrifice of the health of armies; but these exigencies, he ventures to say, occur seldomer in reality than they do in superficial appearance. The preservation of the health of the soldier is indispensable to the preservation of the conquests which fortune or courage achieves. If genius conquer, prudence preserves: the health of the army, as the preserving instrument, ought therefore to be a primary consideration of the state. The character which a country, or district of country, bears relatively to health, is known to the native inhabitant by practical experience: the healthy and unhealthy aspect is cognizable by medical observers through rules established in science. The general question respecting the healthiness of localities is thus open for judgment. The means of obtaining information on the subject are not abstruse or difficult; but they are rarely resorted to. Human life suffers, and must be expected to suffer, in war. It is sacrificed on too many occasions to ignorance and inattention, to indolence and desire of indulgence. No one who is acquainted with the subject will venture to say that the British nation was niggardly in the provision of medical means for the use of its

armies in the late war. No one will venture to maintain that the lights of science were generally employed to give effect to the application. The nature of the causes which act on health are not correctly understood by the generality of mankind; and it is scarcely to be expected that those who command armies, who dedicate their time to perfect the tactic of troops, in anticipation of the effect which arises from tactic in the conflict of battle; or that those who administer government, and who, to manage with dexterity, devote their time and study to find out the propensities and passions of those who hold the strings of the national purse, which is the omnipotent engine in all the national operations, can or will take the trouble to penetrate deeply into the study of an abstruse science like that of health. The study of health is a study of value; but it is not accompanied with the external splendour or political distinction which men covet. It requires great labour and some talent to attain even the first principles of knowledge that relate to it; and as correct knowledge is attained with difficulty, those who possess power, not submitting to be instructed by those who have no power except what arises from the force of reason, follow their fancies, consequently err in the course which they pursue. Such is the fact on the present subject. It is not however a fact which attaches to one nation only; it is common to all the European nations that have founded colonies in the West Indies. The situation of the greater number of forts or barracks, whether erected by the English, French, or Danes, is not favourable to health; or, if otherwise, it is so by accident only. The nature of the causes which act on the health of the animal system has either not been known, or not regarded by those who formed military establishments in the colonies; and disregard of the nature of those causes has, in the writer's opinion, occasioned an enormous loss of human life. It is the imperious duty of the physician to seek for a remedy against evils of urgency; and, if the remedy be discovered, it is not to be considered as a mark of enmity to the state to say in plain terms what it is. A remedy does exist; and it is presumed, on good grounds of fact and argument, that it would not be an inefficacious one if experiment were made to ascertain the conditions of its application. It implies no new provision, no great expense of money; and in military service it is always at command. It consists merely in knowing what we are to do before



we begin to do it; namely, that, previously to the erection of forts, barracks, or even the cantonments for troops, an official and professional survey be instituted by a commission of military and medical officers for the purpose of ascertaining the advantages and disadvantages of position relatively to health and defence. The measure is obvious and plain; and if it were adopted and executed scientifically and systematically by persons who are competent to execute, the greater part of the evils now complained of would cease to exist.

Besides the suggestions now offered relative to the disposition and quartering of European troops in tropical climates, the writer takes the liberty of cursorily noticing some changes and modifications in dress, which he conceives to be convenient and suitable for the soldier during his service in hot countries, whether in quarters or the field. It is obvious that, as the temperature of the air is higher in the West Indies than in Europe, all the articles of clothing ought to be of a slighter texture. The hat, for instance, ought to be light, formed with a high crown, and broad brim, as affording shade to the eyes, and protection to the brain-pan against the vertical rays of the sun. The cloth of the coat ought to be coarse kerseymere, camblet, or fustian; the trowsers strong brown linen, dowlas, or cotton, large and loose; thereby securing the legs against the bite of flies and mosquitoes, and leaving the motion of the joints free and unincumbered. The shoe ought to be well-chosen, strong, and well-fitted; the sock, cotton or flannel; the gaiter short, and so applied as to deny the passage of dust or sand to the foot. A dressing-gown of cotton cloth is sufficient covering for the night in places near the sea-coast. It serves the purpose of shirt and sheets, and even blanket, unless in the interior mountains in the cooler months of the year. It may be worn at all times when the soldier desires to be at ease. The dressing-gown is an economical and safe provisionary article of clothing against cold. The cloak is necessary for night duty, and light duffle or strong cotton cloth is the most suitable materials. The days are hot, the nights often disagreeably cold and piercing, particularly near mountains intersected by ravines; hence a cloak, as it is easily assumed when the cold winds set in, is a highly useful part of a soldier's dress in a hot country. Man is little sensible of the impressions of cold when he is actively engaged

in exercise; and for this reason it is proper that the soldier, while employed on military duty, or engaged in amusements during the day, be as nearly naked as decency or duty permit. If the body be cool, toil is endured with comparatively little fatigue. The dressing-gown and the cloak, with which the soldier is supposed to be provided, furnish the means of guarding against cold, when exercise is suspended, and the frame becomes susceptible of impression as an effect of inaction; or when it is unavoidably exposed to the breezes of the night or morning, which are often disagreeable to the feeling, and contingently injurious to the health. The effect of the land-wind, particularly as descending through deep ravines, or passing over arid plains, pierces and constricts the surface of the unprotected body, and apparently gives rise to fever or dysentery. This effect is common; and, as the means of guarding against it are obvious, it may be supposed to pass into the standing orders of a regiment, that a soldier, not on *duty*, assume the dressing-gown at a certain hour in the evening, and that the soldier on *duty* assume the cloak when the land-winds begin to blow from the interior.

A spare and exactly-measured diet is justly regarded as preservative of health in all countries; it is particularly so in tropical climates. The fact is proved so clearly in history, that it would not be adverted to in this place, did not those who are esteemed the most enlightened of the English nation maintain a contrary opinion, namely, an opinion that, as animal powers are principally to be increased by feeding, so the noxious effects of a burning climate are principally to be resisted by what is termed good living. This doctrine, which is in a manner peculiar to ourselves, is carried into practice among the military in the West Indies, with correct observance, and with confidence of good effect. The British ration for troops is everywhere a high ration; and it was here augmented by an extra allowance of rum. The effects of the climate are held to be debilitating; and good living, as just now observed, is recommended as the direct remedy for giving strength, that is, for increasing the power of resisting causes of disease; for these are supposed to be depressing. The doctrine, though the doctrine of physicians, is not founded on truth; at least, the salutary effect of it is not supported by a knowledge of what happens to Britons, who die in

greater proportion in the West Indies than the people of other countries; at least, than those who live sparingly, and who eat sparingly of animal food. The Spaniards and Portuguese suffer little sickness, comparatively; and they experience little comparative mortality in the least healthy of the tropical settlements. The French themselves escape better than the English. The French live sumptuously, but they cook skilfully, and the vegetable material preponderates in their mess: their acute diseases are usually less rapid and less fatal than those of the English. If there be any truth in experience, and if any knowledge be as yet attained respecting the laws of animal economy, it may be pronounced to be one of the laws of the best authority, that abstemious living is preservative of health in hot countries more expressly than in others. This is the simple fact; and, if it be admitted, it follows that such scale of diet be fixed for troops in hot climates as is most suitable to the condition; and that when fixed by rule, the rule be rigidly adhered to in practice. A full diet of animal food is not necessary for the execution of the most effective military services; on the contrary, those who never eat meat, or who eat sparingly of meat, sustain toils with cheerfulness, under which those who are highly fed immediately sink. The matter of fact is undeniable: it is ascertained by multiplied experience, and the explanation of it accords with our best views of the nature of animal structure.

If it were permitted to apply the knowledge attained through experience to practical use, the first step in the messing-regulation would be a diminution in the quantity of animal food—perhaps the total abstraction of it for two days in the week; savoury and wholesome preparations of the vegetable and farinaceous articles of diet being substituted in its place. It is customary to carry out soldiers early in the morning for exercise in the West Indies; and as it is not proper to enter on exercise fasting, lest the stomach become faint from emptiness, a cup of strong coffee, with a crust of bread, is recommended as precautionary on this occasion. It is proper that the morning exercises be continued for the space of three hours, varied in all possible ways that service can present; and it is proper that the soldier, returning from the field to his apartment, take off his clothes, wash his body all over, put on his dressing-gown, recline for half an hour, and then repair to the breakfast-

table. The material of the breakfast is coffee, cocoa, or tea, yam, plantain, or bread, with an occasional addition of fruit—the hour of breakfast ten. The dinner, or principal meal, is supposed to consist of soups or stews, roots and vegetables bearing a high proportion to the meat, which is only added to give a relish to the mess, not to fill the stomach by its quantity. The mess ought to be well seasoned and well cooked, palatable and digestible, not unlike the common pepper-pot of the coloured inhabitants. The evening, when the duties of the day are finished, is the most proper time for making the principal repast. Water, as observed above, is the best drink for the soldier in the West Indies; but a small glass of rum, as a liqueur, or a cup of strong coffee, is useful after dinner: it assists the powers of digestion, it ought therefore to constitute an article in the diet. The expense of messing, according to the arrangement here proposed, would not amount to the expense of the present ration; it would thus have economy for its recommendation.

Exercise is useful generally in preserving health; it is useful in this view even in tropical climates. Planters, who may be said to work hard, experience good health comparatively; even soldiers are healthy when actively employed: they suffer where they remain immured in barracks, in ease and apathy. This effect of activity, in preserving health, is strongly illustrated in the history of the Buccaneers, even in the history of the first colonial settlers. But, as the period is remote, and the record may not be considered as authentic, an example is adduced in this place, ascertained by evidence on which the writer is warranted to rely. French soldiers, natives of France, previously to the revolution of 1789, formed all the great roads, and constructed all the aqueducts which convey water through the plains of St. Domingo, for the irrigation of the cultivated lands. In the execution of a work, which required long and continued labour, they were exposed to the sun for the whole day as labourers are in Europe. They toiled; they sweated under toil; and they were brown in colour as Mulattoes. They experienced little sickness while so employed. When they returned to the towns, to idleness and ease, or to revelry and good living, they suffered from sickness, and died in numbers like the soldiers of other nations. From this testimony, and it is of good authority,

the value of exercise, even of hard labour, is proved decisively to be preservative of health; and on this ground it is suggested, that a train of such exercises as are calculated to act favourably on health be digested systematically, and rigidly enforced in practice through all ranks and conditions of the army\*.

\* To what is stated of the labours of the French soldiers in the island of St. Domingo, the writer is enabled to add some facts which occurred among the soldiers of the British army, in the windward and leeward islands at different periods of the late war. The second battalion of the Royal Scotch regiment was sent to garrison the island of Tobago in the year 1803. There was at that time a swamp, windward of Fort King George, which was of an offensive kind, and supposed to be the cause of great sickness to the troops. The commanding officer, who would appear to have been a man of some decision and good sense, took upon himself to drain it by the labour of the men. The corps had recently arrived from Europe, and was susceptible of disease, as new comers usually are. The work was undertaken, executed in a short time, and health suffered nothing in doing it; it was even said to have been good during the continuance of the labour. It was reported, at head-quarters, that the health of the Royal was endangered by exposure to labour and fatigue in the hottest hours of the day. This was not the fact; but it was thought it must be the fact, for the reason of things was not understood at head-quarters. The labour of the corps was suspended; and, as a measure of care, the barracks were ordered to be shut during the heat of the day: the hospitals were soon filled with sick.

A barrack was built at Beau Soleil in the island of Guadaloupe, in the year 1812, and first occupied by the 25th regiment of Foot. The barrack was erected on a healthy site, and, as a contract barrack, it was not badly constructed. But, though finished in the common manner of barrack-building, many things were wanting for comfort and convenience,

when it was opened for the reception of the 25th. It happened fortunately that the officer (Lieut.-Col. Light) who at that time commanded the regiment was an amateur in engineering, and not without knowledge on a subject which he pursued with more than common ardour. He undertook to improve the condition of the quarters; and, by the labour of the men, and without any expense to government, he actually rendered the barracks at Beau Soleil the most commodious of any in the windward or leeward command. The work, as now said, was done without expense to the public, and the doing of it was a high gratification to the soldiers themselves: they were more than usually healthy and cheerful during the time they were thus employed.

A large and magnificent barrack was erected near St. Ann's Castle, Barbadoes, in the year 1806, on a site that could not be approached except through ground that was literally bog in the wet season of the year. The inconvenience was considerable. It is not certain that the health did not sometimes suffer from the feet being wet; it is obvious that the barrack was kept clean with difficulty. The soldiers, who occupied this superb quarter, were desirous of making a road by which they might go to and return from their duties without wading through the mire. The proposition did not accord with the view of the commander of the forces; and permission was not obtained until the year 1814, when the then commandant ascertaining, from the chief medical officer, that the labour necessary in making a road would not be injurious to the health of the troops, gave leave to commence the work, in compliance with the request of the soldier himself. It was undertaken with alacrity,



The writer is aware that the opinions of the military, and even the opinions of the generality of physicians, are averse to the suggestion now made; for he is not ignorant that it was

and executed with cheerfulness. The sick reports of the garrison are in proof that the troops were never more healthy, between 1812 and 1815, than they were while they were thus employed. They never appeared to be more happy and satisfied: they even seemed to be thankful that they were permitted to do something for themselves, for their convenience and their comfort.

The facts now stated, which are of perfect authenticity, may be considered as evidence that the European soldier is capable of sustaining ordinary labour in the West Indies, without incurring risk of injury to health from the heat of the climate. If this fact be established, and it is not equivocal, government may perhaps think itself warranted to erect barracks, or to execute other work to which the labour of the soldier is competent, without fears on the score of health; and, as the work may be done without direct expenditure of money, it is difficult to see by what means the question can be longer evaded. The writer ventures to say, by fair induction from fact, that if the soldier in the West Indies, instead of being restricted from labour, were permitted to do for himself whatever he is capable of doing, his health would suffer less than it now does, the mind would be more occupied, there would be more satisfaction, and fewer of those causes of temptation which, in idleness, lead him into error. In countries where the materials for erecting huts abound, the soldier is capable, with very little assistance from professed artizans, of erecting his own dwelling; he has done so on some occasions even in the West Indies. The 13th regiment of Foot was put into huts on Bouillè height, soon after the capture of the island of Martinico, in the year 1810. The huts, as of flimsy structure (nearly wigwam), had frequent occasion for re-

pair. The labour connected with repair, that is, cutting and dragging the materials from the woods, while it gave employment, and a species of exercise which apparently contributed to the preservation of health, gave an interest in what was done or doing: the work done brought comfort to the person who did it. The soldiers of the 13th regiment formed an attachment to their dwellings, because they were kept in repair by their own labour; and, while they were thus attached to the dwelling, they formed a more intimate society with one another in the small domestic circle than is common in spacious barracks. They were delighted to dwell in huts, evidently so much delighted that had they been ordered to remove from them to the most magnificent and best equipped barrack in the command, they could not have concealed their chagrin. The soldier is at home in a hut: he is like a shepherd's dog in a royal kennel in a palace-like barrack. The huts on Bouillè height were placed on the lee, under the summit of the ridge. As such they were screened from the direct impulse of exhalation from the Lamentin swamps. The occupants, though they had their tours of duty at Fort Edward and other exposed places about Port Royal, were not upon the whole unhealthy. When the regiment embarked for Canada, it left only one sick man in hospital.

The inferences which may be drawn from the facts now stated are important inferences, if preservation of health and saving of public money be objects of importance to the state. The soldier is capable of constructing his own dwelling at little expense in most of the islands in the West Indies; for there materials of all kinds abound. He will be gratified by being permitted to do it: his health will be preserved, and his efficiency, as a soldier, will be improved by the labour

proposed, and that the practice was actually adopted, of attaching a certain number of black men to European regiments in quality of pioneer, for executing the common drudgeries of a soldier's duty. The proposition sounds well in theory: it fails in practice; and a just view of things will shew that it cannot do otherwise than fail. A soldier who is exempted from such drudgeries as relate to the care of his person in times of peace, cannot well be expected to be effective in time of war. The endurance of military toil in all its forms, even cooking, carrying water and cleaning the barrack, are comprehended in a soldier's duty. A soldier ought therefore to be accustomed to do those things, and all other things which belong to military service, in tropical as well as in temperate climates. His physical powers are equal to it, and his value is diminished in proportion as he is exempted from doing it. But, in order to inure the soldier to climate, and to render him fit for all services besides military duties, a train of amusements, such as cricket, quoits, bowls, fives, &c. ought to be practised daily in the open air, under the shade of trees and occasionally in the sun. When persons are intently occupied in exercise, they run no risk of being hurt by cold. On such occasions, therefore, the soldier ought only to be covered by a shirt and trowsers; for, being lightly clothed, he longer endures toil. After a certain continuance of exercise, he is supposed to recline for the sake of rest; and, after refreshment by rest, it is recommended that he wash his body with cold water, as the means of invigorating and fortifying the frame against the effects of vicissitude. The practice now recommended may seem strange; it will probably be deemed barbarous; but it is known by experience that it is not dangerous, and most of those who have experience of it confess that it is pleasant. It is proper that the greatest part of a soldier's time be occupied by military duties, military exercises, amusements and sports in the open air, in the West Indies equally as in Europe. When these cease, or

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or exercise connected with the execution. If work done without expense, and without accounts of expenditure, be more desirable than formal accounts and cart-loads of vouchers, it may be thus attained. It is unnecessary to say more: the fact is demonstrable, but it is an

invidious fact; for it trenches on the power of the treasury, which moves and controls the movement of the political machine in all its extent through the direct influence of expenditure, formally vouched to please the people, but not always honestly vouched.

cannot be practised, it is recommended that military instruction, so digested as to be embodied into national songs, accompanied with martial music which strikes upon a key of warlike sympathy, immediately commence. By this routine of discipline, the body will be rendered equal to the sustaining of toils and fatigues in the field, the mind will be exalted in courage, animated with the spirit of enterprize, and stimulated to persevere in the military course by a thirst for glory. But, besides the routine now suggested as necessary for perfecting the military character, a portion of the soldier's time may be usefully allotted to the cultivation of a kitchen-garden for the benefit of the mess. The exercise implied in this labour conduces to the preservation of health. The object interests, as it adds to domestic comfort. It may be presumed that a soldier newly imported from Europe, and treated in the manner recommended, will be soon reconciled to his condition, and easily conducted into the way of finding satisfaction in a country that had been regarded by him with aversion.

Practical war submits itself to be modified, in some degree, by the feature of the country in which it is carried on. The islands in the American seas, and those parts of Europe which have been the more common theatres of war, as different in aspect from each other, necessarily require different modification in the manner of conducting military operations, whether for defence or aggression. The interior of the greater number of the West India islands is mountainous, intersected by ravines, and so barred by passes in various places, as to be defensible by a small force against a numerous host. The scene is broken and irregular; the mode of warfare must of course be adapted to the scene. Personal activity, exertion, knowledge and ready intelligence, are here the requisite qualities of the soldier; the mechanical machine can rarely be applied in force. The objects are individual objects, and, as such, demand the exercise of individual judgment. A general knowledge of ground, an estimate of the value of position, and an intimate acquaintance with the power of fire-arms individually, constitute the basis on which the soldier's education is to be laid. With a view to open his mind to a proper comprehension of it, he ought to be accustomed to traverse mountains and plains, woods and open grounds, ravines and difficult passes; and, in doing this, led to remark the nature of the fastnesses which give security in defence, or the weak-

nesses in strongholds which give openings for attack. The infantry soldier is here the efficient part of the army—the firelock, armed with the bayonet, the principal instrument of offence. It is therefore fit that the soldier know its power at all distances and in all directions; a knowledge which can only be attained through practical experiment. The mechanical tactic of the Prussian school has no place in the wars of the West Indies; for West Indian warfare must of necessity, from the features of the country, be war of the irregular and partizan character. The Buccaneer of past times, not the automaton of Frederick the Second, is the model of imitation for a soldier destined for service in the West Indies—the mind bold, adventurous, ready in danger, the body healthy, vigorous, and patient of toil.

As the defence of the British possessions in the West Indies is an important object to the interests of the nation, it deserves to be considered on a broad basis, estimated in all its relations for economy as well as for security. The expense of life, according to the existing plan of management, is enormous; and the defences, without a decided superiority at sea, are not of such a nature that dependence can be placed on them. The ravages of disease come suddenly; and they sometimes rage so enormously, that the island which is in safety to day, may be nearly unprotected in the short period of three months. This is a contingency—and it is not one of rare occurrence. It arises from the condition of new troops transported to a new climate; a condition aggravated by the system of arrangement which is now acted upon. It may be assumed as a truth, the stability of which no one who knows the subject will venture to contest, that a force of one thousand men, inured to climate, stationed in the interior and central parts of the country, and trained to the proper mode of West Indian warfare, will produce, at most seasons of the year, more effectives for action, than five thousand recently imported from Europe, stationed on the sea-coast, and equipped in all the splendour of European magnificence. If this be well founded, it would be more eligible, as economical of men, and effective of purpose, to constitute a military force expressly for the defence of the islands. If the suggestion were adopted, it would not be difficult to give an interest to the service above any interest that can possibly attach to it in its present condition. The duty of garrisoning the West Indian islands is the most irk-

some duty which falls to the lot of the British soldier. It is sometimes assigned as a punishment ; and as it implies privation of country, holds out no prominent object of glory, and presents little else than the prospect of an inglorious death from disease, it may not without reason be considered as such. As things now are, the service is disliked, and the sovereignty of the islands is not secure. If a military force of the description alluded to were formed expressly for defence, proportioned in strength to the extent and importance of each island in itself, but disposable among those that are contiguous, in the event of contingent dangers threatening any one in particular, the defence of one and the whole would be better secured than it now is ; and the duty would be less irksome, inasmuch as it might be connected with causes which generate attachment to the soil.

In order to give interest to a system of colonial military defence, it is obvious that some other allurements, besides that of daily pay, ought to be connected with the service. A small lot of land, sufficient for garden stuff and common provisions, with some conveniences for rearing stock, &c. could scarcely fail to create attachment to the soil which is committed to the soldier for defence, and which he then might be supposed to defend on other ground than that of a mere mercenary. The property in land, in the case under view, would be considered as feudal property, attached to actual military service—not commutable, or transferable. The proposition is not visionary. It is not impracticable, not even difficult to be practised ; but it is liable to degenerate, or become void in its effect, by being perverted from its original purpose through the influence of seductive appetites. Propensities are inherent in man, and the desire is likely to become strong with many in the case proposed, to leave the military path, for the sake of farming and becoming rich. This, it is admitted, is an inconvenience, but it is not an irremediable one. It belongs to a judicious and energetic colonial government, a zealous and patriotic military commander, to limit the propensity, without extinguishing the object of utility connected with attachment to the soil. It is supposed that, under the proposed scheme of arrangement, the commissioned officer has his farm or peculium as well as the soldier ; but it is implied, in the condition, that he cultivate the use of arms and the science of his profession for the sake of his duties, more than his field or



his farm for the sake of his profits; in short, the military character is predominant, the farming character subordinate. With a soldiery so constituted, stationed in the interior fastnesses of the country, effective, alert, and aided by the professed planters, who are secondarily instructed in the use of arms, the military service can scarcely fail to be animated; and the islands so protected will be comparatively secure against foreign attack or domestic insurrection.

The observance of correct and rigid economy is an object of the greatest importance towards success in war. Without correct economy, there is no security for the continuance of health; and without the possession of vigorous health there is no dependence on the results of military operations. The medical history of armies holds out a dismal picture of human misery. Armies were crippled, almost annihilated, by artificial diseases in the late war, that is, by contagious fevers proceeding from corrupted sources of recruiting, and gaining strength from ignorance of the principles which conduce to the preservation of health, or from indifference and negligence in applying them to the occasion. Such losses are melancholy, because they proceed from errors. The errors are not always reprehensible; for they proceed from ignorance and misapplied care, as often perhaps as from indifference and neglect. A contagious fever is an accident of frequent occurrence among the masses of armies which appear on the warlike theatre of Europe; but it does not necessarily belong to military service, even in Europe. Wherever it exists, it proves the operation of economical error; and it proves it so unequivocally, that the writer is confident to maintain that, if true principles of economy be thoroughly understood and acted upon with energy, no contagious fever will arise spontaneously among troops; if introduced surreptitiously, it will not make progress. Soldiers are selected from the healthy part of the community. Reason says that they ought to be more healthy than the mass of the people; it is not so in fact. The cause of sickness does not consist in actual hardship, for that is rarely to great extent; or, where it does occur, it rarely affects the health. It oftener has its source in indulgences, in excess in eating and drinking, in apathy, in the contaminated air of crowded quarters, in change and novelty of circumstances, namely, the impression of new or contingent causes applied to the organs

of susceptible subjects, that is, to subjects who have little bodily activity or mental exertion. Armies are destroyed in European countries by contagious fever, the product of sloth, or corrupted air: they suffer in tropical climates through the irritation of a heated atmosphere, to which they are not inured. The simple change of climate acts on health in some shape or other, either for improvement or deterioration. The occurrence of disease, under the change, arises principally from ignorance of the causes of prevention, that is, from not avoiding what is noxious, even sometimes through mistaken care, from adding things that are noxious to the ordinary heat of the climate. Instead of abstinence, which is practically useful, as preservative of the order and harmony of animal movement, full living is gravely recommended as augmenting the power of resistance: experience proves it to be destructive. The writer abstains from further remark on the subject; but he takes leave to say, and he says it confidently, that if the rules here suggested be duly understood and correctly applied, mortality among European troops in the West Indies would little, if in any degree, exceed mortality among soldiers in Europe, even in its healthier districts: as things are it is prodigiously great.

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### CONCLUDING NOTE.

#### SUGGESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A BOARD, FOR FORMING AND MAINTAINING THE MECHANICAL ECONOMY OF ARMIES IN EFFICIENCY.

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IN viewing the subject of military economy in its real and important connexion with the welfare of armies, it strikes the writer, as a measure of obvious utility, that a Board, consisting of officers of high rank distinguished respectively in the walks of science, and at the same time acquainted by experience with military service in its minutest details, even with the humble condition of the soldier, be appointed to form an economical plan and to superintend its movement in all its branches. It is evident that the foundations of economical arrangement, in order to be sure, must be laid upon principles of science, and

that these are only of dependence as drawn from a correct knowledge of the physical powers of the animal body. In this view, the rules which are formed for the regulation of diet, clothing, and exercise, in order to be applicable to all conditions, must be simple, convenient and complete—nothing wanting, nothing superfluous, and everything in its place. This can only be done by those who are acquainted with service in the ranks, and who have moreover the properties of an analyzing mind, capable of bringing things together, and of arranging them by their true principles. The principles are supposed to be common to the constitution of human nature, the practice of them maintained by rigorous surveillance, so that the instrument be always ready and in a fit state for application. Application belongs to the chief commander, responsibility of fitness for purposes, to the board alluded to.

A board, constituted as here suggested, cannot fail of being useful in preserving an army effective for the field. If it does its duty, it assures the efficiency of all the parts, by maintaining a system of correct economy. But though the organization be correct, and the economy faultless, the military act will not be eminent, unless it be animated by a military spirit, and a military spirit cannot be infused, except by the presence and prominent genius of a military chief. A general of genius, paramount in originality and force, animates the operations of an army with one impulse. The prominence of his character acts as a mirror to the lowest order in the ranks: every one views himself through the splendour of his commander, assimilates in idea with his excellence, and, presumptively superior in opinion, becomes so in reality. Hence it is not the dry mechanical prudence of the plan of battle, so much as the animating spirit of the leader, which gives the pledge of success in war: the labours of the board may secure from failure; it is the genius of the commander which leads to victory and achieves conquest.

Good soldiers abound in all nations which cultivate the art of war; original military genius is of rare occurrence. No power of industry can give it, and no one can define the path in which it moves. The genius which plans and executes the conquest of kingdoms, is an original and first impression from the hand of nature. It cannot, as now said, be acquired by art; it is capable of being improved by study in the book of nature; that

is, by knowledge of men and things. It makes its appearance most commonly in the semi-barbarous periods of society, or in times of convulsion, when man reverts to the natural energy of man—the mind to its original freedom. The spirit which knows not to submit, which retires from no danger because it is formidable, as it is the soul and spirit of a soldier, marks the existence of genius. Military genius is a brilliant, but a dangerous quality. Through means of it power is acquired, and the road is opened to tyranny. Where tyranny builds its throne, genius, at least judgment, is extinguished. By a wise provision of the Creator, which guards the independence or primary condition of the human race from annihilation, tyranny and talent cannot long inhabit the same mansion. The man of genius who, in his ambition, acquires power by force of arms, endeavours to constitute himself a sovereign in the empire of the Deity. He exacts homage from his equals; and, obtaining it, conceives himself to be a god. He is in fact a tyrant, and he is not wise. The first step in his course is violence, and every succeeding step is error, directly or indirectly: he proceeds in confusion, and moves with precipitation to destruction. This has been the history of conquerors, individually and nationally, from the first records of history, and it will continue to be their history until man learn to know himself; that is, until he learn that the wisdom of man consists in moving in his own sphere, his courage, in maintaining that sphere against encroachment. Ignorance and folly urge to encroach on the sphere of others; the act is unjust, and the unjust act brings its own punishment. Instead of adding empire to empire, the only victory of value is a victory over man's self: that is, a subjection of animal passion to the law of the Creator, which consists in action and reaction in reciprocity through all visible relations in human life. .

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## APPENDIX.

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### REMARKS ON THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF ARMIES, SUBMITTED TO MILITARY OFFICERS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION.

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It would be a superfluous labour to go into any length of detail, in attempting to prove the value of the soldier's health for assuring success in war. The fact is evident; but, evident as the fact may be, the manner of giving it effect is complicated and difficult, and not perfectly understood by those who are ordinarily entrusted with the command of armies. It therefore will not be impertinent to put before the military reader an outline view of matters which relate to that subject, and which require the military officer's attention.

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### MEDICAL STAFF.

THE preservation of the health of soldiers, in the field and in quarters, is attained, to a certain extent, by a rigid observance of those forms of discipline and economy which are under the direction and surveillance of military officers. Care on these heads goes far in prevention; but, in spite of all the care that has, or perhaps that can be given, diseases arise occasionally among troops; and, when they do arise, the speedy removal becomes an important, and an indispensable part of the duty of those who are entrusted with military command. The removal of disease must be effected by the prompt application of medical skill; consequently care ought to be taken, by the chiefs of the state, that the skill be of the first quality, and the superintending authority must hold itself responsible that it be promptly applied; that is, that it be applied at the first signs of indisposition. It will not be disputed, by those who have experience in war, that there occur few diseases in military life which may not be arrested by means of art, if the means be applied with skill at an early period; and that there are few which do not imply danger, if they be left to themselves, or if they be feebly treated. For this reason, it is suggested that



a sufficiency of competent medical assistance be placed in the regimental circle, which is the first integral part of an army, and that in which the medical art has the best chance of manifesting its power. The arrangements for the execution of this purpose are supposed to proceed from the chiefs of the war department; and, as these are liable to commit error from not understanding the subject in its primary principles, the author ventures to obtrude a few remarks which have occurred to him on that head in a course of long experience. He believes that they may be useful, and, from the experience which he has had, he does not think that they are here presumptuously obtruded on the notice of the public.

It is required that the medical staff of the army be sufficient for every form of duty which is likely to arise in war; but it is proper at the same time that it be not more than sufficient; for superfluity here, as in other things, corrupts and vitiates the execution of duty. A surgeon and an assistant-surgeon may be deemed equal to the care of the health of a regiment of seven hundred, even of one thousand men in most parts of Europe in times of peace and in contiguous quarters. A surgeon and two assistants is not more than sufficient in times of war in Europe, and scarcely sufficient, either in peace or war, in tropical and unhealthy climates. The duty of attending the regiment under actual fire in the field of battle, has not as yet perhaps been very carefully considered, or properly adjusted. It is proposed that it should be assigned to the senior of the assistants, with a mark of distinction, honorary or substantial, as may be thought fit. Where three or more regiments are formed in brigade, and placed under the command of a general officer for field-service, a staff-surgeon, with three hospital-assistants, is supposed, by the present scheme, to be added in extra aid, and, as the staff-surgeon is of superior rank to the regimental, he is placed in superintendence of the medical concerns of the brigade. He is supposed to have power and means to open hospitals, for the reception of such cases of disease as require longer time for cure than could consist with the conditions of regimental-infirmaries, which must be understood, while in the field, to be establishments prepared at all times to be broken up at an hour's notice. Where armies are thrown together in large bodies, in what is called division, a physician, with a given number of hospital-assistants,

is appointed to the superintendence of its medical concerns, invested with power to establish hospitals for the reception of such sick and wounded as cannot be properly accommodated in brigade-hospitals or regimental-infirmaries. Physician is the highest name in the medical profession ; and as medical officers are understood in the present case to have served in every medical rank from hospital or regimental-assistant upwards, the physician must be held competent to judge of execution, qualified to superintend and direct every medical and surgical measure which concerns the troops which are thus collected into a division. When a large force, consisting of several divisions under their respective generals and physicians, is brought into the field for actual war, and placed under a general-in-chief, a person bearing the name of physician-general, or inspector-general, is appointed to correct, superintend, and bring the movements of the whole concern into one view, so as to be easily comprehended by the chief commander.

As the health of troops is a matter of the greatest importance to the success of war, health officers may be justly considered to be an important part of an army. As medical officers are important in their stations, it is presumed that care will be taken, in the primary selection, that no one be admitted into the class of assistant-surgeon who is not fit for the office, and that no one, who actually is in the service, will be moved from a lower to a higher rank and more responsible duty, without some public evidence that he is competent in professional knowledge, and worthy in moral character, for the promotion intended. If a medical officer be professionally skilful and morally correct, he is entitled, as he is eminently useful in his vocation, to a respectable place of rank in the military fabric. The medical officer claims to himself the rank of gentleman, and the respect which is due to a man of science. Rank is everywhere the gift of power. The rank of the medical staff of the British army did not appear to be distinctly defined at the commencement of the war 1793 : it was considered at a subsequent period, and the basis of it was laid on just and reasonable grounds. The assistant-surgeon was allowed to enter a regiment with the rank of lieutenant, the surgeon was classed with captain, and took rank according to the date of his commission. The first steps are fair and reasonable ; but, beyond that, nothing is defined : it scarcely can be said that

there is a gradation. The assistant-surgeon does not enter the army until he has completed a course of education which, besides time, may be supposed to imply an expense of money, not short, if not beyond the price of an ensign's commission. He serves five, ten, even fifteen years or more, before he attains the rank of surgeon; while the ensign, who entered the corps at the same time, has a chance to be major, even lieutenant-colonel, without purchase or proof of extraordinary talent. If this be so, the medical officer of the British army has some cause to complain that he is not sufficiently regarded. It is obvious, to every man's common sense and reason, that a step of rank is virtually implied in every step of promotion which takes place in the military machine, if it be constructed under a rule of science; and, as there is no precise and distinct rank in the medical staff of the British army beyond the rank of surgeon, we are obliged to say that the medical department is not respectfully treated. If the officers of the medical staff were advanced in rank by a just and legitimate rule of gradation, the staff-surgeon would class with majors, the physician with lieutenant-colonels, and the physician-in-chief with generals, namely, with the quarter-master and adjutant-general. The proposition will be deemed presumptuous; but it is not so in fact. The rank accorded to the medical officer does not injure, or even interfere with the military. Rank is of no intrinsic value in itself to a man of science; but the opinion connected with the rank makes an impression on the soldier, which aids materially in giving force to medical authority, and consequently to medical utility. The soldier is accustomed to view things superficially, to estimate and judge by the exterior only; for, as he is not permitted to reason and resolve to principle, the science of the medical art is less regarded by him than the authority of the rank under which it is applied to him. For this reason we venture to assert, that if the medical officer stand in what may be called a degraded rank in military estimation, the usefulness of the medical art will lose much of its value as applied to a military subject. The matter now under view is of some consequence to the interests of the army; and it is not, it is presumed, beneath the dignity of the higher powers of the state to consider it, if it be held to be a national concern to arrange the various departments of the army on a basis of justice and truth. Those who hold high official stations, and particularly

those who wield the sword, are strongly disposed to depress men of science ; and, among others, the medical department, which is a department of science, has been degraded of late years—at least barred from rising to a rank suitable to its importance. But be this as it may, the history of our most brilliant campaigns will not permit our most celebrated generals to say that nothing is due to the medical staff, where that staff is allowed to act according to its judgment. The latter periods of the Peninsular war bear irrefragable testimony of medical value.

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### HOSPITALS.

It does not belong to this place to go into detail on the constitution and management of hospitals. It is sufficient to state a few points of fact, with which the military officer who superintends the execution of medical duty in a corps or in an army ought to be acquainted, so that he do not commit himself to error through ignorance, when he issues orders on matters which concern the health-arrangements of troops. The chief property of a military hospital consists in ventilation, and the means of assuring warmth in winter, or coolness in summer, or in hot climates. Ventilation and coolness follow the mode of construction, namely, lofty roof, and windows that descend to the level of the floor in the manner of Venetian windows. A temperate, and, in many cases, a warm atmosphere is conducive to the cure of disease, and particularly to prosperous convalescence ; and, as warmth is thus useful, it is to be assured in cold and damp weather by open fire-stoves placed near the centre of the apartment, flues being carried from thence to the corners of the ward and along the side walls, so that every part within the precinct be under the influence of artificial heat. Height of roof is a property of great importance in a house that is appropriated to the reception of the sick of armies ; for, the air being contaminated by the breathings of a crowd of people in confined space, the disease is aggravated, and mortality is multiplied to an extraordinary extent. It was often proved, in the history of the late war, that more human life was destroyed by accumulating sick men in low and ill-ventilated apartments, than in leaving

them exposed in severe and inclement weather at the side of a hedge or common dyke. It is fit that the military officer mark this fact, and bear it in mind; and it is also fit that he bear in mind that churches and palaces are less proper receptacles of military sick than barns, hovels, and open sheds.

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#### DUTY IN THE FIELD.

THE medical department of the British army is now so arranged that it would be superfluous, and perhaps impertinent, to go into any detail on the subject of management. It will not however be improper to bring a few points of fact under the notice of military officers on which they may reflect; and, in reflecting, look at the principle of the arrangements recommended, so as to give to them cordial aid in execution. It will not be disputed that medical and surgical assistance is of most value where it is most promptly applied; and, for this reason, it is understood that the military officer consider it to be his duty to know that the hospitals are well and suitably equipped for the reception of sick; namely, the regimental infirmary for all manner of indispositions which do not promise to be of longer duration than ten days or a fortnight; for example, fevers, flesh-wounds in the upper parts of the body—all such cases, in fact, as may be transported in waggons without injury, when the necessity of changing position occurs; the brigade hospital, for the reception of such sick or wounded as cannot be expected to be well in the course of a fortnight, or cannot be moved with safety on every occasion of necessity; and finally, the general hospital of the division, for complicated diseases and complicated wounds which require complicated treatment and medicated diet.

It is proper, as observed above, that an assistant-surgeon attend close in the rear of a battalion when it moves forward to action, so as to be ready to give assistance wherever it may be wanted. The suggestion is not foolish; on the contrary, it is of obvious utility, inasmuch as it serves to give confidence to soldiers, and even to officers, many of whom are unhappy from apprehensions on the head of hæmorrhage. Besides the presence of a surgeon with the line while under fire, the quarter-master of the



regiment, with the pioneers and band furnished with light-bearers, may, or rather ought to be, stationed in the rear, at such a distance from the field that a view of what happens being distinctly seen, those who are wounded may be instantly removed without the range of shot. The execution of the duty proposed in this place requires only small provision of means, and it implies little expense of money; for the pioneers and greater part of the band do not take part in a regular military action. It is imperious on the score of humanity that wounded men be removed from the field of battle with as little delay as possible; and, if that be admitted, the mode proposed is the simplest, and promises to be the most effectual of any that can be devised. It is dangerous to leave the office of removing the wounded from under fire to the care of their comrades. The eye of the soldier, while in action, is supposed to be directed to a point in front; and it is important that it be constantly directed to that point, and steadily fixed on it. It is therefore wise, even necessary, to preclude the operation of every cause which can furnish a pretext of giving it a lateral direction. The feeling of humanity, which prompts the soldier to give assistance to a comrade or officer who is wounded, as it gives a colourable pretext for turning the face from the enemy, commences retrograde, and retrograde commences fear, which, once it makes impression, is difficultly staid from going on. One firelock is withdrawn from the line by the wound of the soldier, another by the impulse of humanity, and a third perhaps by the infection of example. This may happen; and if it do happen, the battle may be lost by the operation of causes which might, and which ought to have been precluded. If the proposition here made be adopted, and it is of obvious utility that it should, it is understood that the regimental and brigade medical staff furnished with the means of performing surgical operations, of dressing and refreshing the wounded, and of conveying them, with every requisite care, to the hospital appointed for their reception, be stationed, by a confidential person of the military staff, in a safe and not distant position from the field of action. It is sufficiently proved, in the experience of army-surgeons, that wherever operations are to be performed on the wounded, pain and suffering are saved, even the chances of recovery are improved, by the operation being performed without loss of time. The subject is an important one: it demands the serious consi-

deration of the higher authorities, if it be desired that the military instrument, as well as being scientifically formed, be scientifically preserved from unnecessary loss.

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### ECONOMICAL ARRANGEMENT.

THE economical arrangements of the medical department of the British army have been changed of late years, and so much improved, that it is not necessary to go into any detail on the subject. It is now seen, and satisfactorily proved, that the sum of money which feeds a soldier in barracks is sufficient to feed him and furnish him with necessary comforts in hospital. The medical department occasions, in such case, no expense to the state beyond the salary of medical officers, medicines, lodging, and some extra equipment of furniture. The subject is an important one; and it is fit that the military officer consider it in all its extent, so as rightly to comprehend the principle through which the operation of so great economy (as compared with past times) has been accomplished. But, besides the mere economical detail of expenditure, which the military officer ought to comprehend as he must certify to its truth, the spirit which directs the management and discipline of hospitals ought to be fully within his view. The visits of the military officer to the sick in hospital are, for the most part, acceptable to the soldier: they rarely fail, when they are made in kindness, to operate favourably on the mind, often to alleviate sufferings, almost always to excite the grateful feelings of the heart; consequently to improve the moral character of the man, and thereby to improve his military qualities.

THE END.



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